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UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
FACULTY OF LAW, ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 
SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
by Nor Shaipah Abdul Wahab 
 
Tax planning by large companies has been widely and publicly discussed due to 
its implications for the level of provision of public goods and more general social 
issues. In the U.K., tax avoidance, as estimated by Her Majesty’s Revenue and 
Customs’ anti avoidance group, leads to several billion pounds of lost revenue 
each year. Consequently, the authorities implement tax investigation through risk 
classification assessments. The prospect of an adverse assessment may influence 
company directors when making tax planning decisions and similar risk concerns 
may influence shareholders in valuing tax planning activities. This study reports 
the results of an investigation of the relationship between firm value and tax 
planning  whilst  simultaneously  considering  corporate  governance  as  a 
moderating influence. The sample of firms examined consists of non financial 
London  Stock  Exchange listed  companies  from  2005  to  2007.  The  results 
indicate a negative relationship between firm value and tax planning activities 
which is unconditional upon corporate governance conditions for both persistent 
and non persistent profit making companies.  This relationship can be further 
explained as being related to the permanent differences component of tax saving 
where firm value is reported as negatively related to permanent differences. The 
findings of this study contribute to the body of knowledge since there is a general 
dearth of published research study from outside the U.S. that investigates these 
relationships.  
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
This thesis aims to examine the relationship between firm value and tax planning 
whilst  simultaneously  considering  the  role  of  corporate  governance  as  a 
moderating influence. As the effects of tax planning cannot be observed directly 
by external researchers, this study uses a number of proxies to examine the above 
relationships.  After  controlling  for  firm specific  characteristics,  for  example 
capital  intensity,  leverage,  dividend,  earnings  management,  extent  of  foreign 
operation and industry membership, this study firstly examines the relationship 
between firm value and tax planning and secondly investigates how corporate 
governance may moderate the relationship. The Scholes Wolfson tax planning 
framework  (Scholes  and  Wolfson,  1992)  and  the  agency  theory  (Jensen  and 
Meckling, 1976) underlie the hypotheses development. The empirical analysis is 
based on Ohlson’s firm valuation model (Ohlson, 1995) where the model, under 
clean surplus accounting relation, examines the association between firm market 
value and accounting data. The following sections of this chapter are organised 
so  as  to  present  the  background  and  motivations  of  this  study,  research 
objectives, research questions and an overview of the research methodology. The 
following subsequent sections discuss the significance of this study and the thesis 
structure. Chapter 1 Introduction                                                                                           2 
 
1.1 Background and Motivations  
 
U.K. company tax planning issues have been an increased concern of several 
parties  including  Non Governmental  Groups  (NGOs)  (Christian  Aid,  2009; 
Oxfam, 2009; Trade Union Congress, 2009) and governmental agencies (OECD, 
1988; Council of Economics and Finance Ministers, 1997). This is due to tax 
planning’s potentially negative effects on the level of provision of public goods 
which can then contribute to social issues (Slemrod, 2004; Sikka, 2010). The 
U.K.  tax  authority,  Her  Majesty’s  Revenue  and  Customs  (HMRC),  has  also 
become increasingly aware of this issue and has been continuously taking action 
to reduce the tax avoidance, which was recently estimated to be in the range of 
£2.1  billion  to  £6.6  billion  per  year  (Timms,  2009).
1  One  of  the  authority’s 
strategies  to  reduce  this  annual  lost  revenue  within  the  large  companies  is 
through  implementing  tax  risk  classification  assessments.  Through  this 
assessment, companies are evaluated in terms of their potential involvement in 
tax planning prior to any HMRC inspection (Hampton, 2005; Varney, 2006). It is 
important to  apply this assessment as the distribution of corporation tax paid by 
these  companies  is  highly  skewed;  for  example,  for  the  year  of  assessment 
2005/2006, 220 out of 700 large companies paid no corporation tax (National 
Audit Office Great Britain, 2007). This suggests that nearly one third of the large 
companies  were  likely  to  be  involved  in  tax  planning  activities.  In  fact,  the 
U.K.’s  biggest  companies  are  said  to  employ  “complex  and  secretive”  tax 
arrangements in limiting their tax payments (The Guardian, 2009). This may be 
due to two factors: firstly, the ambiguity of legislation (National Audit Office 
Great Britain, 2007) and/or secondly, the characteristics of those large companies 
that  create  tax  planning  opportunities,  for  example,  operation  in  multiple  tax 
jurisdictions. 
 
These  increased  attentions  and  actions  are  aimed  at  influencing  shareholders’ 
confidence in the expected benefit of tax planning decisions by the company 
management (SustainAbility Ltd, 2006).  However, due to lack of information 
about tax governance related information (Henderson Global Investors, 2005), 
                                                 
1 As published by HMRC in March 2009 but relating to the start of the decade. Chapter 1 Introduction                                                                                           3 
 
shareholders may value tax planning differently.  This information asymmetry 
evidence is documented by Henderson Global Investors (2005). The evidence 
shows considerable reluctance by management to disclose tax governance related 
information  to  their  shareholders,  particularly  about  risk  management  of  the 
company’s tax affairs. Therefore, considering both perceived benefits and risks 
of tax planning, shareholders are expected to consider tax planning activities in 
their  valuation.  However,  there  is  a  lack  of  empirical  research  studies  that 
investigate this valuation behaviour, particularly in the U.K.   
 
Based on the above discussions, this study examines whether share prices reflect 
companies’ tax planning. As corporate governance practices and information are 
important  to  the  shareholders  in  assessing  the  effectiveness  of  the  company 
management  (Henderson Global Investors, 2005; Desai and Dharmapala, 2009), 
the  role  of  corporate  governance  is  examined  in  the  above mentioned 
relationship.  However,  there  is  a  general  dearth  of  published  research  from 
outside  the  U.S.  that  investigates  the  relationships.  To  the  researcher’s 
knowledge,  there  is  no  published  research  that  investigates  the  impact  of 
corporate  governance  on  the  relationship  between  firm  value  and  U.K. 
companies’ tax planning activities. This is a further motivation to carry out this 
research. 
 
Thus,  the  focus  of  attention  of  this  study  is  related  to  the  following  two 
questions: 
 
1. How do shareholders view corporate tax planning?  
This question is related to how the share market interprets companies’ tax 
planning  activities  by  examining  shareholders’  valuation  of  tax  planning 
activities carried out by managers. 
 
2. Do corporate governance practices lead to variations in valuation of corporate 
income tax planning within companies?  
If  there  is  tax  planning  information  asymmetry  between  shareholders  and 
managers, corporate governance practices may limit or provide reassurance to 
shareholders  on  managers’  incentives  in  tax  planning  decision making. Chapter 1 Introduction                                                                                           4 
 
Therefore,  this  question  attempts  to  seek  answers  on  whether  corporate 
governance moderates the relationship between firm value and tax planning.  
 
1.2 Research Objectives 
 
The primary objective of this study is to investigate the relationship between firm 
value and tax planning of U.K. public listed companies whilst simultaneously 
considering  the  role  of  corporate  governance  as  a  moderating  influence.  The 
specific objectives are as follows: 
 
1.  To investigate the level of tax planning activities of U.K. public listed 
companies. 
2.  To  examine  the  relationship  between  firm  value  and  the  level  of  tax 
planning activity. 
3.  To examine the relationship between firm value and the components of 
tax  saving,  namely  permanent  differences,  temporary  differences,  tax 
losses and foreign tax rates differentials. 
4.  To  investigate  whether  there  are  differences  in  the  nature  of  market 
valuation of each component. 
5.  To  examine  the  moderating  effects  of  corporate  governance  on  the 
relationship between firm value and tax planning.  
6.  To  examine  the  moderating  effects  of  corporate  governance  on  the 
relationship between firm value and the components of tax saving.  
 
1.3 Research Questions 
 
The research questions of this study are raised in order to provide answers to 
achieve the above mentioned research objectives. The following two questions 
are related to the relationship between firm value and tax planning activity: 
 
1.  Does  the  firm  value  of  persistent  profit making  companies  relate  to  the 
extent of their tax planning activities?  Chapter 1 Introduction                                                                                           5 
 
2.  Does the firm value of non persistent profit making companies relate to the 
extent of their tax planning activities?  
 
Each  of  the  above  questions  respectively  focuses  on  persistent  profit making 
companies and non persistent profit making companies, as there is an argument 
that companies’ ability to pursue effective tax planning is related to their earning 
persistency.  Persistent  profit making  companies  are  argued  to  have  more 
incentives  to  conduct  effective  tax  planning  compared  to  their  non persistent 
counterparts (Mills, Erickson and Maydew, 1998).  
 
To  further  examine  shareholders’  tax  planning  valuation,  an  analysis  of  the 
components  of  tax  saving  will  be  examined  in  the  following  10  questions 
(question  3  –  question  12).  Answering  these  questions  will  add  to  an 
understanding  of  which  component(s)  is(are)  related  to  the  shareholders’ 
valuation. This provides an insight into the factors that contribute to the above 
firm value tax planning relationship (question 1 and question 2).    
 
3.  Does  the  firm  value  of  persistent  profit making  companies  relate  to  the 
extent of their permanent differences component of tax saving? 
4.  Does  the  firm  value  of  persistent  profit making  companies  relate  to  the 
extent of their temporary differences component of tax saving? 
5.  Does  the  firm  value  of  persistent  profit making  companies  relate  to  the 
extent of their tax losses component of tax saving? 
6.  Does  the  firm  value  of  persistent  profit making  companies  relate  to  the 
extent of their foreign tax rates differentials component of tax saving? 
7.  Do the relationships between firm value and each component of tax saving 
(i.e. permanent differences, temporary differences, tax losses and foreign tax 
rates differentials) of persistent profit making companies vary? 
8.  Does the firm value of non persistent profit making companies relate to the 
extent of their permanent differences component of tax saving? 
9.  Does the firm value of non persistent profit making companies relate to the 
extent of their temporary differences component of tax saving? 
10.  Does the firm value of non persistent profit making companies relate to the 
extent of their tax losses component of tax saving? Chapter 1 Introduction                                                                                           6 
 
11.  Does the firm value of non persistent profit making companies relate to the 
extent of their foreign tax rates differentials component of tax saving? 
12.  Do the relationships between firm value and each component of tax saving 
(i.e. permanent differences, temporary differences, tax losses and foreign tax 
rates differentials) of non persistent profit making companies vary? 
 
The following research questions (question 13   question 22) are related to the 
potential  moderating  effects  of  corporate  governance  on  any  relationship 
between firm value and tax planning. The moderating effects may vary between 
persistent profit making companies and non persistent profit making companies 
because of shareholders’ differing perceptions of moral hazard risk implications 
and  tax  planning  benefits.  This  is  due  to  the  ability  of  accounting    profit  to 
influence  shareholders’  perceptions  of  managers’  performance  (Scholes  and 
Wolfson,  1992;  Tzovas,  2006).  Based  on  the  perception  that  fluctuating 
accounting profit may indicate managers’ poor performance, shareholders may 
attach  less  weight  to  the  ability  of  corporate  governance  practices  of  non 
persistent  profit making  companies  in  reducing  the  costs  and  risks  of  tax 
planning.  Therefore,  the  following  questions  reflect  the  potential  moderating 
effects  of  corporate  governance  for  both  persistent  and  non persistent  profit 
making companies: 
 
13.  Do corporate governance practices moderate the relationship between firm 
value and tax planning of persistent profit making companies? 
14.  Do corporate governance practices moderate the relationship between firm 
value and tax planning of non persistent profit making companies? 
15.  Do corporate governance practices moderate the relationship between firm 
value and the permanent differences component of tax saving of persistent 
profit making companies? 
16.  Do corporate governance practices moderate the relationship between firm 
value and the temporary differences component of tax saving of persistent 
profit making companies? 
17.  Do corporate governance practices moderate the relationship between firm 
value and the tax losses component of tax saving of persistent profit making 
companies? Chapter 1 Introduction                                                                                           7 
 
18.  Do corporate governance practices moderate the relationship between firm 
value  and  the  foreign  tax  rates  differentials  component  of  tax  saving  of 
persistent profit making companies? 
19.  Do corporate governance practices moderate the relationship between firm 
value  and  the  permanent  differences  component  of  tax  saving  of  non 
persistent profit making companies? 
20.  Do corporate governance practices moderate the relationship between firm 
value  and  the  temporary  differences  component  of  tax  saving  of  non 
persistent profit making companies? 
21.  Do corporate governance practices moderate the relationship between firm 
value and the tax losses component of tax saving of non persistent profit 
making companies? 
22.  Do corporate governance practices moderate the relationship between firm 
value and the foreign tax rates differentials component of tax saving of non 
persistent profit making companies? 
 
All  of  the  above  questions  have  been  hypothesised  in  alternative  forms,  as 
discussed in Chapter 5. The summary of the hypotheses, their tested variables 
and the reference to the results table are as presented in Table 8.1 of Chapter 8 
Summary, Contributions and Recommendations. 
 
1.4 Research Methodology 
 
This  study  applies  a  quantitative  research  methodology.  The  sample  frame  is 
non financial  London  Stock  Exchange  (LSE) listed  companies  for  the  period 
2005 to 2007. Figure 1.1 exhibits the research framework which illustrates the 
key focus of the interested variables. The data of this research is an archival 
panel dataset which is drawn from hand collected tax data from company annual 
reports, Datastream, Hemscott Guru Database and Corporate Register. Chapters 
5, 6 and part of Chapter 7 provide detailed explanations of the applied research 
methodology.       Chapter 1 Introduction                                                                                           8 
 
1.5 Significance of the Research 
 
This study has methodologically, theoretically and practically contributed to the 
body  of  the  knowledge  since  this  is  the  first  research  study  of  its  kind  that 
focuses  on  the  U.K.  setting.  In  addition,  by  examining  the  valuation 
consequences of tax planning, this study provides insights into the implications 
of tax planning on firm (equity) value.  In summary, the contributions of this 
study are as follows: 
 
1.  Add to the knowledge about tax planning activities in U.K.  
2.  Contribute  to  taxation  and  corporate  governance  literature by  highlighting 
implications  of  tax  planning  and  corporate  governance  on  shareholders’ 
valuation. 
3.  Contribute  to  the  taxation  literature  by  measuring  tax  planning  using 
components of tax saving. 
4.  Contribute  to  valuation  literature  by  implementing  valuation  relevance 
approach. 
5.  Provide  insights  to  authorities,  practitioners  and  academics  about  the 
implications  of  disclosed  tax  and  corporate  governance  information  for 
shareholders.          
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Figure 1.1 
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1.6 Thesis Structure 
 
Figure  1.2  presents  a  summary  of  the  thesis  structure.  Overall,  this  thesis 
contains  eight  chapters  of  five  parts:  introduction;  literature  review;  research 
design and methodology; data analysis and result; and conclusion.  
 
1.6.1 Literature Review 
 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 respectively review previous literature related to tax planning 
activities,  corporate  governance,  and  various  effects  of  tax  planning  and 
corporate governance on firm value. Chapter 2 begins with discussions of the 
definitions  and  theories  of  tax  planning  followed  by  explanations  of  the 
objectives  and  constraints  of  tax  planning.  The  next  section  of  the  chapter 
highlights  the  motivations  that  drive  tax  planning  activities,  which  include 
discussions on benefits and moderating factors of tax planning. The subsequent 
section  of  the  chapter  discusses  tax  planning  opportunities  derived  from 
“loopholes”  in  tax  law  and  firm specific  characteristics.  This  chapter  then 
proceeds with discussions on measurements and approaches of tax planning.  
 
 
Chapter  3  reviews  previous  corporate  governance  literature.  It  starts  with 
discussions on the theories of corporate governance. These theories are inclusive 
of agency theory, transaction cost economics approach, stakeholder theory and 
stewardship theory. As this study concentrates on the U.K. setting, the following 
section  presents  the  corporate  governance  requirements  in  the  U.K. 
Subsequently,  the  following  section  reviews  literature  related  to  external  and 
internal corporate governance mechanisms in minimising the conflict between 
managers and the owners. 
 
The third chapter of the literature review, Chapter 4, reviews the literature related 
to various effects of tax planning and corporate governance on firm value. The 
chapter begins with shareholders’ perspective and firm value, which focuses on 
market value of equity in firm valuation, efficient market hypothesis (EMH) and Chapter 1 Introduction                                                                                         11 
 
other  measures  of  firm  value.  Further,  the  chapter  discusses  the  relationship 
between tax planning  and firm value, and between  corporate  governance  and 
firm  value.  From  the  discussions  of  the  above mentioned  sections,  the  next 
section  of  the  chapter  reviews  the  literature  on  the  association  between  tax 
planning, corporate governance and firm value.  
 
1.6.2 Research Design and Methodology 
 
The research design and methodology part consists of two chapters. Chapter 5, a 
chapter on hypotheses development, with the understanding gained in Chapters 
2, 3, and 4, discusses the hypotheses. Basically, the hypotheses are divided into 
two  sections:  firstly,  related  to  the  relationship  between  firm  value  and  tax 
planning,  and  secondly,  related  to  the  moderating  influence  of  corporate 
governance on that relationship.  
 
The second chapter of this part, Chapter 6, explains and discusses the process of 
the data collection and variable definition and measurement. The chapter begins 
with sample selection and data sources. In the next section, the theoretical and 
estimation  models  are  further  explained  so  as  to  present  the  underlying 
assumptions  of  the  estimation  models.  This  is  inclusive  of  the  development 
process, concepts and empirical application.  
 
1.6.3 Data Analysis and Result 
 
Chapter 7 presents the details of the analyses and the results derived therefrom. 
The chapter also highlights the diagnostic tests which are conducted prior to the 
multivariate  analyses.  To  test  the  robustness  of  the  results,  the  chapter  also 
discusses the sensitivity of the results upon several further tests, for example 
alternative measures of market value, deflator choice and fixed effect estimation. 
In order to highlight the nature of the relationships of those interested variables 
over time, results based on annual regressions are also discussed. 
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In summary, this study finds evidence of a negative relationship between firm 
value  and  tax  planning  both  for  persistent  and  non persistent  profit making 
companies.  A  similar  finding  is  also  found  with  respect  to  the  permanent 
differences component of tax saving of persistent profit making companies. The 
other components (temporary differences, foreign tax rates differentials and tax 
losses), however, are not significantly (at five per cent level) related with firm 
valuation. In terms of corporate governance, this study finds only weak evidence 
to support arguments for a moderating effect of corporate governance practices 
on shareholders’ tax planning valuation. 
 
1.6.4 Conclusion of the Thesis 
 
The  final  chapter  of  this  thesis  is  Chapter  8.  It  provides  the  summary, 
contributions of this study and recommendations for future research. In addition, 
this  chapter  also  discusses  the  limitations  of  the  study  that  constrain  the 
generalisation of the findings. 
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Figure 1.2 
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1.7 List of Presentations 
 
Several working papers from this study have been presented in the following 
seminar and conferences: 
 
1.  “Tax Planning, Corporate Governance and Firm Value”, British Accounting 
Association Annual  Conference  2010,  Cardiff,  U.K.,  30
th  March  2010  1
st 
April 2010. 
2.  “Tax  Planning  and  Corporate  Governance:  Effects  on  Shareholders' 
Valuation”, 2010 Global Conference on Business and Finance, Hawaii, U.S., 
3
rd January 2010   6
th January 2010. 
3.  “Tax  Planning  Activities:  Effects  of  Shareholders’  Valuation  under  Clean 
Surplus  Accounting”,  Tax  Research  Network  Conference  2009,  Cardiff, 
U.K., 10
th September 2009 – 11
th September 2009. 
4.  “Tax  Planning  and  Corporate  Governance:  Effects  on  Shareholders' 
Valuation”,  Accounting  Research  Seminar,  University  of  Southampton, 
Southampton, U.K., 22
nd April 2009.  
 
1.8 Conclusions 
 
This chapter highlights the general idea of this study. The first three sections 
respectively  explain  the  background  and  motivations,  research  objectives  and 
research  questions.  This  is  followed  by  a  section  giving  an  overview  of  the 
adopted  research  methodology.  The  significance  of  the  research  is  further 
explained in the following section which briefly discusses the contributions of 
the  research  findings.  In  order  to  ease  the  understanding  of  the  thesis 
arrangement,  the  thesis  structure  section  explains the  thesis  outline.  The  next 
section lists the presentations of the research work of this thesis in a seminar and 
three conferences. 
 
In  the  context  of  increased  concern  about  levels  of  tax  planning  by  several 
parties, including NGOs and governmental agencies, this study is conducted to Chapter 1 Introduction                                                                                         15 
 
investigate how companies’ shareholders view or value such activities. Although 
effective tax planning activities can increase shareholders’ after–tax return, with 
aggressive  and  firm  action  by  HMRC  in  limiting  the  activities  among  large 
companies, shareholders may value tax planning differently. Such valuation may 
also  be  caused  by  perceived  moral  hazard related  risk  in  which  managers’ 
interest in tax planning is doubted. Thus, this study is conducted to investigate 
the  relationship  between  firm  value  and  tax  planning  whilst  simultaneously 
considering  corporate  governance  as  a  moderating  influence.  The  sample 
comprises  non financial  LSE listed  companies  for  the period  from  2005  until 
2007.  The  data  of  this  study  is  archival  in  nature  and  was  collected  from 
company annual reports, Datastream, Hemscott Guru Database and Corporate 
Register. By examining the valuation consequences of tax planning, this study 
provides insights into the implications of tax planning on firm (equity) value. In 
addition,  as  there  is  a  lack  of  research  that  focuses  on  U.K.  companies,  the 
findings contribute to the taxation, corporate governance and valuation relevance 
literature.  This  study  has  also  methodologically  contributed  to  the  taxation 
literature by measuring tax planning using the components of tax saving.  The 
findings  also  highlight  the  implication  of  tax  and  corporate  governance 
information  for  shareholders’  valuation  to  the  authorities,  practitioners  and 
academics.  The  thesis  has  been  structured  so  as  to  include  an  introductory 
chapter, three chapters on literature review, two chapters on research design and 
methodology, a chapter on analysis and results, and a chapter on conclusions. 
 
In summary, this study finds that firm value is adversely related to the level of 
corporate  tax  planning  activities  both  for  persistent  and  non persistent  profit 
making companies. This relationship can be further explained as related to the 
permanent differences component of tax saving where firm value is reported as 
negatively  related  with  permanent  differences.  In  examining  any  moderating 
influence  of  corporate  governance  practices  on  the  firm  value tax  planning 
relationship, this study finds only weak evidence.  
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Chapter 2 
 
 
Tax Planning Activities 
 
 
This chapter aims to review the literature related to tax planning activities by 
companies.  It  begins  with  a  review  of  the  literature  on  the  concept  of  tax 
planning,  which  includes  definitions  of  tax  planning  and  discussions  to 
differentiate  between  tax  avoidance  and  tax  evasion.  In  the  following  sub 
section, the literature on the theory and framework of tax planning is reviewed to 
discuss  the  underlying  theories  of  tax  planning  research.  Further  analyses 
examine the practice of effective tax planning, including objectives, constraints 
and  motivations  of  tax  planning.  Tax  planning  opportunities  created  by 
ambiguity of the tax laws and firms’ specific characteristics are discussed in the 
following  section.  As  there  are  several  approaches  of  tax  planning  among 
companies,  the  following  section  of  this  chapter  reviews  the  literature  on 
applicable approaches of tax planning. Finally, the last section concludes this 
chapter. 
 
2.1 Definitions and Theories of Tax Planning  
2.1.1 Definitions of Tax Planning   
 
Tax planning is defined as “what all sensible people do in order to reduce their 
tax  liabilities”  (Tiley,  2005:  94).  This  definition  implies  the  entitlement  of Chapter 2 Tax Planning Activities                                                                        17 
 
taxpayers to minimise their tax liability as drawn from the legal facts of IRC v 
Duke of Westminster (1936) in which “every man is entitled if he can to arrange 
his affairs so that the tax attaching under the appropriate Act is less than it 
otherwise would be. If he succeeds in ordering them so as to secure the result, 
then, however unappreciative the Commissioners of Inland Revenue or his fellow 
taxpayers may be of his ingenuity, he cannot be compelled to pay an increased 
tax” (Tiley, 2005: 105). From this case, tax planning can be considered as legal 
steps taken by taxpayers so as to reduce tax liability in obtaining the tax saving 
benefits. However, tax planning activities can be ineffective if the tax authority 
successfully challenges the taxpayers over specific approaches of tax planning, 
for example “sham transactions”, i.e. “the acts done were intended to give the 
appearance  of  creating  legal  rights  different  from  those  which  were  actually 
created” (Tiley,  2005:  107).  This  is  drawn  from  the  legal  facts  of Furniss  v 
Dawson (1984) in which the authority was successful in challenging the taxpayer 
who conducted tax planning by way of artificial transactions and not related to 
commercial  purpose  (Tiley,  2005).  However,  the  conclusion  from  Furniss  v 
Dawson (1984) was restricted by the court’s decision in Craven v White (1988) 
in which a tax planning activity cannot be disputed if it has been carried with 
other purpose than tax planning (Tiley, 2005).   
 
In understanding the concept of tax planning activities, previous tax researchers 
consider  tax  avoidance  and  tax  evasion  as  important  components  on  the 
continuum of tax planning. Rego (2003), in research on tax avoidance activities 
of  U.S.  multinational  corporations,  explains  the  term  “tax  avoidance”  as 
comprising any tax planning activities to legally reduce the income tax payment. 
In other words, the term “avoidance” refers to tax planning activities as intended 
or unintended consequences of the ambiguity of tax law provisions either from 
the policies or technical aspects. However, in examining the extent to which tax 
planning, in responding to variations in state tax policy, has affected U.S. state 
corporate income tax bases and revenues, Bruce, Deskins and Fox (2007) define 
tax planning as “a broad set of tax avoidance and evasion schemes that affect 
only financial arrangements of firms” (Bruce et al., 2007: 226). The authors 
combine avoidance and evasion since tax planning strategies are often treated as 
legal  activities  but  some  strategies  could  be  legally  in  the  categories  of Chapter 2 Tax Planning Activities                                                                        18 
 
“uncertainty” or “ambiguity” although some strategies are obviously illegal, for 
example, underreporting taxable income or overstating tax deduction.  
 
Therefore, in explaining tax planning activities, it is essential to differentiate the 
concepts  of  tax  avoidance  and  tax  evasion  in  order  to  avoid  unintended 
consequences  of  tax  planning,  for  example,  penalty  due  to  ignorance  of  a 
taxpayer about a legal aspect of tax planning. In addition, failure to differentiate 
avoidance and evasion could also lead to the discrediting of the tax planning 
process and, in a worse circumstance, it could cause serious legal consequences 
(Hoffman, 1961). As compared to tax avoidance, tax evasion is an illegal activity 
used to reduce the tax liability, for example, underreporting of income or, in an 
extreme  manner,  omitting  the  income  in  determining  taxable  income  in  tax 
assessment.  Thus,  it  can  be  concluded  that  the  basic  terms  to  explain  the 
difference  are  “legal”  or  “illegal”.  This  is  in  line  with  Hoffman  (1961)  who 
explains the difference between tax avoidance and tax evasion by referring to the 
legal prerogative aspect in which the author highlights that “tax avoidance is 
usually  the  ultimate  goal  to  be  achieved  by  tax  planning.  In  this  sense,  the 
exercise of legal prerogatives may aid in the avoidance of taxes. Tax evasion, 
however,  connotes  the  misrepresentation  or  omission  of  key  financial 
information in an effort to evade the taxes that are largely enforceable. One is 
fraudulent and abhorrent to any decent and honest practitioner, and the other is 
completely acceptable” (Hoffman, 1961: 274 275). However, Hoffman’s (1961) 
view of tax avoidance as “completely acceptable” activity could be disputed as 
there  is  an  ambiguous  line  to  consider  when  differentiating  “acceptable”  and 
“unacceptable” avoidance. This issue, for many years, has been debated between 
authorities, practitioners and taxpayers because what is  “acceptable” to one party 
may not be acceptable to the others (Bond, Gammie and Whiting, 2006; Self, 
2007). Self (2007) explains “acceptable avoidance” as a tax planning activity that 
comprises two elements: firstly, the relationship of the tax planning with business 
transaction and secondly, the relationship of the tax planning with commercial 
purpose. On the other hand, without these elements, a tax avoidance activity is 
considered  as  “unacceptable”.  However,  although  an  avoidance  activity  may 
have fulfilled these two conditions, it may still not be considered “acceptable” by 
the  HMRC  since  the  authority  defines  “acceptable”  avoidance  as  only Chapter 2 Tax Planning Activities                                                                        19 
 
comprising  any  action  to  reduce  tax  liability  by  “very  clearly”  just  taking 
advantage of tax reliefs (Bond et al., 2006). This indicates that those activities, 
from the HMRC’s point of view, that are not “very clearly” just taking advantage 
of tax reliefs are considered “unacceptable” avoidance, which then, presumably, 
falls into the evasion category. Difficulties in differentiating “acceptable” and 
“unacceptable”  avoidance  are  also  admitted  by  Dave  Hartnett,  Deputy  Chief 
Executive of HMRC, who states that, in general, “unacceptable” avoidance is 
said  to  be  related  to  “aggression,  artificial,  and  secrecy”  and  “things  nobody 
wants  in  a  tax  system”  (HMRC,  2008).  These  indications  of  “unacceptable” 
avoidance,  especially  “things  nobody  wants  in  a  tax  system”,  lead  to  open 
interpretation  and  consequently  introduce  ambiguous  understanding  of  the 
difference  between  “acceptable”  and  “unacceptable”  avoidance  among  the 
related parties.  This conflict is also discussed in detail by Slemrod (2004). In 
reviewing the demand for tax evasion, the author admits that there is no obvious 
line between avoidance and evasion, which then leads to the interpretation of tax 
planning  as  a  matter  of  creative  compliance.  Based  on  the  arguments,  the 
definition  of  tax  avoidance  as  a  “completely  acceptable”  activity  (Hoffman, 
1961) varies according to different parties.  
 
Similarly to Hoffman (1961), Kirchler, Maciejovsky and Schneider (2003), in a 
study that investigates social representations of tax avoidance, tax evasion and 
tax  flight,  differentiate  tax  avoidance  and  tax  evasion  by  means  of  the  legal 
aspect in which the authors state that “tax avoidance refers to an attempt to 
reduce tax payments by legal means, for instance by exploiting tax loopholes, 
whereas tax evasion refers to an illegal reduction of tax payments, for instance 
by underreporting income or by stating higher deduction rates” (Kirchler et al., 
2003: 536).  From the results, the authors conclude that, in terms of perceptions, 
tax avoidance is an activity that uses cleverness and good ideas in legally saving 
on  taxes  while  tax  evasion  is  illegal,  immoral,  and  interrelated  with  fraud, 
criminal prosecution, risk, tax audit, and penalty. Hence, it can be summarised 
that tax avoidance is an interpretation of tax planning in which the activity is 
mainly  connected to utilisations of tax law ambiguities with the main aim to 
effectively save tax. 
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Despite distinct definitions of avoidance and evasion, this study considers tax 
planning  activities  as  comprising  both  avoidance  and  evasion.  As  this  study 
concentrates on the relationship between firm value and tax planning, the legality 
aspect  of  avoidance  and  evasion  is  not  empirically  investigated.  In  addition, 
considering the difficulty in determining “acceptable avoidance”, “unacceptable 
avoidance”  and  evasion  using  publicly  available  information  (Slemrod  and 
Yitzhaki, 2002; Kirchler et al., 2003; Slemrod, 2004; Lymer and Oats, 2008), 
this  study  defines  tax  planning  activities  as  embracing  both  avoidance  and 
evasion.  
 
Tax planning activities can also be considered in terms of “active” or “passive” 
tax  planning.  Active  tax  planning  is  relevant  in  the  circumstance  where  a 
transaction is carried out with an intention to reduce the tax liability. On the other 
hand,  passive  tax  planning  is  applicable  in  cases  where  the  transactions  are 
carried out without an initial intention to reduce the tax burden. For example, a 
taxpayer is considered to be involved in active tax planning if a purchase of a 
capital asset, which attracts capital allowances, has been done with the aim to 
reduce the taxable income. However, if the purchase decision did not consider 
the tax aspects, the taxpayer is characterised as performing passive tax planning. 
Similarly, in the cases of loss making companies, there are still tax planning 
related decisions to be made.  Although it could be argued that the relationship 
between tax charge and accounting profit (loss) differs between profit making 
and loss making companies, a claim to offset the losses must be made and thus it 
does require action on the part of the firm. 
 
Based on the above discussions, tax planning could be interpreted as an activity 
that involves avoidance and evasion.   Although avoidance is always referred to 
as a legal activity, a further distinction exists, as it is argued by tax authorities, 
between  acceptable  and  unacceptable  avoidance  depending  on  different 
interpretations  of  acceptable  and  unacceptable  avoidance  among  various  tax 
planning related  parties.  As  explained  above,  tax  planning  could  also  be 
classified in relation to “active” and “passive” tax planning depending on the 
taxpayer’s tax planning intention in conducting a transaction. In summary, tax 
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to researchers, authorities, practitioners and taxpayers. Corporate tax evasion and 
tax avoidance are also of crucial concern to researchers and authorities since they 
relate  to  public  policy  in  which  both  activities  may  distort  tax  burden 
distributions and in terms of economic perspective, they could distort resource 
allocations (Slemrod, 2004). As a consequence, as explained by Slemrod (2004), 
a  society  would  be  most  affected  and  there  would  be  no  development  if  all 
corporate taxpayers  were equally successful in reducing their tax liability by the 
same percentage. Therefore, valuations and considerations on tax planning differ 
among tax planning parties depending on their perceptions of the nature of the 
activities and the potential tax planning benefits. 
 
2.1.2 Theories of Tax Planning  
 
Hoffman (1961), in elaborating the theory of tax planning activities, introduces 
principles  and  concepts  of  tax  planning  that  are  mostly  applicable  to  tax 
practitioners.  However,  these  principles  and  concepts  are  considered  below 
because taxpayers are likely to conduct tax planning based on the advice of the 
practitioners. The author highlights four important points of tax planning. Firstly, 
in the case of properly handled, tax planning is not a simple process. Secondly, 
much  gain  will be  obtained  if  the process  of  tax planning  is  conducted  as  a 
formalised procedure. Thirdly, many tax planners do not practise tax planning to 
the  greatest  possible  advantage  and  finally,  tax  planning  could  benefit  many 
taxpayers but few are aware of its advantages.  
 
Further, the author highlights that it is essential for tax planners to note that tax 
planning could not be sustained for a long term period unless the tax planning 
activities  are  “flexible”  in  the  sense  of  a  continuity  of  the  strategies.  This  is 
especially applicable for the cases of tax planning strategies that rely on tax law 
ambiguities,  since  the  law  is  revised  on  an  ongoing  basis.    Therefore,  tax 
planning  strategies  should  be  time oriented  and  consistent  in  the  sense  that 
“consistency  requires  that  the  past  limit  the  present  and  the  future  but  the 
present  must  be  further  circumscribed  in  the  light  of  the  taxpayer’s  future 
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findings by Dyreng, Hanlon and Maydew (2008) in investigating firms’ ability to 
avoid tax over a long period of time using a dataset of 2,077 U.S. firms for the 
period from 1995 until 2004. The researchers find a significant fraction of firms 
that could avoid corporate taxes for the 10 year period. This finding is explained 
as long term tax avoidance which might be triggered by management actions in 
avoiding tax and it may be caused by inherent variations in the characteristics of 
groups of firms, for example, different characteristics in different industries. This 
shows that there is a possibility for firms to become involved in tax planning for 
a long period of time but, as claimed by Hoffman (1961), it may be limited if the 
motivation for such activities is based on tax law ambiguities. 
 
In  addition  to  the  above mentioned  principles,  Scholes Wolfson  tax  planning 
framework  suggests  three  important  principles  in  tax  planning:  a  multilateral 
approach, i.e. all contracting parties, the importance of hidden taxes, i.e. all taxes, 
and the importance of non tax costs, i.e. all costs. The themes are further detailed 
as follows: “all contracting parties must be taken into account in tax planning; 
importance  of  hidden  taxes  –  all  taxes  must  be  taken  into  account;  and 
importance of non tax costs – all costs of business must be considered, not just 
tax costs” (Scholes and Wolfson, 1992: 3). Shackelford and Shevlin (2001), in 
tracing the development of income tax research in accounting, highlight that the 
Scholes Wolfson framework adopts a positive approach in explaining the role of 
taxes in organizations.  
 
Scholes  and  Wolfson  (1992)  also provide  examples  of  the  three  themes:  “all 
parties” could refer to both employer’s and employees’ taxes in arranging the 
compensation; “all taxes” could refer to taxes comprehensive of explicit taxes 
(the tax paid to the authority) and implicit taxes (tax induced reductions in pre 
tax rates of return); and, finally, “all costs” could refer to management incentives 
and transaction costs, and  the trade offs between corporate financial accounting 
aims and tax aims.   
 
In empirical tax researches, the Scholes Wolfson framework is widely accepted 
and, up to the year of the study, Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) find that no 
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and Shevlin (2001) highlight a shortcoming of the framework from a research 
perspective. This is due to the difficulty in quantifying non tax costs which leads 
to the possibility of portraying any result as consistent with the framework. 
 
2.2 Objectives and Constraints of Tax Planning 
2.2.1 Objectives of Tax Planning  
 
Based  on  the  above mentioned  definition,  an  early  definition  of  tax planning 
relates  it  to  the  basic  objective  of  minimising  tax  liability.  This  is  explained 
clearly  by  Hoffman  (1961)  where  tax  planning  is  referred  to  as  “taxpayer’s 
capacity  to  arrange  his  financial  activities  in  such  a  manner  as  to  suffer  a 
minimum expenditure for taxes” (Hoffman, 1961: 274). This implies taxpayers’ 
ability to pursue the tax minimisation objective in tax planning.  
 
However, not all tax planning activities necessarily decrease the tax liability to 
one’s desired minimum level (Hoffman, 1961) since there is no certainty in tax 
planning  due  to  the  possibility  of  non tax  costs  (see  section  2.2.2  below)  in 
limiting the successfulness of the tax planning activities. It is also important to 
note that the optimal aim of tax planning should be to maximise after tax returns 
since the tax minimisation objective will contribute to non tax costs (Scholes and 
Wolfson, 1992). In other words, tax planning activities are about exercising skills 
and  knowledge  to  reduce  the  tax  burden  whilst  simultaneously  ensuring  an 
increment  of  after tax  returns.  Such  tax  planning  activities  are  referred  to  as 
effective  tax  planning  in  which  the  role  of  taxes  and  other  contracting  costs 
underlies  the  decision  rule  of  maximising  after tax  returns  or  optimising  tax 
liability (Scholes and Wolfson, 1992). Equivalently, the objective can be stated 
as  maximising  the  after tax  net  present  value  of  a  transaction  (Jones  and 
Rhoades Catanach, 2005).  
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2.2.2 Constraints of Tax Planning  
 
Companies might have to face some constraints or adverse implications of tax 
planning  in  achieving  the  above mentioned  tax  objectives.  For  that  reason, 
Scholes and Wolfson (1992) consider optimal tax planning as an activity that 
takes into account tax planning implications in terms of “all taxes”, “all costs” 
and  “all  parties”.  These  constraints  and  implications  can  be  explained  by 
referring to the costs and non tax costs of tax planning. Previous research has 
emphasised the importance of costs for tax planning in several distinct matters, 
for  example,  the  decision  of  tax  planning,  role  of  auditors  and  effective  tax 
planning  (see  Tran Nam,  Evans,  Walpole  and  Ritchie,  2000;  Slemrod,  2001; 
Rego, 2003; Slemrod, 2004; Maydew and Shackelford, 2007).  As the process of 
tax planning and tax minimisation can be expensive, it is essential to consider 
these  costs  before  undertaking  tax  planning  activity  (Slemrod,  2004).  The 
circumstances  would  be  worse  if  the  government  subsequently  increases 
corporate tax rates in response to the lower tax revenues (Slemrod, 2004). Hence, 
the  activity  will  be  pursued  only  if  the  costs  are  seemingly  lower  than  the 
expected tax reduction (Tran Nam et al., 2000).  
 
The costs of tax planning might be associated with two interrelated costs: the 
costs that arise from existing tax planning activities, and future costs from the 
prospective of additional tax planning activities in which the latter is related to 
the  costs  that  arise  from  the  activity  of  seeking  out  additional  tax  planning 
methods (Curry, Hill and Parisi, 2007). In short, the costs of tax planning that are 
incurred by companies could arise from both existing and future tax planning 
strategies. Further elaboration on the costs of tax planning in this section is based 
on two types of costs: direct and indirect costs. 
 
2.2.2.1 Direct Costs 
 
Direct costs are the cash outflows that have to be incurred directly by the tax 
planners in realising the objective of tax planning. These costs are inclusive of 
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Companies  incur  the  said  legal  cost  as  a  part  of  their  compliance  costs  in 
ensuring the attainment of the tax planning target. This is due to legislative and 
judicial  restrictions  in  tax planning  as  the  tax  authority  and  the  courts  might 
challenge  the  tax  planning  strategies  using  legislative  and  judicial  doctrines 
(Jones and Rhoades Catanach, 2005). In addition to the above mentioned costs, 
Slemrod and Venkatesh (2002) explain tax planning costs as inclusive of internal 
pre filing  costs,  which  includes  soliciting  tax  guidance  and  information,  and 
maintaining tax related records. These legal costs are important in tax planning 
decisions as they could economically reduce the value of the benefits of the tax 
planning activities. 
 
Legal costs of tax planning could also be considered as costs related to outside 
assistance,  for  example,  costs  associated  with  the tax related  fees paid  to  the 
attorneys, accountants and other relevant parties (Mills et al., 1998). In addition 
to the outside assistance costs, Mills et al. (1998), in a study that investigates 
investments  in  tax planning,  include  in house  costs  as  additional  expenses  in 
conducting tax planning. The authors describe in house costs as the cost of the 
firm’s tax department salaries inclusive of fringe benefits.  
 
2.2.2.2 Indirect Costs 
 
Indirect  costs  include,  for  example,  conflicts  with  the  financial  reporting 
objective, loss of voting control and reduced access to capital markets due to 
restructuring activity in tax planning. Previous literature has widely discussed the 
issue  of  conflict  between  financial  reporting  and  tax  planning  (for  example 
Scholes, Wilson and Wolfson, 1990; Cloyd, Pratt and Stock, 1996; Shackelford 
and Shevlin, 2001; Hunton, Libby and Mazza, 2006). The conflict exists due to 
reputation which reflects managers’ compensation, implicit costs and political 
costs.  However,  it  is  important  to  note  that  the  effect  of  tax  planning  and 
financial reporting is not only of a one way nature but  could work both ways 
insofar  as  it  is  not  only  tax  planning  that  could  affect  financial  accounting 
choices but financial accounting considerations could also affect the tax planning 
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Wolfson  (1992)  as  a  “conflict  between  financial  reporting  and  tax  planning 
consideration”  which  basically  deals  with  the  decision  to  pursue  either  high 
accounting income or lower taxable income. From the capital market’s point of 
view, the conflict, which usually exists through the tax planning approach of 
deferring  or  lowering  the  net  reported  income,  would  result  in  a  negative 
perception among shareholders as it reveals a bad reputation of the management 
of  a  company  (Scholes  and  Wolfson,  1992;  Tzovas,  2006).  In  fact,  Tzovas 
(2006), under the  assumption that a decrease in tax liability usually entails a 
decrease in reported income, finds that firms might pursue after tax reporting 
profit related  objectives  rather  than  tax  minimisation  objectives  since  the 
reporting figures could influence firms’ stakeholders’ perception of reputation 
for lending decisions and firm valuation.  
 
In  line  with  reputation,  managers’  compensation  could  suffer  in  the  case  of 
performance based remuneration in which the lower the reporting income, the 
lower the remuneration. This could be regarded as tax disadvantageous for the 
management of companies that rely on performance in rewarding the employees, 
especially in granting executive options (Stapledon, 2004). In addition, Klassen, 
Lang and Wolfson (1993) argue that companies might be restrained in pursuing 
tax  planning  strategy  via  geographical  income shifting  because  such  activity 
might affect internal performance assessment and managerial incentives. Thus, 
this indicates that performance based executive compensation considerations or 
consequences could be one of the indirect costs of the tax planning. 
   
In addition to reputation and executive compensation, implicit tax and political 
costs are other indirect costs that are important considerations in tax planning. 
Scholes and Wolfson (1992) highlight that companies which pay lower or no 
explicit tax may bear higher political costs or implicit taxes of which the former 
includes  additional  levies  or  regulations  and  the  latter  is  the  cost  indirectly 
incurred in the form of a lower return on tax favoured investment. Political cost 
is also related to government scrutiny and wealth transfer (Zimmerman, 1983).  
 
Other indirect costs that might need to be considered by the tax planners are loss 
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tax planning via the restructuring of the organisational structure in which loss of 
voting control refers to owners’ limited control over managers’ actions while 
access to capital market is related to access to the market for debts and equity  
(Scholes and Wolfson, 1992).  In other words, companies might engage in tax 
planning by  restructuring  the  organisation but  they  may  suffer  from  negative 
capital market consequences; for example, some companies may plan their tax 
through  restructuring  the  organisation  by  reallocating  local  subsidiaries  to 
foreign subsidiaries but the foreign countries may have a set of regulations that 
restricts  the  voting  control  and  access  to  capital  markets  as  compared  to  the 
former country.  
 
2.3 Motivations of Tax Planning 
 
Tax planning is mainly motivated by the expected benefits sought by taxpayers.  
However,  different  decision makers  may  value  the benefits  differently  due  to 
different  levels  of  tax  planning  aggressiveness,  which  may  depend  on  the 
decision makers’ attitude; for example, are they risk averse or risk takers? In the 
case of the risk averse, decision makers are likely to make decisions that entail 
less risk but a low return; in contrast, risk takers would prefer a decision that 
resulted in high returns even though the risks related to the decisions are high. 
These attitudes could be further explained in relation to expected utility theory 
and prospect theory. Expected utility theory explains taxpayers’ decisions under 
uncertainty with expectation of receiving maximum benefits in considering the 
trade offs  between  expected  return  (tax  saving)  and  the  risks  from  decisions 
made, while prospect theory explains taxpayers’ decisions under safe and assured 
conditions in which the taxpayers prefer a tax planning strategy that entails less 
risk although the tax saving is lower (King and Sheffrin, 2002). Risk takers, in 
line with expected utility theory, would engage in tax planning using strategies 
that produce maximum tax saving, but in the case of the risk averse, according to 
prospect theory, the taxpayer will prefer a strategy that involves less risk and 
only deals with standard deductions (King and Sheffrin, 2002).  
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The  discussion  on  the  factors  that  could  motivate  a  tax  planning  decision  is 
incomplete without clarifications of the moderating influences of tax planning. In 
a tax planning decision process, moderating factors are the factors that indirectly 
motivate or inhibit the taxpayers in conducting a tax planning activity. Corporate 
governance and stakeholders’ opinion are the moderating factors discussed in 
this section. 
 
2.3.1 Benefits of Tax Planning 
 
Companies involve themselves in tax planning because of the primary benefit 
derived  thereof,  that  is  an  increase  in  after tax  returns.  As  discussed  in  the 
section on definitions and theories of tax planning, it is important to note that 
after tax returns could be negatively affected by tax minimisation although tax 
minimisation could be claimed as a benefit of tax planning. This is due to the 
possibility of a tax minimisation strategy to bring in significant costs of a non tax 
dimension (see section 2.2.2 on constraints of tax planning above).  Therefore, 
the increment of after tax returns is the main aim of effective tax planning rather 
than  tax  minimisation  (Scholes  and  Wolfson,  1992).  The  Scholes Wolfson 
framework further claims that, due to its potential negative effect on after tax 
returns, tax minimisation is not an optimum benefit in tax planning; for example, 
in order to maximise the tax, one may simply not invest in profitable ventures. In 
addition, tax minimisation benefit may result in other non tax costs, for example, 
lower reported income (Shackelford and Shevlin, 2001).  
 
An empirical test of the impact of tax planning strategies on after tax investment 
returns by Chincarini and Kim (2001) finds evidence on the increment of the tax 
planning effect on after tax returns.  The authors compute after tax price returns 
by  dividing  after tax  final  value  of  the portfolio with  the  initial  value  of  the 
portfolio.  Using  a  portfolio  comparisons  approach  with  a  dataset  from  the 
Vanguard Index 500 Fund, which exclusively covers investors in August 1976 
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returns  for  the  “tax smart  investors”  as  compared  to  “naïve  investors”.
2  The 
authors finally conclude that, by cleverly planning the investments (considering 
the tax implications of an investment), the after tax returns could be increased by 
the index investors. In other words, the results indicate that good tax planning 
could lead to greater after tax returns.  
 
Besides an increase in after tax returns, tax planning also benefits the companies 
by way of cash inflows (Jones and Rhoades Catanach, 2005). As compared to 
after tax  returns,  increased  cash  inflows  benefit  the  taxpayers  by  way  of 
increasing cash available to the companies with considerations only on the tax 
paid rather than tax expense.  Tran Nam et al. (2000) explain that cash flow 
benefit can accrue in two circumstances. The first is when no tax is charged on 
income; the second is in the situation of lawfully delaying the remittance of tax 
revenue to the authority, particularly the tax that is collected on behalf of the 
government. Based on the above, the cash inflow benefit of taxation could be 
related to timing or deferral tax planning strategy. In addition, increased cash 
flow  benefit  is  also  available  by  way  of  lower  tax  rates  between  related 
companies. This is applicable to companies that perform tax planning through 
transfer pricing as highlighted by Martinson, Englebrecht and Mitchell (1999) 
whereby companies would increase their after tax cash flow if they involve in a 
high transfer price to a foreign division or subsidiary that suffers high tax rates. 
Such artificial determination of transfer pricing is illegal and therefore constitutes 
evasion. Thus, if the companies are viewed as a group, the group’s after tax cash 
will consequently be significantly increased. 
 
Further, in light of the  Scholes Wolfson framework, Shackelford and  Shevlin 
(2001) highlight that taxes together with all parties and all costs may benefit the 
tax  planning related  parties,  which  include  shareholders,  management  and 
companies,  through  a  tax  management  structure  that  achieves  organisational 
goals, for  example, profit or wealth maximisation. Tax management structure 
                                                 
2 Tax smart investors are referred to by the authors as tax aware investors while naïve investors 
are non tax aware investors. The awareness is measured based on the investors’ decision in 
keeping the realised investment capital gains below a threshold level to reduce immediate tax 
payments. Taxpayers who are tax aware are regarded as those who manage to maintain their 
gains under a certain level so as to suffer minimum tax payments; otherwise, the investors are 
considered as non tax aware investors. Chapter 2 Tax Planning Activities                                                                        30 
 
could be referred to as an arrangement of a tax planning management at decision 
making level. This structure, with the assumptions that there is no agency cost 
and that  all themes (all taxes, all parties and  all costs) can be identified and 
controlled,  is  an  outcome  of  effective  tax  planning  since,  in  making  a 
comprehensive  (considering  the  three  themes)  tax  planning  decision,  the 
management of a company has to arrange a structure that considers the effects of 
tax planning decisions on all of the themes.  Thus, in addition to increasing after 
tax returns and cash inflows, better tax management structures could also benefit 
not  only  the  companies  that  engage  in  effective  tax  planning,  but  also  the 
management  and  the  shareholders  in  the  sense  of  reducing  agency  conflict 
whereby the shareholders could rely on the management’s decision in conducting 
the tax planning activities while increasing the shareholders’ wealth. 
 
2.3.2 Moderating Factors 
 
Moderating  factors  of  tax  planning,  for  example  corporate  governance  and 
stakeholders’  opinion,  are  considered  in  this  section  as  they  could  indirectly 
motivate tax planning decisions due to their ability to influence the expected 
magnitude of tax planning benefits. For example, the managements of companies 
with  good  corporate  governance  would  consider  tax  planning  decisions  that 
could  increase  the  firm  value  which  would  directly  increase  shareholders’ 
wealth, instead of pursuing managers’ wealth interests in the cases of companies 
with poor corporate governance practice. Similarly, stakeholders’ opinion could 
influence  companies’  tax  planning  decisions  in  the  sense  of  tax  planning 
valuation  and  approval  consideration  which  depend  on  the  benefits  of  tax 
planning activities from the stakeholders’ point of view.  
 
2.3.2.1 Corporate Governance 
 
Shareholders,  due  to  information  asymmetry,  rely  on  corporate  governance 
mechanisms in ensuring that managements’ actions are in line with their wealth 
objective. In this context, corporate governance and tax planning are interrelated 
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managers.  Therefore,  from  an  economic  point  of  view,  tax  and  corporate 
governance are interacting in the sense of managerial opportunism in which a 
conflict of interest explains managers’ opportunity to pursue self interest in tax 
planning  since  tax  planning,  if  carried  out  with  intention  to  avoid  the  tax 
authority’s  detection,  involves  complexity  and  obfuscation  (Desai  and 
Dharmapala, 2008). As the details of tax planning related transactions or activity 
are kept secret by the companies to prevent detection,  Desai and Dharmapala 
(2008) highlight managers’ opportunities to involve themselves in activities that 
are  harmful  to  shareholders.  This,  as  in  the  above discussion,  in  turn creates 
information asymmetry between shareholders and managers which consequently 
causes  agency  problems.  Therefore,  as  the  shareholders  refer  to  corporate 
governance mechanisms in ensuring that the tax planning decisions are consistent 
with  their  interests,  corporate  governance  could  be  claimed  as  a  moderating 
factor in tax planning activities. 
 
In  addition  to  economic  perspective,  shareholders  also  consider  corporate 
governance  in  tax  planning  from  a  strategic  management  perspective.  A  
company’s strategic decisions rely on corporate governance conduct within the 
company itself (see Hoskisson and Turk, 1990; Bushman and Smith, 2001). Tax 
decisions, as argued by Glaister and Hughes (2008), usually follow in the wake 
of a strategic decision.  Therefore, good corporate governance is likely to be an 
important consideration for shareholders in valuing management’s strategic tax 
planning decision making as the said tax decision normally includes tax planning 
strategies  that  attract  management’s  serious  consideration  of  the  risks  of  tax 
planning.  The risks entailed in tax planning are increasing U.K. boards’ concern 
since tax planning activities require serious management time, serious money 
and serious reputational risk (Hartnett, 2008). In fact, some companies are seen 
to be risk averse in tax planning in order to avoid a high risk classification by the 
tax authority (KPMG, 2004). Thus, boards’ duties, among others, include tax risk 
management, which is about managing tax related activity under uncertainty, and 
such a duty is now shifting to responsibility for tax governance due to a rising 
concern about social responsibility among stakeholders (Erle, 2008). Therefore, 
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good corporate governance to ensure that the tax planning decisions are made 
with appropriate consideration of the risks.  
 
The importance of corporate governance consideration in valuing tax planning 
decisions is further highlighted by Owens (2008) in stressing two issues arising 
from an intersection between tax and corporate governance: a set of issues on 
conflict of interest and  the issues about ensuring the transparency and quality of 
management decisions. In addition to the board, the intersection could also occur 
due to the effect of individual managers.  Dyreng, Hanlon and Maydew (2009), 
in  investigating  the  effect  of  individual  executives  on  a  firm’s  tax  avoidance 
activities, find significant involvement of individual executives in determining 
the  firm’s  level  of  tax  avoidance.  The  authors  conduct  the  analysis  using  a 
dataset from a sample of 899 executives for a period from 1992 to 2006. The 
results  suggest  that  the  relationship  between  tax  planning  and  corporate 
governance  is  not  only  a  board level  matter  but  that  the  link  could  also  be 
scrutinised in the sense of individual executive effects. Specifically, the findings 
of the research indicate a significant relationship between Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) effective tax rates (ETR) and cash ETR and the 
executives  who  were  CEOs  in  the  last  year  of  their  careers,  chief  financial 
officers  (CFOs)  and  other  executives  (non CEO  and  non CFO)  covered  by 
ExecuComp. 
 
Previous  empirical  research  has  widely  discussed  the  interactions  between 
taxation and corporate governance (Erickson, Hanlon and Maydew, 2004; Chan, 
Lo and Mo, 2006; Desai and Dharmapala, 2006; Brown, Liang and Weisbenner, 
2007; Desai, Dharmapala and Fung, 2007a; Desai, Dyck and Zingales, 2007b; 
Desai  and  Dharmapala,  2008;  Desai  and  Dharmapala,  2009;  Hanlon  and 
Slemrod,  2009).  As  discussed  above,  corporate  governance  could  be  a 
moderating  factor  in  tax  planning  activities  since  the  activities  require 
commitments from managers who have had access to the information about the 
company. Due to the information asymmetry, there is a possibility for managers 
to benefit at the expense of the shareholders. This is in line with the findings of 
the research by Erickson et al. (2004). In this research, which investigates the 
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managers did get involved in tax overpayment of the overstated earnings in order 
to  reduce  the  possibilities  of  being  discovered  by  outsiders.  In  other  words, 
managers would engage in tax overpayment with an intention of concealing from 
investors  their  fraudulent  earnings  overstatement  activities.  Thus,  as  far  as 
information  asymmetry  is  concerned,  corporate  governance  is  an  important 
element to be considered in understanding the tax planning arrangements of a 
company. This is due to shareholders’ limited access to companies’ tax planning 
information since tax planning information is normally kept confidential by the 
management for commercial reasons and to prevent detection by tax authorities 
(Desai and Dharmapala, 2008).  
 
In explaining the relationship between the tax system and corporate governance 
arrangements, Desai and Dharmapala (2008) draw attention to the interactions 
between tax avoidance decisions and managerial opportunism as the foundation 
of  agency  perspective  in  tax  avoidance.  The  authors  emphasise  that  the 
relationship  between  corporate  governance  and  taxation  could  exist  in  three 
settings  that  are  characteristic  of  a  tax  system,  the  nature  of  the  corporate 
governance  environment  and  managers’  potential  to  capture  a  share  of  tax 
avoidance benefits. In other words, corporate governance and tax planning could 
interact in the sense of the influence of a tax system on managerial behaviour, the 
influence  of  corporate  governance  structure  on  the  tax  arrangements  of  a 
company, and the benefits derived by the managers from tax planning activities.  
It is also important to note that, from an agency perspective, the direction of the 
relationship between  tax planning  and  corporate  governance  might  happen  in 
both ways in which “the working of corporate tax may well influence, and be 
influenced  by  the  relationship  between  managers  and  outside  shareholders” 
(Desai et al., 2007a: 350). In addition to the outside shareholders, the association 
between  taxation  and  ownership  structure  is  also  applicable  in  the  case  of 
executive stock ownership, as managers with stock ownership are presumed to 
act in favour of shareholders’ interests due to the similar wealth objectives of the 
managers  and  shareholders  (Jensen  and  Meckling,  1976)  and  hence  such 
managers  will  make  tax  planning  decisions  that  will  increase  the  wealth  of 
shareholders, which also directly increases the managers’ wealth. Brown et al. 
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ownership with the dividend payout during a dividend tax cut year. This shows 
that ownership structure would correlate with the corporate payout policy where 
the authors document that the higher the ownership, the higher the amount of the 
dividend during the dividend tax cut year. Further, in terms of family ownership, 
Chen, Chen, Cheng and Shevlin (2010), in investigating the tax aggressiveness of 
family firms as compared to non family firms using a panel dataset of 1,003 U.S. 
firms for a period from 1996 until 2000, find that family firms demonstrate a 
lower level of tax aggressiveness as compared to the other firms in which the tax 
aggressiveness is measured by four difference measures consisting of ETR, cash 
ETR, book tax difference and residual book tax difference (following firm fixed 
effect regression). These results indicate the concern over non tax costs by the 
family  owners  in  their  tax  planning  activities.  The  said  non tax  costs  are 
highlighted as consisting of the potential price discount (share price reduction) 
from  non family  shareholders  (minority  shareholders),  a  potential  of  penalty 
imposed by the tax authority and a potential of impairment of family reputation. 
These considerations of tax planning constrain the family firms’ tax planning 
activities in terms of the perception of other non family shareholders, detection 
by the tax authority and damage to reputation resulting from the tax audit by the 
tax authority. 
 
In light of the above literature, it is clear that agency perspective is strongly 
related to the conflict of wealth maximisation objectives between managers and 
shareholders in which consideration of managers’ wealth is usually seen as a 
managerial incentive. Regarding tax avoidance and managerial incentives, Desai 
and Dharmapala (2006), using a large sample of U.S. data for a period of 1993 
until 2001, examine the link between corporate tax avoidance and the growth of 
“high powered” incentives for managers.  The findings demonstrate a negative 
association between managers’ incentive compensation and tax avoidance where 
the  higher  the  incentive  compensation,  the  lower  the  tax  avoidance.  These 
empirical findings, with the assumption that tax avoidance increases firm value, 
contradict the theory as the increment of managers’ incentive is found not to 
align  with  the  shareholder managers’  interests.  This  is  explained  by  the 
researchers as being due to the “undersheltering” phenomenon which relates to 
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to pursue their interests and thus influences the managers to reduce tax planning 
activities.  In  addition,  the  research  also  documents  the  role  of  corporate 
governance in the above mentioned negative association where the association is 
mostly  driven  by  the  poorly governed  firms.  Thus,  as  the  managerial 
opportunism  is  higher  in  the  weak  corporate  governance  companies,  the  tax 
planning activities are also found to be higher (i.e. in relation to lower ratio of 
value  of  stock  option  grants  to  total  compensation  for  top five  executives). 
Therefore, the authors conclude that the corporate governance characteristics of a 
company  appear  to  mediate  the  association  between  compensation  and  tax 
avoidance  by  way  of  higher  managers’  opportunism  in  weak  corporate 
governance companies and, hence, high compensation to control the manager 
could  not  positively  contribute  to  shareholders’  interests  in  tax  planning 
decisions. 
 
The association of corporate governance and taxation at the national level can 
also be exhibited by  way  of the increment of tax revenue in  response  to the 
increment of tax rates. By using private benefits, which are measured as control 
premium in negotiated control block sales, as an indicator of worse corporate 
governance, Desai et al. (2007b), in analysing the sensitivity of corporate tax 
revenues to tax rates with quality of corporate governance systems, find robust 
negative interaction between tax rates and the measure of private benefits.
3 The 
authors interpret the findings as a lower sensitivity of tax revenues to a tax rate 
increment  among  countries  that  have  worse  corporate  governance.  The  result 
also shows that, with strong corporate governance, the increment of tax rates will 
increase the tax revenue in an increasing rate.  
 
The function of corporate governance as a mediating factor in tax planning could 
also be viewed by way of investors’ responses towards a tax planning activity. In 
answering  the  research  question  of  how  investors  value  managerial  actions 
designed  solely  to  minimise  corporate  tax  obligation,  Desai  and  Dharmapala 
                                                 
3 The results of the research are based on 36 countries: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Portugal, 
South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, U.K., U.S., Venezuela 
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(2009) investigate the relationship between the effect of tax avoidance activity 
and the firm value. In the research, tax avoidance is measured by book tax gap 
while Tobin’s Q is the proxy for the firm value. By using a dataset of U.S. firms 
for a sample period of 1993 until 2001, the authors find a significant positive 
effect of tax avoidance on firm value for well governed firms. The firm value tax 
planning relationship is found to be pronounced only with the presence of the 
corporate governance consideration. Specifically, the authors find a significant 
positive  association  between  book tax  gap  and  firm  value  from  a  good 
governance  firms years.  The  measure  of  corporate  governance  is  based  on  a 
fraction of a company’s shares owned by institutional investors in which ratios of 
more than 60 per cent are indicative of stronger  governance institutions. The 
institutional investors are chosen as a proxy of corporate governance mechanism 
due to the presumption of positive association between the institutional investors 
and a degree of scrutiny  of a managerial action.  In addition, the institutional 
investors  are  also  presumed  by  the  authors  to  have  greater  incentives  and 
capacity for monitoring the managers. The results of the analyses are interpreted 
by the authors as a contribution of corporate governance in explaining the tax 
avoidance  undertaking  by  companies  in  which  the  better  the  corporate 
governance, the larger the effect of tax avoidance on firm valuation.  Based on 
this research, corporate governance characteristics could be concluded as having 
an important role in interpreting the association between tax planning activities 
and firm value.  
 
Similarly,  Hanlon  and  Slemrod  (2009)  also  document  a  significant  role  of 
corporate governance in  tax planning activities but, instead of using Tobin’s Q, 
the authors utilise stock price as the proxy of market valuation. The researchers 
study  markets’  responses  to  tax  planning  activities  through  an  event  study 
investigating market evaluation of news about corporate tax aggressiveness. The 
authors examine stock price reaction to the tax aggressiveness news on three 
consecutive days: the day immediately before the announcement, the day of the 
announcement and the day immediately after the announcement. The findings of 
the research indicate that corporate governance factors influence the association 
between  the  stock  price  and  the  news  about  tax  shelters  in  an  unexpected 
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that are not related to management entrenchment and the share price during the 
event dates. They interpret the result as indirect negative effects of corporate 
governance on the relationship between firm value and tax shelter news. 
 
In summary, corporate governance can be seen as a moderating factor in tax 
planning since it can directly or indirectly affect tax planning activities. This 
mediating role is performed through several means including ownership structure 
and  managers’  compensation.  It  is  important  to  note  that  the  foundation  of 
corporate governance intervention is largely interrelated with the agency problem 
and, as far as the agency problem is concerned, a conflict of interests will be an 
ongoing shareholders’ problem since a separation between ownership and control 
is a key characteristic of companies’ management. Thus, it could be presumed 
that  the  direction  of  the  relationship  between  corporate  governance  and  tax 
planning  might  occur  in  either  negative  or  positive  ways  depending  on  the 
magnitude, interests and objectives of the managers and the shareholders.  
 
2.3.2.2 Stakeholders’ Opinion 
 
Stakeholders’  opinion  or  perspective  is  an  important  consideration  in  tax 
planning  activities  since  the  opinion  is  a  crucial  element  in  valuation  and 
approval  considerations.  This  is  aligned  with  the  concept  of  “all  parties” 
introduced  by  the  Scholes Wolfson  framework  in  which  it  is  essential  for 
managers to be aware of the influence of tax rules changes on the behaviour of  a 
company’s stakeholders, who may  consist of customers, employees, suppliers 
and competitors (Scholes, Wolfson, Erickson, Maydew and Shevlin, 2005). In 
considering stakeholders’ opinions in tax planning activities, it is important to 
note that stakeholders’ opinions may vary since different stakeholders may have 
different  interests  and  information.  In  a  research  survey  that  investigates  the 
factors that influence the accounting policy decisions of the 200 largest firms 
operating in Greece, Tzovas (2006) finds that firms’ stakeholders’ perceptions 
and decision making could be influenced by accounting figures. Thus, it can be 
concluded that it is essential for the statutory auditor to provide assurance on the 
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status  to  different  stakeholders  of  a  company  (Van  Tendeloo,  2007).  This  is 
important  to  suit  the  different  needs  and  interests  of  stakeholders  who,  with 
sufficient  information,  could  effectively  value  the  tax  planning  activities 
conducted by the companies. Therefore, different stakeholders, who are equipped 
with  different  relevant  information,  could  assess  whether  the  tax  planning 
activities might meet their expectations, needs and interests. 
 
Hence,  with  such  assurance,  stakeholders’  opinion  could  be  an  effective 
moderating factor of tax planning activities for companies that emphasise a long 
term  competitive  advantage.  This  is  applicable  to  all  types  of  companies 
regardless  of  whether  the  companies  are  domestic only  or  multinationally 
operated.  Christensen  and  Murphy  (2004),  in  discussing  corporate  social 
responsibility  in  corporate  tax  avoidance,  suggest  that  clear  corporate  social 
responsibility  standards  in  taxation  should  be  adopted  by  multinational 
companies.  The  said  standards  are  inclusive  of  the standards  that  require  the 
company to publish all necessary information and constrain the company from 
the  use  of  “profits laundering  vehicles”  that  have  no  significant  economic 
objectives  for  relevant  stakeholders.  The  said  stakeholders  may  consist  of 
government, shareholders, employees and the general public.  
 
Overall, it can be concluded that stakeholders’ opinions are likely to mediate tax 
planning activities through their influence on tax planning valuation and needs. 
Thus, it is important for companies to seriously pay attention to the accuracy of 
the  information  available  to  stakeholders  where  tax  planning  information  is 
transparent to the stakeholders through financial reporting statements, as found 
by Van Tendeloo (2007) in examining the association of audit quality and tax 
induced earnings using U.K. private firms for a sample period from 1998 until 
2002.  The  author  highlights  that,  as  compared  to  other  motivated  forms  of 
earnings management, tax induced earnings management, defined as downward 
earnings  management  to  reduce  tax  liability,  for  example,  by  manipulating 
accruals  to  increase  tax  allowable  expenses,  could  be  argued  as  more  easily 
detected and scrutinised by stakeholders through the company’s financial report. 
In addition, stakeholders’ opinion could also mediate the tax planning activities 
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due  to  political  objective,  the  government  considers  the  pressures  exerted  by 
stakeholders  when  it  determines  tax related  rules  and  regulations  (Klumpes, 
2003). This in turn reflects tax planning decisions by management in the form of 
a response to the stakeholder related tax rules and regulations whereby managers 
plan the tax in responding to stakeholders’ needs which are considered by the 
government  in  setting  up  the  rules  and  regulations.  In  summary,  the  above 
discussions  stress  the  influence  of  stakeholders’  opinion  on  tax  planning 
activities  by  way  of  tax  planning  valuation,  approval  considerations  and 
stakeholders’ needs.  
 
2.4 Tax Planning Opportunity 
 
Tax  planning  opportunity  is  discussed  in  this  section  with  reference  to  the 
contribution  of  “loopholes”  in  tax  law  and  firms’  specific  characteristics. 
“Loopholes”  in  tax  law  creates  a  tax  planning  opportunity  as  it  relates  to 
ambiguity in tax law and thus, as highlighted by Slemrod (2004), creates creative 
compliance  by  taxpayers.  Similarly,  companies  with  certain  specific 
characteristics,  for  example  multinational  companies  (MNC),  would  have  a 
better opportunity to plan their tax effectively as compared to other companies. 
  
2.4.1 “Loopholes” in Tax Law 
 
The existence of “loopholes” in tax law could trigger the taxpayers to avoid tax 
without going against the law. In a study that examines a feature of a budget 
process,  Saxton  (1999)  defines  a  “loophole”  in    tax  terminology  as  “a 
technicality making it possible to circumvent the law’s intent without violating 
the letter of the law” (Saxton, 1999: 9). In other words, “loopholes” in tax law 
could provide an opportunity for taxpayers to technically plan their tax without 
violating the rules.  
 
In the context of effective tax planning, due to detailed elaboration in response to 
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Hoffman  (1961)  claims  the  existence  of  “loopholes”  as  a  reason  for  more 
effective tax planning activities. Thus, it is likely that “loopholes” in tax law 
have actually emerged from the complexity of the law itself in which the more 
complex  the  law,  the more  “loopholes”  will be  available.  This  would further 
encourage  tax  planning  activity,  as  highlighted  by    Slemrod  (2004)  that  the 
complexity of the tax law, which leads to an open interpretation, could facilitate 
creative compliance which will then assist ethical rationalisations.  
 
The effectiveness of tax planning strategies, based on the opportunity available 
from “loopholes” in tax law, is assured as long as it is not discovered by the 
authority. The tax planning opportunity that is available from the complexity of 
the law is of concern to the authority since the main purpose of the tax law is to 
ensure that tax functions as a social instrument (Aharony and Geva, 2003), which 
is related to the ethical or morality functions of taxpayers. This is stressed by 
Aharony and Geva (2003) who argue that, from a Kantian ethics perspective, 
efforts to exploit tax “loopholes” are considered to be reliant on the expectation 
that the tax authority will not discover the avoidance opportunity. However, a tax 
planner should be aware of the temporary nature of “loopholes” since the tax 
authority may quickly stop the opportunity for tax planning using “loopholes” in 
tax  law  by  issuing  supplementary  government  legislation  or  its  own  rulings 
(Hoffman,  1961).  For  example,  in  Australia,  the  tax  authority  has  designed 
specific provisions, for instance restrictions on deductible operating losses and 
bad  debts,  which  are  carried  out  simultaneously  with  general  anti avoidance 
measures  purposely  to  plug  specific  “loopholes”  (Porcano  and  Tran,  1998). 
Similarly in the U.K., for example, in an attempt to require more information 
from  taxpayers,  the  authority  issues  notification  requirements  to  enforce 
additional rules and regulations to the existing law (Tooma, 2008). On the other 
hand,  in  view  of  the  authority’s  actions  to  overcome  the  unintended 
consequences of the law with additional rules or provisions, Aharony and Geva 
(2003), from a utilitarian perspective, shed light on the potential of an additional 
new  layer  of  complexity  to  the  law  which  will  then  undermine  the  law’s 
efficiency. This is also in line with James and Wallschutzky (1997) who argue 
that,  by  having  an  increasing  amount  of  legislation,  more  “loopholes”  and 
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Alternatively, the authority may stress the ethics and moral implications of tax 
planning to the taxpayers to reduce tax planning opportunities through tax law 
“loopholes”.   In presenting a case of  a tax “loophole” while highlighting the 
moral implications of law in business, Aharony and Geva (2003) claim that the 
“loophole” problem will disappear if the spirit of law is treated as a guiding 
principle  in  tax  planning  instead  of  an  opportunity  to  avoid  taxes.  Similarly, 
Murphy (2005) emphasises the efforts that restore faith and equity to the system 
in  dealing  with  tax  planning  strategies  that  are  designed  to  exploit  the 
“loopholes”. In other words, ethics and moral views could be the authorities’ 
alternative strategy in closing the “loopholes” or in convincing the taxpayers not 
to exploit them. This could possibly work since tax administrations that are too 
strong and bureaucratic will lead to risks of distortion in the tax base (Trasberg, 
2005) as in the case of more complicated tax administrations, companies tend to 
seek more professional advice for tax planning which will then lead to more 
“loopholes”  being  discovered,  thus  resulting  in  a  country  collecting  lower 
amounts of  tax. Further, it should be noted that closing the “loopholes” with 
more laws will bring about more costs (Braithwaite, 2003).  
 
Based on the above literature review, it can be concluded that “loopholes” in tax 
law could be seen as an opportunity for tax planning activities since one would 
not be charged with violating the law by manipulating the “loopholes”. However, 
the opportunities for tax planning that have emerged from the “loopholes” might 
not last very long since the authority could plug the “loopholes” with additional 
rules and regulations.  Previous research also emphasises that the efforts to close 
the “loopholes” by enforcing more rules and regulations will entail further costs 
and  further  opportunities  to  avoid  taxes  (James  and  Wallschutzky,  1997; 
Braithwaite, 2003).  
 
2.4.2 Firms’ Specific Characteristics 
 
This  section  considers  how  firms’  characteristics  can  be  used  to  explain  the 
variation in levels of tax planning. Tax planning decisions may differ among 
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the  companies.  These  factors  refer  to  firms’  specific  characteristics  in  which 
different  companies  might  have  different  characteristics  that  lead  to  various 
opportunities for tax planning. Previous literature has discussed the association 
of several firms’ specific characteristics with ETR, an indirect measure of tax 
planning (see Zimmerman, 1983; Porcano, 1986; Kern and Morris, 1992; Gupta 
and Newberry, 1997; Holland, 1998; Kim and Limpaphayom, 1998; Mills et al., 
1998; Derashid and Zhang, 2003).  
 
The size of a company could be related to tax planning due to the implications of 
public scrutiny and political cost (Zimmerman, 1983; Porcano, 1986).
4 As argued 
by Zimmerman (1983), the size of a company could be positively related to ETR 
since the large (small) companies are indicated as being exposed to greater (less) 
public scrutiny. Thus, in this relationship, large companies had to bear increased 
political costs imposed on them. With 43,515 final observations from a 35 year 
sample  period,  i.e.  1947 1981,  the  author  documents  a  positive  association 
between tax rates and firm size, a proxy of a firm’s political costs.  In contrast, 
Porcano (1986), in a study analysing corporate ETR of U.S. corporations during 
1982 and 1983, finds evidence of a negative association between firm size and 
ETR. This might be due to the greater resources available to the larger firm in 
influencing  the  above mentioned  political  cost  where  “…a  larger  volume  of 
assets,  sales,  and/or  net  income  might  be  better  able  to  utilize  various  tax 
provisions which reduce the firms’ overall tax rate” (Porcano, 1986: 22).  Taking 
into account divergent measures of the ETR measures, Kim and Limpaphayom 
(1998) utilise both ETR measures set out by Porcano (1986) and Zimmerman 
(1983) in investigating the relationship of ETR and firm size in Pacific Basin 
emerging economies. The findings reveal a negative relationship between ETR 
and company size, which is in line with Porcano (1986). However, the authors 
highlight that the results are sensitive to the alternative of ETR measures. 
 
                                                 
4 It is important to note the difference between the ETR measures of Porcano (1986) and 
Zimmerman (1983) in which the authors employ the following formulae respectively: 1) Current 
U.S. federal income taxes/Adjusted net income before tax and 2) (Income tax expense – change 
in deferred tax)/(Sales – cost of goods sold). Kern and Morris (1992), in extending the analysis of 
ETR structure, find  results that suggest Porcano’s (1986) results are quite sensitive to the 
alternative of the Value Line or Compustat database as compared to the results from Zimmerman 
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Similarly to Porcano (1986), Derashid and Zhang (2003) also find a negative 
association between size and ETR in a study using Malaysian data from 1990 to 
1999.
5 The negative association is also presented by Gupta and Newberry (1997) 
using 915 U.S. firms over a four year period, i.e. 1987 – 1990.
6 However, during 
1982 – 1985, with a sample of 823 U.S. firms, the authors find a significant 
positive relationship between firm size and ETR.
7 This inconsistent relationship 
is also reported by Holland (1998) who documents the relationship using U.K. 
data for a period of 26 years, i.e. 1968 1993. In investigating the relationship 
between firm size and ETR, Holland (1998) uses sales and assets as the proxies 
of  firm  size.  In  the  case  of  size  measured  by  sales,  a  significant  negative 
relationship is found from 1978 until 1981 but, in the case of size measured by 
assets, the relationship is found only from 1978 and 1982. However, the results 
are sensitive to an industry effect. The negative association is said to be related to 
the  cost  of  option  in  the  period  of  maximum  U.K.  corporate  tax  rates 
circumstances where the author explains that “these negative associations may 
arise because the incentive to choose tax reduction activities from a potential 
range of costly options may be higher during a period of relatively high statutory 
rates” (Holland, 1998: 281).  
 
The discussion on the above mentioned costly option could be explained with 
reference to investment in tax planning. Mills et al. (1998) find a significant 
negative  relationship  between  firm  size  and  tax  planning related  expenditure, 
which is measured as a percentage of selling, general and administrative expense. 
However,  it  is  inappropriate  to  conclude  that  firms  that  have  lesser  spending 
would benefit more than the firms that spent more on tax planning (Mills et al., 
1998).  The  cost  of  tax  planning  could  also  be  explained  in  relation  to  tax 
compliance cost. Similar to the explanation on investment in tax planning by 
Mills  et  al.  (1998),  total  tax  compliance  costs  of  tax  planning  by  small  and 
medium sized U.S. businesses are found, by Slemrod and Venkatesh (2002), to 
be greater than those of the large businesses. Therefore, the relationship between 
                                                 
5 The findings are drawn when the ETR was measured using three methods: 1) (tax expense – 
deferred tax expense)/(profit before interest and tax); 2) (tax expense)/(profit before interest and 
tax) and 3) (tax expense – deferred tax expense)/(pre tax profit – (changes in deferred 
tax/statutory tax rate)). 
6 The period is referred to as the post Tax Reform Act of 1986. 
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the size of the companies and tax saving seems to be related to the cost of tax 
planning options. 
 
In addition to firm size, tax planning activities might be also associated with 
leverage since leverage entails an interest tax shield which leads to lower tax 
liability  (Porcano, 1986; Kim and  Limpaphayom, 1998; Derashid and  Zhang, 
2003).  Derashid and Zhang (2003) find a negative relationship between leverage 
and ETR.
8 The authors claim that the finding provides evidence of the use of 
debt financing as a tax shield. In line with these findings, Gupta and Newberry 
(1997) find evidence of a negative relationship between ETR and leverage for 
both periods of pre Tax Reform Act 1986 and post Tax Reform Act 1986 but the 
results are sensitive to the type of ETR measures. However, this relationship is 
found to be inconclusive by Kim and Limpaphayom (1998) in a study that  uses a 
dataset  from  five  emerging economy  countries  that  are  Hong  Kong,  Korea, 
Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand. The authors qualify the results as not necessarily 
reflecting the unimportance of the interest shield, because of the limited use of 
long term debt among the samples instead.  
 
Mills et al. (1998) also find inconclusive evidence about the relationship between 
the  amount  of  expenditure  on  tax  planning  with  leverage  among  166  U.S. 
companies  which  leads  the  authors  to  conclude  that  “more  highly  leveraged 
firms do not invest more heavily in tax planning” (Mills et al., 1998: 13). Based 
on  the  above  literature,  it  could  be  concluded  that  there  are  mixed  results 
regarding the association between tax planning and leverage of a company. 
 
Other than firm size and leverage, capital intensity, which explains the utilisation 
of property, plant and equipment in the business activity, could also correlate 
with  tax  planning  because  of  the  general  availability  of  specific  investment 
incentives.  This  is  due  to  its  correlation  with  the  industries  in  which  the 
companies are involved, where different industries might utilise different levels 
of  capital  intensity.  Previous  literature  finds  conclusive  evidence  of  the 
                                                 
8 The findings are drawn from when the ETR was measured using two methods: 1) (tax expense – 
deferred tax expense)/(profit before interest and tax); 2) (tax expense)/(profit before interest and 
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association between capital intensity and ETR. Gupta and Newberry (1997) and 
Derashid  and  Zhang  (2003)  find  a  significant  negative  relationship  between 
capital  intensity  and  ETR.  Mills  et  al.  (1998)  find  a  significant  positive 
association  between  capital  intensity  and  the  amount  of  tax  planning 
expenditures. These results show that companies with a greater proportion of 
fixed assets utilise tax deductions in lowering the ETR (Gupta and Newberry, 
1997). The deductions might include capital allowance and incentive provision.  
In  addition  to  the  aforementioned  firm specific  characteristics,  industry 
classification could also be associated with ETR due to different opportunities to 
reduce  tax  liability  by  means  of  different  tax  incentives.  For  example,  the 
manufacturing and hotel industries are found to be negatively related to the ETR 
due  to  various  incentives  in  promoting  industrialisation  in  the  manufacturing 
industry and tourism sectors (Derashid and Zhang, 2003). Mills et al. (1998) find 
a significant positive association for the  manufacturing, agriculture and mining 
industries while a negative association is found for the oil and gas industries. 
This might be due to different opportunity sets, for example, different investment 
incentives  which  are  available  for  different  industry  classifications;  it  is 
explained  by  the  authors  that  “..these  industries  either  have  a  richer  “tax 
opportunity  terrain”  or  that  the  tax  laws  specific  to  these  industries  require 
additional  nondiscretionary  spending,  such  as  depreciation  and  inventory 
bookkeeping” (Mills et al., 1998: 13). 
 
Based on the above literature review, it can be concluded that firms’ specific 
characteristics create opportunities for tax planning activities due to different sets 
of  available  tax  incentives  being  attached  to  different  characteristics  of 
companies.  The  implications  of  the  characteristics  are  applicable  to  various 
economic  conditions  in  different  countries.  Thus,  it  should  be  noted  that,  in 
addition to the consideration of the benefit, costs and other mediating factors of 
tax planning, firms’ characteristics could also contribute to the explanation of a 
range of tax planning activity levels.  
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2.5 Measurements and Approaches of Tax 
Planning 
 
This section discusses measurements and approaches of tax planning activities. 
Measures of tax planning used by previous studies vary based on data availability 
and researchers’ general or specific interest in tax planning approaches.  
 
2.5.1 Measurements of Tax Planning 
 
Previous tax planning researchers utilise various measures of tax planning using 
both  publicly  and  privately  available  data.  In  measuring  the  outcome  of  tax 
planning, tax saving could be an appropriate measure since it exhibits the gap of 
tax burden between “book reporting based” and “taxable income based”. Several 
tax  researchers,  either  directly  or  indirectly,  consider  tax  saving  to  be  a 
consequence  of  tax  planning  (for  example  Scholes  et  al.,  1990;  Grubert  and 
Mutti,  1991;  Scholes,  Wilson  and  Wolfson,  1992;  King  and  Sheffrin,  2002; 
Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002; Kirchler et al., 2003; Rego, 2003; Grubert, 2004; 
Slemrod, 2004; Altshuler and Grubert, 2005).  
 
Measures of tax saving is still an ongoing issue among researchers due to the 
appropriateness  of  the  measure  in  exhibiting  tax  planning  activity  (Slemrod, 
2004). This is because tax burden related data could not be accessed by external 
parties. The most common measures that are of use to researchers are book tax 
gap  (for  example  Plesko,  2003;  Desai  and  Dharmapala,  2009)  and  ETR  (for 
example Mills et al., 1998; Rego, 2003). Discussions on the measurements of tax 
planning are further detailed in Chapter 6 of this thesis.   
 
2.5.2 Approaches of Tax Planning 
 
There are several approaches that could be employed by companies in carrying 
out their tax planning activities. The approaches that are discussed in this section Chapter 2 Tax Planning Activities                                                                        47 
 
consist of profit sharing or income shifting, changes of income characteristics, 
reorganisations  and  involvement  in  tax exempt  or  tax favoured  investments. 
However,  these  approaches  may  not  precisely  and  appropriately  describe  tax 
planning  approaches  in  the  future  since  requisite  uncertainty  exists  whereby  
popular approach could be easily detected and shut down by the authorities in 
which  in  the  scenarios  when  many  taxpayers  adopted  the  said  approach,  the 
authorities could gain more information to target their efforts in preventing or 
limiting the tax planning opportunity by that particular approach (Curry et al., 
2007).  
 
2.5.2.1 Profit-Sharing/Income-Shifting 
 
Profit sharing or income shifting exists in the case of different tax rates and tax 
provisions  across  time,  location  and  type  of  income.  Taxpayers,  using  this 
approach, modify the nature of incomes so that the profit or income could be 
either shared with or shifted to related parties that are subject to tax in lower tax 
jurisdictions. Slemrod (1995) refers to income shifting as an activity to reclassify 
a set of real transactions for tax objectives. Tax planning by way of profit sharing 
(for example, transferring profits to subsidiaries in different tax jurisdictions) or 
income shifting is of concern to the authorities  because it has several negative 
implications,  as  discussed  by  Gordon  and  Slemrod  (2000).  These  comprise 
misleading  distributional  statistics,  misleading  corporate  rates  of  return  and 
efficiency consequences in estimating marginal excess burden resulting from any 
tax  change.  According  to  the  Scholes Wolfson  framework,  companies  may 
become involved in tax planning through profit sharing or income shifting by 
transferring  the  income  from  “one  pocket  to  another  pocket”,  or  shifting  the 
income in terms of geographical business location that is transferring the profits 
to the lower tax jurisdictions and shifting the income over time. 
 
2.5.2.1.1 “One Pocket to another Pocket” 
 
Transferring  the  income  from  “one  pocket  to  another  pocket”  is  related  to  a 
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another  that  would  minimise  the  tax  on  that  particular  income  under  the 
taxpayer’s control. Scholes and Wolfson (1992) explain this approach in the light 
of strategies by high tax bracket taxpayers to receive  income from a tax exempt 
pension fund instead of from a personal account and to earn the income from 
their low tax bracket business. This approach of income transfer might also take 
into account a geographical income shifting strategy as discussed below.  
 
2.5.2.1.2 Geographical 
  
Shifting  the  taxable  income  from  a  domestic  company  to  other  countries  is 
claimed by Fuest and Weichenrieder (2002) as one type of income shifting in a 
stylised  model  of  a  small  open  economy.  Shifting  the  income  geographically 
could be brought about by MNC in which at least one of the foreign businesses is 
located in a low tax jurisdiction. In other words, companies that are operating in 
more than one jurisdiction would have a greater opportunity to avoid tax. This is 
in line with the findings by Mills et al. (1998) where companies that have foreign 
operations (expressed by a dummy variable of foreign asset) invest to a greater 
extent in tax planning as compared to their counterparts. The findings, however, 
are found to be sensitive to an industry classification. In addition to the above 
interpretation, this result, alternatively, could also imply high compliance costs 
incurred by companies with foreign operations since investment in tax planning 
is measured as inclusive of tax department salaries, outside legal and accounting 
costs, and other tax planning expenditures. 
 
The  geographical  income shifting  strategy  could  be  carried  out  by  the  MNC 
since  there  are  geographically  different  applications  of  tax  rates  between 
countries  (Klassen  et  al.,  1993).  The  relationship  between  ETR  and  MNC  is 
empirically  investigated  by  Rego  (2003)  in  probing  the  difference  of  ETR 
between MNC and domestic only companies (DOC) in the U.S. The research 
indicates  that  the  MNC’s  ETR  is  lower  than  that  of  the  other  counterparts 
although the MNC’s pre tax income is higher than the DOC’s since MNC carries 
a high volume of transactions and also benefits from economies of scale and 
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strategy can achieve efficient tax planning. In addition, Klassen et al. (1993) also 
significantly observe the same phenomena among U.S. MNC due to changes in 
tax rates during 1985 until 1989. During the sample period, the authors observe 
the  income shifting  strategy  by  MNC  in  planning  their  tax  when  there  were 
reductions  in  tax  rates  in  the  U.S.,  Canada,  Europe  and  other  countries. 
Throughout the period, in 1985 and 1986, the Canadian tax rates were increased 
while European tax rates were decreased. Meanwhile in 1987, the U.S. tax rates 
were decreased while the Canadian and European tax rates were unchanged. In 
1988, other countries’ (other than U.S., Canada and Europe, for example Japan 
and Australia) tax rates were decreased and, in 1989, Canadian tax rates were 
decreased.  Based  on  the  results,  the  authors  find  evidence  of  income shifting 
activities during the tax rate reduction years. Table 2.1 exhibits the phenomena 
of income shifting among multinational U.S. companies during the period. 
 
Table 2.1  
Geographical Income-Shifting among Multinational U.S. Companies from 
1985 until 1989
9 
 
Tax Rates Changes  Year 
U.S.  Canada  Europe  Others 
Geographical 
Income Shifting 
 
1985, 
1986 
   Increase  Decrease     From Canada to 
U.S., from U.S. to 
Europe 
 
1987  Decrease  Constant  Constant     To U.S. 
 
1988           Decrease  From U.S. to non 
U.S. (other than 
Europe and Canada)  
 
1989     Decrease        From non U.S. to 
Canada 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Source: Klassen, K., Lang, M. & Wolfson, M. (1993) Geographic income shifting by 
multinational corporations in response to tax rate changes. Journal of Accounting Research, 31 
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The  strategy  of  tax  planning  via  shifting  the  income  geographically  is  also 
associated with transfer pricing. Transfer pricing is defined as “the method of 
establishing  prices  of  raw  materials,  goods,  or  services  that  are  transferred 
within the corporation among the parent and its subsidiaries, or among different 
subsidiaries” (Martinson et al., 1999: 92). Bruce et al. (2007) claim that transfer 
pricing  is  a  common  type  of  tax  planning.  This  is  in  line  with  one  of  the 
objectives of transfer pricing that is minimising worldwide tax (Martinson et al., 
1999).
10  In  explaining  how  transfer  pricing  works  among  related  companies, 
Bruce et al. (2007) provide an example as exhibited by Figure 2.1.  
 
Figure 2.1 
Transfer Pricing among Related Companies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the case where Country Y does not impose combined reporting and there is no 
corporate tax charged in Country Z, the transaction between A and B (i.e. B 
increases charge to A) could reduce overall tax liability (see Bruce et al., 2007).  
 
Similarly, Martinson et al. (1999) highlight the increase of group after tax cash 
flow  benefit  through  transfer  pricing.  With  reference  to  Figure  2.2,  related 
companies  of  division  or  subsidiary  A  in  Country  ABC  and  division  or 
                                                 
10 The authors list the other five objectives as “minimize import duties, bolster a subsidiary’s 
financial, condition, circumvent government placed restrictions on capital flows (repatriation of 
profits), apply managerial performance measures, and adjust for currency fluctuations” 
(Martinson et al., 2007: 92).  
Headquarters in 
Country X 
 Wholly owned 
Subsidiary B (wholesaler) 
in Country Z (zero tax) 
 
Subsidiary A (retailer) 
in Country Y 
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subsidiary  B  in  Country  DEF  suffer  low  and  high  corporate  tax  rates 
respectively. In the case where A performs a high transfer price to B, A will 
increase its taxable income while B will experience a decrement of income due 
to high costs.  
 
However, it should be noted that the level of tax manipulation in transfer pricing 
may vary according to an independence of managerial control. This is evidenced 
by Chan et al. (2006) in examining the impact of managerial autonomy on tax 
compliance in an international transfer pricing context. By utilising 163 field 
audited for transfer pricing manipulations cases that were filed by tax bureaus in 
coastal  China  in  2002,  the  authors  find  conclusive  evidence  that  foreign 
investment enterprises, which have more managerial autonomy in setting transfer 
prices or sourcing from outsiders, experienced lesser tax audit adjustments as 
compared to parent dictated foreign investment enterprises.  
 
Figure 2.2 
Increase After-Tax Cash Flow through Transfer Pricing
11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In  addition,  managers,  in  conducting  tax  planning  through  transfer  pricing, 
should also pay attention on “Arm’s Length Principle”. This principle allows the 
tax authority to consider “arm’s length price”, i.e. the price based on unrelated 
parties  transaction,  instead  of  the  actual  transfer  price  charged  between  the 
related parties in determining  the companies’ taxable income (Lymer and Oats, 
                                                 
11 Source: Martinson, O. B., Englebrecht, T. D. & Mitchell, C. (1999) How multinational firms 
can profit from sophisticated transfer pricing strategies. Journal of Corporate Accounting & 
Finance, 10, 91 103. 
Division/Subsidiary B in 
Country DEF 
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in Country ABC 
Related companies 
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2008). In other words, the “arm’s length price” limits the tax saving by way of 
price determination by the authority. Therefore, tax planning through transfer 
pricing may not be able to maximise the tax saving as expected since the HMRC 
can  substitute  the  “arm’s  length  price”  for  any  “artificial”  price  from  the 
authority’s point of view (Lymer and Oats, 2008). 
 
2.5.2.1.3 Time 
 
Shifting the income in terms of time mainly engages the activities of delaying the 
recognition of income and deferring tax payments. Scholes and Wolfson (1992) 
highlight that taxpayers would prefer to delay income recognition in the case of 
constant  or  declining  tax  rates  over  time.  Further,  the  authors  claim  that  the 
strategy of deferring the tax payment can be beneficial if there is no interest 
charge on the tax liability. This is also observed by Shackelford and Shevlin 
(2001) who note that, during the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which phased in tax 
rate reductions through until 1988, firms were said to have a high willingness to 
seek tax saving by deferring earnings. This effort of tax planning may also be 
realised  by  alternative  accounting  approaches,  for  example,  the  choice  of 
accounting approach for inventory. Consequently, the accounting income would 
be  affected  by  the  choice  and  thus  it  would  influence  the  taxable  income 
accordingly. However, one should note that shifting the income by way of time 
should require a thorough examination of a firm’s value and financial reporting 
regulations as the low reported income in the current year could be perceived 
negatively by shareholders which in turn would negatively reflect the firm value 
of the company.  
 
2.5.2.2 Change of Characteristics of Income 
 
The  taxpayers  may  also  be  involved  in  tax  planning  through  the  changes  of 
characteristics  of  an  income.  The  changes  are  mainly  related  to  the  income 
shifting strategy since the strategy provides an opportunity to companies to alter 
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companies may then benefit from double taxation relief if the income is then 
remitted to the U.K. (Arthur Weller, 2005).   
 
In  addition,  companies  may  pursue  tax  planning  by  way  of  changes  in  the 
characteristics  of  an  income  through  a  modification  from  income revenue  in 
nature to capital gain in nature. This strategy will be effective in the situation of 
lower  capital  gain  tax  rates  as  compared  to  income  tax  rates.  Similarly,  a 
company may also be involved in tax planning by changing the nature of an 
income from  a business to non business income, or vice versa.   Bruce et al. 
(2007),  in  a  U.S.  state business  tax  planning  study,  highlight  that  companies 
reclassify business income as non business income and then transfer to a low tax 
or no tax state to reduce the state tax burden. Similarly, by reclassifying a non 
business income as a business income, a company may reduce the tax burden 
since the business income would be eligible for a capital allowance deduction 
and treatment of business losses deductions.  
 
2.5.2.3 Organisational Structure 
 
Another  tax  planning  approach  which  could  be  adopted  by  companies  is 
reorganisations.  Tomsett  and  Noble  (1986)  explain  the  tax  planning  via 
reorganisations by examining both domestic and international companies. The 
said  reorganisations  by  domestic  companies  include  share  reorganisations, 
amalgamations and mergers, reconstructions, demergers, management buyouts 
and  purchasing  their  own  shares,  while  the  international  companies  may  be 
involved  in  conversion  from  branch  to  subsidiary  or  vice versa,  and 
multinational mergers and reorganisations. In a case study of a conglomerate, 
Hanson Plc, Stonham (1997) documents that the company benefited from its tax 
planning  by  means  of  a  demerger  strategy  in  1996  in  which  the  company 
successfully obtained both U.K. and U.S. tax authorities’ approval of a tax free 
distribution of the stock dividend to their nationals. This led the company to gain 
several benefits in the form of tax exemption, a lower tax bill and a tax shield. 
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adoption of this approach due to differing structures and the complexity of  a 
demerger (Practical Law Company, 1996). 
 
Similarly,  a  tax  planning  approach  through  reorganisation  could  be  done  by 
means of changes to the residential status of a company. This strategy is also 
referred to as “corporate migration” or “corporate inversion” (A&L Goodbody, 
2009). Bahamas Financial Service Board (2004) explains tax planning through 
corporate  inversion  as  expatriating  domestic  companies  through  a  change  of 
corporate address. A&L Goodbody (2009) reports that several large MNC, for 
example Ingersoll Rand, WPP and Henderson and Accenture, were observed to 
migrate  their  corporate  holding  companies  to  Ireland  to  enjoy  tax  planning 
benefits  since  that  country  provides  tax  incentives  to  holding  companies,  for 
example,  exemption  on  qualified  capital  gains,  domestic  exemptions  from 
withholding tax and lower tax rates on Ireland derived trading income. Based on 
the  above  discussion,  tax  planning  through  organisational  structure  could  be 
accomplished through demerger, corporate migration and corporate inversion. 
 
2.5.2.4 Tax-Exempt or Tax-Favoured Investment 
 
In  addition  to  the  above mentioned  tax  planning  strategies,  dealing  with  tax 
exempt  or  tax favoured  investment  might  also  be  an  effective  tax  planning 
strategy. Scholes et al. (2005) refer to tax favoured investments as investments 
that  are  taxed  explicitly  more  lightly  than  fully  taxable  bonds.  Tax favoured 
investments may enjoy several types of tax favoured status, for example, full tax 
exemption and tax credits, and in fact the investment may enjoy more than one 
tax favoured status.  
 
Hence, it is obvious that tax favoured investments could influence the taxable 
income and this is highlighted by Manzon and Plesko (2001 2002) in a study of 
book tax  income  spread  which  specifically  examines  the  difference  between 
income for tax and financial reporting purposes using 11 years of data (1988 to 
1998).  The  book tax  income  is  computed  as  the  difference  between  U.S. 
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considers investments in venture capital companies, real estate and investment 
trusts, energy related investment and research and development. The evidence 
supports the arguments on the efficient use of tax deduction, tax credit and tax 
exemption  by  profitable  companies.  Therefore,  by  investing  in  tax favoured 
investments,  companies  should  ideally  enjoy  tax  incentives  as  a  result  of 
effective tax planning.  
 
2.6 Conclusions 
 
This  chapter  reviews  the  tax  planning  literature  with  a  focus  on  effective 
corporate tax planning. The review begins with a discussion of definitions and 
theories of tax planning. The chapter further details the objectives and constraints 
of tax planning and this is followed by discussions of the motivations of tax 
planning. Literature about tax planning opportunities due to “loopholes” in tax 
law and firms’ characteristics is further reviewed to discuss how tax planning 
using  one  approach  and  one  measure  differs  among  companies.  As  there  are 
several measures and approaches of tax planning activities, the following section 
discusses several tax planning measurements employed by previous studies and 
several  approaches  or  strategies  of  tax  planning  utilised  by  companies  in 
achieving their tax planning objective. 
 
Overall, based on the literature, tax planning interpretation is basically referring 
to tax avoidance and evasion. Due to the difficulty in differentiating “acceptable” 
avoidance  and  “unacceptable”  avoidance,  and  identifying  evasion,  this  study 
considers both  avoidance and  evasion in defining tax planning. Tax planning 
activities  among  companies  are  mainly  triggered  by  the  availability  of  the 
opportunity to avoid tax, derived from “loopholes” in tax law and firms’ specific 
characteristics.  The  activities  are  carried  out  by  companies  with  different 
objectives, for example increasing after tax returns or increasing after tax cash 
flow, but these objectives could be restricted by constraints of tax planning, for 
example, direct and indirect (non tax) costs of tax planning. Several tax planning 
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characteristics of income, reorganisation and tax favoured investment. Factors 
that motivate tax planning activities are primarily based on the expected benefits 
of tax planning and this motivating factor could be moderated by other factors, 
i.e.  corporate  governance  linked  to  stakeholders’  opinion  considerations. 
Corporate  governance  in  moderating  tax  planning  activities  is  of  interest  to 
researchers  as  shareholders  have  limited  access  to  companies’  tax  planning 
related  information.  Therefore,  there  is  a  possibility  of  incongruence  of  tax 
planning objectives between the managers and the owners of the companies. This 
phenomenon, which is called conflict of interest, is widely explained in corporate 
governance  literature.  Thus,  the  next  chapter  will  review  the  literature  on 
corporate governance, including the examination of the theories, requirements 
and mechanisms of corporate governance.  
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Chapter 3 
 
 
Corporate Governance 
 
 
Corporate  governance  is  important  in  explaining  management  behaviour  and 
how  a  company  is  monitored,  especially  in  mitigating  the  conflict  between 
owners and management. A report on corporate failure and accountability by The 
Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (“The Cadbury 
Committee”)  in  the  U.K.  namely  The  Financial  Aspects  of  Corporate 
Governance  (“The  Cadbury  Report”,  1992)  defines  corporate  governance  as 
“the system by which companies are directed and controlled” (Committee on the 
Financial  Aspects  of  Corporate  Governance,  1992:  Para  2.5).  Corporate 
governance  issues  have  been  widely  discussed  and  researched  due  to  the 
information  asymmetry  implications  on  shareholders’  wealth.  The  underlying 
theories of the issues are led by the agency theory which is mainly concerned 
with  the  phenomenon  of  a  separation  between  ownership  and  control  in  the 
context of information asymmetry.  This is in line with the work of Boubakri, 
Cosset  and  Guedhami  (2005),  where  corporate  governance  is  defined  as  “a 
response to the agency problems that arise from the separation of ownership and 
control in a corporation” (Boubakri et al., 2005: 370). In addition to agency 
theory,  this  chapter  also  discusses  other  relevant  theories  and  approaches, 
comprising  the  transaction  cost economics  approach,  stakeholder  theory  and 
stewardship theory.   
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3.1 Theories of Corporate Governance 
  
The underlying theories of corporate governance vary depending on the scope 
and focus of a discussed phenomenon. Mallin (2007) explains the main theories 
that  could  reflect  the  development  of  corporate  governance  as  consisting  of 
agency  theory,  transaction  cost economics  approach,  stakeholder  theory  and 
stewardship theory. These theories are important in explaining various topics in 
corporate  governance,  for  example,  corporate  performance  and  corporate 
governance mechanisms. This is due to the functions of the theory that could 
systematically predict, explain and support the cause and effect relationship of 
the variables or observed phenomenon (Zikmund, 2003; Babbie, 2004; Malhotra 
and Birks, 2007; Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2007). 
 
3.1.1 Agency Theory 
 
Mallin (2007) summarises agency theory as a theory that “identifies the agency 
relationship where one party, the principal, delegates work to another party, the 
agent. In  the  context  of  a  corporation,  the  owners are  the principal  and  the 
directors are the agent” (Mallin, 2007: 12). Agency theory is underpinned by the 
agency relationship, which is defined as “a contract under which one or more 
persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some 
service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority 
to the agent” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976: 308). With reference to the agency 
relationship, as there is separation between ownership and control, the agency 
problem will occur when the management, who act on behalf of the owners, 
might not actually behave in such a way as to maximise the owners’ welfare 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
 
The objective of wealth maximisation by the managers may be triggered by the 
information asymmetry between the owners and managers since the managers 
have more access to the companies’ information as compared to the owners and 
therefore, the owners are unable to monitor the agents effectively. Managers’ 
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objectives  (Weir,  Laing  and  McKnight,  2002).    Thus,  it  is  important  for 
shareholders  to  control  the  agency  problem  since  the  shareholders managers 
conflict may impair the endurance of the company as the managers are likely to 
pay more attention to the opportunity to maximise their own wealth instead of 
the future of the company. This is highlighted by Fama and Jensen (1983) in 
which the control of an agency problem can be regarded as an important survival 
factor for a company.   
 
In addition to the separation between ownership and control, separation between 
management and the control of decision systems also contributes to the conflict 
of  interests.  This  is  argued  by  Fama  and  Jensen  (1983)  where  decision 
hierarchies, boards of directors and incentive structures are further highlighted as 
devices of the separation. In this context, the agency problem is referred to as the 
problem of separation between residual risk bearing and decision functions while 
management  and  control  are  respectively  referred  to  as  initiation  and 
implementation, and ratification and monitoring.  
 
Therefore, it is important for shareholders to take some initiatives to limit or at 
least reduce the agency problem in order to ensure that the managers run the 
company and act on behalf of the shareholders’ interests. However, the initiatives 
will  apparently  incur  some  costs.  The  costs  are  explained  by  Jensen  and 
Meckling (1976) as agency costs. Agency costs are the costs that exist due to the 
complex set of contracting relationships and the said costs can be interpreted as 
follows:  the  total  of  monitoring  expenditures  by  the  principal  (for  example 
auditing,  compensation,  operating  rules  and  budget  restriction);  bonding 
expenditures by the agent; and residual loss (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama 
and  Jensen,  1983).  In  addition  to  the  shareholders managers  relationship,  an 
agency  relationship  also  exists  between  bondholders  and  shareholders.  This 
relationship focuses on the conflict of interest between the bondholders, who aim 
to  maximise  the  value of  the  firms’  debts,  and  the shareholders,  who  aim  to 
maximise the equity value of the  firms (Brander and Poitevin, 1992).  In this 
context, the principals (bondholders), who depend on the agents (shareholders) to 
increase the debt value, will require high interest rates to ensure that the expected 
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bondholders’ funds (Brander and Poitevin, 1992). This in turn can result in the 
above mentioned agency cost of debt covenant (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
 
In summary, agency theory is a theory in corporate governance that explains the 
agency  problem  due  to  the  agency  relationship.  The  agency  relationship  is 
mainly about the relation between principals and agents in which both parties 
have respective self interests of wealth maximisation. Thus, agency costs have to 
be incurred by the principals in order to align these interests which will then 
ensure the survival of the company.   
 
3.1.2 Transaction Cost-Economics Approach 
 
Transaction cost economics is an approach that explains institutions in terms of 
transaction costs. Williamson (1981), using an  economic approach, highlights 
that  transaction  cost economics  regards  a  firm  as  an  organisation  that 
accomplishes  a  transaction  which,  together  with  its  governance  structure,  is 
further used as a basic unit of analysis in organisational study. In this context, 
transaction  cost  is  defined  as  “the  management  costs  associated  with  either 
internally producing the service or buying it through contracting” (Brown and 
Potoski, 2003:443). Based on this definition, transaction cost can be interpreted 
as the cost that has been incurred in mediating a transaction, which is elaborated 
by Williamson (1981) as comprising  “comparative costs of planning, adapting, 
and  monitoring  task  completion  under  governance  structures”  (Williamson, 
1981:  552 553).  These  costs  are  explained  by  Coase  (1937)  as  being  due  to 
uncertainty and lack of information between contracting parties, for example in 
terms  of  corporate  governance,  the  cost  is  incurred  because  of  information 
asymmetry  between  the  shareholders  and  the  managers.  In  this  case,  the 
managers are seen as the “specialists” who have full access to the companies’ 
information while the shareholders are referred to as the “contracting parties” 
who need to incur the cost of “negotiating and concluding” the contract of a 
transaction, so as to reduce the risk of managerial opportunism. 
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From the above explanations, the main concern of transaction cost economics 
can be concluded as cost economising where the said cost is inclusive of the cost 
associated  with  governance  structure  in  which  it  “essentially  reduces  to 
economizing  on  bounded  rationality  while  simultaneously  safeguarding  the 
transactions  in  the  question  against  the  hazards  opportunism”  (Williamson, 
1979: 246). The costs are also explained by Kochhar (1996) as related  to the 
setting up and enforcement of the governance structure. The underlying premise 
of  this  approach  also  lies  in  the  insight  of  different  institutional  arrangement 
effects  towards  dissimilarities  of  governance  outcomes  (Shelanski  and  Klein, 
1995).  Therefore,  to  economise  the  transaction  cost,  corporate  governance 
mechanisms are essential for shareholders in “negotiating and concluding” the 
contract  of  a  transaction.  Romano  (1999)  highlights  that,  in  view  of  the 
transaction  cost economics  approach,  shareholder  voting  rights,  directors’  and 
officers’ fiduciary duties to the shareholder, federal disclosure requirements and 
the  market  for  corporate  control  are  the  internal  and  external  corporate 
governance mechanisms established by corporate law. Thus, the transaction cost 
economics approach can be concluded as an approach that explains the agency 
problem with an orientation of a corporate law.  
 
The  difference  between  the  transaction  cost economics  approach  and  agency 
theory can be illustrated from the firm capital structure perspective. Transaction 
cost economics concentrates more on governance of the contractual relationship, 
that is, focusing on characteristics of the transaction, whereas the agency theory 
is more concerned with governance structure in aligning shareholders’ managers’ 
interests,  that  is,  concentrating  on  the  characteristics  of  the  agents  (Kochhar, 
1996). The aforementioned characteristics of a transaction can be revealed by 
different types of financing for different levels of financial asset specificity in 
which a high specificity asset would not attract the debt finance due to a high 
risk  of  market  failure  caused  by  a  high  cost  in  market  exchange.  This  then 
requires shareholders to incur extra costs, in terms of the governance structure of 
the transaction, in ensuring management effectiveness in dealing with the high 
specificity of financing assets. In this perspective, the transaction cost economics 
approach  can be  claimed  as  viewing  the  governance  system  as  a  governance 
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institutions that frame a transaction” (Speckbacher, 2008: 297). The comparison 
between agency theory and the transaction cost economics approach is clearly 
presented by figure 3.1, which is adopted from Kochhar (1996).  
 
Figure 3.1 
Agency Theory versus Transaction Cost-Economics Approach: Capital 
Structure Perspective
12 
 
Agency Theory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Transaction Cost-Economics Approach 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Based on the above discussions, it can be summarised that the transaction cost 
economics  approach  indicates  a  governance  structure  of  a  contract  between 
shareholders and managers as an essence to clarify the shareholders managers 
alignment  problem.  Similarly  to  agency  theory,  information  asymmetry 
underpins the transaction cost economics approach but they are different in terms 
                                                 
12 Source: Kochhar, R. (1996) Explaining firm capital structure: The role of agency theory vs. 
transaction cost economics. Strategic Management Journal, 17 (9), 716 717. 
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of the focus of corporate governance in which agency theory concentrates on the 
managerial  behaviour  while  transaction  cost  economics  focuses  on  the 
governance structure of a transaction. This is in line with the summary by Mallin 
(2007) where the transaction cost economics approach considers the firm as a 
governance structure in aligning mangers’ and owners’ interests. 
 
3.1.3 Stakeholder Theory 
 
Jensen (2001) explains stakeholder theory as a theory that “says that managers 
should make decisions that take account of the interests of all the stakeholders in 
a firm” (Jensen, 2001: 8). The author refers to stakeholders as comprising any 
individual or group that can affect or be affected by the welfare of the firm, for 
example employees, customers, communities at large and government officials. 
Similarly, Mallin (2007) summarises stakeholder theory as a theory that “takes 
account of a wider group of constituents rather than focusing on shareholders. 
Where there is an emphasis on stakeholders, then the governance structure of the 
company may provide for some direct representation of the stakeholder groups” 
(Mallin, 2007: 12). In view of established corporations, stakeholder theory aims 
to  guide  and  explain  the  companies’  structures  and  operations  with  the 
foundation  that  the  corporation  is  an  entity  through  which  several  parties 
accomplish their various and different objectives (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). 
Thus, it can be concluded that, as compared to agency theory and the transaction 
cost economics approach, stakeholder theory deals with a wider range of parties 
in corporate governance.  
 
In summary, this theory explains that the managers are expected to serve not only 
the shareholders but also have to consider other parties that can be affected by 
activities of the company. Therefore, managers need to clarify the conflicting 
interests among the stakeholders to ensure the best level of implications from 
decisions made in accommodating those interests. Table 3.1 lists examples of 
conflicting  interests  among  customers,  employees,  suppliers  of  capital  and 
communities. Upon realising that it is impossible to fulfil all of the stakeholders’ 
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concern  of  the  managers  is  to  react  so  as  to  minimise  the  social  waste  in 
benefiting all relevant parties.  
 
Table 3.1 
Conflicting Interests of Stakeholders
13 
Stakeholder  Interest 
Customers  Low price, high quality, full service 
 
Employees  High  wages,  high quality  working  conditions,  fringe 
benefits including vacations, medical benefits, pensions 
 
Suppliers of capital  Low risk, high return 
 
Communities  High  charitable  contributions,  social  expenditures  by 
companies to benefit community at large, increased local 
investment, stable employment 
 
From the perspective of stakeholder theory as an alternative model of corporate 
governance, Sternberg  (1997) claims that stakeholder theory is appropriate to 
play a role as a “convenient reminder” and as a “key to social responsibility”. 
The  term  “convenient  reminder”  is  referred  to  by  the  author  as  an  alarm  to 
various groups and individual in the organisation about other affected parties in 
pursuing  their  respective  objectives,  while  “key  to  social  responsibility”  is 
referred to as everybody’s contributions to economic conditions which in turn 
reflect the business decisions. Therefore, stakeholder theory can be concluded as 
a corporate governance theory that considers various beneficiaries through the 
emphasis of awareness about other affected parties and social responsibility.  
 
Based  on  the  above  discussions,  stakeholder  theory  could  be  perceived  as  a 
theory  that  comprehensively  considers  all  beneficiaries  or  all  individuals  and 
groups  affected  by  decisions  made  by  the  management  of  the  companies. 
However,  previous  researchers  argue  that  stakeholder  theory  might  not  be 
capable of providing better corporate governance (Sternberg, 1997; Letza, Sun 
and Kirkbride, 2004). This is due to the debates on a divergence of corporate 
governance focus in stakeholder theory that is focusing on stakeholders instead 
                                                 
13 Source: Jensen, M. C. (2001) Value maximization, stakeholder theory, and the corporate 
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of  shareholders,  in  which  shareholders  are  seen  to  be  the  authority  of  the 
companies since they own the business. Sternberg (1997) argues that stakeholder 
theory might be incompatible with corporate governance since the theory is not 
in line with the key concept of corporate governance that is accountability of 
management  to  shareholders  and  accountability  of  corporate  employees  and 
other corporate agents to the shareholders through the management.  Thus, in 
corporate governance, it is important to note the differences in perspective in 
respect of shareholders’ and stakeholders’ views where, in terms of shareholders, 
the corporate governance is viewed as a private matter while stakeholders view 
the corporation as a social entity (Letza et al., 2004).  
 
Due to the above arguments, Friedman and Miles (2002) present a model that 
combines  stakeholder  theory  with  a  realist  theory  of  social  change  and 
differentiation in which the model provides a clearer understanding in terms of 
the reasons and ways in four matters: firstly, different ways of influencing the 
organisation  by  different  stakeholders;  secondly,  different  influences  on 
organisations  by  different  stakeholders;  thirdly,  not  all  stakeholders  are 
considered  as  legitimate  by  organisations;  and  finally,  changes  in  the 
organisation stakeholder  relationship  over  time.  In  addition  to  the  model  by 
Friedman and Miles (2002), the stakeholder agency theory as suggested by Hill 
and  Jones  (1992),  which  intends  to  combine  both  notions  of  power  and 
efficiency, could also ease the arguments on corporate governance focus between 
shareholders  and  stakeholders.  The  model  views  the  managers  as  being 
responsible to shareholders while benefiting other stakeholders (Hill and Jones, 
1992).  
 
Overall, it can be concluded that shareholders are not the only affected parties to 
be considered in a decision making process by the managers. This is due to the 
contributions  of  stakeholders  in  terms  of  capital,  skills  and  other  factors. 
However, it is important to note that it is impossible for the managers to satisfy 
all stakeholders due to conflicting interests among stakeholders. This leads to 
several arguments which then suggest alternative models and paradigms to the 
stakeholder theory. However, the suggested theory or paradigm is still paying 
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3.1.4 Stewardship Theory 
 
Stewardship theory regards directors as “the stewards of the company’s assets 
and will be predisposed to act in the best interest of the shareholders” (Mallin, 
2007:  12),  and  therefore  corporate  governance  mechanisms  are  seen  as 
unimportant in disciplining the managers from the shareholders’ point of view. 
As  compared  to  previously mentioned  theories,  stewardship  theory  positively 
views managers’ actions, concentrating on the role of managers as stewards of a 
company in which the managers are presumed to run the business with the aim of 
fulfilling  the  principals’  interests.  The  theory  is  based  on  the  premise  that 
managers are “stewards whose motives are aligned with the objectives of their 
principals” (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997: 21). In contrast to agency 
theory, which regards the managers’ actions as being undertaken to maximise 
their own wealth, stewardship theory emphasises the function of managers in 
maximising  the principals’  wealth  (Donaldson  and  Davis,  1991;  Davis  et  al., 
1997; Muth and Donaldson, 1998).      
 
Based on the assumption that the two theories (agency theory and stewardship 
theory) are competing one another,  Donaldson and Davis (1991), in  research 
investigating the association of the role and rewards of the chief executive officer 
(CEO) with the return on equity, find that CEO duality (i.e. the CEO is also the 
chairman) leads to a higher return for the shareholders. This result is interpreted 
by the authors as an empirical finding that supports stewardship theory where the 
combination of both positions of CEO and chairman leads to a higher return for 
the shareholders. This result contrasts with the assumption of agency theory that 
the combination of both positions will lead to higher managerial opportunism 
(Vafeas  and  Theodorou,  1998)  and  thus  will  result  in  a  lower  return  to 
shareholders.  The  finding  by  Donaldson  and  Davis  (1991)  implies  that  the 
combination of the positions positively affects shareholders’ interests since, as 
claimed by Weir et al. (2002), the director that holds both positions is likely to 
have more knowledge and understanding of a company’s operation and will thus 
positively affect shareholders’ wealth.  
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In view of previous literature, it can be concluded that stewardship theory is a 
theory that conflicts with agency theory. However, it is inappropriate to deny 
agency  theory’s  contributions  to  corporate  governance  as  it  has  dominated 
corporate  governance  research  since  1976  (see  Jensen  and  Meckling,  1976), 
relative  to  stewardship  theory.  Therefore,  in  explaining  a  theory  of  the  firm, 
various  theories  should  be  referred  to,  depending  on  the  main  focus  of  the 
governance  issue,  for  example,  agency  theory  is  about  conflict  of  interests, 
transaction cost economics theory is about contracting parties, stakeholder theory 
relates  to  various  interested  parties  and  stewardship  theory  concerns  the 
stewardship view of managerial actions. 
 
3.2 Corporate Governance Requirements  
 
Studies,  on  the  importance  of  corporate  governance  in  monitoring  executive 
activities while managing the business, have been highlighted since the early 
1990s  (see  Keasey,  Short  and  Wright,  2005).  Similarly,  specific  corporate 
governance  requirements  in  the  U.K.  have  been  in  force  since  1992  when 
corporate governance codes were implemented following the formation of the 
Cadbury Committee in 1991. Table 3.2 summarises the development of U.K. 
corporate governance regulations from 1992 until 2009.  
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Table 3.2 
Corporate Governance Regulations in U.K.
14 
 
Date of 
Publication 
Regulations 
/Publications 
Main Purpose 
/Recommendations 
Relevant 
Authority 
/Issuing Body 
 
December 
1992 
Code of Best 
Practice – “The 
Financial Aspects 
of Corporate 
Governance” (The 
Cadbury Report) 
 
To improve financial 
accountability to shareholders 
through: 
•  Information – full 
disclosure of highest 
directors’ and 
chairman’s 
remuneration; report 
on internal control and 
going concern 
•  Continued self 
regulation 
•  Separation of CEO 
and chairman unless 
there are strong and 
independent non 
executive directors 
•  Membership of the 
board – Should consist 
of both executive and 
non executive 
directors 
•  Non executive 
directors’ 
independence 
•  Audit committee 
independence – At 
least three non 
executive directors 
•  Executive directors’ 
contracts – Should not 
be more than three 
years without 
shareholders’ approval 
•  Remuneration 
committee – comprise 
wholly or mainly non 
executive directors 
 
Cadbury 
Committee 
                                                 
14 Source: Demirag, I., Sudarsanam, S. & Wright, M. (2000) Corporate governance: Overview 
and research agenda, The British Accounting Review, 32 (4), 342 343, Keasey, K., Short, H. & 
Wright, M. (2005) The development of corporate governance codes in the U.K. In Keasey, K., 
Thompson, S. & Wright, M. (Eds.) Corporate Governance Accountability, Enterprise and 
International Comparisons. 2nd ed., West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, 24 and Mallin, C. A. 
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April 1993  Amendments of 
Listing Rules by 
U.K. Stock 
Exchange 
To require the company to 
provide the information on the 
compliance with the Cadbury 
recommendations (from 1 July 
1993) 
  
LSE 
December 
1994 
Rutteman Guidance 
on Internal Control 
and Financial 
Reporting 
To provide guidance to limit 
the directors’ reporting 
responsibilities to internal 
financial control and assess the 
directors’ effectiveness 
 
Rutteman 
Committee 
July 1995  Code of Best 
Practice – 
“Directors’ 
Remuneration” 
(The Greenbury 
Report) 
 
To emphasise the role of 
independent non executive 
directors and disclosure of all 
components of remunerations 
through: 
•  Exclusively 
independent non 
executive directors’ 
membership in 
remuneration 
committee 
•  Annual report to 
shareholders by 
remuneration 
committee 
•  Shareholder approval 
for adoption of long 
term incentive plan 
•  Requirement for 
issuance of share 
option 
  
Greenbury 
Committee 
October 
1995 
Amendments of 
Listing Rules by 
U.K. Stock 
Exchange 
To require the company to 
provide the information on the 
compliance with the 
Greenbury recommendations  
 
LSE 
June 1996  Amendments of 
Listing Rules by 
U.K. Stock 
Exchange 
 
To ensure the issue of share 
options in phases instead of in 
one large block 
 
LSE 
January 
1998 
“Committee on 
Corporate 
Governance” 
Report (The 
Hampel Report)  
•  To review the 
implementation of 
Cadbury and Greenbury 
recommendations 
•  To restrict the regulatory 
burden on companies i.e. 
from ‘check list’ method 
to issuance of list of 
applied principles of 
corporate governance 
Hampel 
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March 1998  Modern Company 
Law for a 
Competitive 
Economy 
To provide consultative 
document in outlining the 
revision and modernization of 
the framework of company 
law
15 
 
Department of 
Trade and 
Industry (DTI) 
June 1998  The Combined 
Code  
To provide a set of 18 
principles and 48 codes 
comprising of Cadbury, 
Greenbury and Hampel 
recommendations with main 
extended recommendations on: 
•  At least three non 
executive directors on 
the boards and the 
non executive 
directors should not be 
less than a third of the 
boards 
•  Independence of non 
executive directors  
•  Justification for 
unitary leadership 
•  Identification of 
members in 
nomination committee 
in annual report 
•  Re election of all 
directors at least every 
three years 
•  The board, instead of 
remuneration 
committee, should 
report to the 
shareholder about 
remuneration matters 
•  Indication of the level 
of proxy votes, the 
balance of for and 
against for each 
resolution in AGM. 
•  Availability of the 
chairs of audit, 
remuneration and 
nomination 
committees in AGM  
•  At least three non 
executive directors in 
which the majority 
should be independent 
Hampel 
Committee 
                                                 
15 See reports and publications by Department for Business Innovation and Skills Department, 
formally known as Business Enterprise & Regulatory Reform, 
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as the members of 
audit committee and 
the members should be 
mentioned in the 
annual report 
 
February 
1999 
The Strategic 
Framework: 
Modern Company 
Law for a 
Competitive 
Economy 
•  To provide a fundamental 
review of company law
16 
•  To examine issues relating 
to the legislative form of 
implementation, and the 
institutional structures for 
ongoing reform
17 
 
DTI 
March 1999  DTI consultative 
paper – Political 
Donations by 
Companies: A 
Consultative 
Document  
 
To provide a consultative 
paper to amend Companies 
Act on shareholder consent 
prior to political donations 
 
DTI 
July 1999  DTI consultative 
paper – Directors’ 
Remuneration: A 
Consultative 
Document 
To provide a consultative 
paper to propose: 
•  Increase disclosure of 
the relationship 
between performance 
and pay 
•  Simplification of share 
option disclosure 
•  Measures of 
shareholders’ votes on 
remuneration reports 
  
DTI 
September 
1999 
Turnbull Report on 
Internal Control 
To develop practical and 
robust guidance that requires 
the directors to include the 
reviews of operational and 
compliance  controls and risk 
management in the report  
 
Turnbull 
Committee 
September 
1999 
Recommendations 
by Law 
Commission/Scotti
sh Law 
Commission 
To recommend a statutory 
requirement for principal 
duties of directors and 
definition of a director’s duty 
of skill and care 
 
Scottish Law 
Commission 
March 2000  Modern Company 
Law for a 
Competitive 
Economy: 
Developing the 
Framework 
To provide a consultative 
paper for: 
•  The role of directors, 
shareholders and 
reporting and 
DTI 
                                                 
16 Ibid. 
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accounting 
•  Simplification of 
reporting disclosure 
for private companies 
 
November 
2000 
Modern Company 
Law for a 
Competitive 
Economy: 
Completing the 
Structure  
To provide consultative paper 
in developing previous 
documents with reference to 
responses and comments  
 
DTI 
March 2001  Myners review – 
Institutional 
Investment in the 
United Kingdom: A 
Review 
To highlight the standards and 
promoting greater (i.e. 
institutional) shareholder 
activism 
 
HM Treasury 
February 
2002 
Government 
consultation 
document – 
Encouraging 
Shareholder 
Activism 
•  To embark proposed 
legislation in U.K. law 
about active monitoring 
and communication 
between management and 
investee companies  
•  To exercise shareholders’ 
vote  
 
Department 
for Work and 
Pensions and 
HM Treasury 
July 2002  Government’s 
White Paper – 
Modernising 
Company Law 
•  To codify the directors’ 
obligations 
•  To enhance the  
transparency  of the 
operation of AGM  
 
House of 
Commons 
Trade and 
Industry 
Committee 
October 
2002 
Institutional 
Shareholders 
Committee’s 
Statement of 
Principles  
 
To outline the responsibilities 
of institutional shareholders 
and agents 
 
Institutional 
Shareholders 
Committee 
January 
2003 
Higgs review – 
Review of the Role 
and Effectiveness 
of Non Executive 
Directors 
 
To review the role and the 
effectiveness of non executive 
directors through the 
recommendations on: 
•  The independent non 
executive directors 
portion should not be 
less than half of the 
board (exclude the 
chairman) 
•  New definition of 
independent non 
executive directors 
that is independent in 
terms of: 
o  Character and 
judgement 
Higgs 
Committee Chapter 3 Corporate Governance                                                                        73 
 
o  Last five years’ 
former 
employment 
o  Last three years’ 
material business 
relationship 
o  Payments granted 
other than 
directors’ fee 
o  Close family ties 
with advisers, 
directors or senior 
employees 
o  Significant links 
with other directors 
o  Significant 
shareholder 
o  Serve the board 
more than 10 years 
•  Senior independent 
non executive 
directors’ 
identification 
•  Meeting attendance by 
senior independent 
non executive 
directors  
•  Meeting among non 
executive directors  
•  Independent non 
executive directors as 
the chairman of 
nomination committee 
•  Non executive 
directors’ positions 
and chairman of a 
FTSE 100 company 
•  Separation of CEO 
and chairman 
•  Non executive 
directors in not more 
than three committees 
•  Induction programmes 
for new non executive 
directors  
 
June 2003  DTI consultative 
paper – A 
Consultative 
Document: 
Rewards for 
Failure; Directors’ 
To provide a consultative 
document on directors' 
contracts, performance and 
severance payments and the 
linkage between all of the 
three aspects
18 
DTI 
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Remuneration – 
Contracts, 
Performance and 
Severance  
 
July 2003  The Combined 
Code  
To review the codes of 
corporate governance and to 
provide a new set of codes as a 
response to Higgs Report 
 
Financial 
Reporting 
Council (FRC) 
October 
2005 
Revised Turnbull 
Guidance 
To provide the guidance of 
internal control that has 
elements of sound system, 
relevant overtime and suitable 
to apply by each company
19 
  
FRC 
June 2006  The Combined 
Code 
•  To permit the 
remuneration committee to 
be served by company’s 
chairman. However, the 
chairman could not chair 
the said committee and the 
chairman should be 
independent of the 
chairman’s appointment  
•  To provide the 
shareholders  a ‘vote 
withheld’ option on proxy 
appointment forms  
•  To suggest the particulars 
of proxies that were lodged 
at general meetings where 
votes were taken based on 
a show of hands to be 
published on the 
companies’ websites 
 
FRC 
June 2008  The Combined 
Code
20  
•  To allow an individual to  
chair more than one FTSE 
100 company  
•  To allow the company 
chairman (only if 
independent on 
appointment) of listed 
companies outside the 
FTSE 350 to sit on the 
FRC 
                                                 
19 See Financial Reporting Council Internal Control Revised Guidance for Directors on the 
Combined Code October 2005  
http://www.frc.org.uk/documents/pagemanager/frc/Revised%20Turnbull%20Guidance%20October
%202005.pdf [Accessed 13 May 2008]. 
20 Financial Reporting Council (2008) The Combined Code on Corporate Governance. Available 
from: 
http://www.frc.org.uk/documents/pagemanager/frc/Combined_Code_June_2008/Combined%20C
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audit committee 
November 
2009 
Walker Review 
2009
21 
To suggest measures to 
improve corporate 
governance of banks and 
other financial entities, 
particularly on risk 
management 
 
Walker 
Committee 
December 
2009 
2009 Review of 
The Combined 
Code: Final 
Report
22 
•  To revise The Combined 
Code and to rename it as 
The UK Corporate 
Governance Code. This 
code will apply to the 
reporting periods 
beginning on or after 29 
June 2010. 
•  To implement some of 
the recommendations in 
the Walker Review to all 
listed companies 
FRC 
 
The  first  code  of  corporate  governance  in  the  U.K.  was  developed  by  the 
Cadbury Committee, which was established in May 1991. The committee was 
established due to several underlying problems related to accounting standards, 
business  controls  and  competitive  pressures  on  both  companies  and  auditors 
(Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1992). In 1992, 
the  committee  produced  a  report  and  code  on  the  best  practice  of  corporate 
governance,  namely  Report  of  the  Committee  on  the  Financial  Aspects  of 
Corporate  Governance  (“The  Cadbury  Report”,  1992)  and  Report  of  the 
Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance the Code of Best 
Practice  (“The  Cadbury  Report  Code”,  1992)  respectively.  The  report 
concentrates  on  the  accountability  and  risk  management  aspect  of  corporate 
governance with a central objective of reinforcing director integrity and board 
effectiveness  in  promoting  good  quality  and  reliable  financial  information 
                                                 
21 Walker, D. (2009) A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and Other Financial 
Industry Entities: Final Recommendations. Available from: http://www.hm 
treasury.gov.uk/d/walker_review_261109.pdf [Accessed 7 April 2010]. 
22 Financial Reporting Council (2009) 2009 Review of the Combined Code: Final Report. 
Available from: 
http://www.frc.org.uk/images/uploaded/documents/2009%20Review%20of%20the%20Combined
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(Demirag, Sudarsanam and Wright, 2000). This particular objective provides the 
insight  into  the  importance  of  financial  reporting  in  corporate  governance, 
especially in ensuring the accountability function of the executives.  
 
However, the report was criticised due to its initial shortcomings in the ad hoc 
process and lack of enforcement mechanism that fails to provide a legislative 
requirement to which a company should adhere  (Dewing and Russell, 2000). 
The shortcomings, together with a further emphasis on the importance of the 
good practice of corporate governance in the U.K., led to the establishment and 
publication  of  subsequent  committees  and  reports.  Demirag et  al. (2000)  and 
Keasey et al. (2005) chronologically summarise the development of these codes 
until the publication of the Combined Code on Corporate Governance in July 
2003. Consequent to the establishment of the Cadbury Committee, The Study 
Group on Directors’ Remuneration (“The Greenbury Committee”), which was 
established in January 1995 at the request of the U.K. government, produced 
Greenbury Report Code of Best Practice (“The Greenbury Report”, 1995). The 
report  mainly  concentrates  on  procedures  relating  to  directors’  remuneration. 
Three months after this publication, The Committee on Corporate Governance 
(“The Hampel Committee”) was established in November 1995 with the aim of 
reviewing the implementation of the Cadbury and Greenbury Reports. Committee 
on  Corporate  Governance:  Final  Report  (“The  Hampel  Report”,  1998) 
recommends  a  long term  view  of  the  employment  of  institutional  investors 
(Webb, Beck and McKinnon, 2003).  Then, in 1998, The Combined Code on 
Corporate Governance was published to combine the Hampel, Greenbury and 
Cadbury  Codes.  Next,  a  revised  combined  code,  The  Combined  Code  on 
Corporate  Governance  2003,  was  published  in  response  to  the  criticism  of 
Review  of  the  Role  and  Effectiveness  of  Non Executive  Directors  (“Higgs 
Report”, 2003) about the function and effectiveness of non executive directors. 
In  recent  years,  the  code  was  revised  to  The  Combined  Code  on  Corporate 
Governance  2006  (Mallin,  2007)  and    The  Combined  Code  on  Corporate 
Governance 2008 (Financial Reporting Council, 2008). This code is then revised 
in 2009 to consider recommendations in Review of Corporate Governance in UK 
Banks  and  Other  Financial  Industry  Entities,  i.e.  “Walker  Review”  (Walker, Chapter 3 Corporate Governance                                                                        77 
 
2009) and the revised code is named UK Corporate Governance Code (Financial 
Reporting Council, 2009). 
 
In short, all the reports and codes are basically responding to the agency problem 
specifically in protecting the interest of the owners or shareholders of companies. 
In  addition  to  the  corporate  governance  requirements,  studies  of  the  agency 
problem also highlight the role and the effectiveness of corporate governance 
mechanisms in ensuring the objective of shareholders’ wealth maximisation (for 
example Jensen and Meckling, 1976; John and Senbet, 1998; Demirag et al., 
2000; Goergen, Manjon and Renneboog, 2005). The said mechanisms include 
internal and external mechanisms.  
 
3.3 Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
 
Hart (1995) discusses corporate governance mechanisms as comprising board of 
directors,  proxy  fights,  large  shareholders,  hostile  takeovers  and  financial 
structure. In terms of internal and external mechanisms, Demirag et al. (2000) 
explain the internal mechanisms as consisting of board composition, managerial 
ownership  and  non managerial  large  shareholdings  (inclusive  of  institutional 
shareholding) while external mechanisms consist of a statutory audit, the market 
for corporate control manifested in hostile takeovers and stock market evaluation 
of corporate performance. Further, Weir et al. (2002), in investigating the impact 
of internal and external mechanisms on the performance of large U.K. public 
companies,  refer  to  board  structure,  board  monitoring,  committee  structure, 
director  quality,  director  shareholdings,  debt  financing  and  institutional 
shareholdings  as  internal  mechanisms  while  the  market  for  corporate  control, 
which is the threat of a takeover, is an external mechanism.  In addition to the 
above mentioned internal mechanisms, John and Senbet (1998) further specify 
corporate governance functions of the board of directors based on the monitoring 
function and board objectives; board composition, which is outside directorship 
and  board  independence;  board  size  and  committee  structure,  which  is  audit, 
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structures. The effectiveness of these mechanisms in mitigating agency problems 
is discussed in the following two sub sections. 
 
3.3.1 External Mechanisms 
 
Denis and McConnell (2003), in a research survey about international corporate 
governance,  highlight  that  the  market  for  corporate  control  and  the  legal  or 
regulatory  system  are  the  main  external  corporate  governance  mechanisms  in 
mitigating agency problems. The external mechanisms are said by the authors to 
interfere particularly in the case where the internal mechanisms are significantly 
unsuccessful in playing the governance role.  
 
A  hostile  takeover  is  regarded  “as  external  mean  of  removing  managers 
upholding  stakeholder  claims”  (Shleifer  and  Summers,  1988:  15).  Cash  flow 
theory explains that the occurrence of takeovers in disciplining the management 
is instigated by the breakdown of internal control processes in firms that have a 
significant level of free cash flows and policies that lead to a waste of resources 
(Jensen, 1986). The flow of takeover threat is explained by Gibbs (1993), as 
depicted by the figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.2 
Flow of Takeover Threats 
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Takeover, as an effective mechanism, could be observed when the actual firm 
value is sufficiently lower than its potential value for it to create an incentive for 
outsiders to take over the control of the firm (Denis and McConnell, 2003).  This 
is  also  explained  by  O'Sullivan  and  Wong  (1998)  where  “the  greater  is 
management’s departure from value maximisation, the larger the potential gain 
for  any  acquirer  and  consequently  the  more  vulnerable  the  incumbent 
management team is to takeover bid” (O'Sullivan and Wong, 1998: 19). Thus, 
the takeover threats will then provide an incentive to the managers to increase the 
firm value so as to ensure that the deviation of the actual value from the potential 
value will not be too high (Denis and McConnell, 2003). The differences in the 
values motivate the acquirer since it would provide a large gain. Hart (1995) 
explains  that  hostile  takeover  is  a  powerful  mechanism  in  disciplining  the 
management due to the large rewards available to those parties who are able to 
identify underperforming companies. In addition to the rewards, takeover is also 
motivated by several other factors comprising recovery of agency costs, market 
power, economies of scale and scope, underpriced resources and potential costs 
of  takeovers  (Gibbs,  1993).  However,  it  should  be  noted  that  takeover  is  an 
expensive  mechanism  due  to  the  leverage  incurred  in performing  a  takeover. 
Despite this cost, takeover might be preferred by some shareholders due to the 
temporary nature of the costs. This is in line with free cash flow theory in which 
the  debt  created  in  a  hostile  takeover  (or  takeover  defence)  should  not  be 
everlasting  as  the  benefits  of  an  expansion  program  and  sales  of  valuable 
divisions could be used to reduce the debts  (Jensen, 1986).  
 
In terms of the implications of a takeover activity, Firth (1980), in examining 
merger and takeover activity in the U.K. between 1969 and 1975, finds evidence 
of  the  relationship  between  mergers  and  takeover  activities,  and  shareholder 
returns. The results indicate a positive effect of mergers and takeovers for the 
acquired firms’ shareholders as well as for the acquiring companies’ managers. 
In contrast, the results show a negative effect of mergers and takeover on the 
acquiring  companies’  shareholders.  The  author  signifies  the  results  of  the 
research  as  being  due  to  motivation  for  the  takeover  activity  which  is  to 
maximise management utility instead of maximising shareholder wealth.  
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Short, Keasey, Hull and Wright (1998)  claim that U.K. and  U.S. governance 
practices rely on the takeover market which is categorised as one of the market 
based solutions to the agency problem, in which takeover is treated as a dominant 
and  primary  tool  in  both  countries,  particularly  to  remove  underperforming 
management. However, the authors, based on previous research studies, identify 
several arguments on the role of hostile takeover in a governance process. The 
first argument is related to the deviation of managers’ focus from the long term 
benefit to the short term gains. Stein (1988), in examining the argument about 
the damage that is caused by takeover pressure, highlights that the caveat to a 
takeover being an effective governance mechanism occurs in the case where the 
shareholders  are  inadequately  informed  about  the  temporary  fall  in  earnings 
which then leads to an  undervaluing of stock and thus, the possibility  of the 
occurrence of takeover  at an unfavourable price is higher. This is led by the 
attention of management to the short term objective as highlighted by Short et al. 
(1998).  Stein  (1988)  further  explains  that  the  said  action  of  the  management 
depends on several factors that include shareholders’ attitudes and beliefs, inside 
information of corporate raiders, and managers’ commitment to holding on to 
their control of the firms. 
 
Secondly,  takeover  might  be  inefficient  since,  from  the  point  of  view  of  the 
bidding firms, there is a potential for the managers to make use of takeover in 
pursuing their own purposes and representing the strategic objective of the bidder 
instead of focusing on the managerial failure of the target firms. This is also 
highlighted by Denis and McConnell (2003) who state that the takeover market 
might negatively affect the acquiring company’s shareholders if the managers are 
more focused on maximising their business empires which will then lead to a 
waste of corporate resources by overpaying for acquisition instead of returning 
cash to the shareholders.    
 
Thirdly,  takeover  can  be  criticised  in  terms  of  the  opportunity  for  the  new 
shareholders to renege on implicit contracts with stakeholders. This is discussed 
in detail by Shleifer and Summers (1988) who argue that takeover effectiveness 
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this could drive the phenomenon of wealth redistribution from stakeholders to 
the shareholders which then leads to a deterioration of trust in the corporation. 
 
These negative consequences of takeover are due to the “free rider” problem, 
competition  from  other  bidders  (inclusive  of  minority  shareholders)  and 
competition from incumbent management (Hart, 1995). Thus, due to the above 
mentioned  criticisms,  the  effectiveness  of  the  takeover  market  mechanism  in 
disciplining  the  management  could  be  debated.  In  fact,  due  to  the  takeover 
issues, takeover could possibly create more governance problems than solutions 
which then suggests the applicability of legal action in limiting the prevalence of 
takeovers (Short et al., 1998).   
 
However, the  effectiveness of the legal or  regulatory  system is also  arguable 
where Jensen (1993) regards the legal or regulatory system as a blunt instrument 
in effectively handling the wasteful managerial problem. There are three reasons 
for this: firstly, inconsistency of law in governance around the world; secondly, 
inconsistency  of  enforcement  of  the  law  around  the  world;  and  thirdly,  the 
substitute mechanisms for poor investor protection (La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, 
Shleifer  and  Vishny,  1998).  Thus,  given  the  pros  and  cons  of  external 
mechanisms,  internal  mechanisms  could  be  another  alternative  in  mitigating 
agency problems.  
 
3.3.2 Internal Mechanisms 
 
The  internal  corporate  governance  mechanisms  that  will  be  discussed  in  the 
following sections consist of ownership monitoring and board of directors. 
 
3.3.2.1 Ownership Monitoring  
 
Jensen  and  Meckling  (1976)  regard  the  ownership  structure  as  a  corporate 
governance mechanism since it could reduce the agency problem with reference 
to  stock  ownership  by  management  where  such  ownership  could  moderate 
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ownership tend to maximise their wealth as owners, which is in line with other 
shareholders’ wealth objectives.  This is aligned with the findings by Florackis 
(2005) using 962 non financial U.K. listed firms for a sample period of 1999 
2003, where the percentage of shares held by executive directors is found to be 
related to company performance.
23  However, an excessive level of managerial 
ownership may not be effective as it tends to lead to  greater agency problems, 
for example, insufficient efforts, private benefits emphasis and entrenchment at 
the expense of other shareholders (Florackis, 2008). 
 
In  addition  to  the  management  stock  ownership,  large  ownership  is  another 
important characteristic of ownership that could also play an essential role in 
ensuring  effective  corporate  governance.  Large  shareholders  are  normally 
associated  with  institutional  shareholders.  In  other  words,  management 
opportunism  can  be  constrained  by  the  existence  of  institutional  ownership 
monitoring (Firth, Tam and Tang, 1999). It should be noted that, in the U.K., the 
ownership structure is dispersed instead of concentrated. This is highlighted by 
Faccio  and  Lang  (2002)  who  state  that  widely held  companies  are  more 
important  in  the  U.K.  as  well  as  in  Ireland  as  compared  to  companies  in 
continental Europe.  This phenomenon is due to the existing takeover code and 
the  law  that  protects  the  interests  of  minority  shareholders,  which  leads  to  a 
constraint on building controlling stakes (Florackis, 2005). In explaining the role 
of large investors in protecting small investors, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) draw 
attention to large shareholders and large creditors as the forms of concentrated 
ownership.  
 
Hart  (1995)  highlights  the  role  played  by  large  shareholders  in  lessening  the 
agency problem in terms of management monitoring and proxy fight launching 
in which such types of shareholders in the U.K. are referred to as institutional 
shareholders while, in Germany and Japan, the large shareholders are typically 
banks. However, the role of large shareholders in reducing the agency problem 
could be debated since the large shareholders may run the company in their own 
                                                 
23 The author tests the relationship by means of four different models of which models 1 and 2 are 
non linear and models 3 and 4 are linear models. The non linear models are the models that 
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interests and they might use their power to increase their wealth at the expense of 
the other shareholders, since their ownerships are less than 100 percent (Hart, 
1995). In fact, in the U.K., the institutional shareholders are found to be passive 
and  do  not  behave  in  a  manner  that  maximises  the  shareholders’  interests 
(Goergen and Renneboog, 2001). In addition, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) stress 
the importance of sophisticated legal systems in ensuring the effectiveness of 
large shareholders because, with weak courts, the large shareholders are likely to 
gain outright majority ownership.  
 
The functions of large shareholders’ ownership in agency problems can also be 
explained  in  relation  to  owner controlled  firms.  The  said  ownership  type  is 
highlighted as being more effective in reducing any conflict of interest  compared 
to management controlled firms since owner controlled firms tend to hold a large 
portion of companies’ equity and hence constitute large shareholders, as defined 
by Short (1994) that the firm is owner controlled if “a dominant stockholding 
interest owns specified fraction of the firms” (Short, 1994: 207).  
  
In  addition  to  the  above mentioned  types  of  ownership,  ownership  by  non 
executive directors could also perform the role of protecting the welfare of the 
shareholders since these directors are highly related to director independence. 
This is in line with the finding by Byrd and Hickman (1992) that independent 
outside directors monitor a firm’s decision on the behalf of shareholders during 
the acquisition process of tender offer bids which were made from 1980 through 
1987. In addition, Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) explain that ownership by non 
executive board members could be positively related to the firm value due to the 
enhancement of director independence.  
 
3.3.2.2 Board of Directors 
 
As  discussed  above,  besides  ownership  structure,  the  board  of  directors  is 
another  internal  mechanism  in  effective  corporate  governance.  Fama  (1980) 
views  the  board  of  directors  as  “a  market induced  institution,  the  ultimate 
internal monitor of the set of contracts called firm, whose most important role is 
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an internal mechanism, the main function of the board of directors is to monitor 
the executive activities. This is in line with The Cadbury Report “The Financial 
Aspects of Corporate Governance” in which the board of directors is said to be 
responsible for the governance of the company of which their responsibilities 
include “setting the company’s strategic aims, providing the leadership to put 
them into effect, supervising the management of the business and reporting to 
shareholders  on  their  stewardship”  (Committee  on  the  Financial  Aspects  of 
Corporate Governance,  1992: Para 2.5).  Beaver, Davies  and Joyce  (2007), in 
discussing the issues and contexts of the leadership role of the board of directors, 
highlight two main dimensions of boards’ activity which consist of setting the 
strategic direction and evaluating company performance.  
 
In  relation  to  agency  theory,  Zahra  and  Pearce  (1989)  explain  the  board  of 
directors as an ultimate mechanism of corporate control since the boards perform 
a critical function of monitoring and rewarding the executive. Further, Zahra and 
Pearce  (1989)  outline  the  board  of  directors’  attributes  as  composition, 
characteristics,  decision  process  and  structure  in  which  board  composition 
concerns  the  board  size  and  type  while  the  characteristics  are  directors’ 
experiences,  functional  background,  independence,  stock  ownership  and 
variables that could influence directors’ interest in carrying out the tasks. The 
decision process is referred to as the decision making process and styles of the 
board  while  the  board  structure  is  about  the  board  organisation,  division  of 
labour among standing committees and the efficiency of its operation. The next 
two  sections  of  this  chapter  will  discuss  the  importance  and  effectiveness  of 
board composition and board structure in corporate governance. 
 
3.3.2.2.1 Board Composition 
 
Board composition, as seen in the above discussion, comprises board size and 
board  type.  Previous  researchers  have  measured board  size  as  the  number  of 
directors on the board (for example Florackis, 2005; Marchica and Mura, 2005; 
Brick, Palmon and Wald, 2006). Marchica and Mura (2005), in analysing the 
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document  that  board  size  is  positively  related  to  firm  size.  In  terms  of  the 
effectiveness  of  corporate  governance  by  board  size,  previous  studies  find 
conflicting  results  on  the  relationship  between  board  size  and  corporate 
performance proxies (for example Florackis, 2005; Brick et al., 2006). Brick et 
al.  (2006)  find  a  significant  negative  relationship  between  the  number  of 
directors  with  directors’  cash  compensation  and  total  compensation.  In  other 
words, the higher the board size, the lower the compensation per director and this 
exhibits better governance as it shows lower agency costs incurred in monitoring 
management  opportunism.  In  contrast,  Florackis  (2005)  finds  a  negative 
relationship  between  the  number  of  directors  on  the  board  and  performance, 
measured by Tobin’s Q, among U.K. publicly traded firms. Zahra and Pearce 
(1989) highlight three reasons for the positive impact of board size on corporate 
performance, specifically  a company’s financial performance. Firstly, a larger 
board size is assumed to have a variety of educational and industrial backgrounds 
and skills. Subsequent to the educational and industry expertise, the larger board 
size will have varieties of perspective in improving the decisions or activities of a 
company.  Secondly,  a  larger  board  size  would  have  a  greater  opportunity  to 
secure  resources  and  establish  a  favourable  image  for  a  company  due  to  the 
choice of multiple aspects of the firm’s environment, for example in terms of 
competition, product placement and supplier, a large board constitutes directors 
with  various  business  experience  and  directors  from  various  business 
environments who then  create opportunities for  a large business network and 
thus  contribute  to  a  positive  effect  on  the  company’s  image  among  the 
companies, at least within the same industry. Thirdly, with a larger board, there 
will be a constraint upon the CEO domination on the board and this in turn will 
lead  to  an  improvement  by  the  board  in  exercising  its  power  in  running  the 
company.     
 
Consistent with Brick et al. (2006), in a study of the association of agency costs 
and  corporate  governance  mechanisms  using  U.K.  data,  Florackis  (2008) 
explains that board size could be negatively related to the firm’s performance due 
to difficulties in coordination, communication and decision making as compared 
to smaller boards. This is in line with De Andres, Azofra and Lopez (2005), who 
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De Andres et al. (2005) discuss the negative relationship as being due to the 
disadvantages of large board size that are poorer coordination, flexibility and 
communication.  
 
In  respect  of  the  influence  of  the  type  of  board  of  directors  in  corporate 
governance, the explanation can be attributed to three types of boards of directors 
that are inside directors, independent directors, and interlocking directors.  Inside 
directors  can  be  referred  to  as  executive  directors  who  are  working  in  the 
managerial team. In their descriptive analysis, while investigating an association 
of  board  and  ownership  structure  with  cross sectional  variations  in  CEO 
compensation, Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) define inside directors as 
“the percentage of the total directors who are insiders (i.e., directors who are 
managers,  retired  managers,  or  family  members  of  present  or  past 
management)” (Core et al., 1999: 382).  From the said study, Core et al. (1999) 
find a negative association between CEO compensation and the percentage of 
inside  directors.  This  shows  that  inside  directors  play  a  significant  role  in 
corporate governance, specifically in executive compensation determination.  
 
However, in the case of firm value, Yeh and Woidtke (2005) find contradictory 
evidence on the effectiveness of the insiders in which companies whose boards 
are dominated by members affiliated with the controlling family are negatively 
related  to  firm  value.  This  is  due  to  shareholders’  perception  that  the  inside 
directors are more interested in decision making that is related to their interests 
instead of firm value.  
 
In contrast to the inside directors, the level of the independent directors would be 
an effective governance mechanism due to the monitoring role played by the 
independent directors. In explaining what constitutes an independent director, the 
National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF)
24 highlights that “an individual 
                                                 
24 “The main UK body representing the interests of the occupational pensions movement and 
provides representation and other services for those involved in designing, operating, advising 
and investing funds of pension schemes in the UK. Because of the voting power that members 
collectively possess as institutional investors, the NAPF's views are important to UK public 
companies on matters such as voting” Glossary item: Practical Law Company (2008) National 
Association of Pension Funds (NAPF). Available from: http://pensions.practicallaw.com/9 107 
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director’s integrity is highly relevant and the level of a director’s independence 
can vary, depending on the particular issue under discussion. In assessing the 
independence of a non executive director the assumption is that the individual is 
independent unless, in relation to the company, the director: 
● Was formerly an executive 
● Is, or has been, paid by the company in any capacity other than as a non 
executive director 
● Represents a trading partner or is connected to a company or partnership (or 
was prior to retirement) which does business with the company 
● Has been a non executive director for nine years   i.e. three 3 year terms 
● Is closely related to an executive director 
● Has been awarded share options, performance related pay or is a member of 
the company’s pension fund 
● Represents a controlling or significant shareholder 
● Is a new appointee selected other than by a formal process 
● Has cross directorships with any executive director 
● Is deemed by the company, for whatever reason(s), not to be independent” 
(NAPF's Shareholder Affairs Sub Committee, 2002: 21) 
 
Previous  researchers  relate  board  independence  to  the  proportion  of  non 
executive directors that serve the board (for example Weir et al., 2002; Dulewicz 
and Herbert, 2004; Linck, Netter and Yang, 2008). Non executive directors are 
“outside directors who monitor the decisions made by the executive directors” 
(Laing and Weir, 1999: 458). In other words, non executive directors are outside 
directors that play a role in improving a board’s monitoring quality through their 
independent characteristics (Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998). 
 
As outside directors are claimed to be related to board independence, in contrast 
to inside directors, outside directors could positively affect corporate governance 
(see Core et al., 1999). Domination by outside directors is essential for corporate 
governance effectiveness (Zahra and Pearce, 1989) since, with their domination, 
they  will  be  more  powerful  in  the  decision making  process  while  protecting 
shareholders’  interests,  which  leads  to  a  minimum  conflict  of  interest.    In 
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environments since they have a wide range of expertise, personal relationships 
and professional personal reputations (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). However, Weir 
and Laing (2000) find  negative and simultaneous relationships between outside 
directors’  representation  and  accounting  performance  among  U.K. quoted 
companies during 1992 and 1995 in which return on asset is the proxy for firm 
performance. The authors interpret the finding as the sensitivity of the results 
towards  the  choice  of performance  measure.    In  the case  of  the  influence  of 
independent directors on executive compensation determination, the independent 
directors have a bargaining advantage over the CEO in which there will be an 
alignment  between  the  compensation  and  shareholders’  objectives  (Ryan  and 
Wiggins, 2004).  
 
Another  type  of  director  who  could  influence  the  effectiveness  of  corporate 
governance is the interlocking director or reciprocal director. Mizruchi (1996) 
refers to an interlocking directorate as being “when a person affiliated with one 
organization sits on the board of directors of another organization” (Mizruchi, 
1996: 271). Similarly, a director is also considered as interlocked if he/she sits on 
the board of directors of an organisation and concurrently affiliated with another 
organisation.  Brennan  and  McDermott  (2004)  highlight  several  roles  of 
interlocking  directors  that  are  mechanism  for  collusion  and  cooperation; 
facilitating the companies in controlling and monitoring others; and providing 
information  on  business  practices.  However,  interlocking  directors  could 
negatively affect the effectiveness of corporate governance since they are busy 
with several boards. This is also explained by previous researchers as a multi 
directorship where a director sits on more than one board (O'Neal and Thomas, 
1996;  Conyon  and  Muldoon,  2006;  Haniffa  and  Hudaib,  2006).    The  multi 
directorship  is  further  highlighted  by  the  researchers  as  reflecting  social 
networks, multiple backgrounds and increasing directors’ commitment.  In other 
words, the effectiveness of  directors who serve too many boards would decrease 
unless  they  can  perform  their  tasks  adequately  (Core  et  al.,  1999).  As  poor 
performance  is  correlated  with  excess  compensation  (Brick  et  al.,  2006), 
interlocking directors tend to receive high compensation (Core et al., 1999). This 
can be observed from the findings of a compensation and performance study by 
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be busy and to serve on interlocking boards. However, the authors observe a 
different direction of association between CEO compensation and the percentage 
of outside directors who are busy, which is defined as  serving on three or more 
other boards, or six or more boards, if retired. This could be due to the adequate 
task performance by the directors. 
 
3.3.2.2.2 Board Structure 
 
In addition to the size and type of board of directors, the structure of the board 
also  plays  an  essential  role  in  monitoring  the  effectiveness  of  corporate 
governance, since board structure is regarded by previous researchers as a major 
contributor to a company’s financial performance (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). The 
contribution is explained as the ability of an efficient board structure to facilitate 
directors’ involvement in two aspects: firstly, in shaping the firm’s mission and 
strategies and, secondly, in strengthening the directors’ position relative to the 
CEO (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). The effectiveness of an efficient board structure 
is further highlighted by Zahra and Pearce (1989) as  relating to a duality role or 
dual leadership in which dual leadership is interpreted as “different individuals 
hold  the  CEO  and  chair  positions”  (Zahra  and  Pearce,  1989:  322).  Dual 
leadership  is  claimed by  the  authors  to  imply  a  more positive  impact  on  the 
companies’  performance  due  to  the  availability  of  appropriate  checks  and 
balances. Separation between CEO and chairman is likely to be effective since a 
non executive  chairman  would  provide  more  objective  opinions,  effective 
decisions  and  intentions  to  promote  shareholders’  interests  (Weir  and  Laing, 
2001). Additionally, Dahya and Travlos (2000) highlight that the separation of 
the CEO and chairman positions could increase the independence of the board 
and provide outside expertise. 
 
Dual leadership is quite common in the U.K. as compared to the U.S. (Vafeas 
and Theodorou, 1998; Dahya and Travlos, 2000). Despite the above mentioned 
effectiveness  of  duality  leadership  in  mitigating  agency  conflict,  previous 
researchers  using  U.K.  data  find  contradictory  results  about  the  effect  of 
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Theodorou, 1998; Laing and Weir, 1999; Weir and Laing, 2000; Weir and Laing, 
2001;  Florackis,  2005).    In  contrast  to  dual  leadership,  unity  leadership  is 
claimed  by  previous  researchers  to  be  unable  to  play  an  effective  role  in 
corporate  governance  since  the  combination  of  both  positions  leads  to  self 
checking  of  the  CEO’s  work  and  a  lack  of  independence  in  the  boardroom 
(Vafeas  and  Theodorou,  1998).    However,  as  discussed  in  Section  3.1.4  on 
stewardship theory, unitary leadership could positively contribute to a company 
since  the  person  who  occupies  both  chairman’s  and  CEO’s  positions  could 
exhibit  greater  understanding  and  knowledge  about  the  company’s  operating 
performance (Weir et al., 2002). Dahya and Travlos (2000) discuss the positive 
argument for unitary leadership’s effect on corporate performance with reference 
to  clear cut  leadership  and  lower  information  costs.  Clear cut  leadership  is 
referred  to  as  the  concentration  by  the  leader  on  the  achievement  of  the 
company’s target while lower information costs is referred to as the lower costs 
incurred if the same person is appointed to both CEO’s and chairman’s positions 
as compared to different persons for both positions. 
    
The effectiveness of a board structure could also be captured by way of board 
committees  which  consist  of  audit  committee,  remuneration  committee  and 
nomination committee. Board committees are the committees that concentrate on 
specific tasks, in which audit committee normally deals with disclosure quality, 
the remuneration committee is responsible for executive remuneration and the 
nomination  committee  is  accountable  for  the  determination  of  appointed 
directors’ quality (Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998). In ensuring the effectiveness of 
a board structure, Hilb (2005) suggests two different structures of committees on 
the board that are an integrated audit and risk management committee, and an 
integrated board management committee. The former is in charge of audit and 
risk while the latter is for nomination, feedback, remuneration and development 
of board and top management.  
 
The  existence  of  board  committees  alone  is  not  sufficient  to  ensure  the 
effectiveness of corporate governance because independence of the committees 
is  an  important  feature  of  an  effective  committees’  monitoring  and  control 
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decisions  and  judgement  as  highlighted  by  Weir  and  Laing  (2001).  Previous 
researchers  use  various  measures  of  the  independence  of  board  committees 
including, for example, the number or percentage of independent directors on the 
committee, the absence of any former CEO on the board, and duality (Bruno and 
Claessens,  2007).  In  addition,  independent  non executive  directors  could  also 
exhibit independence because non independent non executive directors have less 
ability in exercising independent judgement in the committee which leads to less 
effective control (Weir and Laing, 2001).  
 
The  importance  of  audit  and  remuneration  committees  in  governing  financial 
disclosure and remuneration decisions has been highlighted by previous studies 
(for example, Conyon and Peck, 1998a; Laing and Weir, 1999; Weir and Laing, 
2001; Ezzamel and Watson, 2002; Collier and Mahbub, 2005). An effective audit 
committee benefits the company in terms of enhancing links between the board 
and both external and internal auditors which in turn assists the board to meet its 
statutory and fiduciary responsibilities (Weir et al., 2002). The advantage of an 
effective  audit  committee  is  also  stressed  in  The  Cadbury  Report  “Financial 
Aspects of Corporate Governance” where an audit committee could “offer added 
assurance to the shareholders that the auditors, who act on their behalf, are in 
position  to safeguard  their  interest”  (Committee  on  the  Financial  Aspects  of 
Corporate Governance, 1992: Para 4.34).  
 
Similarly, the remuneration committee benefits the company as it exhibits the 
possibility  of  a  linkage between pay  and performance  from  the  shareholders’ 
perspective as explained in Code of Best Practice by the Greenbury Committee 
where “to avoid potential conflicts of interest, board of directors should set up 
remuneration committees of non executive directors to determine on their behalf, 
and  on  behalf  of  the  shareholders,  within  agreed  terms  of  reference,  the 
company’s policy on executive remuneration and specific remuneration packages 
for  each  of  the  executive  directors,  including  pension  rights  and  any 
compensation payments” (Study Group on Directors' Remuneration, 1995: Para 
A1).  The benefits of audit and remuneration committees are in line with the 
findings of research by Laing and Wier (1999) in which, using 115 randomly 
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had audit and remuneration committees in the sample years of 1992 and 1995 
returned a higher performance than other companies. Similarly, in investigating 
the extent of the relationship between recommendations made by the Cadbury 
Committee and U.K. company performance, Weir and Laing (2000) find that, for 
the sample year of 1995, there is a positive association between remuneration 
committee existence and firm performance measured by market returns, which is 
the  percentage  of  change  in  the  share  price  over  the  financial  year.  Further, 
Ezzamel and Watson (2002), in a study of  pay comparability across and within 
U.K. boards, explain that a remuneration committee demonstrates an important 
corporate governance function as the committee is essential to the executive pay 
setting  process.  However,  in  the  case  of  the  relationship  between    the 
independence of the boards and firm performance, Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) 
find  an  insignificant  relationship    between  the  percentage  of  non executive 
directors in the remuneration committee and firm performance in the U.K. 
 
In addition to audit and remuneration committees, to ensure the effectiveness of 
corporate governance of a company, a nomination committee is also a significant 
internal  corporate  governance  mechanism.  In  terms  of  the  members  of  the 
committee,  the  Cadbury  Committee  suggests  a  majority  of  non executive 
directors  on  the  board  while  it  is  suggested  that  the  chairmanship  of  the 
committee be held by either the chairman of the company or a non executive 
director (Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1992).  
The committee’s role is to “seek out, screen and interview potential candidates 
for executives and non executive positions, often assisted by outside recruitment 
agencies”  (Pass,  2004:  57).  This  is  also  stressed  in  the  Cadbury  Committee 
Report where the nomination committee has “the responsibility of proposing to 
the board, in the first instance, any new appointments, whether executive or non 
executive  directors”  (Committee  on  the  Financial  Aspects  of  Corporate 
Governance, 1992: Para 4.30).  In short, the nomination committee demonstrates 
its function by way of ensuring the quality of appointed directors (McKnight and 
Weir, 2009).  
 
Although the importance of the nomination committee as a corporate governance 
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publicly quoted companies  is slower as compared to the adoption of audit and 
remuneration committees (McKnight and Weir, 2009). This is related to agency 
costs in which the relationship of the existence of the committee with agency 
costs is found to be positive by McKnight and Weir (2009), where the agency 
costs  are  measured  using  three  different proxies  that  are  assets to sales  ratio; 
interaction  of  free  cash  flow  and  growth  prospects;  and  the  number  of 
acquisitions  undertaken  by  an  individual  firm.  Similarly,  in  the  case  of  the 
independence  of  the  nomination  committee,  Pass  (2004)  finds  that  only  18 
companies (36 per cent) from a sample of 50 large U.K. companies from the 
FTSE 100  listing  exhibit  non executives  as  the  entire  membership  of  the 
nomination committee which is the lowest proportion of non executive directors 
in terms of committee composition as compared to remuneration committee (100 
percent) and audit committee (94 percent). 
 
3.4 Conclusions 
 
This  chapter  reviews  corporate  governance  literature  with  the  main  aim  of 
discussing corporate governance development in the U.K. The chapter begins 
with a discussion on the theories and approach of corporate governance. Despite 
the  availability  of  alternative  theories  to  the  agency  theory,  the  remaining 
sections  of  this  chapter  are  constructed  in  light  of  the  managers shareholders 
conflict, since agency theory has dominated the previous corporate governance 
research. Upon realising the importance of corporate governance monitoring in 
ensuring the effectiveness of corporate governance, the next two sections of this 
chapter highlight corporate governance requirements in the U.K. and corporate 
governance mechanisms respectively. In terms of internal corporate governance 
mechanisms, this chapter concentrates on ownership monitoring and the board of 
directors in which the former focuses on ownership structure while the latter pays 
attention to board composition and board structure.  
 
Based  on  the  above  literature  review,  the  effectiveness  of  the  corporate 
governance  mechanisms  in  mitigating  the  owners managers  conflict  can  be 
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External  mechanisms  include  takeover  and  corporate  governance  rules  and 
requirements while internal mechanisms include ownership structure and board 
of directors. Previous studies document mixed results about the effectiveness of 
corporate  governance  mechanisms  on  firm  performance.  Therefore,  it  can  be 
concluded  that  each  mechanism  could  imply  both  positive  and  negative 
consequences depending on managers’ opportunism in the business environment. 
The  relationships  between  corporate  governance  mechanisms  and  firm 
performance, inclusive of market performance and accounting performance, are 
studied by researchers using several sources of data, for example, companies’ 
annual report and corporate governance database. Thus, as the information on 
these mechanisms from these sources can also be scrutinised by shareholders, the 
mechanisms are found, by previous studies, to be interrelated with firms’ market 
value, a direct measure of shareholders’ valuation. This, as discussed in Chapter 
2, could be due to the ability of corporate governance mechanisms to influence 
shareholders’ attitude towards risk. Therefore, the following chapter, in light of 
this chapter and Chapter 2, will discuss the various effects of tax planning and 
corporate governance on firm value.  
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Chapter 4 
 
 
Various Effects of Tax Planning and 
Corporate Governance on Firm 
Value 
 
This  chapter  focuses  on  tax  planning  frameworks  and  corporate  governance 
mechanisms, and examines their relationship with firm value. The underlying 
justification  of  the  effects  of  tax  planning  and  corporate  governance  on  firm 
value is related to moral hazard which basically explains the conflict between 
principal  and  agent  due  to  information  asymmetry  (Desai  and  Dharmapala, 
2008). This is explained in detail in Chapter 2, specifically in the section on 
corporate governance as a moderating factor of tax planning activities. Thus, as 
far  as  the  principal agent  problem  is  concerned,  corporate  governance 
mechanisms or procedures are supposed to reduce the scope of moral hazard 
which  in  turn  increases  the  wealth  of  the  shareholders  that  may be  observed 
through firm value. Therefore, this chapter aims to review the available literature 
that explains the implications of tax planning and corporate governance on the 
firm value of a company. 
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4.1   Shareholders’ Perspective and Firm Value 
 
The Companies Act of 2006 specifies a legal requirement of directors to act in 
the  best  interests  of  the  shareholders.  Specifically,  Section  172  (1)  of  the 
Companies Act 2006 requires directors to manage the business in such a way as 
to ensure the successfulness of the company for the benefit of the shareholders 
(Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, 2006; Aird, 2009; Dunne, Collins and Riley, 
2009; Edge and Mulligan, 2009). The same provision requires consideration of 
other stakeholders in its “enlighten shareholders’ value” corporate governance 
approach  (Keay,  2007;  Cerioni,  2008).  Therefore,  the  effectiveness  of  the 
company’s management can be measured by the market value of the company as 
the  market  value  measures  shareholders’  value  or  wealth.  It  indicates 
shareholders’  perspective  on  the  performance  of  the  management  as  it  could 
represent the shareholders’ expectation or assessment of the companies’ general 
performance (Rockmore and Jones, 1996). Consequently, stock market valuation 
or  shareholders’  valuation  is  frequently  treated  as  an  efficiency  criterion  in 
finance and legal writings on corporate governance (Becht, Bolton and Roell, 
2005).  
 
4.1.1 Market Value of Equity in Firm Valuation 
 
A shareholder’s financial interest can be measured in terms of their involvement 
in  a  company,  i.e.  the  market  value  of  the  shareholding.  If  the  markets  are 
efficient, the managers should maximise the market value of the firm’s share, if 
they are to act in the best interest of the shareholders. Several researchers use 
share price or market value of equity as a proxy for firm value (for example Bao 
and Bao, 1989; Horton, 2008) since changes in security price could be inferred as 
market participants’ prediction about the future earnings of a company (Beaver, 
Lambert and Morse, 1980). According to Beaver et al. (1980), there are three 
reasons why the share price may reflect future earnings information. The first 
reason is related to the availability of short time interval in viewing the annual 
earnings (for example quarterly, monthly and daily) which will then allow the 
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Secondly, share price could be a remedy for limitations of current earnings in 
reflecting the events that effect future earnings. Finally, share price could reflect 
information in the case of earnings as a compound process that involves several 
stochastic variables.  
 
4.1.2 Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) 
 
The relationship between the share price and relevant information is explained by 
the  EMH.  The  EMH  explains  share  price  movement  behaviour  as  reflecting 
relevant available information in which the market is said to be efficient when 
the  share  price  “fully  and  immediately”  reflects  the  information.  This  is 
expressed by Fama (1970) where “a market in which the prices always “fully 
reflect” available information is called efficient” (Fama, 1970: 383). In addition, 
Fama (1970) provides three conditions for capital market efficiency: firstly, no 
transaction cost, secondly, all available information is obtained without cost and 
thirdly, all market participants agree about the effects of current information on 
current and future prices. An efficient market could be categorised as “strong 
form”, “semi strong form” or “weak form”, which basically explains the amount 
of impounded information of share price movement. That is fully reflecting all 
information  for  “strong  form”,  efficiently  reflecting  all  publicly  available 
information    for  “semi strong  form”  and  reflecting  only  historical  price 
information  for  “weak  form"  (Fama,  1970).  The  EMH  has  been  widely  and 
extensively  researched  across  disciplines  and  countries.  Although  the 
development  of  the  theory  started  long  ago,  that  is,  since  the  16th  century 
(Sewell,  2008),  it  is  still  found  to  be  relevant  in  explaining  share  price 
movement. This is documented by Malkiel (2005) in a study that investigates 
reflections on EMH for a 30 year period in which the U.S. market is found to 
impound all publicly available information. Similarly, previous U.K. studies (for 
example  Hon  and  Tonks,  2003;  Kenourgios  and  Pavlidis,  2004;  Al Twaijry, 
2006) also find that EMH is relevant in explaining U.K. stock market behaviour 
from various aspects, for example forecasting, earnings and returns. In terms of 
EMH  form,  the  U.K.  stock  market  is  considered  to  have  a  semi strong  form 
efficiency  (Solomon,  2007).  Therefore,  based  on  these  studies,  it  can  be Chapter 4 Various Effects of Tax Planning and Corporate Governance on Firm 
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summarised that the market value of equity exhibits shareholders’ valuation since 
it reflects the company’s performance information available to shareholders in 
determining the firm value.  
 
4.1.3 Other Measures of Firm Value 
  
Besides share price, market to book equity ratio has also been used by previous 
researchers as a measure of firm value (for example Leech and Leahy, 1991; 
Short and Keasey, 1999; McConaughy, Matthews and Fialko, 2001; Pauwels, 
Silva Risso, Srinivasan and Hanssens, 2004; Bhabra, 2007; Cheung, Connelly, 
Limpaphayom  and  Zhou,  2007).    In  addition,  previous  researchers  also  use 
Tobin’s Q and excess valuation as proxies for firm value.  
 
Tobin’s Q is defined “as the ratio of the market value of the firm to replacement 
cost of assets, evaluated at the end of the fiscal year of each firm” (Allayannis 
and  Weston,  2001:  249).  The  measure  was  developed  by  Tobin  (1969)  in 
discussing a general equilibrium to monetary theory. It is calculated by deflating 
the market value of the outstanding financial claims with the current replacement 
cost (Lewellen and Badrinath, 1997). In other words, Tobin’s Q measures a firm 
value by scaling the market value of the firm’s assets with the costs that need to 
be  incurred  to  replace  the  asset  at  the  current  market  price  (Lewellen  and 
Badrinath, 1997). However, due to difficulties in measuring the replacement cost 
of  assets  as  claimed  by  Claessens,  Djankov,  Fan  and  Lang  (2002)
25  and 
Thomsen, Pedersen and Kvist (2006), the researchers employ several formulas of 
Tobin’s  Q.
26  Tobin’s  Q  is  highly  utilised  as  the  market  value  of  a  firm  in 
                                                 
25 The authors explain that the difficulties are mainly due to the unavailability of data in 
calculating the replacement values. 
26 McConnell and Servaes (1990) compute Tobin’s Q as the ratio of the market value of common 
stock plus the estimated market value of debt and preferred stock divided by the replacement 
value of assets. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) compute Tobin’s Q as the ratio of firm’s 
market value, defined as the sum of the actual market value of common stock and estimated 
market values of preferred stock and debt, the replacement cost of the firm’s plant and 
inventories. Bhabra (2007) measures Tobin’s Q as the ratio of the sum of market value of equity, 
liquidating value of preferred stock and value of short term liabilities net of short term assets plus 
the book value of long term debt to book value of total assets. Desai and Dharmapala (2009) 
measure Tobin’s Q as the ratio of the market value of assets, which is computed as the book 
value of assets, plus the market value of common stock, minus the book value of common stock, 
minus deferred tax expense, to the book value of assets.  Chapter 4 Various Effects of Tax Planning and Corporate Governance on Firm 
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corporate governance studies (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988; McConnell and 
Servaes,  1990;  Allayannis  and  Weston,  2001;  Bhabra,  2007;  Desai  and 
Dharmapala, 2009). This is due to the ability of Tobin’s Q to reflect management 
performance as “high Tobin’s q suggests that a firm’s managers have produced 
greater market value from the same assets” (Bhagat and Black, 2002: 236). This 
is consistent with Lewellen and Badrinath’s (1997) argument that the companies 
that  exhibit  Tobin’s  Q  greater  than  “one”  indicate  effective  use  of  scarce 
resources while, in contrast, companies that exhibit Tobin’s Q lower than “one” 
demonstrate poor use of resources. 
 
In  terms  of  excess  valuation
27,  Pantzalis,  Kim  and  Kim  (1998)  apply  that 
particular alternative market valuation measure in investigating the link between 
firm  performance  and  distributions  of  common  shares  between  insiders, 
blockholders and institutions. The measure is developed by Thomadakis (1977) 
in conducting a value based test of profitability and market structure. The authors 
claim that the use of excess valuation would not impair the comparability of the 
study with other studies that use Tobin’s Q as the measure of firm value due to 
the close relationship between both measures (excess valuation and Tobin’s Q). 
 
Overall, based on the above literature, it can be concluded that market value of a 
firm can be appropriately measured by share price due to its ability to reflect 
future  expected  cash  flow.  However,  with  the  concern  of  cross sectional 
differences in size, alternative deflators can be used, as discussed subsequently.  
 
4.2 Tax Planning and Firm Value 
 
Tax planning is important to shareholders as it implies a reduction of the tax cost 
that  significantly  burdens  the  firms  and  shareholders  (Chen  et  al.,  2010). 
However, shareholders might not favour the tax planning activities due to the 
potential non tax costs embodied in the activities (Chen et al., 2010). Thus, tax 
planning might affect firm value in both positive and negative directions since 
                                                 
27 Excess valuation is computed as the ratio of the sum of market value of equity and book value 
of long term debt minus book value of total assets, to sales (Thomadakis, 1977). Chapter 4 Various Effects of Tax Planning and Corporate Governance on Firm 
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shareholders  might  value  tax  planning  differently  depending  on  their 
expectations.  In  cases  where  tax  is  considered  a  burden  to  a  company, 
shareholders would positively value tax planning while, in contrast, shareholders 
might respond negatively if tax planning were viewed as a risk related activity 
(see  Slemrod,  2005;  Chen  et  al.,  2010).  As  explained  in  Chapter  2,  the  risk 
related to tax planning is inclusive of risk of potential for greater moral hazard or 
managerial opportunism (Desai and Dharmapala, 2008; Desai and Dharmapala, 
2009). 
 
Tax planning could be valued by shareholders using ETR information, which 
could  reflect  tax  planning  activities  and  is  publicly  available  for  scrutiny  by 
shareholders.  This  is  consistent  with  Slemrod  (2004),  who  argues  that 
shareholders could discipline management by referring to the high ETR because 
of  the  potential  detrimental  effect  on  share  prices.  In  fact,  Swenson  (1999), 
following  anecdotal  evidence,  finds  a  negative  association  between  ETR  and 
share price. This could be due to the significant effects of long term sustainable 
reduction  in  ETR  on  market  capitalisation  and  shareholder  value  where  it  is 
claimed that a penny of tax saving could have a multiplying effect on the market 
value  (Mintz,  1999).
28  Therefore,  shareholders  seem  to  weigh  tax  planning 
related information in valuing firms. However, shareholders might incorporate 
the information about tax planning activities only if the information is considered 
to be “valid”. Bauman and Shaw (2005) find that shareholders do not appear to 
fully impound the earnings implication of interim ETR into share prices. The 
authors  interpret  this  as  an  indication  that  shareholders  rely  on  audited 
information in the form of annual ETR as a measure of tax planning.  This is 
consistent with several other researchers who document the positive implications 
of tax planning activities on firm value (for example Tiras and Wheatley, 1998; 
Amir and Sougiannis, 1999; Desai and Hines, 2002).  
 
Tiras and Wheatley (1998) investigate whether firm valuation considers firms’ 
ability to mitigate increases in tax rates or maintain tax savings. Using a sample 
                                                 
28 Mintz (1999) specifically explains the incremental effect of ETR reduction on the market 
capitalisation by referring to S&P 500 companies in which a dollar of tax saving represents a full 
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of U.S. firms for the period 1980 to 1994, they find that the change in ETR is an 
important  consideration  in  firm  value  in  which  the  security  market  expects 
“strong” (“weak”) firms to bear a relatively small (large) portion of the ETR 
increment.
29 In contrast, in the case of decreases in ETR, the “strong” (“weak”) 
firms are expected to bear a greater (lesser) portion. The changes in the ETR are 
studied in terms of the effect of tax law changes.   
 
The implication of tax planning could also be viewed from the aspect of deferred 
taxes on the carry forward of tax losses or net operating losses (NOLs). Amir and 
Sougiannis  (1999)  find  that  share  prices  respond  positively  to  deferred  taxes 
from  losses  being  carried  forward,  that  is  tax  deferral  planning  activities.  In 
addition to tax planning via deferral, shareholders value permanent tax saving 
obtained  by  “inversions”  (Desai  and  Hines,  2002).  In  investigating  the 
determinants of corporate expatriation, Desai and Hines (2002) document that 
share price is positively associated with inversion announcement. In addition, as 
it is claimed that the heavily leveraged companies are more involved in inversion 
due to low tax rates in the foreign countries where they are operating, the authors 
also  investigate  the  difference  in  the  association  between  high   and  low 
leveraged companies. The results reveal that the share price of highly leveraged 
companies  is  more  positively  associated  with  inversion  announcement  as 
compared  to  other  companies.    This  is  interpreted  by  the  authors  as  the 
shareholders valuing tax saving through allocation of interest expense. 
 
Besides  positive  associations  between  tax  planning  and  firm  value,  previous 
researchers also document the inverse relationship between ETR and share price. 
Abarbanell  and  Bushee  (1997)  find  a  negative  relationship  between  annual 
changes  of  ETR  and  abnormal  return  in  examining  the  underlying  relations 
between accounting based fundamental signals and security prices. The authors 
identify three possible reasons for the results. The first reason is related to the 
constraints on analysts’ forecasts in conveying earnings information in the short 
                                                 
29 The authors define “strong” firms as “those firm years that are ranked in the lower fifty 
percent of the distribution for the book to market ratio and in the lower fifty percent of the 
distribution for the earnings to price ratio. Firms years are defined as “weak” when they are 
ranked in the upper fifty percent of the distribution for the book to market ratio and in the upper 
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term, which leads to omission of value relevant information in the forecast. The 
second reason is said to be related to the failure of the analysts’ forecasts to 
completely  impound  the  information  in  the  fundamental  signals  and  thus 
influence  the  investors’  decision.  The  third  reason  is  said  to  be  related  to 
analysts’  underreaction  to  financial  statement  information  which  in  turn 
influences  the  investors’  general  analysis.    Similarly,  Lev  and  Thiagarajan 
(1993), using a sample of U.S. firms from the period 1974 until 1988, find that 
stock  return  relates  negatively  to  the  annual  changes  in  ETR.  The  authors 
indicate  that  this  result  could  arise  from  a  negative  signal  about  the  level  of 
earnings  persistence  in  which  shareholders  are  claimed  to  perceive  that  the 
earnings derived from the one time decrement of ETR is unlikely to persist. 
 
In  contrast  to  the  above  findings,  there  are  also  studies  that  find  no  direct 
association between measures of tax planning and firm value. Cloyd, Mills and 
Weaver (2003) interpret their findings as the influence of non tax cost in the 
inversion transaction which then leads to a lack of association between ETR and 
firm  value.  Similarly,  Desai  and  Dharmapala  (2009),  in  investigating  the 
association between tax avoidance activities and firm value using a sample of 
862 U.S. firms for the period from 1993 until 2001, also find no direct significant 
association between tax avoidance activities and firm value. Further analysis by 
the  authors  shows  the  relationship  to  be  correlated  with  firms’  corporate 
governance. Therefore, the paper suggests that shareholders value tax planning 
activities by reference to both their magnitude and risk. 
 
Besides  the  association  between  market  value  and  aggregate  effect  of  ETR, 
previous  researchers  also  document  relationships  between  shareholders’ 
valuation and components of tax planning (Hanlon, 2005; Atwood and Reynolds, 
2008; Bauman and Shaw, 2008; Frank, Lynch and Rego, 2009). The components 
include permanent differences, temporary differences, carry forward NOLs and 
foreign tax rates differentials. Each of the components will be considered in turn. 
As  the  actual  tax  expense  is  usually  different  from  statutory  tax  expense, 
shareholders could be fruitfully furnished with information on the effectiveness 
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the companies with respect to the financial reporting year. This difference, which 
could be drawn from tax reconciling items of notes to the accounts in annual 
reports, is of valuation relevance due to its reflection of effective tax planning 
activities which basically aim for long standing benefits to earnings (Schmidt, 
2006). 
 
Permanent difference could always represent tax reporting aggressiveness (Frank 
et al., 2009). Shareholders may price permanent difference due to its capability 
of reflecting strategic tax planning. This is found by Frank et al. (2009), where 
tax reporting aggressiveness by firms that are aggressive in financial reporting 
(measured  by  discretionary  accruals)  was  overpriced  by  shareholders.  The 
overpricing is measured using abnormal stock return (in year t+1) in which the 
return is found to be positively associated with permanent difference (in year t) 
of the companies that are highly aggressive in financial reporting (fifth quintile).  
With the definition of aggressive tax reporting as the downward manipulation of 
taxable income, the authors interpret this result as an indication that companies 
with aggressive tax reporting have high permanent book tax differences due to 
nonconformity  of  financial and tax reporting standards. This in turn provides 
opportunities for tax planning that are further considered by shareholders in their 
valuation. 
 
Tax saving through the deferral method of tax planning could be demonstrated 
by  temporary  differences.  Although  temporary  differences  have  no  ultimate 
implications for current tax expense due to its reversal effect, it could, however, 
affect the tax expense composition of the respective reporting year (Maydew and 
Shackelford,  2007)  and  thus  provide  some  indications  of  tax  planning  to 
shareholders. Due to its independence from permanent differences, tax saving 
from  temporary  differences  could  be  traced  from  deferred  tax  expense.  In 
addition,  temporary  differences  could  also  be  technically  depicted  from  the 
current  portion  of  tax  expense,  for  example,  through  adjustments  and 
impairments.  In  this  case,  temporary  differences  enlighten  shareholders  about 
earnings quality (Hanlon, 2005; Frank et al., 2009).    
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In  addition  to  tax  deferrals,  tax  savings  could  also  be  generated  from  carry 
forward of NOLs. In terms of pricing the NOLs, shareholders’ valuations are 
found by Atwood and Reynolds (2008) to be affected by  presentation of carry 
forward NOLs in the income statement. By implementing a hedge portfolio test, 
the authors document that shareholders overpriced
30 the NOLs when they were 
included as part of income before extraordinary items but not when they were 
presented as extraordinary items. Based on these findings, it could be inferred 
that shareholders are likely to value tax losses as a component of tax planning, 
depending on how the component is presented in the financial statement.  In 
addition, the authors claim that the findings support the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board’s proposal to implement separate disclosure of the income taxes 
section in the financial statement.
31 
 
Besides the three above mentioned components of tax saving, foreign tax rates 
differentials (i.e. the difference between local tax rates and foreign countries’ tax 
rates) is another eminent component of tax saving. Shareholders may value tax 
saving from the foreign tax rates differentials especially in forecasting the future 
for the companies since, as claimed by Schmidt (2006), the said component is 
able to illustrate continuing and persistent effective tax planning activities and 
thus provides forward looking information to shareholders. This is illustrated by 
Bauman and Shaw (2008) in investigating the valuation relevance of untaxed 
foreign  earnings  disclosures  of  the    largest  U.S.  multinational  firms  where 
disclosed repatriation tax liabilities are more relevant to shareholders’ pricing 
decision  than  estimated  repatriation  tax  of  non disclosing  firms.  The  authors 
indicate that the results are due to downward bias and reduced accuracy of the 
estimated amount. Therefore, based on this research, shareholders are expected 
to weigh tax saving from foreign tax rates differentials (from the local tax rate) 
                                                 
30 The valuation is measured by size adjusted return in year t+1. 
31 The board (based on the meeting’s notes for 20
th September 2006) proposed and accepted that 
“all income taxes, including taxes related to transactions with owners, would be presented in a 
separate section in the basic financial statements. Amounts presented in all other sections (the 
business section, financing section, and discounted operations) would be pre tax amounts, 
eliminating the need for intraperiod tax allocation requirements. Also, income taxes related to 
transactions with owners would be recognized in comprehensive income rather than as a direct 
charge or credit to equity. The Board also agreed to consider whether changes to existing income 
tax disclosure requirements are made necessary by the proposed changes in the presentation” 
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due  to  its  long term  strategic  tax  planning  characteristic;  and,  as  claimed  by 
Schmidt (2006), this type of tax saving may be perceived as permanent in nature 
especially in the case of business expansion in foreign tax jurisdictions. 
 
In summary, shareholders are not necessarily responding only to aggregate tax 
saving in valuing tax planning activities   they may also value the components of 
tax saving. This is in line with the  findings by Lev and Nissim (2004) where 
shareholders  are  found  not  to  fully  value  the  aggregate  book tax  difference. 
Therefore, in supporting the valuation relevance of aggregate tax saving from tax 
planning  activities,  it  is  of  interest  to  this  study  to  investigate  shareholders’ 
valuation of the components of tax saving.  
 
4.3   Corporate Governance and Firm value 
 
The implications of corporate governance practice on firm value is a worldwide 
research interest, for example Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Japan, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, 
Spain,  Switzerland,  U.K.  and  U.S.  (La  Porta,  Lopez De Silanes,  Shleifer  and 
Vishny,  2002),  U.S.  (Gompers,  Ishii  and  Metrick,  2003),  European  countries 
(Bauer,  Guenster  and  Otten,  2004),  Germany  (Drobetz,  Schillhofer  and 
Zimmermann, 2004), Netherlands (De Jong, DeJong, Mertens and Wasley, 2005) 
and Korea (Black, Jang and Kim, 2006).  Corporate governance could be related 
to firm value since, as explained in Chapter 3, good corporate governance could 
affect  corporate  performance  through  agency  costs  reduction,  shareholders’ 
interest protection and directors’ professional expertise and experience (Zahra 
and Pearce, 1989). 
 
In valuing a company, shareholders have also been found to compare corporate 
governance practice among companies. This is found by Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz 
and  Williamson  (2007)  in  regressing  firm  value  with  the  firm’s  corporate 
governance gap, measured by the difference between the quality of the foreign 
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measure the governance by referring to 44 index governance attributes in five 
categories:  the  board,  audit,  anti takeover,  compensation  and  ownership.  The 
firm value is measured by Tobin’s Q. The authors interpret the results as an 
indication of a reward by shareholders for companies that have better governance 
as compared to their U.S. peers.  
 
Further  positive  association  between  firm  value  and  corporate  governance  is 
documented  by  Beiner,  Drobetz,  Schmid  and  Zimmermann  (2006),  using  a 
sample of Swiss firms in which Tobin's Q is found to be positively related to 
corporate governance index, which is developed based on the recommendations 
and suggestions of the Swiss Code of Best Practice examined by the authors.
32 
The positive relationship between firm value and corporate governance is also 
documented by studies using Asian data. Cheung et al. (2007), using a sample of 
168 of the largest firms constituting four major Hong Kong stock indices
33 for 
the year 2002, discover that market value of the firm, measured by market to 
book equity ratio, is positively associated with the overall corporate governance 
index score, which is constructed  based on The Organization for Economic Co 
operation and Development (OECD) principles. The said principles incorporate 
rights  of  shareholders,  equitable  treatment  of  shareholders,  the  role  of 
stakeholders  in  corporate  governance,  disclosure  and  transparency,  and 
responsibility of the board. In addition to the findings, the study also documents 
that  the  transparency  component  of  corporate  governance  scores  is  the  most 
important factor in explaining the relationship between corporate governance and 
market valuation. These results are highlighted by the authors as indicating the 
importance of corporate governance to the shareholders.  
 
Similarly, by using Korean data, Black et al. (2006) also find positive association 
between corporate  governance index and firm value, measured by Tobin's Q, 
market to book equity ratio and market to sales ratio. The authors employ the 
                                                 
32 The index consists of five categories of survey questions: corporate governance commitment, 
shareholders’ rights, transparency, board of directors and executive management, and reporting 
and auditing. 
33 The four major Hong Kong Exchange and Clearing Limited indices consist of Hang Seng 
Index, Hang Seng Hong Kong Composite Index, Hang Seng China Affiliated Corporate Index 
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Korean Corporate Governance Index
34 as a measure of corporate governance in 
which  the  index  is  constructed  based  on  a  spring  2001  survey  of  corporate 
governance practices by the Korean Stock Exchange. The results of the research 
reveal that a worst to best change in the index explains 0.47 rises in Tobin’s Q, 
which represents about a 160 per cent increase in share price. The result is also 
similar to the other two measures of firm value. 
 
Despite  consistent  findings  of  positive  association  by  the  above  researchers, 
Bauer  et  al.  (2004),  using  U.K.  data,  find  that  the  implication  of  corporate 
governance in the U.K. is not as strong as the implication in countries under the 
European Monetary Union. The authors utilise Tobin's Q to measure firm value 
while Deminor’s corporate governance ratings
35 (as examined by the authors) are 
utilised  to  measure  companies’  quality  of  corporate  governance.  Bauer  et  al. 
(2004) interpret the result as an indication that the U.K. market does not impound 
companies’ corporate governance practice since the U.K. companies are likely to 
have strong corporate governance as compared to the corporate governance of 
the  Eurozone
36  companies  which  are  considered  traditionally  as  having  poor 
governance standards. In other words, due to good corporate governance practice 
in the U.K., shareholders are likely to consider that good corporate governance 
practices are generally in operation and therefore the corporate governance is not 
a discriminating factor as it is for shareholders of companies in other countries. 
 
This is consistent with Klapper and Love (2004) who analyse the data of 336 
companies  from  14  countries  (exclusive  of  the  U.K.)  in  investigating  the 
relationship between governance and Tobin's Q.
37 The corporate governance is 
measured  by  the  average  of  six  categories  of  corporate  governance  areas, 
discipline,  transparency,  independence,  accountability,  responsibility  and 
                                                 
34 The index covers sub indices of shareholder rights, board structure, board procedure, 
disclosure and ownership parity.  
35 The rating is based on about 300 criteria which are then assigned by the authors to four broad 
categories that are “rights and duties of shareholders”, “range of takeover defences”, “disclosure 
on corporate governance” and “board structure and functioning”. 
36 The Eurozone companies are the companies where the dataset is available in the European 
Monetary Union’s currency. 
37 The countries are based on the available firm level accounting data from the merger of Credit 
Lyonnais Securities Asia’s data and Worldscope’s data. The countries consist of Brazil, Chile, 
Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, South Africa, South 
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fairness, from the Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia’s report as examined by the 
authors. As predicted, a positive association is revealed and the association is 
found to be twice as large and more significant after the country fixed effects are 
included. The authors, however, do not reveal the findings on the relationships 
between the countries. 
 
The positive association between corporate governance and firm value is also 
documented by Brown and Caylor (2006) in regressing Tobin’s Q on governance 
scores  using  the  data  from  1,868  U.S.  firms  in  the  year  2002.  The  main 
contribution of this research compared to the others concerns the construction of 
the  governance  score  that  considers  both  internal  and  external  governance 
mechanisms,  in  which  the  authors  use  51  internal  and  external  corporate 
governance provisions provided by Institutional Investor Services (ISS) as of 1
st 
February 2003.  In order to determine which provisions drive the above finding, 
the researchers further investigate the provisions that are linked to Tobin's Q. 
From the results, five internal and two external governance provisions are found 
to be linked with the firm value. The internal provisions consist of option re 
pricing, average options granted, attendance at board meetings, board guidelines 
and stock ownership guidelines, while the external provisions consist of “poison 
pills” and “staggered boards”. The authors signify the results as proof that both 
internal  and  external  factors  of  corporate  governance  contribute  to  firm 
valuation. 
 
The association of firm value with both internal and external mechanisms is also 
investigated by Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) using a sample of 383 large U.S. 
firms  for  the  year  1987.  The  corporate  governance  mechanisms  that  are 
incorporated  in  the  analysis  consist  of  insider  shareholding,  institutional 
shareholding, shareholdings by blockholders, use of outsiders on the board of 
directors, debt financing, external labour market for managers and market for 
corporate control. The researchers test the association between the mechanisms 
with  Tobin's  Q  using  a  single  mechanism  at  a  time  as  well  as  multivariate 
analysis. The findings from the single mechanism ordinary least square (OLS) 
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while negative associations are found between firm value and outsiders on the 
board, more debt financing, and corporate control activity.  In terms of cross 
sectional OLS estimates using all mechanisms, the findings derived from single 
mechanism OLS remain unchanged except for insider shareholding. The authors 
interpret the negative relationship between outside directors and firm value as 
being  related  to  political  constraints  related  to  outside  directors  which,  it  is 
argued, leads to lower firm valuation.  This political factor is further discussed in 
the following section, on the relationship between board structure and firm value 
(section 4.3.2.2.2). 
 
In terms of U.K. data, Weir et al. (2002) find mixed results in the association of 
Tobin's Q with both internal and external governance mechanisms. The research 
employs  a  dataset  of  311  quoted  non financial  U.K.  firms.  The  internal 
mechanisms  that  are  investigated  comprise  board  structure,  audit  committee 
structure,  leverage,  CEO  shareholding  and  directors’  independence  while 
external mechanisms are market for corporate control and external shareholding. 
From  the  findings,  the  authors  are  unable  to  conclude  whether  the  U.K. 
governance regulations, specifically Code of Best Practice, definitely benefit the 
shareholders’ interests. The authors also signify that the results have been driven 
by the limitation on the information about the non executive directors’ expertise, 
independence  and  appointments.  The  results  may  also  be  related  to  lack  of 
variations in corporate governance practice between U.K. companies since, as 
claimed by  Bauer et al. (2004), in general, the U.K. companies exhibit good 
corporate governance practice. 
 
Based on the above literature, it can be concluded that both internal and external 
mechanisms drive the firm market valuation. Thus, the following two sections 
respectively review the literature related to the association between internal and 
external mechanisms and firm value.  
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4.3.1 External Mechanisms 
 
External  mechanisms  may  contribute  to  firm  value  as  they  could  indirectly 
discipline  the  management  on  behalf  of  the  shareholders.  The  mechanisms’ 
disciplinary  role  is  carried  out  through  shareholders  protection.  This  is 
particularly relevant to a legal or regulation system. The effects of legal systems 
on firm value are found by La Porta et al. (2002) where firm value of firms in 
countries that have better protection for minority shareholders tends to be higher. 
La Porta et al. (2002) examine the implications of legal protection for minority 
shareholders  and of  cash flow ownership by  a  controlling shareholder  on the 
valuation of firms using a sample of 539 large firms from 27 countries.
38 The 
authors  find  a  positive  association  between  firm  valuation  and  the  level  of 
minority shareholders protection and the level of cash flow ownership by the 
controlling shareholder. The authors indicate that the results are a confirmation 
of  the  crucial  predictions  of  the  theory  that  “poor  shareholder  protection  is 
penalized  with  lower  valuations,  and  that  higher  cash flow  ownership  by  the 
controlling shareholder  improves  valuation,  especially  in  countries  with poor 
investor protection” (La Porta et al., 2002: 1168). 
 
The effects of a regulatory system on firm value could also be related to the 
investors’  rights  and  managers’  duties  (Daines,  2001).  Daines  (2001),  in 
examining whether Delaware law improves firm value using a sample of 4,481 
U.S.  firms  for  the  period  from  1981  to  1996,  finds  evidence  that  Delaware 
corporate law improves firm value, measured by Tobin's Q. It is claimed that 
Delaware corporate law is able to improve the firm value since, as compared to 
other  U.S.  laws,  the  provisions  in  Delaware  law  maximise  the  shareholders’ 
value through market forces, i.e. inclusive of competition for capital, products 
and corporate control (Daines, 2001).  In addition to these findings, Delaware 
firms are also found to have a significant likelihood of receiving takeover bids 
and being acquired; this indicates that the firms are worthy prospects from the 
                                                 
38 The countries are Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel, New Zealand, Singapore, U.K. and U.S. Chapter 4 Various Effects of Tax Planning and Corporate Governance on Firm 
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acquirers’ point of view since it is argued that Delaware law could facilitate the 
sales of public firms through its “clear and mild takeover law and expert courts” 
(Daines, 2001: 555) .   
 
In addition to the legal or regulation system, takeover or market for corporate 
control could also influence firm value due to their role in delivering a threat to 
the management. Scharfstein (1988) highlights that takeover plays a disciplinary 
role by being an indirect means of governance for shareholders in which it could 
“improve efficiency by enabling a third party (a raider) to take control of the 
firm and institute a more efficient contract, one better suited to the firm’s new 
environment” (Scharfstein, 1988: 185). Takeover is utilised by shareholders to 
discipline  the  management  especially  when  the  management  is  perceived  as 
underperforming. This is highlighted by Karpoff, Malatesta and Walkling (1996) 
where the firms that are attracting governance proposals are found to have poor 
prior market to book ratio. However, the efficiency of takeover could be reduced 
if the management uses anti takeover strategies and hoarded resources to defeat 
the takeover bid, for example, by using the resources to fight off the bid or by 
selling the poor investments and retaining the good investments so as to increase 
the  firm  value,  which  would  then  reduce  the  probability  of  a  takeover  bid 
occurring (Stulz, 2000).  
 
Takeover, as a corporate governance mechanism, could be more effective with 
the presence of a legal system mechanism. This is revealed by Sinha (2006), in 
examining the effects of regulation and a contested market for corporate control 
as the external mechanisms of corporate governance of U.K. firms, in which the 
research concentrates on two sectors, the manufacturing and banking industries. 
The sectors are chosen since they have a different governance environment in 
relation to the regulation system; the manufacturing sector is characterised by a 
contested market for corporate control with little or no regulatory interference 
while such a  characteristic is not applicable to  the banking sector due  to the 
supervisory function performed by the Bank of England. The findings reveal a 
significant  association  between  share  price  and  disciplinary  top  management 
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concerned with the governance of firms in the manufacturing sector as compared 
to  the  banking  sector.  Similarly,  outside  directors  are  considered  to  be  more 
effective in disciplining top management in manufacturing as compared to the 
banking sector. These findings exhibit the importance of market for corporate 
control and regulatory systems in firms’ governance from the shareholders’ point 
of view. 
 
The implication of takeover for share price is also investigated by Lauterbach, 
Malitz and Vu (1991) in examining the influence of takeover threats on the stock 
price of firms proposing anti takeover amendments, using the data of 383 anti 
takeover amendments during the period from 1979 to 1985. The results of the 
study show that takeover is an effective governance mechanism, where the share 
prices of firms that become takeover targets within two years are significantly 
increased  as  compared  to  a  majority  of  other  firms.  A  similar  study  of  U.K. 
firms’ takeover announcements also finds that the announcement is associated 
with an increase in share price of the target firm, a significant proportion of 
which is anticipated (Holland and Hodgkinson, 1994). 
 
The tendency of the occurrence of takeover activity seems to be related to large 
shareholders  since  the  large  shareholders  are  willing  to  absorb  the  risk  in 
takeover. This is documented by Shleifer and Vishny (1986) in specifying the 
basic model in the exploration of the presence of a large minority shareholder.  
The model shows the effect of large shareholders on firms’ share prices; with the 
existence of takeovers, the share prices are likely to rise with the increment of 
shares held by large shareholders.  
 
Overall, it can be concluded that shareholders perceive takeovers as playing a 
significant role in governance. However, the effectiveness of takeover could be 
debatable due to the ability of the management to repel takeover bids (Stulz, 
2000).  Therefore,  alternatively,  internal  mechanisms  may  also  essential  in 
corporate governance. 
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4.3.2 Internal mechanisms 
 
The relationship between internal mechanisms and firm value has been widely 
studied (for example Yermack, 1996; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Bai, Liu, Lu, 
Song  and  Zhang,  2004;  Beiner,  Drobetz,  Schmid  and  Zimmermann,  2004; 
Ahmed, Hossain and Adams, 2006; Beiner et al., 2006; Thomsen et al., 2006). In 
mitigating  the  agency  problem,  internal  mechanisms  might  substitute  one 
another. This is in line with the findings by  Florackis (2005) in a study  that 
investigates the relationship between internal corporate governance mechanisms 
and  Tobin’s  Q.  By  using  a  sample  of  962  non financial  U.K. listed  publicly 
traded  firms  for  the period  from  1999  to  2003,  the author  finds  a  non linear 
impact of both managerial ownership and managerial compensation on the firm 
value. In addition to managerial ownership and managerial compensation, the 
debt maturity structure is also associated with Tobin's Q. The author regards the 
finding  as  indicating  the  possibility  of  managerial  ownership  and  managerial 
compensation working as substitute mechanisms in performing the governance 
role.  However,  in  investigating  the  relationship  between  Tobin's  Q  and 
managerial  ownership,  board  structure  and  the  combination  of  managerial 
ownership and board structure, using the data of 1,650 non financial companies 
quoted on the LSE from 1996 to 1997, Faccio and Lasfer (1999) find a weak 
association between the mechanisms and firm value. The results indicate that 
managerial  ownership  and  board  structure  might  not  work  effectively  as 
substitutes. 
 
Thus, in order to ensure effective monitoring, a comprehensive understanding of 
the effectiveness of each mechanism is important prior to any conclusions about 
substitution. Therefore, with the understanding of internal corporate governance 
mechanisms  as  detailed  in  Chapter  3,  the  following sections  review previous 
literature on the association between ownership structure and board of directors 
with firm value.  
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4.3.2.1 Ownership Structure 
 
Ownership structure could be related to firm value since shareholders might view 
the ownership structure as a mechanism that could reflect shareholder protection 
especially among minority shareholders. In investigating the association between 
ownership regime and firm value, Pantzalis et al. (1998) find some evidence of 
the  association  between  high  blockholder  stakes  and  lower  average  market 
values, measured by excess valuation. The authors test the relationship between 
four types of ownership regimes using a dataset of 549 U.S. firms with firm 
value in which the regimes consist of the combination of insider and blockholder 
ownership where type  I refers to low insider ownership and low blockholder 
ownership, type II refers to low insiders but high blockholders, type III is high 
insiders  but  low  blockholders,  and  type  IV  refers  to  high  insiders  and  high 
blockholders. The sequence, from the highest to the lowest firm value, is found 
to be associated with type I, type III, type II and finally type IV. The authors 
regard the result of the highest firm value among type I firms as being due to the 
blue chip type of firms that have high proportion of institutional shareholders 
who could play the governance role as performed by blockholders. This claim is 
consistent with the findings by McConnell and Servaes (1990) who document a 
positive  relationship  between  Tobin's  Q  and  the  portion  of  institutional 
shareholders.  Thus,  it  could  be  concluded  that  the  contribution  of  ownership 
structure  to  explaining  the  variation  of  firm  value  could  be  clarified  using  a 
single ownership type or combination of ownership types. 
 
The discussion on the effectiveness of blockholder ownership is also referred to 
by  previous  researchers  as  the  effectiveness  of  concentrated  ownership. 
Ownership  concentration,  depending  on  the  identity  of  the  ownership  (for 
example family, financial institution and government) is effective in mitigating 
the agency problem (Pedersen and Thomsen, 2003) as different identities have 
different  abilities  in  limiting  managerial  opportunism.  In  examining  the 
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largest  European  firms
39  for  the  period  from  1992  until  1995,  Pedersen  and 
Thomsen (2003) find that, in the case of companies where the largest owners are 
a  financial  institution  or  another  corporation,  the  firm  value  is  found  to  be 
positively  associated  with  ownership  concentration.  However,  the  positive 
association is found not to be applicable if the largest owner is a family or a 
single individual. If the largest owner is a government organisation, firm value is 
documented as negatively associated with ownership concentration. The authors 
indicate  that  the  results  show  the  importance  of  owner identity  from  the 
shareholders’ point of view, specifically in the Continental European institutional 
setting, where the companies in said region having a high level of ownership 
concentration but a low level of minority investor protection. 
 
In  contrast,  using  U.S.  data,  Anderson  and  Reeb  (2003)  find  a  positive 
association between family ownership and firm value. Their study investigates 
the relationship between founding family and Tobin's Q using a sample of 403 
U.S. firms from 1992 to 1999. The authors find that family firms are valued more 
highly  by  the  shareholders,  compared  to  non family  firms.  Tobin's  Q  is  also 
found to be higher for companies where a family member is the CEO than for 
companies that have an outside CEO. The authors interpret the result as evidence 
that family ownership is an effective ownership structure.  
 
Based  on  the  findings  of  the  above  researchers,  it  can  be  concluded  that 
shareholders  in  different  regions  or  countries  value  the  ownership  structure 
differently due to general different ownership structures, country by country, for 
example,  in  the  U.K.,  the  ownership  structure  is  more  dispersed  while  the 
ownership  structure  of  companies  in  Asian  countries  is  more  concentrated 
(Faccio and Lang, 2002). The implications of different ownership structures for 
firm value in firms of different countries is also documented by Thomsen et al. 
(2006) in examining the relationship between blockholder ownership and Tobin's 
Q  using  a  dataset  of  863  firms,  both  Anglo American  and  from  Continental 
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Europe
40, for a sample period of 1990 1998. The findings indicate that Tobin's Q 
for  the  companies  in  the  U.K.  and  U.S.  is  not  significantly  associated  with 
blockholder  ownership.  However,  significant  negative  associations  between 
blockholder ownership and Tobin's Q are found for firms in Continental Europe. 
The  authors  also  find  that  the  negative  association  is  significant  only  for 
companies with high levels of blockholder ownership of more than 10 per cent. 
This  is  indicated  by  Thomsen  et  al.  (2006)  as  conflicts  of  interest  between 
blockholders and minority investors. The authors also interpret the results as the 
minority  shareholders’  negative  perception  of  the  large  percentage  of 
blockholder  ownership  in  Continental  Europe.  This  result  is  consistent  with 
Thomsen’s (2005) research  investigating the relationship between blockholder 
ownership, dividend policy and firm value in the largest European Union (EU) 
and U.S. companies for a period from 1988 to1998, where the author signifies 
the result as a negative perception of the excessive level of block ownership from 
the minority shareholders’ point of view. 
 
Based on these findings, shareholders are likely to value dispersed ownership, an 
ownership  structure  that  explains  ownership  as  a  widely held  structure  and 
avoids blockholder or concentrated ownership structure. This is documented by 
Leech and Leahy (1991) in a study using 470 U.K. listed companies’ data where 
a greater dispersion of ownership is found to be related to higher valuation ratio, 
profit margin and growth rate of net assets. These findings are in line with Chen, 
Cheung, Stouraitis and Wong (2005b) in a study that analyses a dataset of 412 
publicly listed Hong Kong companies from 1995 to 1998   the authors document 
no  association  between  concentrated  family  ownership  and  market to book 
equity ratio.  
 
The negative perception of blockholders or concentrated shareholders could also 
be related to managerial blockholders’ opportunism. In this circumstance, non 
management  blockholders  are  valued  by  the  shareholders  since  a  large  non 
management shareholding block is said to have enough control and incentives to 
monitor and influence the management (Lins, 2003).  Thus, from this point of 
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view, high concentration of non managerial ownership could lead to higher firm 
value. This is found by Bai et al. (2004) in investigating the relationship between 
ownership concentration and Tobin's Q using the data from China for the period 
of  1999  to  2001,  in  which  a    high  concentration  of  shareholding  among  the 
second to the tenth largest shareholders is positively related to market valuation.  
 
In  addition  to  the  above,  previous  researchers  have  also  investigated  the 
relationship between firm value and managerial ownership. Many studies find a 
non linear relationship between managerial ownership and firm value. Short and 
Keasey (1999) investigate the relationship between the valuation ratio and return 
on equity (ROE) with ownership structures using a dataset of 225 U.K. firms for 
the period of 1988 to 1992. The findings indicate cubic relationships between 
managerial  ownership  and  firm  value  in  which  the  positive negative positive 
relationship  is  inferred  as  alignment entrenchment alignment  of  managerial 
interest. In terms of U.S. data, McConnell and Servaes (1990), in investigating 
the relationship between Tobin's Q and the structure of equity ownership, find a 
curvilinear  relationship  between  managerial  ownership  and  firm  value.  The 
turning  point  of  the  positive  association  on  the  curve  is  where  the  insider 
ownership reaches approximately 40 per cent to 50 per cent; at this point the 
curve begins to move slightly downward. Similarly, Morck et al. (1988) find a 
non linear relationship between managerial ownership and Tobin's Q among 371 
U.S. firms. However, the turning point of the curve is lower; it begins with a 
positive relationship until reaching a five per cent level of managerial ownership, 
followed by a negative relationship until the managerial ownership reaches 25 
per  cent  where  it  returns  to  positive.  The  non linear  relationship  between 
managerial ownership and firm value is also found by Bhabra (2007) using 54 
New Zealand publicly listed firms for the period of 1994 to 1998. These findings 
illustrate  how  shareholders  value  managerial  ownership  as  a  mechanism  for 
controlling  managerial  opportunism  in  which  lower  managerial  ownership 
signifies an alignment between shareholders’ and managers’ interests. 
 
In summary, it can be concluded that the ownership structure is of concern to 
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between ownership structure and firm value, one should consider the possibility 
of  an  alternative  direction  of  causality  as  highlighted  by  López Iturriaga  and 
Rodríguez Sanz  (2001).  In  addition  to  the  claim  that  ownership  structure 
influences the firm value, the authors argue that ownership structure could also 
be influenced by the firm value. This may be due to the possibility of the owners 
retaining or increasing their fraction of ownership in the companies that exhibit 
high  firm  value.  Therefore,  shareholders’  valuation  and  ownership  structure 
could be seen as simultaneously related. 
 
4.3.2.2 Board of Directors 
 
The importance of the board of directors from the shareholders’ point of view 
could be explained from the aspects of board composition and board structure as 
discussed in Chapter 3. The following sections will review previous literature on 
the association between board composition and board structure with firm value.  
 
4.3.2.2.1 Board Composition 
 
Board composition, which consists of board size and board type, is important to 
the  shareholders  since  optimal  board  composition  would  reflect  better 
governance. A positive relationship between firm value and board size is found 
by Beiner et al. (2006) in a study that uses a sample of 235 Swiss firms for the 
year  2002.  This  finding  indicates  the  importance  of  board  size,  from  the 
shareholders’ point of view, in mitigating the agency problem.  
 
However, the effectiveness of a large board, in the shareholders’ perceptions, is 
questioned  by  other  researchers  using  different  sets  of  samples  (for  example 
Yermack,  1996;  Conyon  and  Peck,  1998b;  Postma,  Ees  and  Sterken,  2001; 
Loderer and Peyer, 2002; De Andres et al., 2005; Cheng, 2008). Postma et al. 
(2001), in examining the relationship between market to book ratio and board 
composition  of  94  Dutch  non financial  listed  firms  in  1996,  document  an 
insignificant relationship between firm value and board size. The authors claim 
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with a large number of outsiders on the supervisory board. In fact, Postma et al. 
(2001) find that the number of outsiders is negatively associated with market to 
book value. Similarly, using 452 large U.S. firms for the period from 1984 to 
1991, Yermack (1996) also finds a negative relationship between  board size and 
firm  value,  which  is  measured  by  Tobin's  Q.  Further  negative  association 
between board size and firm value is highlighted by Loderer and Peyer (2002) 
using a sample of firms listed in Switzerland in which the firm value is measured 
by  Tobin's  Q.  The  authors  interpret  the  results  as  indicating  the  bad  overall 
governance system of a large board. In terms of European
41 data, Conyon and 
Peck (1998b) reveal significant negative relationships between firm value and 
board size in U.K. and the Netherlands. The negative association between board 
size and firm value is explained by Cheng (2008), in investigating the association 
between board size and Tobin’s Q using 1,252 U.S. firms’ data for a sample 
period of 1996   2004, as a larger board tends to compromise more to reach a 
consensus,  thus leading to more moderate strategies in firm performance. 
 
The  negative  relationship  between  board  size  and  firm  value  could  also  be 
interpreted  as  being  related  to  the  board’s  approach  to  decision making,  for 
example,  with  regard  to  shareholders’  rights  and  power  distribution  among 
directors,  where  a  large  board  is  perceived  as  leading  to  weak  coordination, 
flexibility and communication. This is explained by De Andres et al. (2005) in 
interpreting  a  negative  association  between  board  size  and  Tobin's  Q
42  and 
market to book ratio. 
 
In  light  of  the  above  findings,  it  can  be  claimed  that  there  is  a  relationship 
between  board  size  and  firm  value.  Further,  Ghosh  (2003),  in  analysing  the 
relationship between board structure, CEO compensation and firm value using 
462 manufacturing firms from the Indian corporate sector for the period from 
1997 to 2002, finds a non linear relationship between board size and firm value, 
implying a turning point in the positive negative relationship. Thus, based on the 
                                                 
41 The countries are U.K, France, Netherlands, Denmark and Italy. 
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non linear relationships between board size and firm value noted by previous 
studies,  it  can  be  concluded  that  an  optimal  size  of  board  is  valued  by  the 
shareholders  as  an  effective  mechanism  in  mitigating  the  conflict  between 
shareholders and agents. 
 
The role of governance by board composition could also be related to type of 
control.  One  type  of  control  that  is  considered  by  previous  research  is  the 
controlling family (Yeh and Woidtke, 2005). By using 251 non financial public 
listed companies in Taiwan, Yeh and Woidtke (2005) find a negative relationship 
between  Tobin's  Q  and  family controlled  firms, particularly  in  cases  where  a 
higher proportion of board members are affiliated to the controlling family. This 
is interpreted by the authors as a negative perception by shareholders of family 
controlled  firms  as  these  firms  are  said  to  be  associated  with  negative 
entrenchment  effects  and  larger  agency  problems.  However,  in  terms  of 
controlling by the founding family, McConaughy et al. (2001) find a positive 
relationship between the firms controlled by the founding family and market to 
book ratio. This result is interpreted by the authors as efficient operation by the 
said type of control. The research is conducted by utilising U.S. sample firms for 
the period  of  1986  to  1988.  Similarly,  Barontini  and  Caprio  (2006)  find  that 
family controlled firms do not exhibit a low Tobin's Q
43 even though a family 
controlled firm is said to be related to a greater separation between control and 
cash flow rights, since, as claimed by Claessens and Fan (2002), the insertion of 
family members onto the board is likely to occur when the control rights are 
largely  different  from  the  cash  flow  rights,  which  exhibits  a  higher  agency 
problem in the family controlled firms compared to other companies. Barontini 
and Caprio (2006) utilise a dataset of 675 public companies from 11 countries in 
Continental Europe for the period of 1999   2001.
44 In addition to the above 
findings, the authors find a positive association between Tobin's Q with founder 
controlled  corporations  and  descendant controlled  corporations,  in  which  the 
                                                 
43 The authors adjust the computation by multiplying the book value of minority interest with the 
market to book ratio of the company’s shareholders’ equity in order to obviate the 
underestimation of Tobin’s Q due to full consolidation of the financial statements of controlled 
companies.  
44 The countries consist of Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, 
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descendant  sits  on  the  board  as  a  non executive  director.  However,  if  the 
descendant is the CEO, the valuations of family controlled firms are found by the 
authors  to  be  no  different  from  non family  firms.    The  authors  interpret  the 
findings  as  evidence  of  the  importance  of  regulations  on  the  prohibition  of 
separation between control and cash flow rights. 
 
In addition to the size and type of control, board independence is also found to be 
associated with firm value. This is documented by Aggarwal et al. (2007) where 
Tobin's Q is found to be negatively related to board independence. This could be 
due to political reasons as highlighted by Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) where 
board  independence  is  related  to  outside  directors,  for  example  politicians, 
environmental  activists  or  consumer  representatives,  who  are  said  to  impose 
political constraints. Therefore, based on the above literature review, it can be 
concluded that shareholders consider the effectiveness of board composition in 
valuing the companies. 
 
4.3.2.2.2 Board Structure 
 
Board  structure,  which  can  be  viewed  from  the  aspect  of  duality  and  board 
committees,  is  valued  by  the  shareholders  since  effective  board  structure 
contributes  to  a  company’s  financial  performance  (Zahra  and  Pearce,  1989). 
However, this does not mean that uniform board structure across companies is 
appropriate,  as  discovered  by  Vafeas  and  Theodorou  (1998)  in  testing  the 
relationship between board structure and market to book ratio using  250 U.K. 
publicly traded firms for the year 1994. The results of the research do not show 
any significant link between board structure, which comprises director affiliation 
and ownership, chairman affiliation, and committee composition, and market to 
book ratio. Therefore, the authors claim that uniform board structures should not 
be mandated, since governance needs are different across firms.  
 
In  terms  of  remuneration  committee,  shareholders  value  an  appropriate 
remuneration  committee  structure  because  it  could  provide  a  signal  that  the 
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according  to  Vafeas  and  Theodorou  (1998),  the  remuneration  committee  is 
highly    responsible  for  determining  executive  remuneration.  A  positive 
association between compensation and Tobin's Q is found by Mehran (1995). 
These  findings  indicate  that  shareholders  value  executive  compensation  as  a 
corporate  governance  mechanism  which  confirms  the  argument  on  the  direct 
association  between  compensation  and  managerial  ability,  as  claimed  by 
Narayanan  (1996).  However,  the positive  association between  firm  value  and 
compensation may not persist in the case of excess payment of compensation.  
This  is  found  by  Ghosh  (2003),  who  noted  that  the  relationship  between 
compensation  and  firm  value  is  found  to  be  non linear  (positive negative 
relationship). This relationship shows a turning point of the inverted U shape of 
the compensation firm value relationship.  This result is interpreted by the author 
as an indication of low performance due to an increased level of leisure by the 
directors that leads to poor firm value.    
 
In  addition  to  the  remuneration  committee,  an  appropriate  audit  committee 
structure  could  also  contribute  to  firm  value  since,  according  to  Weir  et  al. 
(2002),  a  well structured  audit  committee  ensures  the  quality  of  financial 
reporting  disclosure.  As  highlighted  in  Chapter  3,  an  independent  audit 
committee is more effective for corporate governance (Weir and Laing, 2001). 
However, the effectiveness of audit committee independence could be questioned 
by the shareholders due to the appointment of directors for the above mentioned 
political reasons (in section 4.3.2.2.1). This is revealed by a negative association 
between  audit  committee  independence  and  firm  value,  as  discovered  by 
Aggarwal  et  al.  (2007).  Therefore,  based  on  these  findings,  shareholders  are 
found to consider the importance of board structure in valuing the firm where 
effectiveness is not only being assessed in terms of functions but also in terms of 
factors that contribute to the structure, for example, the appointment of directors. 
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4.4  Association of Tax Planning and Corporate 
Governance with Firm Value  
 
The association between tax planning and firm value can be better explained in 
conjunction with corporate governance factors (Desai and Dharmapala, 2009). 
This  section  reviews  previous  literature  in  relation  to  the  association  of  tax 
planning  and  corporate  governance  with  firm  value. However,  only  a  limited 
amount of literature has so far studied this association. Tax planning activities 
might be more meaningful to shareholders with knowledge about the company’s 
governance condition since, as discussed in Chapter 2, the risks involved in tax 
planning  might  be  lower  if  companies  exhibited  good  corporate  governance 
practices. Thus, in this circumstance, corporate governance plays a mediating 
role  in  influencing  shareholders’  valuation  of  tax  planning  activities.  This  is 
depicted by figure 4.1. 
 
Figure 4.1 
Tax Planning, Corporate Governance and Firm Value 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The importance of corporate governance in explaining the association between 
tax planning and firm value is illustrated by Desai and Dharmapala (2009). The 
authors initially test the association between book tax gap and Tobin's Q without 
the corporate governance variable but no significant association is documented. 
However, in further analyses, which consider associations between book tax gap 
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and Tobin's Q with separations of the sample based on a governance measure, the 
authors find a significant positive association between book tax gap and firm 
value from a good governance firms years. The measure of corporate governance 
is based on a fraction of a company’s shares owned by institutional investors in 
which ratios of more than 60 per cent indicate stronger governance institutions.
45 
The  institutional  investors  are  chosen  as  a  proxy  of  a  corporate  governance 
mechanism as they have greater incentives and capacity to monitor the managers 
(Desai and Dharmapala, 2009). The results of the analyses are interpreted by the 
authors  as  the  contribution  of  corporate  governance  in  explaining  the  tax 
avoidance  undertaking  by  companies,  in  which  the  better  the  corporate 
governance, the larger the positive effect of tax avoidance on firm valuation.  
This result also shows that good governance reduces shareholders’ doubts about 
the value of tax planning activities (Desai and Dharmapala, 2009). This is due to 
the ability of good governance practice to lessen the managers opportunism in 
pursuing  their  self interest  in  tax  planning,  as  there  is  a  tax information 
asymmetry between shareholders and managers   the information on tax planning 
activities  is  kept  secret  by  the  managers  to  prevent  detection  (Desai  and 
Dharmapala, 2008). 
 
Besides  institutional  ownership,  a  family  ownership  structure  could  also 
influence  the  shareholders’  valuation  of  tax  planning  activities.  This  is 
highlighted by Chen et al. (2010) where a potential share price reduction from 
non family shareholders, a potential of penalty by tax authority and a potential of 
impairment of family  reputation are the non tax factors  considered by  family 
firms  in  tax planning.  Thus,  shareholders  valuation  of  tax planning  might be 
influenced by the ownership structure. 
 
In  addition  to  Desai  and  Dharmapala  (2009),  Wilson  (2009)  also  finds  that 
shareholders value the tax planning activities as long as the companies display 
good corporate governance conduct. Wilson (2009) tests the association for three 
time periods associated with firms’ tax planning or “sheltering” activities: the 
period  of  active  tax  sheltering,  24  months  prior  to  the  initial  year  of  tax 
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sheltering, and 24 months after the final year of tax sheltering. The corporate 
governance  variable  is  measured  using  the  corporate  governance  index 
developed by Gompers et al. (2003). The results of the study indicate that active 
tax shelter firms with good corporate governance demonstrate positive abnormal 
returns while tax shelter firms that have poor corporate governance demonstrate 
significant lower abnormal returns. The author interprets the results as evidence 
that tax sheltering is an activity that creates shareholders’ wealth only for firms 
that have good corporate governance practice. The interaction between active tax 
sheltering  and  good  governance  implies  a  sign  of  strong  alignment  between 
shareholders’  and  managers’  interests  which  in  turn  results  in  higher 
shareholders’ valuation (Wilson, 2009). 
 
In light of the above findings, it can be concluded that tax planning activities by 
companies  that  have  good  corporate  governance  practice  are  valued  by 
shareholders. However, such valuation consequences contradict the findings by 
Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) in examining the stock price reaction to news about 
tax aggressiveness. As compared to Desai and Dharmapala (2009) and Wilson 
(2009), Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) find evidence that the share price of good 
governance  companies,  measured  by  a  high  non entrench  score
46,  reacts 
negatively to the news about the company’s involvement in tax sheltering. In 
contrast,  the  market  price  of  poor  governance  companies,  measured  by  high 
entrench score
47, is found to respond positively towards the news. Based on these 
results,  the  authors  conclude  that  tax  sheltering  activities  are  perceived 
negatively by the markets since the news is viewed by the shareholders as being 
related to the negative insiders’ intentions not only towards the tax authority but 
also towards the shareholders. In other words, if the shareholders suspect that the 
management  are  being  aggressive  towards  the  tax  authority,  the  market  will 
doubt  the  accuracy  of  the  financial  statement,  which  then  leads  to  negative 
shareholders’  valuation  (Hanlon  and  Slemrod,  2009).  The  results  are  also 
rationalised  ex post  by  Hanlon  and  Slemrod  (2009)  where  the  negative 
relationship between share price and the tax sheltering news of good governance 
                                                 
46 The score is developed based on an earlier version (i.e. 2005) of Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell 
(2009) and Gompers et al. (2003). 
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companies is said to be related to the market’s reaction to suspicions of poor 
corporate governance that were previously not impounded in the shareholders’ 
valuation. However, the positive coefficient estimate of the tax planning variable 
of the poor corporate governance companies remains a puzzle, according to the 
researchers,  which  suggests  the  possibility  of  a  relationship  between  the 
corporate  governance  measures  and  other  unmeasured  characteristics  of  the 
companies. 
 
The above studies concentrate on a U.S. setting and document mixed directions 
of the association between tax planning, corporate governance and firm value. 
Therefore,  as  there  is  a  general  lack  of  published  research  that  studies  these 
relationships in a U.K. setting, further research needs to be conducted to confirm 
the relationship using U.K. data.  Table 4.1 presents a summary of the studies 
and  subsequently  highlights  the  gaps  in  the  literature  investigating  the  firm 
value tax planning corporate governance relationship.  
 
The summary shows that the available studies use various measures of firm value 
to reflect the effect of tax planning and corporate governance on shareholders’ 
valuation. The literature also directly focuses on specific measures of corporate 
governance,  which  may  limit the  generalisability  of  the  results.  Therefore,  to 
ensure  the  representativeness  of  the  selected  mechanism  towards  companies’ 
corporate  governance  conduct,  this  study  determines  corporate  governance 
measures through a data reduction process using principal component analysis. 
This  is  discussed  in  detail  in  Chapter  6.  Thus,  based  on  these  gaps  in  the 
literature, this study is interested in investigating the relationship between market 
value and tax planning whilst including corporate governance factors along with 
other data that is publicly available for scrutiny by shareholders.   
 
 
 
Chapter 4 Various Effects of Tax Planning and Corporate Governance on Firm Value                                                                     127 
 
 
Table 4.1 
Summary of Previous Studies on Relationship between Firm Value, Tax Planning and Corporate Governance 
 
  Sample  Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variable 
Corporate 
Governance 
Measure 
Findings/Conclusions 
Chen et 
al.(2010) 
1003 U.S. 
firms 
(1996 2000) 
ETR, Cash 
ETR, book 
tax gap based 
on Manzon 
and Plesko 
(2001 2002), 
book tax gap 
based on 
Desai and 
Dharmapala 
(2006) 
 
Market to book 
ratio, natural log 
of market value 
of equity 
 
Dummy of 
founding family 
members continue 
to hold position in 
top management, 
continuous family 
equity ownership 
variable, dummy of 
family blockholder 
indicator (more 
than five percent) 
Significant level of the relationship 
between firm value and tax planning is 
not tested. The measures of firm value 
are for controlling the fundamentals 
effect on the relationship between 
corporate governance measures and tax 
planning measures 
Desai and 
Dharmapala 
(2009) 
862 U.S. firms 
(1993 2001) 
Tobin’s Q 
and scaled 
market value 
Scaled book tax 
gap, interaction 
variable of 
book tax gap 
and institutional 
ownership 
Institutional 
ownership 
•  OLS approach  
o  All firms without institutional 
ownership variable: No 
significant relationship between 
Tobin’s Q and book tax gap 
o   All firms with institutional 
ownership and interaction 
between book tax gap and  
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institutional variables: No 
significant relationship between 
book tax gap and Tobin’s Q. 
Positive relationship between 
interaction variable with firm 
value 
o  Firm years with high institutional 
ownership: Significant positive 
relationship between book tax 
gap and Tobin’s Q 
o  Firm years with low institutional 
ownership: No significant 
relationship between book tax 
gap and Tobin’s Q 
•  Instrument variable (IV) approach  
o  No significant relationship 
between book tax gap and firm 
value (Tobin’s Q and scaled 
market value) 
o  Positive relationship between 
interaction variables (book tax 
gap and institutional ownership) 
with firm value (Tobin’s Q and 
market value) 
Hanlon and 
Slemrod 
(2009) 
97 U.S. firms 
(event study of 
a range date 
from 1
st 
Cumulative 
abnormal 
return  
Control events: 
News about 
involvement in 
tax shelters 
Entrench score and 
non entrench score 
developed from 
Bebchuk et al. 
•  Significant negative relation between 
non entrench score and abnormal 
returns. This relationship is not 
significant when observations with  
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January 1990 
until 1
st 
September 
2004) 
(three day 
window centred 
on the day of the 
press mention) 
(2009) and 
Gompers et al. 
(2003) 
some specific types of accounting 
news during the event window are 
excluded  
•  Significant positive relation between 
entrench score and abnormal returns. 
This relationship is not significant 
when observations with some specific 
types of accounting news during the 
event window are excluded  
 
Wilson 
(2009) 
59 public U.S. 
firms   accused 
by Treasury or 
identified in 
the press from 
1975 to 2007 
(Event study of 
before, during 
and after tax 
shelter 
participation)  
Abnormal 
return 
Control events: 
Three terms that 
are:  
1.  During the 
period of 
active tax 
sheltering  
2.  24 months 
prior to 
initial year of 
tax sheltering  
3.  24 months 
after the final 
year of tax 
sheltering 
Index of 
shareholder rights 
(Gompers et al., 
2003) 
•  Significant  positive abnormal stock 
return in each of the three periods for 
well governed tax shelter firms  
•  Significant negative abnormal return 
of an indicator variable of poorly 
governed tax shelter firms   Chapter 4 Various Effects of Tax Planning and Corporate Governance on Firm 
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4.5 Conclusions 
   
This  chapter  aims  to  review  the  literature  relating  to  the  implications  of  tax 
planning and corporate governance on firm value. In order to provide a better 
understanding  of  the  firm  value,  this  chapter  begins  with  an  explanation  of 
measures  of  firm  value  in  which  there  are  two  sub sections  that  review  firm 
value related  literature:  firstly,  market  value  of  equity  in  firm  valuation  and 
secondly, other measures of firm value. Subsequently, this chapter proceeds with 
two sections that review the literature related to the association of tax planning 
with firm value and the association of corporate governance with firm value. The 
following section of this chapter discusses the association of tax planning and 
corporate governance with firm value. In addition to the discussion, the section 
also provides a summarised overview of the related literature and thus identifies 
the gaps in the current body of knowledge. 
 
In summary, it can be concluded that shareholders value tax planning depending 
on both its magnitude and their attitudes towards risk; shareholders are found to 
value  tax  planning  activities  as  a  means  of  wealth  creation  only  with 
consideration of good corporate governance, since good governance practice is 
said to be able to reduce the risk of managerial opportunism afforded by the lack 
of transparency in tax planning information made available to the shareholders 
(Desai and Dharmapala, 2008; Desai and Dharmapala, 2009; Wilson, 2009). The 
firm value tax planning relationship is found to be pronounced when corporate 
governance  is  considered  as  a  moderating  influence  (Desai  and  Dharmapala, 
2009) and, in fact, wealth creation through tax planning (measured by abnormal 
return)  by  poor  governance  companies  is  found  to  be  significantly  lower 
compared to companies that exhibit good corporate governance practice (Wilson, 
2009). This indicates that tax planning activities conducted by management with 
good governance are valued by shareholders. This might be due to the claim that 
good  corporate  governance  practice  increases  shareholders’  confidence  about 
managerial tax planning decisions in the sense of reduced agency costs (Desai 
and  Dharmapala,  2009).  Despite  this  claim,  previous  studies  also  document 
contradictory  results  that  indicate  the  shareholders’  prudence  over  managers’ Chapter 4 Various Effects of Tax Planning and Corporate Governance on Firm 
Value                                                                                                                   131 
 
 
 
opportunism  in  pursuing  their  self interest  while  managing  the  companies 
(Hanlon and Slemrod, 2009). This also shows that good governance does not 
necessarily  guarantee  an  alignment  of  owners’  and  managers’  interests. 
However, the generalisability of these findings is limited to a U.S. setting; to the 
researcher’s  knowledge  there  is  no  published  research  that  investigates  the 
relationship in a U.K. setting.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Hypotheses Development 
 
The  literature  review  in  Chapter  4  discusses  evidence  of  the  moderating 
influence  of  corporate  governance  on  shareholders’  tax  planning  valuation. 
However,  the  highlighted  gaps  in  the  general  literature  suggest  the  need  for 
further empirical testing of the relationship, particularly in a U.K. setting. This 
chapter will focus on relevant underlying theories in developing the hypotheses. 
Subsequently, this chapter continues with hypotheses development in which the 
testable hypotheses will be developed and formally stated.  
 
5.1 Theory 
 
Gioia and Pitre (1993) define theory “as any coherent description or explanation 
of  observed  or  experienced  phenomena”  (Gioia  and  Pitre,  1993:  587).  This 
implies previous knowledge of a theory about related phenomena of a current 
piece of research. Therefore, along with knowledge, theory plays an important 
role in predicting the relationships between variables in empirical research. In 
addition,  theory  is  also  important  in  research  methods  since  it  provides 
underlying justifications for practice, hypotheses and management control (Gill 
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Hussey (2003) in which theory is referred to as “a set of explanatory concepts” 
(Collis and Hussey, 2003: 56).  
 
The assumptions and predictions of this study are based on two distinct theories: 
the Scholes Wolfson framework and agency theory. As discussed in detail in 
Chapter 2, the Scholes Wolfson framework highlights three important principles 
of effective tax planning that decision makers need to consider: “all contracting 
parties”, “all taxes” and “all costs” (Scholes and Wolfson, 1992). All parties are 
considered  in  tax  planning  activities  since  the  managers,  in  tax  planning 
decision making, affect the stakeholders at large. In fact, societies are the most 
affected parties since tax planning activities could cause problems in resource 
allocation (Slemrod, 2004). In terms of all taxes and all costs, managers ought to 
incorporate  those  principles  in  tax  planning  activities  since,  in  achieving  the 
ultimate  objective  of  tax  planning,  that  is  maximising  after tax  returns,  the 
managers consider the trade offs between the benefits and costs of tax planning. 
Subsequently,  under  the  classical  economic  approach,  which  highlights 
utilisation of utility with limited resources (O'Brien, 2003), shareholders would 
be assumed to positively value tax planning if the activity were to increase the 
after tax returns due to the net tax planning benefit of all costs and tax savings.   
 
Consideration of all costs in tax planning by managers is also inclusive of the 
cost  related  to  the  principal agent  problem.  This  problem,  caused  by  the 
separation  of  ownership  and  control  (Jensen  and  Meckling,  1976),  influences 
shareholders’  valuation  of  managers’  tax  planning  activities  through  the 
perception of the risk of tax planning, due to information asymmetry between the 
shareholders and the management. The tax planning information asymmetry is 
caused  by  the  lack  of  transparency  about  tax  planning  information  made 
available to the shareholders   in order to prevent detection by the authorities, 
companies’ tax planning information is kept secret by the managers. This can 
lead to managerial opportunism in the sense of maximising the managers’ wealth 
at the expense of the shareholders (Desai and Dharmapala, 2009). This risk is 
basically related to a conflict of interests between shareholders and managers in 
which the conflict, according to the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), 
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contracting parties. This is discussed in detail in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, in 
which  it  is  reasoned  that,  ideally,  shareholders  might  prefer  tax  planning 
activities  since  such  activities  could  result  in  increased  after tax  returns; 
however, this is balanced by the argument that managers might act differently for 
reasons of self interest, so shareholders might value tax planning negatively.  
 
In this circumstance, the agency theory explains that agency costs have to be 
incurred by shareholders in aligning the conflicting interests between managers 
and  shareholders  that  arise  from  the  complex  setting  of  the  contracting 
shareholders managers  relationship  (Jensen  and  Meckling,  1976;  Fama  and 
Jensen, 1983). Therefore, shareholders’ negative valuation of tax planning might 
differ with the existence of good corporate governance conduct, which could be 
exhibited  by  corporate  governance  mechanisms.  The  significant  roles  of 
corporate governance mechanisms, for example ownership monitoring, board of 
directors  and  regulatory  system,  in  monitoring  the  management  have  been 
extensively  explored  by  previous  researchers  (for  example  Zahra  and  Pearce, 
1989; Hart, 1995; Denis and McConnell, 2003). The empirical evidence on the 
effectiveness  of  the  monitoring  functions  of  the  mechanisms  from  the 
shareholders’ point of view is discussed in Chapter 3.  
 
Therefore, the presence of corporate governance mechanisms could influence tax 
planning  activities  wherein  the  mechanisms  provide  some  insights  to  the 
shareholders in valuing tax planning by the management. The positive influence 
of corporate governance in the tax planning firm value relationship is highlighted 
by  Desai  and  Dharmapala  (2009)  and  Wilson  (2009).  However,  Hanlon  and 
Slemrod  (2009)  find  a  contradictory  result  in  which  firm  value  of  good 
governance companies is found to be negatively related with tax planning. This 
could be due to negative perceptions by shareholders of the managers’ intentions 
in conducting tax planning activities. The findings of these studies are discussed 
in detail in Chapter 4.  
 
Based  on  the  above  discussions,  the  Scholes Wolfson  framework  and  agency 
theory provide underlying predictions and justifications towards the aim of this 
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activities  whilst  considering  companies’  corporate  governance  practice  as  a 
moderating  influence  of  the  relationship.  The  said  relationships  will  be 
scrutinised based on two parts. Firstly, the relationship between market value and 
tax planning will be investigated in order to gain an insight into shareholders’ 
valuation of tax planning activities. Secondly, the relationship between market 
value, tax planning and corporate governance will be tested to investigate the 
implications of corporate governance on the firm value tax planning relationship. 
These are illustrated by figure 5.1.  
 
Figure 5.1 
Tax Planning, Corporate Governance and Firm Valuation  
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5.2 Hypotheses 
 
This  section  aims  to  formally  state  the  hypotheses that  will be  tested  in  this 
study. Hypothesis is a “testable proposition about the relationship between two 
or more events or concepts” (Saunders et al., 2007: 599). Hypotheses in this 
study  consist  of  propositions  that  are  related  to  variables  in  associating  firm 
value,  tax  planning  and  corporate  governance.  Based  on  the  arguments 
highlighted by previous studies and the assumptions in tax planning framework 
and agency theory, this research intends to investigate the association of several 
variables  with firm value and tax planning. The hypotheses of this study  are 
developed from the understanding obtained from Chapters 2, 3 and 4. 
 
5.2.1 Firm Value and Tax Planning  
 
Chapter  4  reviews  previous  studies  related  to  shareholders’  valuation  on 
corporate tax planning activities, and mixed results are documented. The positive 
relationship between firm value and tax planning (Tiras and Wheatley, 1998; 
Amir  and  Sougiannis,  1999;  Desai  and  Hines,  2002)  could  be  due  to 
shareholders’ perception that tax is a burden to a company (Chen et al., 2010) 
while  the  negative  relationship  (Lev  and  Thiagarajan,  1993;  Abarbanell  and 
Bushee,  1997)  could be  related  to  the perception  that  tax planning  is  a  risk 
related activity (Slemrod, 2005; Desai and Dharmapala, 2009; Chen et al., 2010). 
Therefore, based on the above mentioned mixed findings of previous studies, the 
extent of tax planning is presumed to be related to firm valuation in unpredicted 
directions. In addition, to reflect strong incentives of conducting tax planning 
activities (Mills et al., 1998), the relationship will be examined within persistent 
profit making companies. Thus, it is hypothesised (in alternative form) that: 
 
Hypothesis  1a  (H1a):  There  is  an  association  between  the  extent  of  a 
persistent profit making company’s tax planning activities and its market 
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As  earnings  persistence  could  contribute  to  shareholders’  valuation  (Lev  and 
Thiagarajan,  1993),  shareholders  are  expected  to  value  tax  planning  by  non 
persistent  profit making  companies  differently  as  compared  to  the  other 
companies. This could be due to the perception that the non persistent earnings 
companies are unlikely to exhibit persistent tax planning or long run tax planning 
because of the reduced need and higher potential costs due to fluctuating profits. 
This is in line with Dyreng et al. (2008), where a significant fraction of positive 
pre tax  income  firms  are  found  to  be  involved  in  long run  tax  avoidance 
successfully. Thus, with the expectation of differing shareholders’ perceptions on 
risks and returns of tax planning by non persistent companies as compared to 
persistent companies, the relationship between a company’s market value and tax 
planning differs between persistent and non persistent profit making companies. 
Therefore, the next hypothesis (in alternative form) will examine the relationship 
between  firm  value  and  the  extent  of  tax  planning  by  non persistent  profit 
making companies. The hypothesis testing (discussed in Chapter 7) will provide 
evidence  on  whether  the  firm  value  function  is  different  between  persistent 
profit making companies and non persistent profit making companies.  
 
Hypothesis 1b (H1b): Firm valuation is associated with the extent of tax 
planning by non persistent profit making companies. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the relationship between firm value and tax planning 
could be further explained by components of tax saving because of differences in 
perceived  benefits  and  agency related  risks.  Based  on  previous  studies,  the 
components  could  be  categorised  as  permanent  differences,  temporary 
differences, foreign tax rates differentials and NOLs.  
 
Frank  et  al.  (2009)  find  evidence  of  shareholders’  valuation  of  permanent 
differences.  This  is  interpreted  as  evidence  of  shareholders’  valuation  of 
companies that are aggressive in tax reporting; these companies are associated 
with high permanent book tax differences due to nonconformity of financial and 
tax reporting  standards.  This  provides  an  indication  of  the  existence  of  the 
relationship between firm valuation and permanent differences which could be 
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conduct strategic tax planning. Therefore, shareholders are presumed to value the 
permanent differences component of tax saving. Similar to the above argument 
on  incentives  of  conducting  tax  planning  (in  H1a),  the  following  hypotheses, 
hypothesis  2a  to  hypothesis  2e,  focus  on  persistent  profit making  companies.  
Hence, it is hypothesised (in alternative form) that: 
 
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): Firm valuation is associated with the extent of tax 
saving from permanent differences of persistent profit making companies. 
 
The  second  component,  temporary  differences,  which  are  derived  from  the 
deferral method of tax planning, could enlighten shareholders about companies’ 
earnings quality (Hanlon, 2005; Frank et al., 2009). Temporary differences are 
also of concern to shareholders as, according to Tran Nam et al. (2000), this kind 
of tax saving could reflect an increase in cash flows. Based on these studies, it 
could be presumed that shareholders are likely to impound temporary differences 
in their valuation and, hence, it is hypothesised (in alternative form) that: 
 
Hypothesis 2b (H2b): Firm valuation is associated with the extent of tax 
saving from temporary differences of persistent profit making companies. 
 
The third component, NOLs, is found by  Atwood and Reynolds (2008) to be 
valued by shareholders in focusing on  carry forward NOLs presentation in the 
income statement. In addition, Amir and Sougiannis (1999) document a positive 
relationship between share price and carry forward NOLs. Therefore, based on 
these studies, shareholders are expected to impound NOLs in their valuation and, 
thus, it is hypothesised (in alternative form) that: 
 
Hypothesis 2c (H2c): Firm valuation is associated with the extent of tax 
saving from NOLs of persistent profit making companies. 
 
Foreign tax rates differentials, the fourth tax saving component, could be related 
to shareholders’ valuation since, as claimed by Schmidt (2006), foreign tax rates 
differentials exhibit continuing and persistent effective tax planning activities, 
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differential  is  derived  by  MNC  that  have  foreign  operations  in  different  tax 
jurisdictions.  Due  to  greater  tax  planning  opportunities  as  compared  to  other 
companies (as explained in Chapter 2), the MNC, as claimed by Dyreng and 
Lindsey (2009), specifically those that have disclosed material operations in at 
least one tax haven country, experience a relatively lower worldwide tax burden. 
The relationship between this tax saving component and shareholders’ valuation 
is  documented  by  Bauman  and  Shaw  (2008)  who  specifically  indicate  that 
disclosed repatriation tax liabilities are more relevant to shareholders’ pricing 
decision than estimated repatriation tax of non disclosing firms. Therefore, based 
on these researchers’ work, shareholders are expected to weigh tax saving from 
foreign tax rates differentials and, hence, it is hypothesised (in alternative form) 
that: 
 
Hypothesis 2d (H2d): Firm valuation is associated with the extent of tax 
saving  from  foreign  tax  rates  differentials  of  persistent  profit making 
companies. 
 
To test the hypothesis that any detected valuation relationship varies according to 
the type of tax saving of persistent profit making companies (see H2a to H2d) the 
following hypothesis will be tested: 
 
Hypothesis  2e  (H2e):  There  is  a  difference  in  the  relationship  between 
market value and each of the four components of tax saving (i.e. permanent 
differences,  temporary  differences,  NOLs  and  foreign  tax  rates 
differentials) of persistent profit making companies. 
 
To  test  the  hypotheses  relating  to  the  relationships  between  firm  value  and 
components  of  tax  saving  of  non persistent  profit making  companies,  the 
following hypotheses will be tested (in alternative form): 
 
Hypothesis 2f (H2f): Firm valuation is associated with the extent of tax 
saving  from  permanent  differences  of  non persistent  profit making 
companies. 
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Hypothesis 2g (H2g): Firm valuation is associated with the extent of tax 
saving  from  temporary  differences  of  non persistent  profit making 
companies. 
 
Hypothesis 2h (H2h): Firm valuation is associated with the extent of tax 
saving from NOLs of non persistent profit making companies. 
 
Hypothesis 2i (H2i): Firm valuation is associated with the extent of tax 
saving from foreign tax rates differentials of non persistent profit making 
companies. 
 
To test the hypothesis that any detected valuation relationship varies according to 
the type of tax saving of non persistent profit making companies (see H2f to H2i) 
the following hypothesis will be tested: 
 
Hypothesis  2j  (H2j):  There  is  a  difference  in  the  relationship  between 
market value and each of the four components of tax saving (i.e. permanent 
differences,  temporary  differences,  NOLs  and  foreign  tax  rates 
differentials) of non persistent profit making companies. 
 
5.2.2 Firm Value, Tax Planning and Corporate Governance  
 
Consistent with discussions about corporate governance mechanisms in Chapter 
3,  the  hypotheses  development  in  this  section  is  structured  so  as  to  examine 
corporate  governance’s  moderating  influence  on  the  firm  value tax  planning 
relationship. The relationship between these three dimensions is important since 
corporate governance could better explain the association between tax planning 
and firm value (Desai and Dharmapala, 2009). The literature review in Chapter 4 
presents  mixed  results  from  previous  studies  on  this  relationship  (Desai  and 
Dharmapala, 2009; Hanlon and Slemrod, 2009; Wilson, 2009; Chen et al., 2010). 
In line with the above hypotheses’ development structure (H1a H2d), corporate 
governance is hypothesised as moderating the relationship between firm value 
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makers  and components of tax saving due to varying levels of  agency costs. 
Therefore, the following hypothesis will be further tested (in alternative form):   
 
Hypothesis 3a (H3a): The relationship between firm value and the extent of 
tax planning activities by persistent profit making companies is moderated 
by companies’ corporate governance. 
 
In  terms  of  non persistent  profit making  companies,  corporate  governance  is 
expected to moderate the relationship between firm value and the extent of the 
companies’ tax planning differently as compared to the other firms. This is due to 
the  ability  of  the  reporting  profit  to  influence  shareholders’  perception  of 
managers’ performance (Scholes and Wolfson, 1992; Tzovas, 2006) in which the 
fluctuating  reporting  profits  would  indicate  managers’  poor  performance  in 
managing  the  companies.  In  other  words,  managers  of  non persistent  profit 
making companies are perceived as not performing in the best interest of the 
shareholders.  Consequently,  based  on  the  non persistent  reporting  profit, 
shareholders  of  these  companies  are  presumed  to  doubt  the  ability  of  the 
companies’ corporate governance practice to reduce the costs and risks of tax 
planning.  Therefore, the moderating influence of corporate governance on the 
relationship between firm value and tax planning is expected to differ between 
persistent  and  non persistent  profit making  companies.  Thus,  corporate 
governance practice is expected to moderate the relationship between firm value 
and  tax  planning  of  non persistent  profit  making  companies  and,  hence,  it  is 
hypothesised (in alternative form) that: 
 
Hypothesis 3b (H3b): The relationship between firm value and the extent 
of  tax  planning  activities  by  non persistent  profit making  companies  is 
moderated by companies’ corporate governance. 
 
To test the hypotheses relating to the moderating effects of corporate governance 
on  the  relationships  between  firm  value  and  components  of  tax  saving,  the 
following hypotheses will be tested (in alternative form): 
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Hypothesis 4a (H4a): The relationship between firm value and the extent of 
tax  saving  from  permanent  differences  of  persistent  profit making 
companies is moderated by companies’ corporate governance. 
 
Hypothesis 4b (H4b): The relationship between firm value and the extent 
of  tax  saving  from  temporary  differences  of  persistent  profit making 
companies is moderated by companies’ corporate governance. 
 
Hypothesis 4c (H4c): The relationship between firm value and the extent of 
tax saving from foreign tax rates differentials of persistent profit making 
companies is moderated by companies’ corporate governance. 
 
Hypothesis 4d (H4d): The relationship between firm value and the extent 
of  tax  saving  from  NOLs  of  persistent  profit making  companies  is 
moderated by companies’ corporate governance. 
 
To test the hypotheses relating to the moderating effects of corporate governance 
on the relationships between firm value and components of tax saving of non 
persistent profit making companies, the following hypotheses will be tested (in 
alternative form): 
 
Hypothesis 4e (H4e): The relationship between firm value and the extent of 
tax  saving  from  permanent  differences  of  non persistent  profit making 
companies is moderated by companies’ corporate governance. 
 
Hypothesis 4f (H4f): The relationship between firm value and the extent of 
tax  saving  from  temporary  differences  of  non persistent  profit making 
companies is moderated by companies’ corporate governance. 
 
Hypothesis 4g (H4g): The relationship between firm value and the extent of 
tax  saving  from  foreign  tax  rates  differentials  of  non persistent  profit 
making companies is moderated by companies’ corporate governance. 
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Hypothesis 4h (H4h): The relationship between firm value and the extent 
of  tax  saving  from  NOLs  of  non persistent  profit making  companies  is 
moderated by companies’ corporate governance. 
 
5.3 Conclusions   
 
This  chapter  has  been  developed  based  on  the  understanding  obtained  in 
Chapters  2,  3  and  4.  This  chapter  has been  constructed  with  the  intention  to 
provide an explanation of the underlying theories and hypotheses development of 
this study. This chapter begins with a discussion of the theories that underpin the 
hypotheses development. The following section, hypotheses, is constructed based 
on the discussions in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 and  the underlying theories  of tax 
planning and corporate governance. 
 
In  understanding  the  research  problem,  the  Scholes Wolfson  framework  and 
agency theory are referred to as respectively applying previous knowledge on tax 
planning  and  corporate  governance.  As  this  study  attempts  to  investigate  the 
relationship  between  firm  value  and  tax  planning  whilst  simultaneously 
considering corporate governance as a moderating influence, the hypotheses are 
developed in two parts: firstly, firm value and tax planning, and secondly, firm 
value, tax planning and corporate governance. The hypotheses are also developed 
so as to test the influence of earnings persistency and components of tax saving. 
Overall, 22 hypotheses will be tested to examine the relationships between the 
interested  variables,  which  include,  for  example,  share  price,  tax  saving  and 
corporate  governance.    Consequently,  the  following  chapter,  Chapter  6,  will 
provide  explanations  of  the  variables  in  particular  measurements  and  data 
collection.  
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Chapter 6 
 
 
Data Collection and Variables 
Measurements 
 
This chapter focuses on the sample framework, estimation model development 
and variables measurements. It begins with sample selection and data sources of 
the  data  collection  and  is  followed  by  estimation  model  development.  The 
estimation  model  was  developed based  on  Ohlson’s  clean  surplus  accounting 
valuation model (Ohlson, 1995). Subsequently, this chapter continues with the 
explanation  of  the  variables  measurements.  The  summary  of  the  variables 
measurements is presented in the appendix in order to ease the understanding of 
the interested and control variables.  
 
6.1 Sample Selection and Data Sources 
 
This study employs a panel dataset of a large sample of publicly traded U.K. 
companies. The sample frame is non financial public companies that are listed in 
the main market of LSE. The sample frame was selected due to the availability of 
public access to the companies’ financial and corporate governance information, 
since U.K. listed companies are required to publicly publish their annual reports 
shortly  after  the  year end  (Financial  Services  Authority,  2009).  The  sample Chapter 6 Data Collection and Variables Measurements                                   145 
 
 
 
frame focuses only on the main market since companies listed under Alternative 
Investment Market (AIM) are “young growing companies”
48 and, therefore, the 
companies may tend to have low ETR due to the losses at the initial business 
start up  instead  of  tax  planning  activities.  Therefore,  in  order  to  ensure  the 
authenticity  of  effective  tax  planning  measures,  companies  under  AIM  are 
excluded.  The  sample  frame  concentrates  only  on  non financial  companies 
because  financial  companies  have  specific  regulations  which  may  affect  the 
relationship between tax planning and market value. In more general terms, this 
exclusion follows normal practice when using Ohlson based valuation models 
because of asset measurement issues (O'Hanlon and Taylor, 2007). 
 
The data was assembled over a three year sample period from 2005 until 2007. 
However,  2004  data  was  also  collected  to  use  as  prior year  information, 
specifically for scaling purposes.
49 The period was chosen to reflect the most 
current available data. In addition, the sample period was selected to consider 
authorities’  risk  assessment  of  large  companies.  Risk  assessment  has  been 
highlighted  in  Reducing  Administrative  Burdens:  Effective  Inspection  and 
Enforcement, i.e. “The Hampton Review” (Hampton, 2005) as an alternative to 
reducing  authorities’  administrative  burdens.  The  Hampton  Review  was 
published  in  March  2005  with  the  objective  “to  identify  ways  in  which  the 
administrative  burden  of  regulation  on  businesses  can  be  reduced  while 
maintaining or improving regulatory outcomes” (Hampton, 2005: 3). The review 
also highlights responses of tax authorities towards the risk assessment in which 
the HMRC introduced a proper assessment of non compliance risks prior to any 
inspection. The assessment is further documented and detailed in The Varney 
Report (Varney, 2006) in reviewing the relationship between large businesses 
and the HMRC. In managing its relationship with businesses, HMRC provides 
                                                 
48 “Established in 1995, AIM is the London Stock Exchange’s international market specifically 
designed for smaller, growing companies. The market combines the benefits of a public flotation 
with appropriate levels of regulation – a principles based regulatory approach together with 
high standards of disclosure – meeting the needs of international investors. There are currently 
over 1,600 companies on AIM with a combined market capitalisation of over £100 billion, of 
which £55 billion is held by institutional investors. AIM’s regulatory model has enabled its 
companies to achieve long term investment; of the £52.7 billion raised by AIM companies in the 
12 years since launch, £22.9 billion was raised by companies subsequent to joining the market” 
(source: http://www.londonstockexchange.com/about the exchange/media relations/press 
releases/2007/aimstudyidentifieskeystosuccess.htm).  
49 Details on scaling will be discussed in the variables measurements section. Chapter 6 Data Collection and Variables Measurements                                   146 
 
 
 
guidelines  that  recommend  that  companies  have  a  proper  formal  tax  policy 
(HMRC,  2009).  The  policy  is  suggested  to  include  companies’  tax related 
information,  consisting  of  tax  strategy  level,  operating  principles  and  tax 
guidelines, and this policy has to be approved by the board of directors. This 
indicates the importance of directors’ role in companies’ tax matters. In addition, 
it  also  highlights  HMRC’s  expectation  on  directors’  responsibility  towards 
companies’ tax issues. Therefore, in order to reflect the risk assessment by the 
authorities, the sample period was determined to start from 2005. In addition, 
2005 is the appropriate year to reflect HMRC’s more aggressive approaches to 
reducing  tax  avoidance  among  large  businesses  (The  Chartered  Institute  of 
Taxation,  2007).  These  actions  could  influence  companies’  tax  planning 
strategies and shareholders’ and directors’ awareness of tax planning risks.
50  
 
The dataset of this study can be classified into four types of data: firstly, financial 
and  market  data;  secondly,  industry  classification;  thirdly,  taxation  data;  and 
finally, corporate governance data. All of the data are archival in nature and have 
been published by companies. The financial and market data, for example sales, 
book value of equity and market value of equity, were obtained from Datastream 
database.
51  Data  on  the  industry  classification  were  initially  based  on  LSE’s 
industrial  classification.  Since  the  distributions  of  the  companies  across  the 
industry classifications were highly unbalanced between the large numbers of 
categories, the industries were then condensed based on Financial Times Stock 
Exchange (FTSE)/Dow Jones (DJ)’s industry classification benchmark. Table 6.1 
presents  the  distribution  of  the  sample  companies  according  to  industry 
classification by LSE and FTSE/DJ.
52 
 
 
                                                 
50 HMRC has made significant changes to the compliance structure since 2005 which was the 
year when HMRC was established (combination of Inland Revenue and Customs & Excise). The 
modification of the structure includes changes to several units including Special Compliance 
Office, Large Business Service and Anti Avoidance Group (see The Chartered Institute of 
Taxation, 2007). 
51 This database is provided by Thomson Reuters and the version that is used is Thomson 
Datastream Advance for Office (AFO) which covers time series and static data. 
52 The available non financial companies  exclude companies with more than 12 months 
accounting period, insufficient ETR data, negative book value, “zero” sales, “extreme” value of 
ETR and negative tax charge. This sample selection information is detailed in the sample 
selection table and its description. Chapter 6 Data Collection and Variables Measurements                                   147 
 
 
 
Table 6.1 
Industry Classification by LSE and FTSE/DJ 
 
LSE’s Industry Classification  No of co.    FTSE/DJ’s 
Industry 
Classification 
No. 
of co 
Oil and gas producers  11   
Oil equipment, services and distributions  3   
Oil and gas  14 
Chemicals  8   
Mining  8   
Basic materials  16 
Aerospace and defence  8   
Construction and materials  13   
Electronic and electrical equipment  9   
General industrials  6   
Industrial engineering  11   
Industrial transportation  4   
Support services  39   
Industrials  90 
Automobiles and parts  2   
Beverages  2   
Food producers  7   
Household goods  9   
Leisure goods  3   
Personal goods  4   
Tobacco  2   
Consumer 
goods  29 
Health care equipment and services  5   
Pharmaceutical and biotechnology  9   
Health care  14 
General retailers  16   
Media  14   
Travel and leisure  19   
Consumer 
services  49 
Fixed line telecommunications  2    Telecommuni 
cations  2 
Electricity  2   
Gas, water and multi utilities  2   
Utilities  4 
Software and computer services  12   
Technology hardware and equipment  10   
Technology  22 
Total  240    Total  240 
 
The  third  type  of  data,  taxation  data,  which  includes  tax  expense  and  tax 
reconciliation information, was hand collected from companies’ annual reports, 
specifically  from  the  tax  section  in  notes  to  the  accounts.  For  verification 
purposes, profit before tax was collected from both Datastream and tax notes, 
and cross checked.  
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Finally, corporate governance data, which consists of information on companies’ 
board of directors (except multi directorship data) and ownership, were gathered 
from Hemscott Company Guru Database.
53 For verification purposes, the list of 
directors  who  served  the  companies  was  compared  with  companies’  annual 
reports. Subsequently, corrections based on the annual report were made for any 
detected  conflicting  information.  As  the  data  on  multi directorship  was  not 
available  from  the  database,  the  Corporate  Register  was  used  to  collect  that 
particular data.
54 To ensure the accuracy of the data, this data was sample cross 
checked with the companies’ annual reports. Table 6.2 exhibits a summary of the 
data sources.  
 
Table 6.2 
Data Sources 
Type of 
Data 
Source  Extracted Information 
Financial 
and market 
data  
Datastream  Market value, book value of equity, 
profit before tax, accounting year end, 
number of ordinary shares, sales, 
dividend payout ratio, long term debt, 
total assets, percentage of foreign sales 
over total net sales, cash flow from 
operating, gross machinery and 
equipment and net proceeds from 
sale/issue of common and preferred 
shares 
Industry   LSE classification and 
collapsed based on 
FTSE/DJ’s industry 
classification 
benchmark 
LSE: List of companies with industry 
classification for the sample period 
FTSE/DJ: List of industry as listed in 
the benchmark together with the 
details of sub sectors 
Taxation 
data 
Notes to the accounts of 
financial statements 
Tax expense and tax reconciliation 
 
Corporate 
governance 
data 
Hemscott Company 
Guru Database, annual 
reports and Corporate 
Register 
Chairman, chief executive officers, 
directors’ ownership, institutional 
ownership, number of directors on 
board, non executive directors, 
number of boards being served by the 
directors and directors’ remuneration. 
                                                 
53 The database is provided by Hemscott Group Limited based on online research service which 
covers 2,500 U.K. registered and nearly 500 non U.K. registered LSE listed companies. 
54 Corporate Register, compiled by PriceWaterhouseCoopers and quarterly published by HS 
Financial Publishing, contains information on companies’ directors, which includes a list of 
directors and companies that the directors currently and previously served. Chapter 6 Data Collection and Variables Measurements                                   149 
 
 
 
The sample selection process commenced with public listed companies that were 
only  listed  throughout  the  sample  period  of  2005 2007.  The  total  number  of 
companies derived from this process was 1,419. Companies with negative book 
value of equity, “zero” sales and extreme value of ETR were excluded from the 
sample. The elimination of negative book value of equity is due to its limited 
economic meaning since the book value of equity is utilised to indicate size, 
abandonment value and expected future normal earnings (Collins, Pincus and 
Xie, 1999). Similarly, a company with “zero” sales was also excluded to control 
the economic factors in the sense of financial distress and non standard sales. 
Further, companies with extreme value of ETR were excluded to control the bias 
of “large, nonrecurring statutory reconciliation items such as the effects of a 
business dispositions and asset impairments, and decreases in the deferred tax 
asset  valuation  allowance”  (Phillips,  2003:  858).  Thus,  companies  with  ETR 
value of more or less than one (+1) or negative one ( 1) were eliminated from the 
sample. In addition, as the extent of the tax credit depends on factors other than 
the  current  year  taxable  income,  negative  tax  charged  (tax  credit)  companies 
were excluded to control the influence of carried back current year tax losses and 
brought forward previous written off tax losses. 
 
The sample consists of persistent and non persistent profit making  companies 
which was categorised into firstly, the persistent profit making companies and 
secondly,  both  persistent  and  non persistent  profit making  companies.  This 
categorisation is essential to test the hypotheses related to earnings persistence 
propositions. The first category, persistent profit making companies, consists of 
balance company year data of profit making companies in which the sample was 
restricted only to profit makers throughout the sample period. This restriction is 
intended  to  control  and  minimise  the  effects  of  losses  on  the  tax  planning 
variable.
55 The restriction could also indicate the long term survivorship of the 
companies and where such companies may have a stronger incentive to carry out 
tax planning activities (Mills et al., 1998).    
                                                 
55 The exclusion of loss observations or years could also control confounding denominator effect 
in which, as explained in the following variable measurement section, ETR, as a component of 
the tax planning measure, was calculated by scaling the current tax expense with PBT. Therefore, 
the exclusion could avoid errors in ETR calculation due to negative sign of profit before tax 
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The  second  category,  persistent  and  non persistent  profit making  companies, 
consists of unbalance company year data of profit making companies. For this 
category,  all  of  the  companies  (profitable  and  non profitable)  were  firstly 
scrutinised to consider only the observations that exhibit profit before tax in the 
year 2005. For example, in the case of companies that exhibited negative PBT in 
2005,  the  companies’  data  (2005 2007)  were  excluded  from  the  analysis. 
Secondly, for companies that exhibited negative PBT in only 2006, data of 2006 
and 2007 were excluded from the analysis. Finally, for companies that exhibit 
negative PBT in only 2007, the 2007 data were excluded from the analysis. By 
applying this restriction, loss observation in a year was excluded together with 
the observations of its subsequent year(s). In other words, in deriving the second 
category  of  companies,  the  first  year  of  loss  observation  and  its  subsequent 
year(s) (either profit or loss) were eliminated. Therefore, the second category 
comprises both persistent and non persistent profit making companies and, for 
the purpose of the analysis, these companies were coded as “1” for non persistent 
profit making companies and “0” for persistent profit making companies. Table 
6.3 displays the sample selection process of the two categories of companies. In 
short, persistent profit makers can be inferred as a subset of combined persistent 
and non persistent profit makers. 
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Table 6.3 
Sample Selection 
 
Details  Number of 
Observations 
Number of 
Companies 
Public listed companies (listed throughout the 
period)    1419 
Finance companies    (580) 
Non main market    (413) 
Not available in Datastream    (32) 
At least one year of annual report was not 
available    (59) 
Accounting period of more than 12 months    (4) 
Insufficient ETR data (not available or in 
percentage)    (29) 
Negative book value of equity    (24) 
“Zero” sales    (1) 
Extreme value of ETR     (19) 
Negative tax charge    (18) 
  720  240 
Current and subsequent loss observation  (110)   
Persistent and non persistent profit making 
companies   610 
 
Unbalance data  (22)   
Persistent profit making companies  588  196 
 
6.2 Estimation Models Development 
 
The  estimation  models  of  this  study  are  based  on  Ohlson’s  market  valuation 
model  (Ohlson,  1995).    This  study  extends  the  model  by  incorporating  tax 
related variables and other firm specific control variables. This section explains 
in detail about the underlying assumptions of the model. 
 
6.2.1 Theoretical Model 
 
The empirical analysis in this study is based on Ohlson’s firm valuation model 
(Ohlson,  1995)  in  which  the  model,  under  clean  surplus  accounting  relation, Chapter 6 Data Collection and Variables Measurements                                   152 
 
 
 
examines  the  association  between  firm  market  value  and  accounting  data.
56 
Ohlson’s valuation model is a standard valuation model used in the accounting 
literature and has been extensively used by subsequent researchers, for example 
O'Hanlon (1995), Rees (1997), O'Hanlon and Pope (1999), O'Hanlon and Taylor 
(2007) and Horton (2008) in U.K. studies, Collins et al. (1999) in a U.S. study, 
and Zeng (2003) and Zeng (2006) in Canadian studies.  
 
Ohlson’s valuation model demonstrates a firm’s market value of equity (a level 
market  price  data)  as  a  function  of  net  book  value  and  the  future  expected 
earnings.  Rees  (1997)  highlights    that  a  level  valuation  model,  for  example 
Ohlson’s model, is suitable for  accounting valuation study, as  compared to a 
return model, for three reasons. Firstly, as compared to the return model, the 
level model avoids the problem of influence of change variables, for example 
changes in accounting practices and changes in capital structure. Secondly, the 
level  model  is  not  sensitive  to  accumulated  return as  compared  to  the  return 
model, in which the level data only reacts to available information in the current 
price  instead  of  accumulated  information.  Thirdly,  the  level  model  is  more 
appropriate  than  the  return  model  since  the  level  model  considers  long run 
relationships due to the function of expected future items instead of accumulated 
historical items as considered in the return model. In addition, the use of return 
model  also  requires  the  calculation  of  expected  and  subsequently  unexpected 
components of any information disclosure. The level model is also considered 
appropriate for application in this study as it has significantly contributed to the 
understanding  of  valuation  relevance  knowledge  based  on  the  fundamental 
dividend capitalisation model (O'Hanlon, 1995).  
 
Based on three analytical underlying assumptions, Ohlson’s valuation model is 
exhibited as follows: 
( ) ∑
∞
=
+
− + =
1 τ
τ
τ a
t t f t t x E R y P  
 
 
                                                 
56 The relationship is regarded as clean surplus relation since “all changes in assets/liabilities 
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Where: 
Pt  = Market value of firm’s equity at time t 
yt  = Firm net book value at time t 
Rf  = Risk free rate plus one 
Et  = Expectation operator 
 
a
t x   = Abnormal income at time t 
 
The underlying assumptions of the model are related to present value of expected 
future dividend, clean surplus relation and stochastic time series behaviour of 
abnormal  earnings.  The  assumptions  are  exhibited  by  the  following  three 
equations:  
 
Assumption 1: Present value of expected dividend determines market value. 
( ) ∑
∞
=
+
− =
1 τ
τ
τ
t t f t D E R P                                   (1) 
Where Dt = Net dividend paid at time t. 
 
In this assumption, the shareholders are believed to invest in the company so as 
to receive the dividends on their shares. Therefore, the discounted dividend is 
claimed as representing the company share price. 
  
Assumption 2: Accounting data and dividends satisfy the clean surplus relation 
where the change in net asset for a period reflects the retained net profit shown in 
the period’s income statement. This assumption is based on a regular owner’s 
equity accounting as follows:  
t t t t D y y x + − = −1                        (2) 
Where xt = Earnings at time t. 
 
Following  the  basic  accounting  computation  to  determine  the  book  value  of 
equity  at  the  year end,  the  equation  in  assumption  2  computes  the  current 
earnings  by  adding  the  dividend  to  the  difference  between  the  opening  and 
closing book value of equity.  
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Assumption  3:  Stochastic  time series  behaviour  of  expected  earnings  is 
structured by a linear model as follows: 
  ) )( 1 ( 1 − − − = t f t
a
t y R x x                                                                                         (3) 
 
This assumption explains the abnormal income as a result of current earnings less 
the risk free portion of opening book value of equity. This equation also implies 
a linear relationship between both current earnings and the risk free portion of 
opening book value of equity, and the abnormal income.    
 
Based on the above assumptions, share price is explained as a function of current 
book value and expected future abnormal earnings. Ohlson (1995) highlights that 
researchers also refer to the abnormal earnings as residual income.  Therefore, to 
derive after tax abnormal income, one should deduct the tax components from 
the
a
t x , i.e.  TS x STR x
a
t
a
t + − ) 1 ( of which TS is the tax saving that is computed as 
the difference between statutory tax rates (STR) and ETR. In other words, after 
tax abnormal income can be explained as a function of net abnormal income after 
STR  plus  the  tax  saving.  As  STR  across  this  study’s  sample  period  were 
constant, i.e. 30 per cent, the abnormal income net of STR empirically represents 
before tax abnormal income of the companies. 
 
In dealing with expected future term of the variables (t+1), with reference to 
Collins et al. (1999), by substituting the function of book value at time t (BVEt) 
and  the  function  of  abnormal  earnings  in  the  Ohlson’s  valuation  model,  the 
model could be rewritten as  t
a
t t t v x BVE MVE + + =  where  t v  is referred to other 
non accounting value relevant information and MVE is referred to market value 
of  equity.  The  model  is  derived  from  the  stochastic  process  assumption  for 
abnormal earnings in which, 
1 1 1 + + + + = t t
a
t
a
t v x x ε ω                                                                                       (4) 
 
By substituting (4) in Ohlson’s valuation model, the model can be rewritten as 
follows: 
t
a
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As Ohlson (1995) assumes that vt has no significant dependency on BVE and x
a, 
vt is assumed to be “zero” and hence has been omitted in the estimation model 
(O'Hanlon and Pope, 1999; Stober, 1999; O'Hanlon and Taylor, 2007; Horton, 
2008). This omission is also related to the difficulty in measuring vt in explaining 
MVE (Dechow, Hutton and Sloan, 1999). Thus, market value can be explained 
as a function of book value at time t and abnormal income at time t. 
 
In terms of risk term (R) in Ohlson’s model, several previous pieces of literature, 
for example Zeng (2003), measure this term as risk free interest rate while others 
refer to it as cost of capital, for example, Stark and Thomas (1998). In applying 
Ohlson’s model in investigating the relationship between residual income and 
firm value of U.K. firms, Stark and Thomas (1998) assume this term as constant 
since the empirical evidence highlights that the measure does not explain the 
cross section difference of expected returns. Consistent with these authors, the 
term in this study is also assumed to be constant across companies and thus is not 
explicitly included in the estimation model. 
 
Ohlson’s model is based on the clean surplus accounting relation assumption that 
all  transactions  that  affect  book  value  are  incorporated  in  income  statement. 
However, the existence of a clean surplus relationship is dependent upon the 
format of accounting standards. Income measures which depart from the clean 
surplus relationship are  known as “dirty surplus”. O'Hanlon  and Pope (1999) 
examine  the  value  relevance  of  “dirty  surplus”  items,  i.e.  items  that  affect 
shareholder equity but which have not been included in the income statement for 
a U.K. sample of firms over a 20 year period. The researchers, however, find 
little evidence on the value relevance of “dirty surplus” items. Therefore, “dirty 
surplus”  items  are  not  excluded  from  the  earnings  variable  of  the  estimation 
model as they have less effect on the market value as a subsequent effect of 
reduced ability to predict future earnings, dividend or book value (Kallapur and 
Kwan, 2004). This is also consistent with Stark’s (1997) analytical work which 
indicates  that  “dirty  surplus”,  if  irrelevant  for  valuation  purposes,  can  be 
considered to be aggregated in a single whole component of earnings.  
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6.2.2 Estimation Models 
 
The  Ohlson  model  was  subsequently  refined  by  disaggregating  the  expected 
earnings component. This section explains this process in detail, which leads to 
the following model: 
( )
k
t
n
t
a
t t
a
t t
a
t
a
t t t t FSC ETR x STR x STR x x E R BVE MVE Σ ∑
=
∞
=
+ + + + + +
− + − + − + =
1 1
) ( ) (
κ τ
τ τ τ τ τ τ
τ
Where: 
MVEt  = Market value of equity at time t 
BVEt    = Book value of equity at time t 
a
t x   = Abnormal income at time t 
STRt  = STR at time t 
ETRt  = ETR at time t 
FSCt  = Firm specific characteristics at time t 
 
6.2.2.1 Development Process 
 
By replacing MVEt to represent Pt in equation (1) above, the equation is written 
as follows:  
( ) ∑
∞
=
+
− =
1 τ
τ
τ
t t f t D E R MVE                                                                                       (6)  
 
The dividend, Dt, is the net of profit after tax less retained profit. Therefore, Dt 
could be expressed by the following accounting equation: 
t t t t t t t RP TS PBT STR PBT PBT D − − − = ) (                                                          (7) 
Where: 
PBTt = Profit before tax at time t 
TSt    = Tax saving at time t (difference between STR and ETR) 
RPt    = Retained profit at time t 
Substituting equation (7) into equation (6) yields the following:  
( ) ∑
∞
=
+ + + + + +
− − + − =
1 τ
τ τ τ τ τ τ
τ
t t t t t t t f t RP TS PBT STR PBT PBT E R MVE                                   (8) 
Therefore, equation (8) explains the present value of expected future dividends as 
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Equation (2) presents Ohlson’s current earnings assumption on a regular owner’s 
accounting equity. By replacing PATt and BVEt to respectively present xt and yt 
in equation (2) above, the equation is refined as follows:  
t t t t D BVE BVE PAT + − = −1                               (9) 
Where: 
PATt = Profit after tax at time t 
 
Similar to the above process, replacing PATt and BVEt to respectively present xt 
and yt in equation (3), i.e. on current residual earning in Ohlson’s assumption of 
stochastic time series behaviour, yields the following:  
) )( 1 ( 1 − − − = t f t
a
t BVE R PAT x                                                                            (10) 
 
Subsequently, by substituting (9) in (10), the following equation is derived: 
) )( 1 ( 1 1 − − − − + − = t f t t t
a
t BVE R D BVE BVE x                                                      (11) 
 
As Dt in equation (7) is explained as a function of PBTt net of tax and RPt, 
substituting (7) in (11) leads to the following: 
1 1 ) 1 ( ) ( − − − − − − − + − = t f t t t t t t t
a
t BVE R RP TS STR PBT PBT BVE BVE x   
 
This is simplified and rearranged as follows: 
1 1 1 − − − + − − + − + − = t t f t t t t t t t t
a
t BVE BVE R RP TS PBT STR PBT PBT BVE BVE x     (12) 
 
By disaggregating the tax components in the 
a
t x  and rearranging the equation so 
as to be the function of RP, the following equation is derived: 
t
a
t t
a
t
a
t t f t t t t t t t TS x STR x x BVE R TS PBT STR PBT PBT BVE RP − + − − + − + = −1      (13) 
 
Substituting (13) in (8), as presented in the following process, leads to equation 
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In controlling the effects of firm specific characteristics, it is important to relax 
some  of  the  underlying  Ohlson  valuation  model’s  assumptions.  One  of  the 
assumptions  is  related  to  information  asymmetry  in  which  the  Ohlson  model 
assumes that the information asymmetry between management and shareholders 
is absent. However, previous literature argues that information asymmetry not 
only exists but is also correlated to dividend and equity returns (Rees, 1997; 
Hand,  Landsman  and  Building,  2005).  Therefore,  the  equation  is  further 
modified to accommodate the firm specific characteristics variables, FSCt, and 
hence, the equation model is written as the following: 
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The components of FSC variable will be discussed subsequently. 
 
As the future abnormal income or residual income cannot readily be estimated, 
previous pieces of literature, for example O'Hanlon (1995), O'Hanlon and Taylor 
(2007) and Horton (2008) in U.K. studies, and Zeng (2003) in a Canadian study,  
proxy the future abnormal incomes as the latest net profit after tax and thus, in 
the estimation model, the component of the residual income is redefined so as to 
reflect the profit after tax with the inclusion of tax components that are STR and 
tax saving. Therefore, the model is rewritten as the following: 
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As explained in section 6.2.1, as the STR is constant at 30 per cent across the 
sample  period,  the  PBT  net  of  STR,  i.e. τ τ τ + + + − t t t STR PBT PBT ,  empirically 
represents  PBT  of  the  companies.  Therefore,  the  PBT  net  of  STR  is  further 
defined as PBT in the following sections.  
 
In addition to the above, the model is further refined in the sense of expected 
future term. Equation (5) in section 6.2.1 shows that the expected future items (at 
time t+τ) can be explained as the current item (t). Therefore, in the following 
sections, the items at time t+τ in the estimation models are written as items at 
time t. 
 
6.2.2.2 Concepts and Empirical Applications 
 
Previous researchers have provided further explanations of the estimators of the 
valuation  model.  Based  on  these  explanations, the  concepts  of  the  estimation 
model of this study are drawn. 
 
6.2.2.2.1 Alternative Specifications and Measurements 
 
As  highlighted  in  the  above  discussions,  the  estimation  model  of  this  study 
extends Ohlson’s model not only by integrating tax related variables but also by 
considering  firm specific  characteristics,  for  example  industry  classification, 
capital intensity and leverage. In addition, the continuous variables in the model 
are scaled to control for scaling effects. This is explained in detail in the scaling 
effect section. 
 
In order to control the firm specific characteristics, this study includes several 
variables  that  have  been  found  by  previous  researchers  to  be  important  in 
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in  detail  in  the  following  sub section  about  firm specific  characteristics. 
Basically, the estimation model is as follows: 
it it n
n
it it it
it it it it it it months it
INDDUM FS DIV LEV
CAPINT EM CC TS PBT BVE MVE
ε β β β β
β β β β β β β
+ Σ + + + +
+ + + + + + =
=
+
16
10
9 8 7
6 5 4 3 2 1 0 3
Where: 
MVEit+3months   =  Market value of equity after 3 months of company i’s year 
end (t)* 
BVEit              =  Book value of equity of company i at time t* 
PBTit  =  Profit before tax of company i at time t* 
TSit    =  Tax saving of company i at time t* 
CCit    =  Capital contribution of company i at time t* 
EMit    =  Earnings management of company i at time t* 
CAPINTit  =  Capital intensity of company i at time t 
LEVit    =  Leverage of company i at time t 
DIVit    =  Dividend payout ratio of company i at time t 
FSit    =  Level of foreign sales of company i at time t 
INDDUMit  =  Industry dummy of company i at time t 
it ε      =  Error term 
* Scaled by BVEt 1 (refer to the following scaling effect sub section) 
 
Market Value of Equity 
 
Market value of equity is measured as market value after three months from the 
companies’ accounting year end to reflect the lag in disclosure to shareholders, 
since  U.K.  public  listed  companies  are  required  to  issue  their  preliminary 
statement  of  annual  results  shortly  after  the  year end  (Financial  Services 
Authority, 2009). Such measurement is also in line with recent U.K. valuation 
literature  (for  example  O'Hanlon  and  Taylor,  2007;  Horton,  2008;  Oswald, 
2008).
57 However, for the purpose of ensuring the robustness of the results, the 
sensitivity  test  using  market  value  after  six  months  (Rees,  1997;  Stark  and 
Thomas, 1998; O'Hanlon and Pope, 1999; Hughes, 2008) is also conducted.  
                                                 
57 To test the sensitivity of the results upon the change of market value measure to an alternative 
measure that has been also used by previous researchers (Desai and Dharmaphala, 2009), the 
models are re estimated using Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable. This is explained in detail in 
the further test section of Chapter 7. 
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Tax Planning 
 
This study measures tax planning as the amount of “tax savings” in profit terms, 
in  which  the  variable  is  measured  by  multiplying  PBT  with  the  difference 
between STR and ETR. ETR is measured as a ratio of current tax expense on 
profit before tax in which the numerator excludes deferred tax expense to reflect 
“persistent” tax saving derived from strategic tax planning. The omission is also 
to control for the temporary effects of deferral taxation which may be related to 
earnings  management  (Hanlon,  2005;  Frank  et  al.,  2009).    However,  in  the 
refined definition of the variable, deferred tax expense is included to examine its 
influence on market value. ETR used in this study is in line with previous tax 
planning and tax burdens literature (for example Zimmerman, 1983; Porcano, 
1986; Holland, 1998; Mills et al., 1998; Rego, 2003; Dyreng et al., 2008). It is 
appropriate  for  application  in  this  study  as  compared  to  other  measures,  for 
example marginal tax rates and book tax gap, since the information in computing 
the ETR is directly available from the financial statements and thus accessible by 
the  shareholders  (Stewart,  1981).  As  compared  to  marginal  tax  rates  (MTR), 
ETR is more appropriate in measuring tax planning of the estimation model since 
the response variable is related to a level variable (market value at time t) instead 
of a return variable. In other words, ETR is suitable as compared to MTR as the 
dependent variable does not attempt to measure the change in market value as 
MTR does (De Jong, Kabir and Nguyen, 2008). ETR is also perceived to be 
appropriate  as  compared  to  book tax  gap  measure  (Desai  and  Dharmapala, 
2009).
58 The ETR based tax planning variable avoids measurement errors related 
to  tax  expense  on  foreign  income  and  tax  credit.  This  problem  is  raised  by 
Hanlon (2003) as a potential measurement error when estimating taxable income 
in computing the book tax difference.  
                                                 
58 It can be shown algebraically that ETR is equivalent to book tax gap measure used in the U.S. 
literature, for example, Desai and Dharmapala (2009): 
ETR=(TI*STR)/PBT, where TI is taxable income 
PBT*ETR=TI*STR 
(PBT*ETR)/STR=TI 
[(PBT*ETR)/STR] PBT=TI PBT 
[(PBT*ETR) (PBT*STR)]/STR=TI PBT 
[PBT(ETR STR)]/STR=TI PBT 
PBT(ETR STR)=(TI PBT)STR 
∴ETR measure of tax planning is a pseudonym of book tax gap measure of tax planning, 
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Components of Tax Saving  
 
As explained in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, the pricing of tax planning could be 
further explained by the components of tax saving. Since the deviation of actual 
tax  expense  from  statutory  tax  expense  consists  of  permanent  and  temporary 
differences  (Boatsman,  Gupta  and  Weaver,  2002;  Hanlon,  2005),  the  ETR 
reconciling items are firstly identified to reflect both components. In addition, 
based  on  previous  studies,  for  example  Dhaliwal  Gleason  and  Mills  (2004), 
Atwood and Reynolds (2008) and Bauman and Shaw (2008), items related to tax 
losses and foreign tax rates differentials are further separately classified. This 
disaggregation approach allows valuation testing of each component.   
 
Para  81  IAS12  Income  Taxes  (World  GAAP  Info,  2009)  requires  a  separate 
disclosure of reconciliation tax expense items to explain the relationship between 
statutory tax expense and effective tax expense. Based on this standard and the 
above mentioned  literature,  the  reconciling  items  are  carefully  classified  into 
four  main  categories  which  consist  of  permanent  differences,  temporary 
differences,  tax  losses  and  foreign  tax  rates  differentials.  Items  that  can  be 
categorised  under  more  than  one  category  (i.e.  permanent  differences  or 
temporary differences) are controlled as unclassified items. Table 6.4 presents 
the  classification  of  the  ETR  reconciling  items  (the  descriptions  of  the 
reconciling  items  are  based  on  those  reported  items  in  the  published  ETR 
reconciliation). 
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Table 6.4 
Components of Tax Saving 
 
Component  ETR Reconciling Items 
Tax effect on utilisation of previously 
unrecognised/not utilised tax losses and other assets 
Tax effect of unrecognised/not utilised losses 
Tax losses 
(TLOSS) 
Tax effect on utilisation/recognition of tax losses 
Tax effect of income/expenses that are not 
taxable/allowable in determining taxable profit 
Permanent difference 
Associates and joint venture 
Rate change adjustment 
Withholding tax or secondary taxation 
Income tax suffered 
Tax on capital items 
Sale of property 
Permanent differences 
(TPD) 
Share options/share base payments 
Impairment of long leasehold property 
Tax benefit from goodwill deduction 
Exchange differences 
Timing differences  
Movement in unprovided/provided deferred tax 
Recognition of a deferred tax asset not previously 
recognised 
Deferred tax asset/liability not recognised 
Current year deferred tax  
Deferred tax on retirement benefit obligations 
Deferred taxation on unremitted earnings of overseas 
subsidiaries 
Prior period adjustments 
Adjustments in respect of equity accounted 
investments 
Temporary differences 
(TTD) 
Pensions and post retirement benefits 
Foreign tax rates 
differentials 
(TFTR) 
Subsidiaries operating in other jurisdictions 
Credit/incentives/relief 
Tax on derivative financial instruments 
Other 
Restructuring and impairment 
Unclassified items
59 
(TUNC) 
Provisions/accruals/exceptional items  
                                                 
59 Unclassified items represent ETR reconciliation items that could not be categorised under the 
other four categories due to the possibility of them being classified under more than one category 
(i.e. permanent difference and temporary difference). However, for the purpose of the robustness 
of the classification, this category is also separately regressed as permanent difference and 
temporary difference. This is further explained in the further tests section. Chapter 6 Data Collection and Variables Measurements                                   164 
 
 
 
Incorporating these tax saving components in model (15) yields the following 
model: 
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Where: 
TLOSSit  =  NOLs of ETR reconciling items of company i at time t* 
TPDit    =  Permanent differences of ETR reconciling items of company i 
at time t* 
TTDit    =  Temporary differences of ETR reconciling items of company i 
at time t* 
TFTRit   =  Foreign  tax  rates  differentials  of  ETR  reconciling  items  of 
company i at time t* 
TUNCit  =  Unclassified ETR reconciling items of company i at time t* 
* Scaled by BVEt 1 (refer to the following scaling effect sub section) 
 
Firm-Specific Characteristics 
 
The remaining independent variables are related to firm specific characteristics. 
These  variables  are  to  control  for  potential  effects  of  tax related  factors,  for 
example, capital intensity, leverage and the extent of foreign sales, on the tax 
planning measure. In order to ensure that the results on the coefficient estimate of 
tax planning variable is not driven by these factors, firm specific variables, that 
were found by previous literature as directly or indirectly related to tax planning, 
are included as control variables. This inclusion is similar to Chen et al. (2010), 
who  include  firm specific  variables  to  control  the  fundamental  effect  of  the 
hypothesised  variable.  As  highlighted  in  model  (15)  above,  the  variables 
comprise capital contribution, earnings management, capital intensity, leverage, 
dividend, foreign sales and industry classification. 
 
Capital contribution (CC) is significant in U.K. value relevance literature (for 
example Akbar and Stark, 2003; Hughes, 2008) since it indicates shareholders’ 
investments in the company apart from their shareholdings. This is consistent 
with signalling theory (Akbar and Stark, 2003) in which, based on asymmetric 
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distribution information, positive capital contribution reveals information to the 
shareholders about an increase in the equity value.  In line with Hughes (2008), 
capital contribution in this study is measured by net proceeds from the purchase 
and sale of common and preferred stock.  
 
The next control variable, earnings management (EM), is included in order to 
control  for  manipulation  of  financial  accounting  items  by  managers  due  to, 
among  other  things,  the  intention  that  is  based  on  contractual  settings,  for 
instance in  terms of leverage, bonus plan and size (Holland and Jackson, 2004). 
This  is  in  line  with  Healy  and  Wahlen’s  (1999)  explanation  that  earnings 
management “occurs when managers use judgement in financial reporting and 
in  structuring  transactions  to  alter  financial  reports  to  either  mislead  some 
stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to 
influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers” 
(Healy  and  Wahlen,  1999:  368).  Consistent  with  Healy  (1985)  and  Phillips, 
Pincus and Rego (2003), earnings management in this study is measured based 
on total accrual measures which is derived by subtracting net cash flow form 
operation from PBT.  This specifically controls for variation in the tax planning 
variable  (TS)  that  arises  from  earnings  management  (Desai  and  Dharmapala, 
2009). 
 
The  next  firm specific  characteristics  variable,  capital  intensity  (CAPINT),  is 
included  to  control  the  extent  of  machinery  and  equipment  utilisation  in  the 
business activity. As discussed in Chapter 2, the capital intensity level correlates 
with tax planning activities in the sense of capital allowance and other incentives 
related  to  the  capital  expenditure.  The  relationship  between  tax  planning  and 
capital intensity has been exhibited by previous researchers (for example Gupta 
and Newberry, 1997; Derashid and Zhang, 2003) in which ETR is found to be 
negatively related to the level of companies’ capital intensity. Capital intensity is 
also  found  to  be  positively  related  with  tax  planning  investment  expenditure 
(Mills  et  al.,  1998).  Therefore,  in  order  to  control  the  impact  of  capital 
expenditure in tax planning, this variable is measured by the proportion of gross 
machinery and equipment to total assets. Plant and property are excluded from 
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are  smaller  as  compared  to  machinery  and  equipment  and  hence  are  less 
attractive for tax planning purposes. 
 
LEV, a variable for leverage, is included to control interest tax shield. Leverage 
is found to be interrelated with tax planning since it could indicate the use of debt 
financing for the purpose of receiving higher interest tax shield (Porcano, 1986; 
Kim and Limpaphayom, 1998; Derashid and Zhang, 2003). This relationship is 
explained  in  detail  in  Chapter  2.  Thus,  consistent  with  previous  studies,  for 
example Mills et al. (1998), this variable is calculated by the proportion of long 
term debt to total assets. 
 
The  next  control  variable,  foreign  sales  (FS),  is  a  proxy  for  the  extent  of  a 
company’s involvement in multinational business. The inclusion of this variable 
is important as companies with a high level of multinational business activities 
may have greater opportunity to plan their tax. This method of tax planning is 
related to profit  or income shifting in which, as explained in Chapter 2, MNC 
may plan their tax by transferring their profit or taxable income to lower tax 
jurisdictions.  The  relationship  between  tax  planning  and  the  extent  of 
multinational activities has been empirically verified by previous researchers (for 
example Klassen et al., 1993; Mills et al., 1998; Rego, 2003). Therefore, in order 
to control the effect of the extent of multinational operations on cross sectional 
difference, foreign sales variable is included as a control variable. FS expresses 
foreign sales as a percentage of net sales. 
 
In  addition  to  the  above  firm specific  characteristics,  dividend  (DIV)  is  also 
included in the estimation model in order to control signalling effects. From the 
companies’  management  perspective,  dividend  is  an  important  tool  for 
influencing shareholders’ valuation of the performance of the managers in the 
presence of information asymmetry. Thus, as this could result in market failure 
(Akerlof,  1970;  Curry  et  al.,  2007),  DIV  controls  the  cost  of  shareholders’ 
misinterpretation  due  to  signalling  effects  and  information  asymmetry.  These 
arguments  are  consistent  with  Rees  (1997)  and  Akbar  and  Stark  (2003)  who 
document  positive  relations  between  dividend  and  firm  valuation.  Therefore, 
consistent  with  Berkman,  Bradbury,  Hancock  and  Innes  (2002),  the  dividend Chapter 6 Data Collection and Variables Measurements                                   167 
 
 
 
variable in the model is measured as the percentage of dividend per share on 
earnings  per  share.  This  measure  is  suitable  for  reflecting  management’s 
signalling  since,  as  explained  by  Berkman  et  al.  (2002),  high  value  of  stock 
performance  ratio  indicates  signalling  by  management  in  meeting  companies’ 
dividend expectations.  
 
In order to control industry effects on the model, a series of industry dummies 
(INDDUM) is included as control variables in which the variables assume the 
heterogeneity of the samples. In addition, as highlighted in Chapter 2, an industry 
dummy could also indicate different tax planning opportunities across sectors 
(Mills et al., 1998). The industry classification is based on FTSE/DJ industry 
classification benchmark, as discussed in the sample selection section (section 
6.1).  
 
Non-Persistent Profit-Making Companies 
 
As  highlighted  in  Chapter  5,  the  relationship  between  firm  value  and  tax 
planning  of  non persistent  profit making  companies  is  separately  tested  to 
investigate  the  shareholders’  valuation  of  tax  planning  activities  by  non 
persistent profit makers. To examine this relationship, an interaction variable, 
NPSTDUMTS, is included in model (15). Therefore, the equation is written as 
follows: 
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Where NPSTDUMTSit is an interaction variable between non persistent profit 
making dummy (NPSTDUM) and tax saving (TS) of company i at time t, scaled 
by BVEt 1, (refer to the following scaling effect sub section). 
 
In testing the relationship between firm value and the individual components of 
tax saving of non persistent profit making companies, five interactive variables 
between NPSTDUM and the components are included. 
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 Where: 
NPSTDUMit_TLOSSit  =  Interaction  between  NPSTDUM  and  NOLs  of 
ETR reconciling items of company i at time t* 
NPSTDUMit_TPDit    =  Interaction  between  NPSTDUM  and  permanent 
differences of ETR reconciling items of company i 
at time t* 
NPSTDUMit_TTDit    =  Interaction  between  NPSTDUM  and  temporary 
differences of ETR reconciling items of company i 
at time t* 
NPSTDUMit_TFTRit    =  Interaction  between  NPSTDUM  and  foreign  tax 
rates  differentials  of  ETR  reconciling  items  of 
company i at time t* 
NPSTDUMit_TUNCit  =  Interaction between NPSTDUM and unclassified 
ETR reconciling items of company i at time t* 
* Scaled by BVEt 1 (refer to the following scaling effect sub section) 
 
Corporate Governance 
 
As  the  aim  of  this  study  is  to  examine  the  moderating  effect  of  corporate 
governance on tax planning valuation, the corporate governance variables are not 
based  on  individual  governance  mechanisms  but  rather  on  general  corporate 
governance measures. These measures are developed using factor analysis and, 
to ensure the relevance of the measures towards current corporate governance 
practice, the applied mechanisms are based on recent U.K. corporate governance 
studies by  Florackis (2008) and McKnight and Weir (2009).  
 
Corporate  governance  mechanisms  considered  in  this  study  mainly  represent 
ownership structure, board structure and compensation structure. As explained in 
Chapter 3, ownership structure, which consists of managerial and institutional 
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ownerships, could be an effective mechanism to reduce agency conflict due to its 
ability  to  align  owners’  and  managers’  wealth  objectives.  However,  previous 
studies document mixed empirical results on the ability of these mechanisms to 
minimise  the  agency  problem.  Managerial  ownership  is  expected  to  monitor 
management  behaviour  in  favour  of  the  shareholders  (Jensen  and  Meckling, 
1976) since the management has a large interest in pursuing the business so as to 
increase  their  wealth.    However,  an  excessive  level  of  managerial  ownership 
tends  to  lead  to  a  greater  agency  problem,  for  example,  insufficient  efforts, 
private benefits emphasis and entrenchment at the expense of other shareholders 
(Florackis, 2008). Similarly, institutional shareholders might pursue their own 
objective at the expense of other shareholders since their ownership is below the 
100 per cent level (Hart, 1995). In fact, in the U.K., the institutional shareholders 
are  generally  found  to  be  passive  and  do  not  behave  in  the  interests  of 
shareholders (Goergen and Renneboog, 2001). 
 
In  addition,  board  structure  that  focuses  on  the  proportion  of  non executive 
directors to total directors, board size and duality leadership is also found to be 
significant  in  explaining  the  owners management  relationship.  In  contrast  to 
Florackis  (2008),  this  study  concentrates  only  on  non executive  directors  and 
board size. Duality leadership is excluded from the analysis due to a common 
practice of U.K. publicly listed companies (i.e. 98 per cent of the observations). 
As explained in Chapter 3, non executive directors are effective in mitigating the 
agency  problem  due  to  the  constructive  effects  of  directors’  independence, 
professional knowledge and experience (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Board size has 
been  found  to  influence  corporate  governance  in  both  positive  and  negative 
ways.  Positively,  large  size  is  associated  with  skills,  experience,  greater 
opportunity  in  securing  resources  and  establishing  a  favourable  image,  and 
restricting CEO domination (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). However, large size is 
also claimed to be associated with complicated coordination, communication and 
decision making process (Florackis, 2008). In addition to non executive director 
and board size, multi directorship is also included as another control for board 
structure of corporate governance measure. This is to reflect social networks, 
multiple backgrounds and commitment of directors (O'Neal and Thomas, 1996; 
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that is of recent concern to corporate governance researchers is compensation 
structure. This mechanism, either by way of granting share options or providing  
performance related  pay,  is  designed  to  align  shareholders’  and  managers’ 
interests  (Florackis,  2008).    However,  the  effectiveness  of  remuneration  in 
reducing the agency problem could be challenged, specifically in the case of 
misalignment  between  remuneration  and  performance  (Firth  et  al.,  1999). 
Following  Florackis  (2008),  this  study  considers  the  compensation  structure 
mechanism  based  on  executive  salary  and  a  dummy  variable  of  available 
performance related  options  or  bonuses.  Table  6.5  presents  the  details  of  the 
corporate governance mechanisms measures. 
 
Table 6.5 
Corporate Governance Measures 
Mechanism  Items  Measures 
Ownership 
structure 
Director ownership (DOWN)  Percentage  of  shares  held  by 
directors 
 
  Institutional ownership 
(IOWN) 
Percentage  of  shares  held  by 
substantial  institutional 
shareholders 
 
Board 
structure 
Board size (BSIZE)  Number  of  directors  serving 
the board 
 
  Non executive directors 
(NED)  
Percentage  of  non executive 
directors  to  total  number  of 
directors on the board 
 
  Multi directorship 
(MDIR) 
Percentage  of  directors  who 
serve more than one board to 
total number of directors  
 
Compensation 
structure 
Executive salary (SAL)  Total salary paid to executive 
directors (scaled by beginning 
book value of equity) 
 
  Option or bonus (BODUM)  Dummy measure of option or 
bonus, 1 if option or bonus has 
been paid, 0 otherwise 
 
In applying factor analysis, two procedures have been carried out (Pett, Lackey 
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matrices and the second is concerned with extracting the initial factors. In the 
first procedure, three steps have been taken, comprising correlation, determinant 
|R| analysis and measuring sample adequacy through Bartlett’s test of sphericity 
and the Kaiser Mayer Olkins (KMO) test. Table 6.6 and Table 6.7 report the 
correlation  coefficients  (on  the  off diagonal)  among  items  and  KMO  (on  the 
diagonal) of each item for persistent and combined persistent and non persistent 
profit making sample respectively. The overall KMO measures, KMO=0.6115 
for persistent profit making sample and KMO=0.6170 for combined persistent 
and non persistent profit making sample, indicate higher measures of KMO than 
the threshold acceptable level, i.e. KMO=0.5 (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson and 
Tatham, 2006). Similarly, the KMO measures of each item (diagonally presented 
in Table 6.6 and Table 6.7) also show an acceptable level of sampling adequacy 
with a minimum measure of KMO=0.5224 for persistent profit making sample 
and  KMO=0.5200  for  combined  persistent  and  non persistent  profit making 
sample. The correlation coefficients signify only four coefficients that are close 
to  zero  (for  both  persistent  and  combined  persistent  and  non persistent  profit 
makers)  but  the  related  items  are,  however,  essential  in  explaining  their 
relationship  with  the  other  items  in  the  matrices.  In  addition,  the  significant 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity reveals a sufficient correlation (p<0.01) among items 
(Hair et al., 2006), for both persistent and combined persistent and non persistent 
profit making  samples.  Based  on  previous  studies,  these  relationships  also 
exhibit expected relationships between items and hence, no item is dropped for 
further  tests.  Results  from  the  determinant  |R|  analysis  show  that  the  square 
matrix has an inverse with |R|=0.3530 for persistent profit making sample and 
|R|=0.3700  for  combined  persistent  and  non persistent  profit making  sample, 
indicating no “apparent linear dependencies” in the data and thus, the items do 
not require further elimination and re testing (Pett et al., 2003).
60 
                                                 
60 If the |R|=0.0, the correlation matrix signifies a singular matrix, indicating some items are too 
highly correlated and therefore one or more highly correlated items need to be dropped, while if 
the |R|=1.0, the correlation matrix signifies an identity matrix, indicating that the factor analysis is 
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Table 6.6 
Pearson Correlation Matrix and KMO: Persistent Profit-Making 
Companies 
 
n=588  DOWN  IOWN  BSIZE  NED  MDIR  SAL  BODUM 
DOWN  0.6113             
IOWN   0.2751***  0.5224           
BSIZE   0.0438   0.1465***  0.6538         
NED   0.2044***  0.1272***  0.1539***  0.5931       
MDIR   0.2953**  0.0378  0.1957***  0.6090***  0.5969     
SAL  0.1509***  0.0092   0.1839***   0.3675***   0.2504***  0.7189   
BODUM   0.3303***  0.1457***   0.0708*  0.1650***  0.1184***   0.1119***  0.6405 
***, ** and * indicate significant level at 1%, 2.5% and 5% respectively. 
KMO measures are on the diagonal and correlation coefficients on the off diagonal. 
 
Table 6.7 
Pearson Correlation Matrix and KMO: Persistent and Non-Persistent 
Profit-Making Companies 
 
n=610  DOWN  IOWN  BSIZE  NED  MDIR  SAL  BODUM 
DOWN  0.6250             
IOWN   0.2706***  0.5200           
BSIZE   0.0467   0.1425***  0.6582         
NED   0.2154***  0.1220***  0.1534***  0.6006       
MDIR   0.2893***  0.0350  0.1891***  0.6010***  0.6014     
SAL  0.1487***  0.0057   0.1899***   0.3699***   0.2495***  0.7200   
BODUM   0.3070***  0.1289***   0.0604  0.1534***  0.1009**   0.1062***  0.6338 
***, ** and * indicate significant level at 1%, 2.5% and 5% respectively. 
KMO measures are on the diagonal and correlation coefficients on the off diagonal. 
 
As the interest of this study is to examine the moderating effect of corporate 
governance, principal component analysis is chosen to extract the factors.
61 Table 
6.8 and Table 6.9 respectively display rotated factor loadings of two extracted 
factors with eigenvalues>1 and a cumulative variance explanation of 0.5111 for 
persistent profit making companies and 0.5057 for combined persistent and non 
persistent  profit making  companies.
62  As  the  factor  analysis  is  conducted  to 
                                                 
61 This extraction method would allow the results to be interpreted as a total variance rather than 
common variance as resulted by principal axis factoring (Pett et al., 2003). In addition, this 
method is in line with the study that is primarily concerned with data reduction instead of latent 
construct (Hair et al., 2006). 
62 The loadings are based on orthogonal varimax rotation method in which under this method, the 
factors are assumed to be independent of each other. However, analysis based on an alternative 
rotation, i.e. promax rotation, was also conducted and the results are qualitatively similar to the 
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determine general corporate governance variables, surrogate variable is the best 
measure to be applied (Hair et al., 2006).
63 Thus, all of the items are further 
analysed to determine surrogate variables of each factor. Based on the highest 
factor loading of each factor, NED (factor loadings of 0.7935 and 0.7942 for 
persistent profit making companies and combined persistent and non persistent 
profit making companies respectively) and IOWN (factor loadings of 0.6979 and 
0.7007 for persistent profit making companies and combined persistent and non 
persistent profit making companies respectively) are identified as surrogates of 
factor 1 and 2 respectively (for both persistent and combined persistent and non 
persistent profit makers). Thus, the multivariate analyses incorporate NED and 
IOWN as corporate governance measures. In addition, in conducting a further 
test on corporate governance effects on the relationship between tax planning and 
firm value, the samples are further split around the median of total governance 
score  and  the  estimations  are  then  compared.  This  score  is  computed  by 
multiplying the two surrogate variables, i.e. NED and IOWN.  
 
Table 6.8 
Rotated Factor Loadings: Persistent Profit Makers  
Items  Factor 1  Factor 2 
DOWN   0.3439   0.6497* 
IOWN   0.0390  0.6979* 
BSIZE  0.5051*   0.4247 
NED  0.7935*  0.1656 
MDIR  0.7851*  0.1263 
SAL   0.6305*  0.0260 
BODUM  0.1683  0.6305* 
* Indicates extracted items for each factor. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
63 Factor score is more suitable for studies that aim for orthogonality of the measures and 
summated scale is not appropriate for application due to potential contradictory effects of the 
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Table 6.9 
Rotated Factor Loadings: Persistent and Non-Persistent Profit Makers  
Items  Factor 1  Factor 2 
DOWN   0.3527   0.6439* 
IOWN   0.0353  0.7007* 
BSIZE  0.5016*   0.4232 
NED  0.7942*  0.1651 
MDIR  0.7796*  0.1176 
SAL   0.6348*  0.0336 
BODUM  0.1591  0.6075* 
* Indicates extracted items for each factor. 
 
The  models  to  test  the  moderating  effects  of  corporate  governance  on  the 
relationship between firm value and tax planning of persistent and non persistent 
profit making companies are respectively written as model (19) and model (20).  
it it n
n
it it it it it
it it it it it it months it
INDDUM FS DIV LEV CAPINT EM
CC IOWN NED TS PBT BVE MVE
ε β β β β β β
β β β β β β β
+ Σ + + + + +
+ + + + + + + =
=
+
18
12
11 10 9 8 7
6 5 4 3 2 1 0 3
 
Where: 
NEDit    =  Proportion of non executive directors of company i at time t 
IOWNit  =  Institutional ownership of company i at time t 
 
it it n
n
it it it it it it it
it it it it it months it
INDDUM
FS DIV LEV CAPINT EM CC IOWN
NED NPSTDUMTS TS PBT BVE MVE
ε β
β β β β β β β
β β β β β β
+ Σ +
+ + + + + + +
+ + + + + =
=
+
20
13
12 11 10 9 8 7 6
5 4 3 2 1 0 3
  
 
To  further  investigate  the  role  of  corporate  governance,  model  (19)  is  re 
estimated with the addition of two interactive or moderating variables. This is to 
investigate whether any influence of corporate governance on the relationship 
between  firm  value  and  tax  saving  that  is  found  from  the  above  estimation 
(model 19) is conditional upon the strength of companies’ corporate governance 
structure. Each of the two corporate governance variables, NED and IOWN, are 
multiplied in turn by the tax planning variable, TS, to give rise to the following 
variables: TSit_NEDit and TSit_IOWNit (both are scaled by BVEt 1   refer to the 
following scaling effect sub section).  
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Similarly, to further investigate whether the role of corporate governance that 
may be found from the above estimation (model 21) differs for non persistent 
profit making  companies,  model  (20),  in  addition  to  TSit_NEDit  and 
TSit_IOWNit,  is  estimated  with  the  addition  of  two  interaction  variables: 
NPSTDUMTSit_NEDit,  an  interaction  variable  between  tax  saving  by  non 
persistent profit making companies and the proportion of non executive directors 
of  company  i  at  time  t,  and  NPSTDUMTSit_IOWNit,  an  interaction  variable 
between  tax  saving  of  non persistent  profit making  companies  and  the 
institutional ownership of company i at time t (both are scaled by BVEt 1   refer 
to the following scaling effect sub section). 
it it n
n
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The next set of models which test the effects of corporate governance on the 
relationship between the firm value and the individual components of tax saving 
of  persistent  profit making  companies  and  non persistent  profit making 
companies are respectively written as model (23) and model (24).  
it it n
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To  further  investigate  the  role  of  corporate  governance  in  the  relationship 
between firm value and components of tax saving of persistent profit making 
companies,  model  (23)  is  re estimated  with  the  addition  of  10  interactive  or 
moderating variables. Each of the two corporate governance variables, NED and 
IOWN, are multiplied by the components of tax saving variable, TLOSS, TPD, 
TTD, TFTR and TUNC to give rise to the following variables: TLOSSit_NEDit, 
TLOSSit_IOWNit,  TPDit_NEDit,  TPDit_IOWNit,  TTDit_NEDit,  TTDit_IOWNit, 
TFTRit_NEDit,  TFTRit_IOWNit,  TUNCit_NEDit  and  TUNCit_IOWNit  (all  are 
scaled by BVEt 1   refer to the following scaling effect sub section). 
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Similarly, to further investigate whether the role of corporate governance in the 
relationship between firm value and components of tax saving of non persistent 
profit making companies that is found from the above estimation (model 24) is 
conditional  upon  the  strength  of  companies’  corporate  governance  structure, 
model  (24),  in  addition  to  TLOSSit_NEDit,  TLOSSit_IOWNit,  TPDit_NEDit, 
TPDit_IOWNit,  TTDit_NEDit,  TTDit_IOWNit,  TFTRit_NEDit,  TFTRit_IOWNit, 
TUNCit_NEDit  and  TUNCit_IOWNit,  is  estimated  with  an  additional  10 
interactive variables. Each of the two corporate governance variables, NED and 
IOWN,  are  multiplied  by  the  interactive  variable  between  components  of  tax 
saving  and  NPSTDUM,  i.e.  NPSTDUM_TLOSS,  NPSTDUM_TPD, 
NPSTDUM_TTD, NPSTDUM_TFTR and NPSTDUM_TUNC to give rise to the 
following  variables:  NPSTDUMTLOSSit_NEDit,  NPSTDUMTLOSSit_IOWNit, 
NPSTDUMTPDit_NEDit,  NPSTDUMTPDit_IOWNit,  NPSTDUMTTDit_NEDit, 
NPSTDUMTTDit_IOWNit,  NPSTDUMTFTRit_NEDit, 
NPSTDUMTFTRit_IOWNit,  NPSTDUMTUNCit_NEDit  and 
NPSTDUMTUNCit_IOWNit (all are scaled by BVEt 1   refer to the following 
scaling effect sub section).  
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Scaling Effects 
 
All  continuous  variables  (MVE,  BVE,  PBT,  TS,  TLOSS,  TPD,  TTD,  TFTR, 
TUNC, CC and EM) in the above estimation models are scaled to control for 
scale effect heteroscedasticity (Stark and Thomas, 1998; Akbar and Stark, 2003; 
Horton, 2008).
64 In addition to econometric issues, deflators are also required to 
control for size related correlation (Barth and Clinch, 2009). There are several 
deflators used by previous literature for this purpose, for example, net book value 
of  equity  (assets)  (for  example  Green,  Stark  and  Thomas,  1996;  Stark  and 
Thomas,  1998;  Akbar  and  Stark,  2003;  O'Hanlon  and  Taylor,  2007;  Hughes, 
2008), number of shares outstanding (for example Rees, 1997; Akbar and Stark, 
2003;  Horton,  2008),  market  value  of  equity  (for  example  Akbar  and  Stark, 
2003; Horton, 2008) and sales (for example Hirschey, 1985; Akbar and Stark, 
2003). In the absence of a theoretical justification to control for scale effects 
(Rees, 1997; Liu and Stark, 2009), this study employs book value of equity as a 
deflator in order to be consistent with most U.K. market valuation literature.
65 In 
addition, book value is also used to control size related heteroscedasticity (Barth 
and Kallapur, 1996; Hughes, 2008). Since one of the regressors in the estimation 
                                                 
64  However, the heteroscedasticity test will also be conducted econometrically using Breusch and 
Pagan’s (1979), White’s (1980), and Cook and Weisberg’s (1983) tests. 
65 See Rees (1997) for examples of previous literature on the difference in researched topics and 
issues of the estimation models. 
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models is book value of equity, the deflator is defined as opening book value of 
equity (BVEt 1). However, in order to ensure the robustness of the results, further 
tests will be conducted to determine the sensitivity of the results towards the 
choice of the deflator using number of shares, opening market value and sales.  
 
6.3 Conclusions 
 
This chapter discusses the research methodology of this study. The discussion 
begins with the explanation of the sample selection process and the data sources. 
This  chapter  also  discusses  the  development  of  the  estimation  models  which 
include explanations on the underlying theoretical model, development process, 
and  concepts  and  empirical  application.  The  section  on  the  concepts  and 
empirical application provides detailed explanations of the assumptions in the 
estimation  models,  which  consists  of  alternative  specifications  and 
measurements. The discussion on alternative specifications  and measurements 
focuses  on  market  value  of  equity,  tax  planning  measures,  firm specific 
characteristics, non persistent profit makers, components of tax saving, corporate 
governance and scaling effects of the estimation models. 
 
This study utilises a panel dataset of non financial LSE publicly listed companies 
for  a  sample  period  from  2005  to  2007.  The  sources  of  the  data  collection 
comprise annual reports, Datastream, FTSE/DJ industry classification, Hemscott 
Guru Database and Corporate Register. In the development of the estimation 
models, this study  refers to Ohlson’s valuation model as the foundation. The 
summary of the estimation models and the descriptions and measurement of the 
variables are as in the appendix.  
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Chapter 7 
 
Analyses and Findings 
 
This  chapter  discusses  the  data  analyses  and  the  results  from  the  estimation 
models described in Chapter 6. This chapter begins with explanations on the tests 
for outliers and influential observations. Subsequently, this chapter proceeds with 
the  descriptive  statistics  of  the  samples  and  discussions  on  the  multivariate 
results. In performing the analyses, multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity tests 
have been conducted and these are discussed in detail in the subsequent sections. 
In testing the robustness of the results, further tests have been carried out and the 
results are subsequently discussed in the following sections.  
 
7.1 Outliers and Influential Observations 
 
Outliers  are  observations  that  are  “substantially  different  from  the  other 
observations  (i.e.  has  an  extreme  value)  on  one  or  more  characteristics 
(variables)” (Hair et al., 2006: 40). Influential observations are defined as the 
observations that could disproportionately influence the regression estimates due 
to extreme values of the variables (Hair et al., 2006). The outliers of the data 
were identified using a studentized residual (Hair et al., 2006). Following Chen 
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residual>|2|, as this exhibits a large observation’s residual that may indicate an 
unusual value of the respondent variable given its value on the regressors.  From 
the  analysis,  28  observations  (4.76  per  cent  of  the  full  sample  of  588 
observations) from the estimation models that were used to test the relationship 
between firm value and tax planning of persistent profit making companies have 
been  identified  as  outliers  and  therefore  have  been  excluded  from  the 
multivariate testing. As the interest of this study is to focus on persistent profit 
making  companies,  an  additional  29  observations  (4.93  per  cent  of  the  full 
sample  of  588  observations)  relating  to  the  outlier  companies  (the  above 
mentioned 28 observations) were further excluded, so that the remaining sample 
consists of only persistent profit making companies. This is consistent with Mills 
et al.’s (1998) method of considering only companies that have strong incentives 
to  carry  out  tax  planning  activities  in  their  tax planning  investment  research. 
Therefore, in total, 57 observations (19 companies) have been excluded from 
further  multivariate  tests  of  persistent  profit making  companies.  To  provide 
further understanding of different results based on the full sample (without the 
eliminations) and based on the outliers exclusion sample (with the eliminations), 
Column I and Column II of Table 7.1 respectively present the regression results 
based on 588 firms years (full sample) and 531 firms years (after exclusion of 
outliers). In contrast to the results after the exclusion of outliers, the coefficient 
estimate of tax saving (TS) variable based on the full sample is not significant.  
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Table 7.1 
Persistent Profit-Making Companies: Firm Value and Tax Planning – 
Residual Analysis 
Figures in parentheses represent cross section clustered Eicker Huber White adjusted t statistics. 
 ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 2.5% and 5% respectively.  
# indicates degree of freedom. 
 
Similar procedures were conducted to determine the outliers of the combined 
persistent and non persistent profit making companies. 28 observations (4.59 per 
cent of the full sample of 610 observations) were identified as outliers and, to 
control  for  the  authenticity  of  non persistent  profit making  companies’ 
definition, 27 observations (4.43 per cent of the full sample of 610 observations) 
relating to the outlier companies (the above mentioned 28 observations) were 
further excluded. Therefore, in total, 55 observations (19 companies) have been 
excluded  from  multivariate  testing  of  the  non persistent  profit making 
companies. The results based on 610 firms years (full sample) and 555 firms 
years (after exclusions of outliers) are respectively  reported in Column  I  and 
            (I)  (II) 
DV =MVEt+3months/BVEt-1  Full sample  After exclusions of outliers  
BVE  2.7597 
(3.48)*** 
1.3812 
(4.04)*** 
PBT  10.6855 
(13.73)*** 
10.1791 
(18.21)*** 
TS   3.7261 
( 0.45) 
 9.1235 
( 2.69)*** 
CC   3.7728 
( 3.46)*** 
 1.0590 
( 1.59) 
EM   3.9645 
( 1.87)* 
 2.7749 
( 5.74)*** 
CAPINT   0.7709 
( 1.15) 
 0.4927 
( 2.14)** 
LEV  1.3094 
(1.19) 
 0.2832 
( 0.58) 
DIV  0.0110 
(1.59) 
0.0001 
(0.03) 
FS  0.0185 
(2.59)*** 
0.0069 
(3.03)*** 
Cons   2.5114 
( 2.10)** 
 0.2076 
( 0.41) 
R squared   91.44%  48.58% 
n  588  531 
Wald chi
2   3265.44*** 
16
# 
595.09*** 
16
# 
Breusch Pagan  109.91*** 
16
# 
107.67*** 
16
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Column II of Table 7.2. Consistent with the results after the exclusion of outliers, 
the coefficient estimate of tax saving of the full sample of non persistent profit 
making companies (NPSTDUMTS) is also significant at a higher p value. 
 
Table 7.2 
Persistent and Non-Persistent Profit-Making Companies: Firm Value and 
Tax Planning – Residual Analysis 
            (I)  (II) 
DV =MVEt+3months/BVEt-1  Full sample  After exclusion of outliers 
BVE  2.7250 
(3.40)*** 
1.2384 
(3.52)*** 
PBT  10.6706 
(13.36)*** 
10.0582 
(18.53)*** 
TS   3.7205 
( 0.45) 
 9.3345 
( 2.78)*** 
NPSTDUMTS   28.9639 
( 2.09)** 
 23.3878 
( 4.54)*** 
CC   3.7171 
( 3.39)*** 
 0.8184 
( 1.22) 
EM   3.9037 
( 1.88)* 
 2.6480 
( 5.78)*** 
CAPINT   0.8671 
( 1.32) 
 0.4984 
( 2.23)** 
LEV  1.2350 
(1.20) 
 0.0616 
( 0.13) 
DIV  0.0098 
(1.44) 
 0.0006 
( 0.24) 
FS  0.0181 
(2.60)*** 
0.0063 
(2.80)*** 
Cons   2.4537 
( 2.06)** 
0.0082 
(0.02) 
R squared   91.40%  49.19% 
n  610  555 
Wald chi
2   3236.92*** 
18
# 
632.02*** 
18
# 
Breusch Pagan  116.70*** 
18
# 
110.23*** 
18
# 
Figures in parentheses represent cross section clustered Eicker Huber White adjusted t statistics. 
 ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 2.5% and 5% respectively.  
# indicates degree of freedom. 
 
 
In addition to the above, the analysis of residual for outliers was also conducted 
based on the estimation model used to test the valuation on components of tax 
saving of persistent profit making companies. From the analysis, 36 observations 
(6.12 per cent of the full sample of 588 observations) have been identified as 
outliers  and  therefore  have  been  excluded  from  the multivariate  testing.  This Chapter 7 Analyses and Findings                                                                       183 
 
 
leads to an additional exclusion of 48 observations (8.16 per cent of the full 
sample  of  588  observations)  relating  to  the  outlier  companies  (the  above 
mentioned 36 observations), so that the remaining sample consists of persistent 
profit making  companies.  Therefore,  in  total,  84  observations  (28  companies) 
have  been  excluded  from  further  multivariate  tests on  the  components  of  tax 
saving. Column I and Column II of Table 7.3 respectively present the regression 
results of the 588 firms years (full sample) and 504 firms years (after exclusions 
of outliers). Results in Column I indicate that all of the four components (tax 
losses (TLOSS), permanent difference (TPD), temporary differences (TTD) and 
foreign  tax  differentials  (TFTR))  are  significant  but  these  results,  after 
controlling the outliers, are only significant in the case of permanent differences. 
 
Subsequent  to  the  residual  analysis,  the  data  was  tested  for  influential 
observations. The test was conducted using leverage of DFFITs cut off criterion 
as defined by Belsley et al. (1980), i.e. when abs(dfits)>2*(P/N)
1/2 where P is the 
number of independent variables and N is the number of observations. The tests 
exhibit  39  influential  observations  from  each  persistent  profit  makers  and 
combined  persistent  and  non persistent  profit  makers.  Following  the  above 
mentioned outlier procedures, further exclusions were made, i.e. 48 observations 
of  persistent  profit making  companies  and  44  observations  of  combined 
persistent  and  non persistent  profit making  companies.  In  summary,  29 
companies,  from  both  persistent  profit making  companies  and  combined 
persistent and non persistent profit making companies, were excluded and this 
consequently  reduces  the  number  of  remaining  observations  to  444  and  472 
respectively. In terms of components of tax saving, 44 influential observations 
were  identified  and  therefore  have  been  excluded  from  multivariate  analyses. 
This leads to the exclusion of an additional 55 observations in order to ensure 
balanced firm year observations. This in turn leads to final observations of 405 
firms years.  These  final  samples  are  the  base  for  the  remaining  analyses,  i.e. 
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Table 7.3 
Firm Value and Components of Tax Saving: Persistent Profit-Making 
Companies – Residual Analysis 
            (I)  (II) 
DV =MVEt+3months/BVEt-1  Full sample  After exclusions of outliers  
BVE  2.0470 
(3.16)*** 
0.4977 
(1.50) 
PBT  9.1713 
(16.75)*** 
9.6500 
(25.43)*** 
TLOSS  49.3187 
(5.28)*** 
6.1103 
(1.16) 
TPD   19.2853 
( 3.43)*** 
 14.3129 
( 3.05)*** 
TTD  31.5687 
(3.40)*** 
5.8999 
(1.50) 
TFTR  37.5748 
(1.96)** 
9.8642 
(0.96) 
TUNC   1.3316 
( 0.11) 
 5.2632 
( 0.79) 
CC   2.2032 
( 3.09)*** 
 0.4975 
( 0.90) 
EM   2.3076 
( 4.03)*** 
 2.8604 
( 6.74)*** 
CAPINT   0.5615 
( 1.23) 
 0.5889 
( 2.76)*** 
LEV  1.0671 
(1.18) 
 0.1755 
( 0.37) 
DIV  0.0096 
(1.79)* 
0.0029 
(1.17) 
FS  0.0155 
(3.48)*** 
0.0068 
(3.09)*** 
Cons   1.4039 
( 1.61) 
0.7531 
(1.51) 
R squared   94.12%  65.58% 
n  588  504 
Wald chi
2   4917.01*** 
20
# 
932.91*** 
20
# 
Breusch Pagan  72.24*** 
20
# 
88.44*** 
20
# 
Figures in parentheses represent cross section clustered Eicker Huber White adjusted t statistics. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 2.5% and 5% respectively.  
# indicates degree of freedom. 
 
7.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Tables 7.4 and 7.5 respectively present the descriptive statistics of the persistent 
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sample of persistent profitable publicly traded companies with an average ETR 
of 27.11 per cent or, conversely, an average tax saving of 2.89 per cent. The 
average  ETR  of  non persistent  profit making  companies  is  higher  than  the 
persistent  sample,  i.e.  32.90  per  cent  or,  conversely,  an  average  negative  tax 
saving of 2.90 per cent. These indicate the existence of tax planning activities 
across  persistent  profit making  companies  compared  to  non persistent  profit 
making companies. These also generally signify variations in the extent of tax 
planning between both samples. In general, tax saving of persistent profit making 
companies is higher than the non persistent profit making companies by 5.79 per 
cent. 
 
In terms of corporate governance data, the mean of board size (BSIZE) of both 
samples indicates an average of eight directors who serve the board. The board of 
persistent profit making companies and non persistent profit making companies 
is respectively described as consisting of an average of 57 per cent and 58 per 
cent  of  non executive  directors  (NED),  which  exhibits  that  the  executive 
directors  who  serve  the  board  are  proportionately  less  than  half  of  the  total 
directors. Consistent with the claim that non executive directors exhibit social 
networks (Zahra and Pearce, 1989), the percentage of directors that serve more 
than one board or company (MDIR) is about similar to the percentage of non 
executive directors, i.e. 49 per cent for persistent profit making companies and 
44 per cent for non persistent profit making companies.  The equity ownerships 
of these directors (DOWN) are described as an average of seven per cent of total 
common equity which indicates a low level of ownership interest of directors of 
both samples. In contrast, the institutional ownership (IOWN) of persistent and 
non persistent samples respectively indicates an average of 34 per cent and 39 
per cent of substantial institutions’ equity holding, which signifies a higher level 
of  institutional  interest  than  the  level  of  the  directors’  interests.  In  terms  of 
executive  salary  compensation  (SAL),  on  average,  the  companies  paid,  to  all 
executive  directors,  £987,577  and  £808,229  for  persistent  and  non persistent 
profit making companies respectively. 
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Table 7.4 
Descriptive Statistics: Persistent Profit-Making Companies 
 
n=444  Mean  Min  Max  Standard 
deviation 
MVEt+3months(£’000)  2149390.0000   6650.0000  40034070.0000  5533618.0000 
BVEt(£’000)   712354.1000   8756.0000   13700000.0000   1546922.0000  
PBTt(£’000)   181466.9000    434.0000   5146555.0000   507633.5000  
TSt (£’000)   7465.3680    237300.0000   331700.0000   36836.9700  
ETRt   0.2711   0.0000   0.9272   0.1256  
TSt   0.0289    0.6272   0.3000   0.1256  
CCt(£’000)  12197.5300   140000.0000  805000.0000  57190.0000 
EMt(£’000)  1583.6840   1333000.0000  1133631.0000  148189.7000 
MVEt+3months/BVEt 1    3.4024   0.5900   18.9500   2.1709  
BVEt/BVEt 1   1.1515   0.2125   7.0577   0.3767  
PBTt/BVEt 1   0.2638   0.0142   1.4302   0.1648  
TSt/BVEt 1   0.0091    0.1052   0.1651   0.0269  
CCt/BVEt 1  0.0382   0.3224  2.4159  0.1651 
EMt/BVEt 1   0.0124   0.6533  0.5670  0.1681 
DIVt  37.6752  0.0000  97.57000  22.5539 
CAPINTt  0.2090  0.0000  1.4747  0.2704 
LEVt  0.1552  0.0000  0.6443  0.1552 
FSt  37.8643  0.0000  112.9127  33.9404 
BSIZEt   8.3153   4.0000   16.0000   2.2486  
NEDt   56.7593   0.0000   88.8889   13.1738  
DOWNt    6.6424   0.0000   60.4505   13.1758  
IOWNt    33.5397   0.0000   92.4000    17.6180  
MDIRt   49.1032   0.0000   100.0000   23.7287  
SALt(£’000)   987.5770   86.0000   4303.0000   604.6534  
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Table 7.5 
Descriptive Statistics: Non-Persistent Profit-Making Companies 
 
n=16
66  Mean  Min  Max  Standard 
deviation 
MVEt+3months(£’000)  618863.1000  24820.0000  3876100.0000  1130422.0000 
BVEt(£’000)   360150.1000  13629.0000  2465000.0000  717078.0000 
PBTt(£’000)   74642.7500  2400.0000  620000.0000  177062.3000 
TSt (£’000)   9855.2000   16180.0000  90000.0000  29968.5200 
ETRt   0.3290  0.0030  0.9370  0.2737 
TSt    0.0290   0.6370  0.2970  0.2737 
CCt(£’000)  7488.5630  0.0000  89700.0000  22523.6600 
EMt(£’000)   96911.6300   819000.0000  40600.0000  248526.3000 
MVEt+3months/BVEt 1   2.4531  0.7700  8.4600  1.9350 
BVEt/BVEt 1   1.0612  0.7550  1.5906  0.1827 
PBTt/BVEt 1   0.2028  0.0231  0.7724  0.1865 
TSt/BVEt 1   0.0067   0.0611  0.0766  0.0333 
CCt/BVEt 1  0.0281  0.0000  0.3388  0.0834 
EMt/BVEt 1   0.0280   0.3561  0.5354  0.2583 
DIVt  21.5219  0.0000  94.0200  27.8300 
CAPINTt  0.1805  0.0000  0.8120  0.2266 
LEVt  0.1345  0.0000  0.3568  0.1084 
FSt  41.6032  0.0000  91.6837  34.0992 
BSIZEt   7.7500  5.0000  11.0000  2.5430 
NEDt   57.5262  40.0000  72.7273  11.7100 
DOWNt   6.9829  0.0069  30.1153  9.9488 
IOWNt   39.3281  0.0000  62.1900  21.2649 
MDIRt   44.1026  10.0000  83.3333  22.9897 
SALt(£’000)   808.2291  269.0000  1622.0000  416.0104 
SALt/BVEt 1   0.0121  0.0003  0.0362  0.0109 
                                                 
66 The sample size is extracted from persistent and non persistent profit making sample.  After 
exclusion of outliers and influential observations (discussed in Section 7.1), there are 472 
persistent and non persistent observations in which 16 observations are related to non persistent 
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Table  7.6  and  Table  7.7  respectively  present  the  descriptive  statistics  of  the 
persistent profit making and non persistent profit making samples in testing the 
market valuation of components of tax saving. The sample sizes differ from the 
sizes  of  the  previous  samples  because  of  different  exclusion  of  outliers  and 
influential observations related to the estimation models that test the components 
of tax saving. This is due to different measures of tax saving in which the tax 
saving of the previous two samples are based on total current tax saving while 
the other two samples are based on components of total tax saving.  
 
From the mean of the five components of tax saving of persistent profit making 
sample, the highest tax saving (in £’000) is from temporary differences (TTD) 
and  is  followed  by  foreign  tax  rates  differentials  (TFTR).  The  unclassified 
reconciliation  items  (TUNC)  are  in  the  third  rank  of  the  highest  average  of 
components of tax saving and this is subsequently followed by (in order) tax 
losses component (TLOSS) and permanent differences (TPD).  However, this 
rank is observed to be different for scaled components (by BVEt 1). Considering 
the  scale  heteroscedasticity  effect,  the  highest  tax  saving  component  (in 
magnitude)  for  persistent  profit making  sample  is  temporary  differences 
(TTD/BVEt 1)  and  is  subsequently  followed  by  (in  order)  unclassified  items 
(TUNC/BVEt 1),  tax  losses  (TLOSS/BVEt 1),  foreign  tax  rates  differentials 
(TFTR/BVEt 1) and permanent differences (TPD/BVEt 1). Overall, based on the 
scaled components of tax saving, it can be concluded that for persistent profit 
making  sample,  TTD/BVEt 1,  TUNC/BVEt 1  and  TLOSS/BVEt 1  reduce  the 
scaled statutory tax expense (or conversely, increase the tax saving). In contrast, 
TPD/BVEt 1  and  TFTR/BVEt 1  increase  the  scaled  statutory  tax  expense  (or 
conversely, decrease the tax saving). In terms of corporate governance and other 
specific  characteristic  data,  the  descriptive  statistics  of  the  sample  can  be 
generally summarised as similar to the data of the previous sample. 
 
For  non persistent  profit making  sample,  the  unclassified  reconciliation  items 
(TUNC) is reported as to be at constant “zero” value indicating no TUNC within 
the companies during the sample period. The highest tax saving (in £’000) is 
from temporary differences (TTD). The tax losses component (TLOSS) is in the 
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subsequently followed by (in order) permanent differences (TPD) and foreign tax 
rates differentials (TFTR).  However, this rank is observed to be different for 
scaled components (by BVEt 1). Considering the scale heteroscedasticity effect, 
the  highest  tax  saving  component  (in  magnitude)  for  non persistent  profit 
making  sample  is  temporary  differences  (TTD/BVEt 1)  and  is  subsequently 
followed  by  (in  order)  permanent  differences  (TPD/BVEt 1),  tax  losses 
(TLOSS/BVEt 1)  and  foreign  tax  rates  differentials  (TFTR/BVEt 1).  Overall, 
based on the scaled components of tax saving, it can be concluded that for non 
persistent profit making sample, TTD/BVEt 1, TPD/BVEt 1 and TLOSS/BVEt 1 
reduce the scaled statutory tax expense (or conversely, increase the tax saving). 
In  contrast,  TFTR/BVEt 1  increases  the  scaled  statutory  tax  expense  (or 
conversely, decreases the tax saving).  
 
In terms of corporate governance data, the mean of board size (BSIZE) indicates 
an average of seven directors who serve the board. The board is described as 
consisting of an average of 61 per cent of non executive directors (NED), which 
exhibits that the executive directors who serve the board are proportionately less 
than half of the total directors. The percentage of directors that serve more than 
one board or company (MDIR) is 31 per cent.  The equity ownerships of these 
directors (DOWN) are described as an average of 0.86 per cent of total common 
equity which indicates a low level of ownership interest of directors. In contrast, 
the institutional ownership (IOWN) indicates an average of 62.12 per cent of 
substantial  institutions’  equity  holding,  which  signifies  a  higher  level  of 
institutional  interest  than  the  level  of  the  directors’  interests.  In  terms  of 
executive  salary  compensation  (SAL),  on  average,  the  companies  paid,  to  all 
executive directors, £694,500. Chapter 7 Analyses and Findings                                                                       190 
 
 
Table 7.6 
Descriptive Statistics: Components of Tax Saving - Persistent Profit-Making 
Companies  
 
n=405  Mean  Min  Max  Standard 
deviation 
MVEt+3months(£’000)  2268608.0000  6650.000  40034070.0000  5773970.0000 
BVEt(£’000)   753062.5000  8756.000  13700000.0000  1610579.0000 
PBTt(£’000)   192998.4000  434.0000  5146555.0000  529590.2000 
TLOSSt (£’000)   772.8825   28000.0000  140000.0000  9035.0980 
TPDt(£’000)   360.7066   135000.0000  211524.4000  18490.1400 
TTDt(£’000)  2539.1340   22000.0000  151000.0000  12039.7600 
TFTRt(£’000)  1142.5880   28526.1900  141727.8000  10915.4900 
TUNCt(£’000)  1019.4680   32375.2100  72000.0000  6218.0910 
CCt(£’000)  12247.8200   140000.0000  805000.0000  57809.89000 
EMt(£’000)  4329.0430   13333000.0000  1133631.0000  153651.5000 
MVEt+3months/BVEt 1   3.1749  0.5900  1.9133  18.9500 
BVEt/BVEt 1   1.1315  0.2125  2.5527  0.2455 
PBTt/BVEt 1   0.2579  0.0142  1.4302  0.1541 
TLOSSt/BVEt 1   0.0002   0.0656  0.0399  0.0088 
TPDt/BVEt 1   0.0026   0.0981  0.0470  0.0131 
TTDt/BVEt 1  0.0037   0.0517  0.0758  0.0119 
TFTRt/BVEt 1   0.0002   0.0482  0.0279  0.0075 
TUNCt/BVEt 1  0.0012   0.0634  0.0512  0.0066 
CCt/BVEt 1  0.0340   0.3224  1.2239  0.1254 
EMt/BVEt 1   0.0027   0.5803  0.5670  0.1537 
DIVt  37.6907  0.0000  97.5700  23.1584 
CAPINTt  0.2129  0.0000  1.4747  0.2784 
LEVt  0.1488  0.0000  0.6443  0.1395 
FSt  37.8244  0.0000  112.9127  33.7966 
BSIZEt   8.3457  4.0000  16.0000  2.1877 
NEDt   56.7061  0.0000  88.8889  13.5268 
DOWNt   6.7407  0.0000  60.4505  13.4265 
IOWNt   32.9850  0.0000  77.9400  17.1201 
MDIRt   48.6594  0.0000  100.0000  23.5774 
SALt(£’000)   977.3479  86.0000  3894.0000  536.5355 
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Table 7.7 
Descriptive Statistics: Components of Tax Saving – Non-Persistent Profit-
Making Companies  
 
n=2
67  Mean  Min  Max  Standard 
deviation 
MVEt+3months(£’000)  157505.0000  128180.0000  186830.0000  41471.8200 
BVEt(£’000)   117508.5000  91700.0000  143317.0000  36498.7300 
PBTt(£’000)   8613.5000  4727.0000  12500.0000  5496.3410 
TLOSSt (£’000)    18.0000   136.0000  100.0000  166.8772 
TPDt(£’000)   130.0000   1660.0000  1400.0000  2163.7470 
TTDt(£’000)  842.0000  600.0000  1084.0000  342.2397 
TFTRt(£’000)   300.0000   600.0000  0.0000  424.2641 
TUNCt(£’000)  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
CCt(£’000)  417.5000  35.0000  800.0000  540.9367 
EMt(£’000)  5333.0000  3566.0000  7100.0000  2498.9150 
MVEt+3months/BVEt 1   1.2500  0.7700  1.7300  0.6788 
BVEt/BVEt 1   0.8554  0.8514  0.8593  0.0056 
PBTt/BVEt 1   0.0722  0.0283  0.1161  0.0620 
TLOSSt/BVEt 1   0.0001   0.0008  0.0009  0.0012 
TPDt/BVEt 1  0.0015   0.0100  0.0130  0.0162 
TTDt/BVEt 1  0.0060  0.0056  0.0065  0.0007 
TFTRt/BVEt 1   0.0028   0.0056  0.0000  0.0039 
TUNCt/BVEt 1  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
CCt/BVEt 1  0.0038  0.0002  0.0074  0.0051 
EMt/BVEt 1  0.0437  0.0214  0.0659  0.0315 
DIVt  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
CAPINTt  0.1247  0.0406  0.2088  0.1189 
LEVt  0.1306  0.1172  0.1441  0.0191 
FSt  23.9327  3.0232  44.8422  29.5705 
BSIZEt   6.5000  6.0000  7.0000  0.7071 
NEDt   60.7143  50.0000  71.4286  15.1523 
DOWNt   0.8597  0.1064  1.6131  1.0654 
IOWNt   62.1200  62.0500  62.1900  0.0990 
MDIRt   30.9524  28.5714  33.3333  3.3672 
SALt(£’000)   694.5000  567.0000  822.0000  180.3122 
SALt/BVEt 1   0.0051  0.0049  0.0053  0.0002 
                                                 
67 The sample size is extracted from persistent and non persistent profit making sample.  After 
exclusion of outliers and influential observations (discussed in Section 7.1), there are 455 
persistent and non persistent observations in which two observations are related to non persistent 
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7.3 Multivariate Results 
 
The multivariate analyses are conducted after controlling for outliers (Chen et 
al., 2005a) and influential observation (Belsley et al., 1980). The independent 
variables are also tested for multicollinearity (Belsley et al., 1980). In the case 
where multicollinearity exists (only related to the model that tests relationship 
between firm value, components of tax saving and corporate governance with 
interaction  variables),  centred  variables  are  used  (Aiken  and  West,  1991),  as 
discussed  in  multicollinearity  test  section.  In  addition,  heteroscedasticity  tests 
reveal that the residuals’ variances are not constant and hence the results are 
reported  based  on  clustered  adjusted  t statistics  (Eicker,  1963;  Huber,  1967; 
White, 1980). Consistent with the hypotheses (Chapter 5), the results are reported 
based on two sections: firstly, firm value and tax planning, and secondly, firm 
value, tax planning and corporate governance. 
 
7.3.1 Firm Value and Tax Planning 
 
Estimating the model to test the relationship between firm value and tax planning 
yields the results presented in Table 7.8. Three sets of results are reported in 
columns  I,  II  and  III.  The  results  in  the  first  and  the  second  columns  are 
respectively based on the full sample of 444 firm year ends (persistent profit 
making companies) and 472 firm year ends (persistent and non persistent profit 
making companies). The third column reports the estimation results based on 405 
firm year ends  (persistent  profit making  companies).  The  differences  of  these 
sample sizes, are due to the outliers and influential observations. 
 
Column I presents the results of the estimation model that tests the relationship 
between  firm  value  and  the  level  of  tax  saving.  Generally,  the  model  is 
significant  (p<0.01)  with  Wald  chi squared  value  of  563.77  and  R squared  of 
63.39 per cent. The result supports hypothesis H1a that predicts the existence of 
the  relationship  between  the  extent  of  tax  planning  and  firm  valuation. 
Specifically, market value is found to be negatively related with the extent of tax 
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activities are deemed to be associated with managers’ moral hazard (Desai and 
Dharmapala,  2009),  or  because  higher  levels  of  tax  planning  can  only  be 
obtained if additional risks are taken (Slemrod, 2005; Chen et al., 2010).  
 
Column  II  reports  the  results  of  the  relationship  between  firm  value  and  tax 
planning of persistent and non persistent profit making companies. The model is 
significant (p<0.01) with Wald chi squared value of 659.14 and R squared of 
62.55 per cent. Consistent with hypothesis H1b, the results indicate that there is a 
relationship between the firm valuation and the extent of tax planning by non 
persistent profit making companies. The results also suggest significant different 
detrimental effect of tax saving by non persistent profit making companies on 
their firm value compared to the persistent profit making companies since the 
NPSTDUMTS coefficient is significant. In addition, chi squared test indicates 
reduced possibility of the total of both coefficients of TS and NPSTDUMTS to 
be  equal  to  “zero”,  i.e.  chi squared  value=9.05  at  p=0.0026.    This  implies  a 
negative  perception  by  shareholders  of  the  non persistent  profit making 
companies’ ability in conducting effective tax planning (Mills et al., 1998).  
 
In testing the hypotheses related to market valuation of the components of tax 
saving  of  persistent  profit making  companies  (H2a  –  H2d),  the  model  that 
incorporates tax saving components as independent variables is further estimated. 
The model is significant (p<0.01) with Wald chi squared value of 350.91 and R 
squared  of  57.36  per  cent.  Column  III  reports  the  results  that  indicate  a 
significant  negative  relationship  between  market  value  and  the  permanent 
differences  component  of  tax  saving.  This  result  supports  hypothesis  H2a  in 
predicting  the  relationship  between  the  firm  valuation  and  the  extent  of  tax 
saving from permanent differences. However, the results on the market valuation 
of the other three components (temporary differences, tax losses and foreign tax 
rates differentials) are found to be not supportive of the hypotheses (H2b, H2c and 
H2d respectively). Therefore, in general, it can be interpreted that the negative 
relationship between firm value and tax planning (as in Column I) is influenced 
by the permanent differences component of tax saving. 
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In  terms  of  firm specific  variables,  the  results  indicate  significant  positive 
relationships between firm value and three variables: book value of equity, profit 
before tax and the extent of foreign sales. Significant negative associations are 
found in earnings management and capital intensity. These results indicate that 
the shareholders decreasingly value the extent of the companies’ involvement in 
earnings manipulation suggesting evidence of shareholders’ concern on earnings 
quality.  This  evidence  supports  the  argument  on  shareholders  awareness  of 
management discretion in financial reporting  (Lev and Nissim, 2004). Similarly, 
the  shareholders  are  also  found  to  decreasingly  value  the  extent  of  the 
companies’  capital  investment.  This  is  consistent  with  the  free  cash  flow 
hypothesis (Jensen, 1986) where managers are expected to “disgorge” the cash, 
for example as dividend, rather than investing it as capital expenditure since such 
investment may be inefficient if the expected rate of return is below the cost of 
capital,  i.e.  negative  net  present  value  (NPV).  In  addition  to  the  above 
relationships,  the  results  also  show  that  there  are  no  significant  relationships 
documented between firm value and capital contribution, leverage and dividend. 
All of these results are consistent across the three estimation models, presented in 
Column I, II and III. 
 
In testing the hypothesis H2e which examines the difference in the relationships 
between  market  value  and  each  of  the  four  components  of  tax  saving  of 
persistent profit making companies, the above components’ coefficient estimates 
are  further  tested  to  consider  their  equality.  The  results  indicate  that  the 
coefficients  of  components  are  different  from  one  another  with  significant 
(p<0.025)  chi squared  value  of  10.00.  To  determine  the  difference  between 
coefficient  mean  value  of  a  component  with  the  coefficient  mean  value  of 
another component, the bivariate tests are conducted within coefficients of two 
components at a time. The mean differences are as tabulated in Table 7.9. The 
results show that the permanent differences are significantly different, in terms of 
valuation effect, from the other three components (TTD, TFTR and TLOSS). In 
turn, these three components are not significantly different from one another. 
Therefore,  the  results  do  not  support  the  hypothesis  as  they  show  that  the 
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the permanent differences and the other three components, namely temporary 
differences, foreign tax rates differentials and tax losses. 
 
In terms of the relationship between firm value and components of tax saving of 
non persistent profit making companies, there is insufficient variation in the tax 
saving  components  variables  for  non persistent  profit making  companies,  i.e. 
interactions between the non persistent dummy variable and the components of 
tax  saving  (NPSTDUM_TPD,  NPSTDUM_TTD,  NPSTDUM_TFTR, 
NPSTDUM_TLOSS and NPSTDUM_TUNC). From a total of 455 observations, 
there  are  only  two  observations  related  with  non persistent  profit making 
companies  while  the  remaining  observations  (453)  are  related  with  persistent 
profit making companies. This leads to a lack of variation of NPSTDUM_TPD, 
NPSTDUM_TTD,  NPSTDUM_TFTR,  NPSTDUM_TLOSS  and 
NPSTDUM_TUNC since these interactive variables are defined as non persistent 
dummy (“1” for non persistent profit making, “0” otherwise) multiplied with the 
respective  components  (TPD,  TTD,  TFTR,  TLOSS,  TUNC)  which  in  turn 
implies constant “0” value for the 453 observations of the interactive variables. 
Therefore, analyses related to the components of tax saving of non persistent 
profit making companies cannot be carried out and hence, hypotheses H2f, H2g, 
H2h, H2i, H2j, H4e, H4f, H4g and H4h cannot be tested. 
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Table 7.8 
Regression Results: Firm Value and Tax Planning 
 
   (I)  (II)  (III) 
Dependent Variable 
(DV) = MVEt+3months/ 
BVEt-1 
Persistent 
Profit-Making 
Companies 
Persistent and 
Non-Persistent 
Profit-Making 
Companies 
Components of 
Tax Saving – 
Persistent 
Profit-Making 
Companies 
BVE  1.0814 
(4.53)*** 
1.0182 
(4.38)*** 
0.6795 
(2.51)** 
PBT  10.0106 
(17.00)*** 
10.0056 
(17.76)*** 
9.6292 
(14.44)*** 
TS   9.1967 
( 2.91)*** 
 8.7621 
( 2.87)*** 
  
NPSTDUMTS      15.1616 
( 1.82)* 
  
TLOSS         0.6925 
( 0.12) 
TPD         12.0853 
( 1.84)* 
TTD        6.6822 
(1.36) 
TFTR        6.4261 
(0.76) 
TUNC         3.3336 
( 0.29) 
CC  0.1831 
(0.38) 
0.3676 
(0.78) 
0.3827 
(0.79) 
EM   2.8076 
( 6.42)*** 
 2.8779 
( 6.82)*** 
 2.5333 
( 5.54)*** 
CAPINT   0.5308 
( 2.96)*** 
 0.5591 
( 3.09)*** 
 0.4537 
( 2.31)** 
LEV   0.2923 
( 0.65) 
0.0243 
(0.06) 
 0.0448 
( 0.11) 
DIV   0.0003 
( 0.14) 
0.0001 
(0.05) 
0.0025 
(1.44) 
FS  0.0061 
(3.01)*** 
0.0049 
(2.44)** 
0.0062 
(3.20)*** 
Cons   0.1615 
( 0.45) 
 0.2468 
( 0.65) 
 0.0477 
( 0.12) 
R squared   63.39%  62.55%  57.36% 
n  444  472  405 
Wald chi
2  
 
563.77*** 
16
# 
659.14*** 
18
# 
350.91*** 
20
# 
Breusch Pagan  82.98*** 
16
# 
85.31*** 
18
# 
76.60*** 
20
# 
Figures in parentheses represent cross section clustered Eicker Huber White adjusted t statistics. 
 ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 2.5% and 5% respectively. 
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Table 7.9 
Bivariate Test on Coefficients of Components of Tax Saving (from Column 
III of Table 7.8) 
  TPD  TTD  FTR  TLOSS 
TPD  0.0000       
TTD  18.7675 
(8.0000)*** 
0.0000     
TFTR  18.5114 
(4.3100)** 
 0.2561 
(0.0000) 
0.0000   
TLOSS  12.7778 
(3.3700)* 
 7.3747 
(1.9300) 
 7.1186 
(0.6500) 
0.0000 
Figures in parentheses represent chi squared value. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 2.5% and 5% respectively. 
 
7.3.2 Firm Value, Tax Planning and Corporate Governance  
 
In  considering  the  moderating  influence  of  corporate  governance  on  the 
relationship between firm value and tax planning, the above estimation models 
are further estimated with the inclusion of corporate governance variables, NED 
and IOWN. The results are reported in Table 7.10. Results reported in Column I 
are  based  on  the  full  sample  of  444  firm year ends  (persistent  profit making 
companies).  
 
Column I presents the findings of the estimation model that tests the moderating 
effect of corporate governance on the relationship between firm value and the 
level of tax saving of persistent profit making companies. Generally, the model 
is significant (p<0.01) with Wald chi squared value of 562.08 and R squared of 
64.34 per cent. Comparing the results with the results reported in Column I of 
Table  7.5,  a  consistent  negative  firm  value tax  planning  relationship  is 
documented but at a larger magnitude of the tax planning coefficient estimate. 
Although the results, in general, show that corporate governance practice has an 
effect on the shareholders’ tax planning valuation, the difference between the two 
coefficients’ mean, i.e. with and without corporate governance variables, is not 
significant with chi squared value of 0.02 (p=0.9006). Therefore, the results fail 
to support the arguments on the importance of corporate governance practice or 
conduct  to  shareholders  (Henderson  Global  Investors,  2005;  Desai  and 
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valuation.  Therefore,  hypothesis  H3a,  which  predicts  the  existence  of  a 
moderating  effect  of  corporate  governance  on  the  relationship  between  firm 
value and tax planning of persistent profit making companies, is not supported. 
In  addition  to  the  above mentioned  results,  the  results  in  Column  I  report  a 
negative coefficient estimate of institutional ownership (IOWN) which supports 
Goergen  and  Renneboog’s  (2001)  assertion  on  the  passive  and  ineffective 
monitoring  role  played  by  U.K.  institutional  investors  in  acting  in  the  best 
interests of the shareholders.  
 
To further investigate the role of corporate governance, as described in Chapter 
6,  the  model  that  is  estimated  to  derive  the  results  in  Column  I  is  further 
estimated with an addition of two interactive or moderating variables (TS_NED 
and TS_IOWN). As the implication of corporate governance on the relationship 
between firm value and tax planning may vary due to the corporate governance 
structure, these variables are used to test whether the relationship between market 
value and tax planning is conditional upon the strength of a company’s corporate 
governance structures. Generally, the model is significant (p<0.01) with Wald 
chi squared value of 509.13 and R squared of 64.70 per cent. Column II reports 
the  results  of  the  analysis,  which  indicate  that  the  previously  significant 
relationship between firm value and tax planning no longer holds when the two 
interacting  variables  are  included.  This  suggests  that  corporate  governance 
structure has an effect on the shareholders’ tax planning valuation. However, the 
lack  of  a  significant  coefficient  associated  with  any  of  the  two  interactive 
variables  makes  it  difficult  to  understand  the  nature  of  the  relationship. 
Therefore, contrary to Desai and Dharmapala (2009), this result does not support 
the  argument  on  the  stronger  effect  of  tax  planning  on  firm  value  when  the 
corporate governance structure is stronger. 
 
Re estimating the above models, which were estimated to derive the results in on 
the  persistent  and  non persistent  profit making  sample,  yields  the  results  as 
reported in Column III and IV. Results reported in both columns are based on the 
full sample of 472 firm year ends (persistent and non persistent profit making 
companies). Results in Column III present the findings of the estimation model 
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between firm value and the level of tax planning of non persistent profit making 
companies. Generally, the model is significant (p<0.01) with Wald chi squared 
value of 665.76 and R squared of 63.54 per cent. Comparing the results with the 
initial  results,  a  consistent  negative  relationship  between  firm  value  and  the 
interaction  variable  between  non persistent  dummy  and  tax  saving 
(NPSTDUMTS) is documented. Similar to the above results of persistent profit 
making companies, a larger magnitude of the interaction variables’ coefficient 
estimate  is  documented  when  the  corporate  governance  variables  (NED  and 
IOWN) are included in the estimation model. However, the coefficient estimate 
of the NPSTDUMTS with corporate  governance variables is not significantly 
different as compared to the coefficient estimates of the NPSTDUMTS without 
corporate governance variables, i.e. chi squared value of 0.03 (p=0.8636). These 
results,  therefore,  do  not  indicate  the  importance  of  corporate  governance 
practice  to  shareholders  (Henderson  Global  Investors,  2005;  Desai  and 
Dharmapala,  2009),  particularly  among  those  companies  with  a  reduced 
possibility  of  succeeding  in  long run  tax  planning  (Dyreng  et  al.,  2008). 
Therefore, based on the results, in general, corporate governance practice cannot 
be concluded as a factor that could increase shareholders’ confidence in valuing 
tax planning activities of non persistent profit making companies and hence the 
results fail to support hypothesis H3b that predicts the existence of the corporate 
governance moderating effects on the relationship between the firm value and 
extent of tax planning activities of non persistent profit making companies. 
 
Following  the  above  analysis,  to  further  investigate  the  role  of  corporate 
governance of non persistent profit making companies, the model is re estimated 
with an addition of two non persistent related interactive or moderating variables 
(NPSTDUMTS_NED  and  NPSTDUMTS  _IOWN,  as  detailed  in  Chapter  6). 
These variables are used to test whether the relationship between market value 
and tax planning of non persistent profit making companies is conditional upon 
the  strength  of  a  firm’s  corporate  governance  structures.  The  results  of  the 
analysis  are  reported  in  Column  IV  of  Table  7.10.  Generally,  the  model  is 
significant (p<0.01) with Wald chi squared value of 779.96 and R squared of 
63.85  per  cent.  The  results  from  the  analysis  indicate  that  the  previously 
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profit making  companies  (NPSTDUMTS)  no  longer  holds  when  the  two 
interacting  variables  are  included.  This  suggests  that  corporate  governance 
structure  of  non persistent  profit making  companies  has  an  effect  on  the 
shareholders’ tax planning valuation. Interestingly, the results respectively reveal 
significant  negative  and  positive  relationships  between  firm  value  and 
NPSTDUMTS_NED and NPSTDUMTS_IOWN. These results indicate that the 
relationship  between  market  value  and  tax  planning  of  non persistent  profit 
making  companies  is  dependent  on  the  strength  of  corporate  governance 
structures.  These  relationships  could  be  due  to  different  perceptions  of 
shareholders on the effectiveness of these two mechanisms in mitigating agency 
conflict.  These  suggest  that  shareholders  perceive  that  the  non executive 
directors are not acting in the best interests of the shareholders in increasing their 
wealth in monitoring tax planning activities, as discussed in Chapter 4, possibly 
due to political constraints imposed on these types of directors (Agrawal and 
Knoeber,  1996).  On  the  other  hand,  in  terms  of  institutional  ownership,  the 
results suggest that, due to greater incentive to control the managers (Desai and 
Dharmapala, 2009), shareholders perceive that the institutional investors are an 
effective mechanism to protect shareholders’ welfare in tax planning activities. 
This  is  in  contradiction  to  the  argument  of  a    passive  role  played  by  U.K. 
institutional investors (Goergen and Renneboog, 2001), particularly in the case of 
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Table 7.10 
Regression Results: Firm Value, Tax Planning and Corporate Governance  
  (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV) 
DV = MVEt+3months/ 
BVEt-1 
Persistent Profit-Making 
Companies 
Persistent and Non-
Persistent Profit-Making 
Companies 
BVE  1.1167 
(4.68)*** 
1.1286 
(4.83)*** 
1.0476 
(4.49)*** 
1.0412 
(4.47)*** 
PBT  10.0020 
(16.79)*** 
10.0312 
(16.87)*** 
9.9651 
(17.49)*** 
10.0062 
(17.72)*** 
TS   9.5925 
( 3.03)*** 
2.9235 
(0.30) 
 8.9669 
( 2.95)*** 
 1.1744 
( 0.13) 
NED  0.0080 
(1.48) 
0.0096 
(1.74)* 
0.0038 
(0.69) 
0.0051 
(0.91) 
IOWN   0.0074 
( 1.89)* 
 0.0070 
( 1.66)* 
 0.0071 
( 1.85)* 
 0.0071 
( 1.71)* 
TS_NED      0.1681 
( 1.07) 
    0.0896 
( 0.62) 
TS_IOWN      0.0817 
( 0.56) 
    0.0813 
( 0.56) 
NPSTDUMTS         16.6662 
( 1.90)* 
26.5009 
(1.17) 
NPSTDUMTS_NED            1.0958 
( 2.20)** 
NPSTDUMTS_IOWN           0.6708 
(1.91)* 
CC  0.1048 
(0.22) 
0.0731 
(0.16) 
0.3101 
(0.66) 
0.3000 
(0.64) 
EM   2.7992 
( 6.31)*** 
 2.7651 
( 6.19)*** 
 2.8776 
( 6.72)*** 
 2.8854 
( 6.77)*** 
CAPINT   0.5163 
( 2.96)*** 
 0.5175 
( 2.95)*** 
 0.5291 
( 3.00)*** 
 0.5131 
( 2.88)*** 
LEV   0.4862 
( 1.09) 
 0.4577 
( 1.01) 
 0.1128 
( 0.28) 
 0.0758 
( 0.19) 
DIV   0.0002 
( 0.13) 
 0.0003 
( 0.17) 
 0.0001 
(0.00) 
 0.0003 
( 0.15) 
FS  0.0058 
(2.84)*** 
0.0057 
(2.78)*** 
0.0048 
(2.39)** 
0.0047 
(2.36)** 
Cons   0.3715 
( 0.81) 
 0.4879 
( 1.05) 
 0.2171 
( 0.47) 
 0.2658 
( 0.57) 
R squared   64.34%  64.70%  63.54%  63.85% 
n  444  444  472  472 
Wald chi
2   562.08*** 
18
# 
509.13*** 
20
# 
665.76*** 
20
# 
779.96*** 
24
# 
Breusch Pagan  83.95*** 
18
# 
84.70*** 
20
# 
87.62*** 
20
# 
88.29*** 
24
# 
Figures in parentheses represent cross section clustered Eicker Huber White adjusted t statistics. 
 ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 2.5% and 5% respectively. 
# indicates degree of freedom. 
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In addition to the above analyses, the firm value is also regressed on components 
of  tax  saving,  corporate  governance  and  other  firm specific  variables  to 
investigate  whether  corporate  governance  moderates  the  relationship  between 
firm value and components of tax saving of persistent profit making companies. 
The results from the analysis are reported in Column I of Table 7.11. Generally, 
the model is significant (p<0.01) with Wald chi squared value of 363.70 and R 
squared  of  58.84  per  cent.  Comparing  the  results  with  the  initial  results,  a 
consistent negative relationship between firm value and permanent difference is 
documented  but  the  coefficient  estimate  is  found  to  be  larger.  However,  the 
coefficient estimate of the TPD with corporate governance is not significantly 
different at five per cent level compared to the coefficient estimates of the TPD 
without  corporate  governance  variables,  i.e.  chi  squared  value  of  0.00 
(p=0.9659).  This  result  fails  to  support  the  argument  on  the  importance  of 
corporate  governance  practice  to  shareholders  (Henderson  Global  Investors, 
2005;  Desai  and  Dharmapala,  2009).  In  addition,  the  results  do  not  provide 
indications  of  a  significant  moderating  effect  of  corporate  governance  on  the 
relationship between firm value and the other three components of tax saving, i.e. 
temporary  differences  (TTD),  tax  losses  (TLOSS),    and  foreign  tax  rates 
differentials  (TFTR).  Therefore,  it  can  be  concluded  that  the  results  fail  to 
support hypotheses H4a, H4b, H4c and H4d. 
 
To further investigate the role of corporate governance, as described in Chapter 
6, the model that is estimated to derive the results in Column I is further re 
estimated  with  an  addition  of  10  interactive  or  moderating  variables 
(TLOSS_NED,  TLOSS_IOWN,  TPD_NED,  TPD_IOWN,  TTD_NED, 
TTD_IOWN,  TFTR_NED,  TFTR_IOWN,  TUNC_NED  and  TUNC_IOWN). 
These variables are used to test whether the relationship between market value 
and components of tax saving is conditional upon the strength of a company’s 
corporate  governance  structures.  However,  as  discussed  in  the  section  on 
multicollinearity,  there  is  a  significant  multicollinearity  between  four 
independent  variables  of  this  model,  i.e.  TLOSS,  TPD,  TLOSS_NED  and 
TPD_NED. Given that the multicollinearity only exists in the model upon the 
inclusion  of  the  two  interactive  variables  (TLOSS_NED  and  TPD_NED), 
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that  is  caused  by  the  multiplicative  interaction  variables,  the  data  of  the 
interactive related variables (TLOSS, TPD and NED) are centred, i.e. subtracting 
the variables’ means from the data of the relative variables, before multiplying 
the  variables  to  generate  the  centred  interaction  variables.  As  discussed  in 
multicollinearity section, testing the multicollinearity after substituting the two 
interactive variables (TLOSS_NED and TPD_NED) with centred TLOSS_NED 
and TPD_NED in the  model estimated in Column  II of Table 7.11  yields to 
insignificant  multicollinearity,  i.e.  variance decomposition  proportion  of  less 
than  0.5  (Belsley  et  al.,  1980).  Therefore,  the  results  of  TLOSS_NED  and 
TPD_NED  reported  in  Column  II  of  Table  7.11  are  based  on  centred 
TLOSS_NED and TPD_NED. 
 
Generally, the model (Column II of Table 7.11) is significant (p<0.01) with Wald 
chi squared value of 501.66 and R squared of 59.66 per cent. The results of the 
analysis indicate that the previously significant relationship between firm value 
and permanent difference disappears when the interacting variables are included. 
This  suggests  that  corporate  governance  structure  has  an  effect  on  the 
shareholders’ permanent differences component valuation. However, the lack of 
a  significant  coefficient  associated  with  any  of  the  two  interactive  variables 
between TPD and corporate governance variables (NED and IOWN) makes it 
difficult to understand the nature of the relationship.  In contrast, the firm value 
appears  to  positively  significant  related  with  tax  losses  (TLOSS)  upon  the 
inclusion of the interactive variables. In addition, firm value is also found to be 
significant  and  negatively  related  with  three  interactive  variables: 
TLOSS_IOWN,  TFTR_IOWN  and  TUNC_IOWN.  These  suggest  that  the 
moderating  effects  of  corporate  governance  on  tax  losses,  foreign  tax  rates 
differentials and unclassified components are conditional upon the strength of the 
institutional  ownership.  Consistent  with  the  initial  results  on  the  negative 
relationship between firm value and institutional ownership (IOWN) reported in 
Column I of Table 7.11, these may be due to negative perception of shareholders 
on the effectiveness of U.K. institutional investors in protecting shareholders’ 
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Table 7.11 
Regression Results: Firm Value, Components of Tax Saving and Corporate 
Governance  
  (I)  (II) 
DV = MVEt+3months/ 
BVEt-1 
Persistent 
Profit-Making 
Companies 
Persistent 
Profit-Making 
Companies 
BVE  0.7167 
(2.55)** 
0.6872 
(2.36)** 
PBT  9.5480 
(14.14)*** 
9.5579 
(14.16)*** 
TLOSS   1.7713 
( 0.31) 
28.10 
(2.12)** 
TPD   12.3547 
( 1.96)** 
 11.9780 
( 0.87) 
TTD  7.0694 
(1.47) 
27.1291 
(1.05) 
TFTR  5.6768 
(0.69) 
8.5627 
(0.21) 
TUNC   5.8766 
( 0.54) 
2.4099 
(0.04) 
NED  0.0075 
(1.44) 
0.0063 
(1.22) 
IOWN   0.0083 
( 2.10)** 
 0.0052 
( 1.35) 
TLOSS_NED^      0.1644 
( 0.39) 
TLOSS_IOWN      0.8953 
( 2.50)** 
TPD_NED^      0.3556 
( 0.70) 
TPD_IOWN      0.0351 
( 0.09) 
TTD_NED      0.1831 
( 0.45) 
TTD_IOWN      0.3633 
( 1.06) 
TFTR_NED     0.4928 
(0.74) 
TFTR_IOWN      0.8802 
( 1.80)* 
TUNC_NED     0.4366 
(0.51) 
TUNC_IOWN      1.0541 
( 2.35)** 
CC  0.3319 
(0.71) 
0.4791 
(0.98) 
EM   2.5750 
( 5.46)*** 
 2.5007 
( 5.17)*** 
CAPINT   0.4714 
( 2.44)** 
 0.5063 
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LEV   0.2551 
( 0.61) 
 0.2047 
( 0.48) 
DIV  0.0026 
(1.51) 
0.0025 
(1.46) 
FS  0.0059 
(2.96)*** 
0.0055 
(2.88)*** 
Cons   0.1855 
( 0.41) 
 0.1981 
( 0.43) 
R squared   58.84%  59.66% 
n  405  405 
Wald chi
2  
 
363.70*** 
22
# 
501.66*** 
32
# 
Breusch Pagan  77.60*** 
22
# 
88.51*** 
32
# 
Figures in parentheses represent cross section clustered Eicker Huber White adjusted t statistics. 
 ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 2.5% and 5% respectively. 
# indicates degree of freedom. 
^ indicates centred variable. 
 
In  addition  to  the  above  analyses,  to  further  examine  the  role  of  corporate 
governance on the relationship between firm value and tax planning, firm value 
is regressed on tax saving based on a split sample around the median of corporate 
governance score (median=1782.75), on the basis that both higher institutional 
ownership and proportion of non executive directors would positively contribute 
to better governance (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Florackis, 2008). The score is 
computed by multiplying NED with IOWN. The results are reported in Table 
7.12. Column I focuses on “high” governance firms years and Column II focuses 
on  “low”  governance  firms years  of  persistent  profit making  companies.  
Column  III  and  Column  IV  respectively  report  the  results  based  on  “high” 
governance  firms years  and  “low”  governance  firms years  of  combined 
persistent and non persistent profit making companies. 
 
Interestingly, the tax planning variables of both “high” and “low” governance 
firms years  show  different  significant  levels  and  magnitudes  of  tax  planning 
coefficient estimates. The model that is estimated to derive the results in Column 
I is generally significant (p<0.01) with Wald chi squared value of 838.15 and R 
squared of 61.17 per cent. Similarly, the model that is estimated to derive the 
results in Column II is also significant (p<0.01) with Wald chi squared value of 
465.98 and R squared of 71.66 per cent. Among “high” corporate governance 
firms, there is a significant negative relationship (p<0.05) between market value Chapter 7 Analyses and Findings                                                                       206 
 
 
and tax planning. Within the “high” corporate governance firms, as compared to 
the “low” corporate governance firms, the negative relationship is found to be 
stronger with a more significant (p<0.025) and higher magnitude of tax planning 
coefficient estimate. Although this suggests that, for “low” governance  firms, 
increased tax planning is associated with even lower market value, the difference 
between the two coefficients’ mean is not significant at five per cent level of 
which the chi squared value is 0.03 (p=0.8517). 
     
In the case of non persistent profit making companies, the models are significant 
(p<0.01) with Wald chi squared value of 833.87 and 1217.30 respectively for 
“high” governance firms years and “low” governance firms years of combined 
persistent and non persistent profit making companies. The reported R squared 
for the results in Column III is 55.65 per cent while Column IV is 70.31 per cent. 
The  results  show  that,  among  the  “high”  corporate  governance  observations, 
there is no significant relationship between market value and tax saving of non 
persistent profit making companies (NPSTDUMTS), either negative or positive. 
However,  within  the  “low”  governance  firms years,  there  is  a  negative 
relationship  between  market  value  and  tax  planning  of  non persistent  profit 
making companies (NSTDUMTS). The coefficients of the NPSTDUMTS of both 
“high” and “low” governance firms years are found to be significantly different 
from  one  another  (chi squared=36.86,  p<0.01)  suggesting  that,  for  “low” 
governance  firms,  increased  tax  planning  by  non persistent  profit making 
companies is associated with lower market value. Therefore, in line with Desai 
and Dharmapala (2009), it can be concluded that corporate governance practice 
is perceived as important by shareholders in valuing  tax planning activities of 
non persistent profit making companies. 
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Table 7.12 
Regression Results: Firm Value, Tax planning and Corporate Governance – 
"High" and “Low” Governance Firms-Years 
 
  (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV) 
  Persistent Profit-Making 
Companies 
Persistent and Non-Persistent 
Profit-Making Companies 
DV = 
MVEt+3months/
BVEt-1 
"High" 
governance 
firms-years 
"Low" 
governance 
firms-years 
"High" 
governance 
firms-years 
"Low" 
governance 
firms-years 
BVE  1.2592 
(3.88)*** 
0.6055 
(1.47) 
1.0236 
(3.42)*** 
0.6530 
(1.72)* 
PBT  9.8773 
(16.12)*** 
10.7235 
(10.92)*** 
9.2070 
(13.62)*** 
11.0867 
(14.85)*** 
TS   8.0161 
( 1.76)* 
 8.8816 
( 2.03)** 
 8.5759 
( 2.11)** 
 8.4712 
( 1.90)* 
NPSTDUMTS         0.3692 
( 0.04) 
 28.4233 
( 2.33)** 
CC   0.0238 
( 0.03) 
0.4513 
(0.89) 
0.6713 
(0.98) 
0.3979 
(0.80) 
EM   0.9329 
( 5.15)*** 
 2.9649 
( 4.88)*** 
 2.7313 
( 5.59)*** 
 2.9713 
( 4.78)*** 
CAPINT   0.3598 
( 1.69)* 
 0.7671 
( 2.22)** 
 0.4691 
( 2.36)** 
 0.6550 
( 1.81)* 
LEV  0.0247 
(0.04) 
 1.0018 
( 1.62) 
0.2096 
(0.35) 
 0.4129 
( 0.76) 
DIV   0.0006 
( 0.22) 
 0.0007 
( 0.23) 
0.0005 
(0.19) 
 0.0008 
( 0.30) 
FS  0.0017 
(0.62) 
0.0096 
(3.48)*** 
 0.0001 
( 0.05) 
0.0091 
(3.45)*** 
Cons   0.0878 
( 0.19) 
0.2259 
(0.36) 
0.0290 
(0.06) 
0.0212 
(0.04) 
R squared   61.17%  71.66%  55.65%  70.31% 
n  222  222  236  236 
Wald chi
2  
 
838.15*** 
16
# 
465.98*** 
16
# 
833.87*** 
17
# 
1217.30*** 
18
# 
Breusch Pagan  34.63*** 
16
# 
55.13*** 
16
# 
36.86*** 
17
# 
46.75*** 
18
# 
Figures in parentheses represent cross section clustered Eicker Huber White adjusted t statistics. 
 ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 2.5% and 5% respectively.  
# indicates degree of freedom. 
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7.4 Multicollinearity and Heteroscedasticity  
 
Prior to the above multivariate analyses, the data and the estimations were tested 
to determine any inter correlation of the independent variables. In addition, the 
data was tested for heteroscedasticity in order to identify whether cross section 
variances are constant or otherwise.  
 
7.4.1 Multicollinearity 
 
Multicollinearity  is  a  condition  when  two  or  more  independent  variables 
correlate with each other (Hair et al., 2006). Therefore, it is important to detect 
and  correct  any  multicollinearity  problem  before  conducting  the  multivariate 
analysis  so  that  the  relationship  between  the  dependent  variable  and  the 
independent variables can be determined vigorously (Hair et al., 2006). For this 
purpose, three diagnostic tests have been conducted. The tests consist of analyses 
of correlation coefficients, variance inflation factors and variance decomposition 
proportions. 
 
In the analyses of correlation coefficients, high coefficients of correlation matrix 
of  the  independent  variables  (0.9  and  higher)  signify  initial  indications  of 
substantial  collinearity  (Hair  et  al.,  2006).  The  correlation  coefficients  of  the 
variables  of  the  estimation  models  relating  to  persistent  profit making 
companies, combined persistent and non persistent profit making companies and 
components of tax saving are respectively presented in Table 7.13, Table 7.14 
and Table 7.15. The bolded coefficients are the coefficients that are higher than 
0.9. From the correlation matrices, for persistent profit making companies (Table 
7.13), there is one correlation coefficient that is higher than 0.9 (0.9781), i.e. the 
coefficient of the correlation between TS and TS_NED. For combined persistent 
and  non persistent  profit making  companies  (Table  7.14),  there  are  two 
correlation  coefficients  that  are  higher  than  0.9,  i.e.  the  coefficients  of  the 
correlations between TS and TS_NED (0.9773) and between NPSTDUMTS and 
NPSTDUMTS_NED (0.9708). For components of tax saving (Table 7.15), there 
are 10  correlation coefficients are higher than 0.9, i.e. the coefficients of the Chapter 7 Analyses and Findings                                                                       209 
 
 
correlations  between  TLOSS  and  TLOSS_NED  (0.9886),  between  TPD  and 
TPD_NED (0.9862), between TPD and TPD_IOWN (0.9032), between TTD and 
TTD_NED (0.9822), between TTD and TTD_IOWN (0.9164), between TFTR 
and TFTR_NED (0.9762), between TFTR and TFTR_IOWN (0.9260), between 
TUNC  and  TUNC_NED  (0.9869),  between  TTD_NED  and  TTD_IOWN 
(0.9143) and between TFTR_NED and TFTR_IOWN (0.9274).  These indicate 
an initial possibility of extreme multicollinearity.  
 
However,  as  the  correlation  coefficient  explains  the  relationship  of  only  two 
variables, this analysis does not guarantee the existence of multicollinearity, that 
is the collinearity condition due to the combined effects of two or more variables 
(Hair et al., 2006). Therefore, variance inflation factors (VIF) are used to further 
investigate the existence of multicollinearity. VIF measures the multicollinearity 
by inversing the tolerance value. Tolerance value is a value that measures the 
variability  of  an  independent  variable  that  is  not  explained  by  the  other 
independent variables (Hair et al., 2006).
68 Therefore, a “large” value of VIF 
indicates “high” multicollinearity. The VIF values of the variables of all models 
are presented in Table 7.16. The table consists of nine columns (Columns I   IX). 
Column I is related to the model that tests the relationship between firm value 
and tax planning of persistent profit making companies, Column II is related to 
the  model  that  tests  the  relationship  between  firm  value  and  tax  planning  of 
combined persistent and non persistent profit making companies, Column III is 
related  to  the  model  that  tests  the  relationship  between  firm  value  and 
components of tax saving of persistent profit making companies, Column IV is 
related to the model that tests the relationship between firm value, tax planning 
and corporate governance of persistent profit making companies, Column V is 
related to the model that tests the relationship between firm value, tax planning 
and corporate governance of persistent profit making companies with interaction 
variables, Column VI is related to the model that tests the relationship between 
firm value, tax planning and corporate governance of combined persistent and 
non persistent profit making companies, Column VII is related to the model that 
                                                 
68Tolerance is calculated by 1.0 minus R squared of the regression that is analysed without the 
selected independent variable. Subsequently, VIF is computed by dividing 1 with the tolerance 
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tests the relationship between firm value, tax planning and corporate governance 
of  combined  persistent  and  non persistent  profit making  companies  with 
interaction  variables,  Column  VIII  is  related  to  the  model  that  tests  the 
relationship  between  firm  value,  components  of  tax  saving  and  corporate 
governance of persistent profit making companies and Column IX is related to 
the  model  that  tests  the  relationship  between  firm  value,  components  of  tax 
saving  and  corporate  governance  of  persistent  profit making  companies  with 
interaction  variables.  There  are  17  VIF  values    that  indicate  significant 
multicollinearity between the independent variables (bolded in Table 7.16), i.e. 
VIF higher than 10.00 (Hair et al., 2006). The related variables consist of TS and 
TS_NED  (VIF  of  31.08  and  27.26  respectively)  in  Column  V,  TS, 
NPSTDUMTS, TS_NED and NPSTDUMTS_NED (VIF of 31.78, 20.09, 27.02 
and  21.53  respectively)  in  Column  VII,  TLOSS,  TPD,  TTD,  TFTR,  TUNC, 
TLOSS_NED,  TPD_NED,  TTD_IOWN,  TTD_NED,  TFTR_NED,  and 
TUNC_NED  (VIF  of  55.11,  65.24,  38.82,  26.63,  50.98,  52.61,  50.93,  11.73, 
37.23,  27.99  and  45.27  respectively)  in  Column  IX.  These  suggest  that  the 
multicollinearity exists in relation to the interactive variables.  
 
Although  these  VIF  values  indicate  an  increased  possibility  of  extreme 
multicollinearity,  based  on  the  argument  that  VIF  is  unable  to  differentiate 
between several coexisting near dependencies and is numerical unstable (Belsley 
et al., 1980), variance decomposition proportions analysis is further conducted to 
determine the existence of multicollinearity.
69 The summary of the analysis of 
the  test  is  reported  in  Table  7.17.  The  analysis  shows  that  the  significant 
multicollinearity exists only within the model that tests the relationship between 
firm  value,  components  of  tax  saving  and  corporate  governance  of  persistent 
profit making companies with interaction variables (two condition indices that 
are  above  30,  i.e.  33.75  and  35.66).    The  reported  “large”  variance 
decomposition proportions of the independent variables of the model, i.e. higher 
than 0.5, are related to TLOSS, TPD, TLOSS_NED and TPD_NED (variance 
                                                 
69 According to Belsley et al. (1980), multicollinearity exists only if the following two conditions 
are satisfied: “high” condition index (30 or more) and “high” variance decomposition proportions 
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decomposition proportions of 0.54, 0.75, 0.55 and 0.74 respectively).
70 Based on 
the above analysis, since the significant multicollinearity does not exist within 
other models, it can be concluded that the significant multicollinearity of the 
independent variables exists only when the interaction variables (TLOSS_NED 
and TPD_NED) are included in the estimation model.  
 
To  minimise  the  multicollinearity  due  to  the  interaction  variables,  Aiken  and 
West (1991) recommend “data centring” in which (as discussed in Section 7.3.2) 
the variables related to the interactive variables, i.e. TPD, TLOSS and NED, are 
recalculated as to reflect the difference between the variables and their respective 
mean  values.  Subsequently,  the  interactive  variables  (TLOSS_NED  and 
TPD_NED)  are  recalculated  by  multiplying  the  centred  TLOSS  with  centred 
NED to derive centred TLOSS_NED, and by multiplying the centred TPD with 
centred NED to derive centred TPD_NED. This “data centring” is found to be an 
appropriate approach as it can eliminate “nonessential ill conditioning” of the un 
centred variables (Aiken and West, 1991). Therefore, the model that tests the 
relationship  between  firm  value,  components  of  tax  saving  and  corporate 
governance of persistent profit making companies with interaction variables is 
estimated using centred TLOSS_NED and centred TPD_NED. To ensure that the 
multicollinearity in the model is no longer excessive, the variance decomposition 
proportions  of  the  model  that  utilises  the  centred  interactive  variables  are 
analysed. Based on the test, as expected, there is no significant multicollinearity 
detected as the two conditions specified by Belsley et al. (1980) are not satisfied, 
i.e.  “high”  condition  index  (30  or  more)  and  “high”  variance decomposition 
proportions  (0.5  or  more)  of  two  or  more  estimated  regression  coefficient 
variances,  in  which  the  highest  condition  index  is  30.96  with  the  highest 
variance decomposition proportion of 0.37 (BVE). 
 
As the model that tests the relationship between firm value, components of tax 
saving and corporate governance with interaction variables indicates significant 
multicollinearity, to examine the multicollinearity issue in the sensitivity analysis 
(Section 7.5), the models that are related to the model that tests the relationship 
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between firm value, components of tax saving and corporate governance with 
interaction variables are also tested for robustness check in further tests (Section 
7.5). In analysing the sensitivity of the results upon the alternative market value 
measurement  date,  the  highest  condition  index  and  variance decomposition 
proportions of the initial model, i.e. without centring the interactive variables, 
exhibit  significant  multicollinearity  (the  highest  condition  index  is  35.66  and 
variables in which the variance decomposition proportions that are more than 0.5 
are TLOSS_NED (0.74) and TPD_NED (0.55). After centring both interaction 
variables,  the  variance decomposition  proportions  indicate  insignificant 
multicollinearity (i.e. below 0.5). Therefore, the model is analysed after centring 
both variables (TLOSS_NED and TPD_NED). 
 
In  a  further  test  that  analyses  the  sensitivity  of  the  results  upon  choice  of 
deflators, the highest condition index and variance decomposition proportions of 
the initial model, i.e. without centring the interactive variables, exhibit significant 
multicollinearity (the highest condition indices for the models where the deflators 
are number of shares, opening market value and sales are respectively 41.85, 
33.83  and  45.95,  and  the  variables  in  which  the  variance decomposition 
proportions that are more than 0.5 are TLOSS_NED (0.63), TPD_NED (0.92) 
and TTD_NED (0.69) for number of shares; TLOSS_NED (0.53), TPD_NED 
(0.51)  and  TUNC_NED  (0.59)  for  opening  market  value;  and  TLOSS_NED 
(0.54), TPD_NED (0.91) and TUNC_NED (0.82) for sales. After centring the 
interaction variables, the condition indices indicate insignificant multicollinearity 
(i.e.  below  30).  Therefore,  the  model  is  analysed  after  centring  the  related 
interactive variables (TLOSS_NED, TPD_NED and TTD_NED for number of 
shares; TLOSS_NED, TPD_NED and TUNC_NED for opening market value; 
and TLOSS_NED, TPD_NED and TUNC_NED for sales). 
 
In  analysing  the  sensitivity  of  the  results  upon  the  alternative  market  value 
measure, the highest condition index and variance decomposition proportions of 
the initial model, i.e. without centring the interactive variables, exhibit significant 
multicollinearity (the highest condition index is 35.83 and variables in which the 
variance decomposition  proportions  that  are  more  than  0.5  are  TLOSS_NED 
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variables, the condition indices indicate insignificant multicollinearity (i.e. below 
30). Therefore, the model is analysed after centring three interaction variables 
(TLOSS_NED, TTD_NED and TUNC_NED).  
 
In assessing the sensitivity of the results upon the reclassification of unclassified 
items, the highest condition indices and variance decomposition proportions of 
the initial model when the TUNC is reclassified as TPD and TTD, i.e. without 
centring  the  interactive  variables,  exhibit  significant  multicollinearity  (the 
highest  condition  indices  are  33.55  and  30.76  respectively,  and  variables  in 
which  the  variance decomposition  proportions  that  are  more  than  0.5  are 
TLOSS_NED (0.65) and TPDUNC_NED (0.51) when TUNC is reclassified as 
TPD,  and  TLOSS_NED  (0.63),  TPD_NED  (0.5)  and  TTDUNC_NED  (0.80) 
when TUNC is reclassified as TTD. After centring the interaction variables, the 
variance decomposition proportions indicate insignificant multicollinearity (i.e. 
below  0.5).  Therefore,  the  model  is  analysed  after  centring  the  interaction 
variables  (TLOSS_NED  and  TPDUNC_NED  when  TUNC  is  reclassified  as 
TPD,  and  TLOSS_NED,  TPD_NED  and  TTDUNC_NED  when  TUNC  is 
reclassified as TTD).  
 
7.4.2 Heteroscedasticity 
 
Heteroscedasticity  test  is  related  to  analysis  of  the  relationship  between  the 
dependent  variable  and  cross section  error  term.  The  existence  of 
heteroscedasticity  leads  to  unequal  variance  circumstances  in  which  the 
dispersion  of  the  values  of  the  dependent  variable  is  not  constant  across  the 
values  of  the  independent  variables  (Hair  et  al.,  2006).  The  presence  of 
heteroscedasticity  indicates  that  the  variance  of  the  dependent  variable  is  not 
equally  explained  by  each  of  the  independent  variables  and  thus  limits  the 
explanation of the effects of the regressors. This in turn will lead to incorrect 
estimation of the standard errors and, hence, the results from hypotheses testing 
will also be biased. Therefore, three heteroscedasticity tests have been conducted 
to determine the extent of the heteroscedasticity, which are based on Breusch and 
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for all of the estimation models indicate a significant level of heteroscedasticity 
in  which  the  variances  are  not  constant.  Therefore,  to  control  for 
heteroscedasticity, robust standard errors should be used in the analyses (Eicker, 
1963; Huber, 1967; White, 1980).  
 
However,  due  to  repeated  accounting  and  firm specific  observations  of  the 
companies that have common features (i.e. data within the same year end) across 
times, panel data in accounting is said to potentially suffer from a serious cross 
sectional dependence problem (Bernard, 1987). It is argued that the analyses that 
use robust standard errors could violate the regression models assumption since 
they do not consider the above mentioned cross sectional correlation (Hoechle, 
2007).  Thus,  robust  standard  errors  are  found  to  be  inconsistent  in  terms  of 
variance covariance  estimate  as  it  assumes  the  errors  are  independently 
distributed (Baum, 2006). Therefore, following Cameron and Trivedi (2005) and 
Baum  (2006),  the  above  multivariate  analyses  were  conducted  using  cross 
section  clustered  Eicker Huber White  robust  standard  errors.  This  method  is 
appropriate  for  application  in  this  study  as  it  eliminates  the  deficiencies  of 
alternative methods, for example, panel corrected standard errors, that are not 
suitable  for  application  within  the  dataset  that  has  a  large  cross sectional 
dimension (n, as reported in all tables) but a small time dimension (year), i.e. 
three  years  for  this  study  (Hoechle,  2007;  Petersen,  2009).  This  estimation 
corrects both errors of heteroscedasticity and non normality dispersion (Hair et 
al., 2006). 
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Table 7.13 
Pearson Correlation Matrix: Persistent Profit-Making Companies 
n=444  MVE  BVE  PBT  TS  NED  IOWN  CC  EM  CAPINT  LEV 
MVE  1.0000                   
BVE  0.4667***  1.0000                 
PBT  0.7765***  0.3208***  1.0000               
TS  0.0794*  0.0024  0.2811  1.0000             
NED  0.0066   0.0246   0.0669  0.1149**  1.0000           
IOWN  0.0160  0.0252   0.0256   0.1001**  0.1414***  1.0000         
CC  0.2566***  0.7610***  0.0840*   0.1051**  0.0215   0.0028  1.0000       
EM   0.1586***   0.0229  0.1224***  0.0652   0.1098**   0.0760   0.0453  1.0000     
CAPINT   0.1708***   0.1287***   0.1321***  0.0122  0.0193  0.0082   0.0728   0.1075**  1.0000   
LEV  0.0072   0.0146   0.0132  0.2088***  0.2589***   0.0750  0.0321   0.2390***  0.0647  1.0000 
DIV  0.0285   0.1015**  0.0602  0.0444  0.0169   0.0536   0.0453  0.0242  0.1988***  0.1102** 
FS  0.1174**  0.0765  0.0084   0.0460  0.1400  0.0679  0.0936**  0.0205  0.1336***   0.0553 
TS_NED  0.0971**  0.0030  0.2934***  0.9781***  0.1795***   0.0891*   0.1048**  0.0595  0.0073  0.2251*** 
TS_IOWN  0.0199   0.0112  0.1913***  0.8541***  0.1160**  0.0672   0.0953**  0.0645  0.0121  0.2099*** 
***, ** and * indicate significant level at 1%, 2.5% and 5% respectively. 
 
Table 7.13...continue 
Pearson Correlation Matrix: Persistent Profit-Making Companies 
n=444  DIV  FS  TS_NED  TS_IOWN 
DIV  1.0000       
FS   0.0038  1.0000     
TS_NED  0.0591   0.0370  1.0000   
TS_IOWN  0.0025   0.0746  0.8266***  1.0000 
***, ** and * indicate significant level at 1%, 2.5% and 5% respectively.  
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Table 7.14 
Pearson Correlation Matrix: Persistent and Non-Persistent Profit-Making Companies 
n=472  MVE  BVE  PBT  TS  NPSTDUMTS  NED  IOWN  CC  EM 
MVE  1.0000                 
BVE  0.4508***  1.0000               
PBT  0.7815***  0.3094***  1.0000             
TS  0.0378   0.0174  0.2281***  1.0000           
NPSTDUMTS   0.0752   0.0201  0.0081  0.2105***  1.0000         
NED  0.0155   0.0157   0.0393  0.0914**   0.0292  1.0000       
IOWN  0.0029  0.0181   0.0432   0.1178**   0.1035**  0.1304***  1.0000     
CC  0.2507***  0.7486***  0.0755   0.1115**   0.0540  0.0176   0.0024  1.0000   
EM   0.1295***   0.0144  0.1554***  0.0574  0.0426   0.1238***   0.0890*   0.0429  1.0000 
CAPINT   0.1594***   0.1201***   0.1382***  0.0263   0.0056   0.0133  0.0054   0.0704   0.1252*** 
LEV  0.0009   0.0233   0.0294  0.2159***  0.0335  0.2717***   0.0783*  0.0260   0.2096*** 
DIV  0.0243   0.0919**  0.1111**  0.0366   0.0701  0.0242   0.0567   0.0795*  0.0526 
FS  0.1251***  0.0818  0.0288   0.0605  0.0320  0.1343***  0.0579  0.0932**  0.0033 
TS_NED  0.0542   0.0186  0.2389***  0.9773***  0.1787***  0.1494***   0.1046**   0.1096**  0.0440 
TS_IOWN   0.0091   0.0246  0.1495***  0.8548***  0.1405***  0.0975  0.0531   0.1001**  0.0617 
NPSTDUMTS_NED   0.0777*   0.0252  0.0086  0.2057***  0.9708***   0.0036   0.1000**   0.0593  0.0253 
NPSTDUMTS_IOWN   0.0439   0.0065  0.0120  0.1677***  0.7342***   0.0158   0.0319   0.0491  0.0596 
***, ** and * indicate significant level at 1%, 2.5% and 5% respectively. 
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Table 7.14…continue 
Pearson Correlation Matrix: Persistent and Non-Persistent Profit-Making Companies 
***, ** and * indicate significant level at 1%, 2.5% and 5% respectively. 
n=472  CAPINT  LEV  DIV  FS  TS_NED  TS_IOWN  NPSTDUMTS
_NED 
NPSTDUMTS
_IOWN 
CAPINT  1.0000               
LEV  0.0820*  1.0000             
DIV  0.1892***  0.1065**  1.0000           
FS  0.1169**   0.0482   0.0108  1.0000         
TS_NED  0.0206  0.2339***  0.0502   0.0561  1.0000       
TS_IOWN  0.0248  0.2110***  0.0085   0.0968**  0.8300***  1.0000     
NPSTDUMTS_NED   0.0100  0.0434   0.0687  0.0132  0.1861***  0.1485***  1.0000   
NPSTDUMTS_IOWN   0.0058  0.0109   0.0153   0.0207  0.1547***  0.2080***  0.7666***  1.0000  
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Table 7.15 
Pearson Correlation Matrix: Components of Tax Saving – Persistent Profit-Making Companies 
***, ** and * indicate significant level at 1%, 2.5% and 5% respectively. 
 
n=405  MVE  BVE  PBT  TLOSS  TPD  TTD  TFTR  TUNC  NED  IOWN  CC 
MVE  1.0000                     
BVE  0.3917***  1.0000                   
PBT  0.7985***  0.3817***  1.0000                 
TLOSS   0.0115   0.0410   0.0046  1.0000               
TPD   0.0545   0.0176  0.0765   0.1418***  1.0000             
TTD  0.0875*  0.0322   0.0042   0.3757***   0.0176  1.0000           
TFTR   0.0518   0.0518   0.0543   0.0869*   0.0640   0.1674***  1.0000         
TUNC   0.0101  0.0128   0.0050   0.0008  0.1083   0.1243**   0.0746  1.0000       
NED  0.0178   0.0577   0.0476  0.0221  0.0430  0.0133  0.0190  0.0546  1.0000     
IOWN   0.0299  0.0330   0.0754   0.1311***   0.0626  0.0676   0.0188   0.1649***  0.1934***  1.0000   
CC  0.1300***  0.5581***  0.0694  0.0148  0.0108   0.0266   0.0681  0.0151  0.0085  0.0131  1.0000 
EM   0.1189**  0.1238**  0.1395***   0.0669  0.1557***   0.0214   0.0003  0.0318   0.1221**   0.1096**  0.0884* 
CAPINT   0.1525***   0.1512***   0.1380***   0.0118  0.0885   0.0666  0.1144   0.0072   0.0008  0.0075   0.0635 
LEV   0.0131   0.1006   0.0544  0.0752  0.0609  0.0437  0.0579  0.0832*  0.2602***   0.0961*   0.0115 
DIV  0.0327   0.0599  0.0648  0.0616  0.1248   0.0255  0.0111   0.0336  0.0173   0.0461   0.0449 
FS  0.1145**  0.0490   0.0100   0.0373  0.0659  0.0598   0.1076**  0.0783  0.1610***  0.0697  0.0743 
TLOSS_NED   0.0169   0.0284   0.0117  0.9886***   0.1516***   0.3796***   0.0558  0.0009  0.0268   0.1292***  0.0184 
TLOSS_IOWN   0.0438   0.0801  0.0092  0.8947***   0.1568***   0.4631***   0.0192  0.0234  0.0026   0.1268**  0.0074 
TPD_NED   0.0480   0.0202  0.0876*   0.1579***  0.9862***   0.0073   0.1646  0.1100   0.0044   0.0545  0.0187 
TPD_IOWN   0.0595   0.0361  0.0420   0.1691***  0.9032***  0.0028   0.1866  0.1211***  0.0491***   0.1511***   0.0079 
TTD_NED  0.0839*  0.0263   0.0020   0.3913***   0.0036  0.9822***   0.1262**   0.1064**  0.0473  0.0639   0.0335 
TTD_IOWN  0.0939*  0.1142**  0.0202   0.4786***   0.0001  0.9164***   0.1060**   0.1412***  0.0087***  0.1882***  0.0053 
TFTR_NED   0.0333   0.0459   0.0672   0.0544   0.1540***   0.1198**  0.9762***   0.0889*  0.0464   0.0203   0.0671 
TFTR_IOWN   0.0817   0.0206   0.1170**   0.0183   0.1665***   0.1074**  0.9260***   0.0805  0.0085   0.0071   0.0195 
TUNC_NED   0.0122  0.0039   0.0089  0.0015  0.1079**   0.1035**   0.0883*  0.9869  0.0724   0.1447***  0.0150 
TUNC_IOWN   0.0711  0.0031   0.0295  0.0191  0.1122**   0.1495***   0.1048**  0.8601***  0.0637   0.0342  0.8601***  
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Table 7.15…continue 
Pearson Correlation Matrix: Components of Tax Saving – Persistent Profit-Making Companies 
***, ** and * indicate significant level at 1%, 2.5% and 5% respectively. 
 
 
Table 7.15…continue 
Pearson Correlation Matrix: Components of Tax Saving – Persistent Profit-Making Companies 
***, ** and * indicate significant level at 1%, 2.5% and 5% respectively. 
n=405  EM  CAPINT  LEV  DIV  FS  TLOSS_NED  TLOSS_IOWN  TPD_NED  TPD_IOWN  TTD_NED 
EM  1.0000                   
CAPINT   0.1507***  1.0000                 
LEV   0.2211***  0.0980**  1.0000               
DIV  0.0050  0.2075***  0.1301***  1.0000             
FS   0.0088  0.1113**   0.0441  0.0055  1.0000           
TLOSS_NED   0.0649   0.0075  0.0748  0.0691   0.0344  1.0000         
TLOSS_IOWN   0.0562  0.0228  0.0609  0.0672   0.0525  0.8893***  1.0000       
TPD_NED  0.1532***  0.0806  0.0415  0.1300***  0.0537   0.1693***   0.1701***  1.0000     
TPD_IOWN  0.1366***  0.0919*  0.0779  0.1470***  0.0794   0.1783***   0.2164***  0.8748***  1.0000   
TTD_NED   0.0269   0.0698  0.0639   0.0341  0.0683   0.4028***   0.4844***  0.0024  0.0189  1.0000 
TTD_IOWN  0.0116   0.0883*  0.0135   0.0798  0.0438   0.4838***   0.6023***  0.0107   0.0011  0.9143*** 
TFTR_NED  0.0026  0.1127  0.0617   0.0023   0.1043**   0.0506   0.0104   0.1600   0.1754***   0.1412*** 
TFTR_IOWN   0.0226  0.1048**  0.0595   0.0108   0.1366***   0.0097  0.0123   0.1672***   0.2109***   0.1287*** 
TUNC_NED  0.0407   0.0088  0.0740   0.0349  0.0835*  0.0043  0.0242  0.1133**  0.1164**   0.0900* 
TUNC_IOWN  0.0854*  0.0066  0.0614  0.0088  0.0603  0.0207  0.0339  0.1120**  0.1452***   0.1360*** 
n=405  TTD_IOWN  TFTR_NED  TFTR_IOWN  TUNC_NED  TUNC_IOWN 
TTD_IOWN  1.0000         
TFTR_NED   0.1199**  1.0000       
TFTR_IOWN   0.1189**  0.9274***  1.0000     
TUNC_NED   0.1252**   0.1023**   0.0874*  1.0000   
TUNC_IOWN   0.1598***   0.1132**   0.1185**  0.8454***  1.0000  
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Table 7.16 
Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) 
 
  (I) 
Firm Value 
and Tax 
Planning: 
Persistent 
Profit-
Making 
Companies 
(Column I 
of Table 
7.8) 
(II) 
Firm Value 
and Tax 
Planning: 
Persistent 
and Non-
Persistent 
Profit-
Making 
Companies 
(Column II 
of Table 7.8) 
(III) 
Firm Value 
and 
Components 
of Tax 
Saving: 
Persistent 
Profit-
Making 
Companies 
(Column III 
of Table 7.8) 
(IV) 
Firm Value, 
Tax Planning 
and 
Corporate 
Governance: 
Persistent 
Profit-Making 
Companies 
(Column I of 
Table 7.10) 
(V) 
Firm Value, 
Tax Planning 
and 
Corporate 
Governance: 
Persistent 
Profit-Making 
Companies 
(Column II of 
Table 7.10) 
(VI) 
Firm Value, 
Tax Planning 
and 
Corporate 
Governance: 
Persistent and 
Non-
Persistent 
Profit-Making 
Companies 
(Column III 
of Table 7.10) 
(VII) 
Firm Value, 
Tax Planning 
and 
Corporate 
Governance: 
Persistent and 
Non-
Persistent 
Profit-Making 
Companies 
(Column IV 
of Table 7.10) 
(VIII) 
Firm Value, 
Components 
of Tax Saving 
and Corporate 
Governance: 
Persistent 
Profit-Making 
Companies 
(Column I of 
Table 7.11) 
(IX) 
Firm Value, 
Components 
of Tax Saving 
and Corporate 
Governance: 
Persistent 
Profit-Making 
Companies 
(Column II of 
Table 7.11) 
BVE  2.92  2.75  1.84  2.93  2.93  2.76  2.76  1.85  2.00 
PBT  1.43  1.39  1.43  1.43  1.47  1.39  1.43  1.44  1.51 
TS  1.22  1.23     1.24  31.08  1.25  31.78       
NPSTDUMTS     1.13           1.15  20.09       
TLOSS        1.31              1.34  55.11 
TPD        1.19              1.19  65.24 
TTD        1.28              1.28  38.82 
TFTR        1.16              1.16  26.63 
TUNC        1.10              1.14  50.98 
NED           1.24  1.35  1.23  1.30  1.34  1.52 
IOWN           1.08  1.21  1.09  1.21  1.20  1.56 
CC  2.64  2.51  1.55  2.66  2.66  2.51  2.52  1.55  1.60 
EM  1.18  1.20  1.23  1.19  1.19  1.21  1.22  1.25  1.33 
CAPINT  1.45  1.46  1.62  1.46  1.46  1.46  1.46  1.62  1.64 
LEV  1.36  1.36  1.39  1.42  1.43  1.42  1.43  1.45  1.47 
DIV  1.17  1.20  1.20  1.17  1.17  1.20  1.21  1.20  1.24  
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Table 7.16...continue 
Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) 
  (I) 
Firm Value 
and Tax 
Planning: 
Persistent 
Profit-
Making 
Companies 
(Column I 
of Table 
7.8) 
(II) 
Firm Value 
and Tax 
Planning: 
Persistent 
and Non-
Persistent 
Profit-
Making 
Companies 
(Column II 
of Table 
7.8) 
(III) 
Firm Value 
and 
Components 
of Tax 
Saving: 
Persistent 
Profit-
Making 
Companies 
(Column III 
of Table 7.8) 
(IV) 
Firm Value, 
Tax Planning 
and 
Corporate 
Governance: 
Persistent 
Profit-
Making 
Companies 
(Column I of 
Table 7.10) 
(V) 
Firm Value, 
Tax Planning 
and 
Corporate 
Governance: 
Persistent 
Profit-
Making 
Companies 
(Column II 
of Table 
7.10) 
(VI) 
Firm Value, 
Tax Planning 
and 
Corporate 
Governance: 
Persistent 
and Non-
Persistent 
Profit-
Making 
Companies 
(Column III 
of Table 
7.10) 
(VII) 
Firm Value, 
Tax Planning 
and 
Corporate 
Governance: 
Persistent 
and Non-
Persistent 
Profit-
Making 
Companies 
(Column IV 
of Table 
7.10) 
(VIII) 
Firm Value, 
Components 
of Tax Saving 
and 
Corporate 
Governance: 
Persistent 
Profit-
Making 
Companies 
(Column I of 
Table 7.11) 
(IX) 
Firm Value, 
Components 
of Tax Saving 
and 
Corporate 
Governance: 
Persistent 
Profit-
Making 
Companies 
(Column II of 
Table 7.11) 
FS  1.21  1.23  1.21  1.27  1.29  1.29  1.31  1.27  1.32 
TS_NED              27.26     27.02       
TS_IOWN              4.38     4.72       
NPSTDUMTS_NED                    21.53       
NPSTDUMTS_IOWN                    2.65       
TLOSS_NED           -              52.61 
TLOSS_IOWN                          7.88 
TPD_NED                 -        50.93 
TPD_IOWN                 -        7.68 
TTD_NED                 -        37.23 
TTD_IOWN              -  -        11.73 
TFTR_NED                    -     27.99 
TFTR_IOWN                    -     9.06 
TUNC_NED                       -  45.27 
TUNC_IOWN                          4.83 
n  444  472  405  444  444  472  472  405  405  
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Table 7.17 
Condition Indices and Variance–Decomposition Proportions 
* indicates variance decomposition proportion. 
  (I) 
Firm 
Value and 
Tax 
Planning: 
Persistent 
Profit-
Making 
Companies 
(Column I 
of Table 
7.8) 
(II) 
Firm 
Value and 
Tax 
Planning: 
Persistent 
and Non-
Persistent 
Profit-
Making 
Companies 
(Column 
II of Table 
7.8) 
(III) 
Firm Value, 
and 
Components 
of Tax 
Saving: 
Persistent 
Profit-
Making 
Companies 
(Column III 
of Table 7.8) 
(IV) 
Firm Value, 
Tax 
Planning 
and 
Corporate 
Governance: 
Persistent 
Profit-
Making 
Companies 
(Column I 
of Table 
7.10) 
(V) 
Firm Value, 
Tax 
Planning 
and 
Corporate 
Governance: 
Persistent 
Profit-
Making 
Companies 
(Column II 
of Table 
7.10) 
(VI) 
Firm Value, 
Tax 
Planning 
and 
Corporate 
Governance: 
Persistent 
and Non-
Persistent 
Profit-
Making 
Companies 
(Column III 
of Table 
7.10) 
(VII) 
Firm Value, 
Tax 
Planning 
and 
Corporate 
Governance: 
Persistent 
and Non-
Persistent 
Profit-
Making 
Companies 
(Column IV 
of Table 
7.10) 
(VIII) 
Firm Value, 
Components 
of Tax 
Saving and 
Corporate 
Governance: 
Persistent 
Profit-
Making 
Companies 
(Column I 
of Table 
7.11) 
(IX) 
Firm Value, 
Components 
of Tax 
Saving and 
Corporate 
Governance: 
Persistent 
Profit-
Making 
Companies 
(Column II 
of Table 
7.11) 
Highest condition  index  20.42  20.10  23.62  26.56  25.78  28.58  26.91  28.84  35.66 
Number of condition 
index that is equal to or 
higher than  30 
                        2 
Variables in which the  
condition index is equal 
to or higher than  30 and 
the variance 
decomposition proportion 
is equal to or higher than 
0.5 
  
 
         -     -      TLOSS  
0.54* 
 TPD 
0.75* 
TLOSS_NED 
0.55* 
TPD_NED 
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7.5 Further Tests 
 
Further analysis to assess the robustness of the results is also conducted. The 
analysis is related to market value measurement date, choice of deflator, firm 
fixed effect, non linearity of tax saving and autocorrelation. In order to assess the 
sensitivity of the results to the definition of the dependent variable, an alternative 
measure  of  firm  value,  Tobin’s  Q,  utilised  by  previous  researchers  including 
Desai and Dharmapala (2009), is used. To test for possibility of simultaneity, the 
estimation models are further tested for endogeneity.  In addition, the results on 
the  components  of  tax  saving  are  also  tested  to  assess  the  sensitivity  upon 
reclassification of unclassified reconciliation items.  To test the potential effects 
of tax planning related factors in the tax planning measure, further tests based on 
exclusions of the tax planning related factors are also conducted. Furthermore, to 
provide a better picture of the association between firm value and tax saving over 
time,  annual  regressions  are  carried  out.    Except  the  model  that  tests  the 
relationship  between  firm  value,  components  of  tax  saving  and  corporate 
governance  of  persistent  profit making  companies  with  interaction  variables, 
these further tests are analysed only on the main models (i.e. the models of the 
hypothesis  testing)  since  the  models  exhibit  reduced  possibility  of 
multicollinearity. As there is a significant multicollinearity within the interaction 
variables (TPD_NED and TLOSS_NED) further tests are also conducted only on 
this  model  to  control  for  any  possibility  of  multicollinearity  issues  in  the 
robustness analyses. The tabulated results are as in Appendix B. 
 
7.5.1 Market Value Measurement Date 
 
In  addition  to  the  above  market  value  measure,  previous  value  relevance 
literature also uses market value after six months of the year end (Rees, 1997; 
Stark  and  Thomas,  1998;  O'Hanlon  and  Pope,  1999;  Hughes,  2008).  This 
alternative market value measurement date is basically intended to reflect more 
available  information  to  the  shareholders  across  time.  Therefore,  to  test  any 
effect of this measure on the initial results, the models are re estimated using 
market value of equity after six months of the year end as the dependent variable. Chapter 7 Analyses and Findings                                                                       224 
 
 
The results are reported in Table B.18 and Table B.19 in Appendix B. The results 
can  be  concluded  as  consistent  and  robust,  as  the  coefficient  estimate  of  tax 
saving variable (TS) is also found significant and negatively related with the firm 
value. However, the interaction variable between non persistent dummy and tax 
saving (NPSTDUMTS) is no longer significantly related with firm value. This 
could  imply  that  the  increase  in  available  information  on  companies  for 
shareholders’  scrutiny  increases  shareholders’  confidence  level  on  the  tax 
planning activity of non persistent companies.  In terms of components of tax 
saving, the results reported are identical to the initial results. Similarly, in terms 
of components of tax saving and corporate governance with interaction variables, 
the  results  are  identical  to  the  initial  results.  Therefore,  the  results  on  the 
significant  relationship  between  firm  value  and  permanent  differences  can  be 
inferred  as  consistent  and  robust  upon  use  of  the  alternative  firm  value 
measurement date. 
 
7.5.2 Choice of Deflator  
 
In examining whether the results are sensitive to the choice of deflators, number 
of  shares,  opening  market  value  of  equity  and  sales  are  used  as  alternative 
deflators in the further tests. The findings of these deflators based on persistent 
profit making  companies  are  presented  in  Table  B.20  and  Table  B.21  in 
Appendix B.  
 
Overall,  it  can  be  concluded  that  the  results  of  firm  value  and  tax  planning 
relationship are identical upon the use of opening book value of equity, opening 
market value and sales as deflators but not in the case of number of shares, of 
which  the  coefficient  estimate  of  tax  saving  is  no  longer  significant.  These 
inconsistent  results  support  Akbar  and  Stark’s  (2003)  argument  on  the 
implications  of  different  deflators  for  contradictory  results  of  the  previous 
literature.  These results may also be related to the different nature of relationship 
between  the  deflators  and  the  “economic  phenomena”  in  which  number  of 
shares, as compared to the other deflators, are claimed as having a low potential 
to be linked to the economic interest (Barth and Clinch, 2009). Similar results are 
also  observed  in  testing  the  sensitivity  of  the  choice  of  deflator  on  the Chapter 7 Analyses and Findings                                                                       225 
 
 
relationship  between  firm  value,  tax  planning  and  corporate  governance  of 
persistent profit making companies.  
 
Similar results are also found in the case of the relationship based on combined 
persistent and non persistent profit making companies. The significance of the 
tax saving variable (TS) is identical depending upon the choice of the deflators 
except number of shares. In the case of non persistent profit making companies, 
the initial relationship between firm value and the interactive variable between 
tax saving and non persistent profit making companies dummy (NPSTDUMTS) 
is  similar  except  for  sales,  where  the  coefficient  estimate  of  the  interaction 
variable (NPSTDUMTS) is no longer significant. Similar results occur in testing 
the relationship between firm value, tax planning and corporate governance. 
 
In terms of components of tax saving for persistent profit making companies, the 
results reported in Table B.24 and Table B.25 in Appendix B can be concluded 
as sensitive to the choice of deflator. Compared to the initial results of both tests 
that utilised opening book value of equity as the deflator, the results that use the 
number  of  shares  as  the  deflator  show  permanent  differences  as  no  longer 
significant and foreign tax rates differentials as positively related with firm value. 
When the opening market value is used as the deflator, none of the components 
are reported as significantly related with firm value. The initial results are also 
found  to  be  sensitive  when  sales  are  used  as  the.  These  results  indicate  a 
significant positive relationship between firm value and temporary differences, 
both with and without corporate governance variables.  
 
For  components  of  tax  saving  of  persistent  profit making  companies  and 
corporate  governance  with  interaction  variables,  the  results  reported  in  Table 
B.26  in  Appendix  B  can  be  concluded  as  sensitive  to  the  choice  of  deflator. 
Compared to the initial results of that utilised opening book value of equity as the 
deflator, the initial result on TLOSS is found to be consistent when number of 
shares is used as the deflator. Result on TTD, however, is found to be significant 
and positively related with firm value. The results of the model that uses sales as 
the deflator show that TLOSS, TLOSS_IOWN and TUNC_IOWN as no longer Chapter 7 Analyses and Findings                                                                       226 
 
 
significant and TLOSS_NED as negatively related with firm value. When the 
opening market value is used as the deflator, the relationships between firm value 
and  TLOSS  and  TLOSS_IOWN  are  consistent  with  the  initial  results,  i.e. 
significant and positively correlated for TLOSS, and significant and negatively 
correlated for TLOSS_IOWN. However, TFTR_IOWN and TUNC_IOWN are 
reported as no longer significantly related with firm value. Overall, the analyses 
indicate that the results are sensitive upon the choice of deflator. As discussed 
above, these findings support Akbar and Stark’s (2003) argument on sensitivity 
of  research  findings  due  to  different  deflator  choice.  Due  to  inconclusive 
evidence of the appropriate choice of deflator (Liu and Stark, 2009), as discussed 
in Chapter 6, to be consistent with most relevant previous U.K. literature, the 
main results are discussed based on opening book value of equity as the deflator. 
 
7.5.3 Firm Fixed-Effect  
 
The  initial  results  are  reported  based  on  random effect  estimation.  This 
estimation is appropriate as this study intends to generalise the findings from the 
sample to its population (Kennedy, 2003). However, to assess the sensitivity of 
the results upon fixed effect estimations, the main models are further tested for 
firm fixed effect to control for heterogeneity in firm characteristics. The findings 
of the fixed effect estimations provide explanation about cross sectional effects 
of the initial reported results. The findings of the fixed effects estimated models 
are reported in Table B.27 and Table B.28 in Appendix B.  
 
The  results  of  the  relationships  between  firm  value  and  tax  planning,  and 
between  firm  value  and  components  of  tax  saving,  both  with  and  without 
corporate governance, indicate that the initial multivariate results are robust and 
qualitatively not different from the random effects estimated models. However, 
the significant negative coefficient estimate of tax saving of non persistent profit 
making  companies  (NPSTDUMTS)  is  no  longer  applicable  using  the  fixed 
effects option. Similarly, in terms of components of tax saving with interaction 
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firm value. Therefore, it can be concluded that the initial results of the interactive 
variables are sensitive upon the specification of the estimation model. 
 
7.5.4 Non-Linearity of Tax Saving  
 
As managers’ “aggressiveness” in tax planning is perceived as reflecting “high” 
moral  hazard  risk  (Hanlon  and  Slemrod,  2009),  negative  shareholders’  tax 
planning valuation may increase non linearly at  “higher levels” of tax planning. 
This  relationship  is  likely  to  occur  as  “high”  extent  of  tax  saving  reflects 
managers’ “aggressiveness” in tax planning (Hanlon and Slemrod, 2009), which 
may  be  subsequently  captured  by  shareholders  in  the  tax  planning  valuation. 
Considering this possibility, the non linear relationship between firm value and 
tax planning is tested with the inclusion of quadratic tax saving variable that is 
defined  as  tax  saving squared.  Due  to  the  limited  amount  of  literature  that 
investigates this non linear relationship, the sign of the relationship is difficult to 
predict. The initial reported results remain the same, in which the hierarchical 
regression  results  report  insignificant  quadratic  tax  saving  variable  with 
insignificant incremental F tests. Specifically, based on persistent profit making 
companies, the change in R squared is reported as at 0.0006 with the p value of 
0.5892.  Similar  results  are  also  reported  for  combined  persistent  and  non 
persistent profit making companies where the change in R squared is at 0.0033 
with the p value of 0.1772. 
 
7.5.5 Autocorrelation  
 
The  company year  observations  employed  in  this  study  potentially  exhibit 
autocorrelation as the panel dataset involves repeated observations on the same 
cross section  (Wooldridge,  2002).  Thus,  an  autocorrelation  test  (Wooldridge, 
2002)  is  conducted  to  determine  any  potential  first order  time series 
autocorrelation problem. The results indicate no significant autocorrelation exists 
in any of the models. Specifically, based on persistent profit making companies, 
the F statistics of the tests are 0.1390 (p value of 0.7102) and 0.0090 (p value of 
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and tax planning, and between firm value, tax planning and corporate governance 
respectively. Similar results are also reported for combined persistent and non 
persistent profit making companies where the reported F statistic is 0.1410 with 
p value of 0.7073 for the model that tests the relationship between firm value and 
tax  planning  and  0.0017  with  p  value  of  0.8964  for the  model  that  tests  the 
moderating  effect  of  corporate  governance.  In  terms  of  components  of  tax 
saving, the F statistic is also not significant for both models, with and without 
corporate governance variables, i.e. F statistics of 0.4640 (p value of 0.4968) and 
0.2320 (p value of 0.6307) respectively. Similarly, for the components of tax 
saving and corporate governance with interaction variables, the F statistic is also 
not significant, i.e. F statistics of 0.1670 (p value of 0.6837). 
 
7.5.6 Alternative Market Value Measure 
 
An alternative measure of market value has been used in some of the previous 
literature in testing the  relationship between firm value and tax planning,  for 
example, Desai and Dharmapala (2009). To test the relationship between Tobin’s 
Q  and  tax  planning,  following  Desai  and  Dharmapala  (2009),  Tobin’s  Q  is 
computed by deflating the amount of book value of assets plus market value of 
common stock minus book value of common stock minus deferred tax expense 
with book value of assets. The exclusion of deferred tax in Tobin’s Q measure is 
to control the temporary effects of tax planning (Desai and Dharmapala, 2009). 
The estimation models are then adjusted to exclude book value of equity as it has 
been  included  in  the  Tobin’s  Q.  Consequently,  to  be  consistent  with  the 
denominator  in  computing  Tobin’s  Q,  the  continuous  independent  variables 
(PBT, TS, TLOSS, TPD, TTD, TFTR, TUNC, CC and EM) are also deflated by 
book value of assets.  The results are reported in Table B.29 and Table B.30 in 
Appendix B.  
 
The results indicate qualitative identical coefficient estimates of tax saving (TS) 
with the initial results. These results are in contrast to Desai and Dharmapala’s 
(2009) findings, which found an insignificant relationship between firm value 
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companies, however, the interaction variable between non persistent dummy and 
tax saving (NPSTDUMTS) is no longer significantly related with firm value.  
 
In terms of components of tax saving of persistent profit making companies, the 
initial results are sensitive to the changing of the dependent variable to Tobin’s 
Q. Contrary to the initial results, no significant relationship exists between firm 
value and any of the components of tax saving. Similar results are also applicable 
for  components  of  tax  saving  and  corporate  governance  with  interaction 
variables, in which results show that the relationships between firm value and 
TLOSS, TLOSS_IOWN and TUNC_IOWN in the initial results are no longer 
significant.  Therefore,  it  can  be  concluded  that  the  relationship  between  firm 
value and components of tax saving is sensitive upon the changing of market 
value  measure  to  Tobin’s  Q.  In  addition,  the  R squared  of  all  models  are 
relatively lower than the models that measure firm value using market value of 
equity. This could be due to difficulties in measuring Tobin’s Q to reflect firm 
value, as discussed in Chapter 4 (Section 4.1.3).  
  
7.5.7 Potential Effects of Tax Planning-Related Factors 
  
In  estimating  the  relationship  between  firm  value  and  tax  planning,  capital 
intensity  (CAPINT),  leverage  (LEV)  and  extent  of  foreign  sales  (FS)  are 
included in the estimation models to control for potential effects of tax related 
factors. Each of these relates to areas where tax planning could be present. As a 
consequence, the tax planning variable may in effect be capturing tax planning in 
other  non defined  areas  which,  because  of  their  relative  lack  of  transparency 
compared  to  capital  structure  for  example,  may  be  valued  negatively  by 
shareholders.      To  investigate  whether  the  initial results  of  the  tax  planning 
related  variables,  TS,  NPSTDUMTS,  TLOSS,  TPD,  TTD  and  TFTR  are 
capturing the potential effects of tax planning related factors, the models are re 
estimated with the exclusion of LEV, CAPINT and FS. The results are reported 
in Table B.31 to Table 7.34 in Appendix B.  
 
All results of all models except the model that tests the relationship between 
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with the initial results  suggesting that the omitted variables (LEV, CAPINT and 
FS) have no effect on tax saving (TS) and tax saving by non persistent profit 
making  companies  (NPSTDUMTS). The results also suggest that the  omitted 
variables (LEV, CAPINT and FS) have an effect on TPD in which shareholders 
assume  that  TPD  is  explained  by  the  tax  planning related  factors,  i.e.  LEV, 
CAPINT and FS. 
 
7.5.8 Endogeneity 
 
Endogeneity  occurs  when  a  variable  in  the  estimation  model  is  explained  by 
other variable(s) that is(are) not considered in the model. It is an important issue 
in  econometrics  as  it  could  result  in  violation  of  zero conditional mean 
assumption of linear regression model (Baum, 2006). To address the concern of 
the potential of endogeneity of tax planning variable, a lag tax saving variable is 
considered as an instrumental variable (Larcker and Rusticus, 2007; Loretz and 
Moore, 2009). The lag variable satisfies the assumption under a simultaneous 
system in which it is an exogenous variable that explains tax planning but not 
firm  value.  This  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  the  previous  level  of  tax 
planning may influence the extent of current tax planning activities but not the 
current market value of the firm. This is due to the short run nature of a year tax 
saving  and  the  implication  of  specific  economic  events  in  each  year  on  that 
respective year’s tax saving (Dyreng et al., 2008; Minnick and Noga, 2009). 
 
To  test  this  assumption,  the  initial  model  is  re estimated  using  instrumental 
variable  estimation  (i.e.  2SLS  of  which  lag  tax  planning  is  utilised  as  the 
instrument variable of the tax planning variable (TS)). The results of the 2SLS 
are as reported in Table B.35 in Appendix B. Based on Durbin Wu Hausman 
tests  for  endogeneity  (Baum,  2006),  the  results  reject  the  endogeneity  of  tax 
planning variable (chi squared value of 14.92 with p value of 0.5304). Therefore, 
it can be concluded that the current level of tax planning is exogenous of its lag. 
 
 
 Chapter 7 Analyses and Findings                                                                       231 
 
 
7.5.9 Reclassification of Unclassified Reconciliation Items 
 
In  testing  the  sensitivity  of  the  relationship  between  firm  value  and  the 
components of tax saving to the classification of unclassified items (TUNC), two 
separate tests are conducted. This is based on the possibility that the shareholders 
may perceive the TUNC as either permanent differences (TPD) or temporary 
differences (TTD). The first test is related to reclassification of TUNC as TPD 
and the second is related to the reclassification of TUNC as TTD. The results are 
reported in Table B.36 and Table B.37 in Appendix B. Overall, the results are 
consistent with initial regression results that indicate a significant relationship 
between firm value and TPD. This suggests that the coefficient estimates of the 
components are robust  upon the reclassification of the unclassified items, i.e. 
either unclassified items (TUNC) are treated as permanent differences (TPD) or 
temporary differences (TTD), or are ignored for valuation purposes. However, in 
terms of components of tax saving and corporate governance with interaction 
variables, TTDUNC_IOWN is found to be not consistent with the initial results 
of  TTD_IOWN,  i.e.  when  TUNC  is  reclassified  as  TTD,  in  which  the 
relationship appears to be negatively significant compared to the initial result that 
indicates  insignificant  relationship  of  TTD_IOWN.  This  suggests  different 
shareholders’  valuation  on  the  structure  of  corporate  governance,  particularly 
IOWN, when the TUNC is categorised as TTD.  
 
7.5.10 Annual Regressions and Year Dummies 
 
To  investigate  the  stability  of  the  reported  results  over  time,  the  models  are 
estimated over three annual regressions, 2005, 2006 and 2007. This process is 
appropriate compared to other alternatives, for example averaging the variables 
(Chen et al., 2010), as this test is intended to provide further understanding on 
shareholders’ tax planning valuation instead of mitigating statistical concerns of 
time series  effect.  The  results  are  reported  in  Table  B.38  to  Table  B.44  in 
Appendix B.  
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The initial panel results based on persistent profit making companies for both 
with and without corporate governance hold for both 2005 and 2006 but, in 2007, 
no significant relationship is found. In terms of combined persistent and non 
persistent profit making companies, for the relationship between firm value and 
tax  planning,  the  negative  coefficient  estimate  of  the  interactive  variable 
(NPSTDUMTS) of the panel regression remains throughout the years. However, 
the tax saving variable (TS) is only significant in 2006 and this is also applicable 
for the estimation model that tests the effect of corporate governance. But the 
interactive  variable  between  non persistent  profit companies  and  tax  saving 
(NPSTDUMTS) is only significant in 2006.  
 
In investigating the annual relationship between firm value and the components 
of tax saving of persistent profit making companies, the initial panel regressions 
results  on  the  negative  relationship  between  firm  value  and  permanent 
differences  (TPD)  is  applicable  in  2005  and  2006.  In  2007,  the  relationship 
becomes  positive.  In  addition,  the  results  indicate  a  consistent  positive 
relationship between firm value and temporary differences (TTD) throughout the 
three years. The coefficient estimates of foreign tax rates differentials (TFTR) are 
also  found  to  be  positive  and  significant  but  only  in  2005  and  2007.  In 
considering  the  moderating  influence  of  corporate  governance,  similarly,  the 
results  show  a  negative  relationship  between  firm  value  and  permanent 
differences (TPD) in 2005 and 2006, and a positive relationship in 2007. The 
results  also  indicate  positive  relationships  between  firm  value  and  temporary 
differences (TTD) in 2006 and 2007. The coefficient estimates of foreign tax 
rates  differentials  (TFTR)  are  found  to  be  identical  with  the  previous  annual 
results.  
 
In terms of annual relationship between firm value, components of tax saving 
and  corporate  governance  with  interaction  variables  (persistent  profit making 
companies),  the  initial  panel  regressions  results  on  the  positive  relationship 
between firm value and TLOSS is applicable throughout the period. In addition, 
the  results  indicate  a  consistent  negative  relationship  between  firm  value  and 
TLOSS_IOWN in 2006 and 2007. In 2005, the relationship between firm value 
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observed between firm value and TFTR_IOWN and TUNC_IOWN in which the 
initial negative relationships are only applicable in 2005.  
 
These imply that the results of the research relating to firm value, tax planning 
and corporate governance should be interpreted with consideration of the time 
variation effect. This suggests that the market valuation on tax planning varies 
across the years, perhaps because of small sample sizes for each of the years 
(O'Hanlon and Taylor, 2007). An investigation by year of descriptive statistics 
for the tax planning variables does not reveal any differences between 2007 and 
the earlier years. The difference in results could be due to variations of economic 
conditions during the sample period. During the economic recession starting in 
2007,  the  focus  of  attention  of  shareholders’ tax  planning  valuation may  be 
diverted from agency risk of tax planning to maintaining or increasing after tax 
return. Therefore, during the economic downturn, shareholders may increasingly 
value the permanent differences as it shows the managers’ ability to minimise the 
tax  expense  effectively  and  in  turn  increases  the  permanent  tax  saving 
particularly during the "tough" economic times.   
 
To  further  investigate  this  issue,  following  O'Hanlon  and  Taylor  (2007),  the 
initial models are re estimated with the inclusion of year (intercept) dummies to 
allow variations in the intercept across the three years (2005 – 2007).
71 This is to 
capture yearly fluctuations of shareholders’ tax planning valuation. The results 
are reported in Table B.45 and Table B.46 in Appendix B. Based on the results, it 
can be concluded that the results with inclusions of year dummies are identical to 
the  initial  results  where  the  results  remain  the  same  for  tax  saving  (TS), 
interaction  variable  between  tax  planning  and  non persistent  profit making 
dummy  (NPSTDUMTS),  permanent  differences  (TPD),  temporary  differences 
(TTD),  foreign  tax  rates  differential  (TFTR)  and  tax  losses  (TLOSS).  This 
suggests that the initial results on the relationship between firm value and tax 
planning  has  captured  the  variations  of  shareholders’  tax  planning  valuation 
across the years. However, the results on the relationship between firm value, tax 
                                                 
71 Three year dummy variables were generated. Each of the variables respectively represents 
2005, 2006 and 2007 and the variables are coded as “1” if the year is equal to the respective year 
(2005, 2006 and 2007).  During the analyses, the dummy variable for 2007 is omitted by the 
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planning  and  corporate  governance  with  interaction  variables  are  inconsistent 
with  the  initial  results  in  which  TLOSS  and  TFTR_IOWN  are  no  longer 
significantly related with firm value. This confirms the variations of implication 
of corporate governance structure in shareholders’ tax planning valuation across 
years. 
 
7.6 Conclusions 
 
This chapter presents and discusses the results derived from the analyses. This 
chapter begins explanations on outliers and influential observations. In order to 
provide an understanding about the characteristics of the sample, this chapter 
proceeds  with  an  explanation  of  the  descriptive  statistics.  Subsequently,  this 
chapter continues with two sub sections of multivariate results that respectively 
present the results from the analysis of the relationship between firm value and 
tax planning, and between firm value, tax planning and corporate governance. 
The  following  section  of  this  chapter  discusses  the  multicollinearity  and 
heteroscedasticity  tests.  In  considering  the  sensitivity  of  the  results  towards 
alternative  measures  of  dependent  variable,  choice  of  deflator,  fixed effect 
specification, non linearity of tax saving, autocorrelation, potential effects of tax 
planning related  factors,  endogeneity  and  reclassification  of  unclassified 
reconciliation  items,  the  next  section  discussed  the  robustness  of  the  initial 
results based on the results derived from the further tests. In addition, the section 
also provides the results from annual regressions to discuss the variation in the 
initial reported results over time.   
 
In summary, the findings of this study provide insights about the significance of 
tax  planning  activities  from  shareholders’  point  of  view.  Specifically, 
shareholders  are  found  to  negatively  value  tax  planning  activities  both  for 
persistent and non persistent profit making companies. These indicate that tax 
planning is not perceived as a source of shareholders’ wealth creation. These 
results could be due to the perception that tax planning is an activity that entails 
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negative relationship (persistent profit making companies) is further found to be 
significantly  related  to  the  permanent  differences  component  of  tax  saving 
(TPD). In terms of the nature of shareholders’ valuation of different components 
of  tax  saving  of  persistent  profit making  companies,  the  hypothesis  testing 
indicates that the valuation effect between permanent differences (TPD) and the 
other  three  components  (temporary  differences  (TTD),  foreign  tax  rates 
differentials  (TFTR)  and  NOLs  (TLOSS))  are  different  from  each  other 
suggesting  different  perceived  benefits  and  risks  between  TPD  and  the  other 
components. The three components (TTD, TFTR and TLOSS), however, are not 
significantly different (at five per cent level) from one another, indicating no 
differing shareholders’ valuation effect between these components.  
 
Investigating the implication of corporate governance on the above firm value 
tax  planning  relationships  yields  higher  negative  tax  planning  coefficient 
estimates than the initial results (without corporate governance). Although this 
shows  that,  with  corporate  governance,  shareholders  appear  to  value  the  tax 
planning  even  more  negatively,  the  coefficient  estimates  of  the  tax  planning 
related  variables  (TS,  NPSTDUMTS,  TPD,  TTD,  TFTR,  TLOSS)  are  not 
significantly  different  from  the  respective  coefficients  in  the  initial  results 
(without corporate governance). These results, hence, fail to support Henderson 
Global Investors’ (2005) and Desai and Dharmapala’s (2009) suggestion on the 
importance of corporate governance effectiveness to shareholders, particularly in 
addressing their concern about managerial opportunism in tax planning.  The  
negative coefficient estimates support Hanlon and Slemrod’s (2009) argument on 
shareholders’ doubts about managers’ role in increasing the shareholders’ wealth.  
 
In testing the sensitivity of the results towards the alternative measures of firm 
value, the initial results of the main models of the relationship between firm 
value and both tax saving and permanent differences variables are robust when 
the firm value is measured as at six months after the year end. However, the 
relationship between firm value and tax planning by non persistent profit making 
companies (NPSTDUMTS) is found to be sensitive towards the changing of the 
measurement.  Specifically,  NPSTDUMTS  is  no  longer  significant  when  firm 
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observed when the firm value is measured using Tobin’s Q. In terms of different 
choices of deflators, the results based on persistent profit making companies are 
qualitatively identical with the initial multivariate results when the continuous 
variables  are  scaled  with  opening  market  value  and  sales.  However,  the 
significant coefficient estimate of tax planning is found to be no longer available 
when the variables are scaled with number of shares. In the case of tax planning 
by non persistent profit making companies, the initial result of the interactive 
variable is found to be identical with the results when the variables are deflated 
with number of shares and opening market value but not sales. In assessing the 
sensitivity of the results for components of tax saving of persistent profit making 
companies,  the  results  can  be  concluded  as  being  sensitive  to  the  choice  of 
deflators.  
 
In addition to the above tests, the results are also tested for robustness of the 
model  specification  using  fixed effect  estimators.  The  results  from  the  fixed 
effect estimation can be concluded as qualitatively similar with the random effect 
estimation except for the result on tax planning by non persistent profit making 
companies, which is found to be no longer significant. In addressing the concern 
about  the  possibility  of  non linearity  of  tax  saving,  autocorrelation  and 
endogeneity  issues,  F tests,  Wooldridge  test  and  2SLS  are  respectively 
conducted. The findings reveal that there is a low possibility of these issues to 
occur as the statistical tests values are not significant at normal level in all cases.  
 
To address the potential for differing valuation effects on the categorisation of 
the  unclassified  tax  reconciliation  items,  further  tests  are  conducted  by 
reclassifying the unclassified items (TUNC), firstly as permanent differences and 
secondly as temporary differences. Both tests indicate that the initial results of 
the main models of the relationship between firm value and components of tax 
saving  of  persistent  profit making  companies  are  robust  towards  the 
reclassification of the unclassified items. Considering the variations of the tested 
relationships over time, annual regressions are conducted. The results show that 
there is a time variation effect on the relationships, suggesting that the panel 
regressions results vary over time. Although the results of the various models are 
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providing strong support towards the hypotheses, as they support hypotheses H1a, 
H1b and H2a.  
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Chapter 8 
 
 
Summary, Contributions and 
Recommendations 
 
This study has been carried out to investigate the relationship between firm value 
and tax planning whilst simultaneously considering the moderating influence of 
corporate governance. It provides empirical evidence that strongly supports the 
hypotheses  related  to  shareholders’  tax  planning  valuation.  However,  the 
evidence  does  not  support  the  argument  on  the  importance  of  corporate 
governance practice to that valuation.  In summarising this study, this chapter 
focuses on discussions of the findings, contributions and limitations of this study, 
and  recommendations  for  future  research.  The  chapter  begins  with  a  brief 
overview of this study and is followed by a summary of the hypotheses. The 
chapter  consequently  proceeds  with  the  results  of  the  hypotheses  testing.  In 
highlighting the contributions of this study, the subsequent section focuses on 
three aspects of the contributions: firstly, methodological, secondly, theoretical 
and finally, practical. To explain the limitations in generalising the findings, the 
next section discusses the limitations and in turn provides suggestions for future 
research. Chapter 8 Summary, Contributions and Recommendations                              239 
 
 
 8.1 Overview of the Study 
 
The literature review in Chapter 2 highlights reasons and objectives for managers 
to conduct tax planning activities. Basically, the main aim of the tax planning 
activities is to increase the after tax return if managers are acting in shareholders’ 
interests.  This  is  after  considering  the  potential  benefits  and  costs  of  the 
activities.  However,  the  activities  are  not  only  influenced  by  the  perceived 
benefits or risks, but also depend on several other factors including corporate 
governance.  The  literature  review  in  Chapter  3  suggests  the  importance  of 
corporate governance in limiting the owners managers conflict. This conflict, in 
tax planning, is more about managerial opportunism in pursuing the tax planning 
activities. This moral hazard issue is caused by the information asymmetry of tax 
planning activities between the shareholders and the managers. Consequently, as 
highlighted  by  the  literature  review  in  Chapter  4,  although  tax  planning  can 
increase the shareholders’ wealth, shareholders might negatively value the tax 
planning  activities.  Therefore,  corporate  governance  practice  is  expected  to 
increase  shareholders’  confidence  in  managers  in  conducting  tax  planning 
activities.  However,  as  discussed  in  Chapter  4,  some  research  has  found  that 
good corporate governance conduct is not necessarily viewed by shareholders as 
an effective mechanism for ensuring that the managers are carrying out the tax 
planning so as to increase shareholders’ wealth  (Hanlon and Slemrod, 2009). 
This is due to shareholders’ doubts about managers’ interests in conducting tax 
planning and is also related to ex post prior year valuation effects. Hanlon and 
Slemrod (2009) discuss  shareholders’ doubts as related to the perception that a 
management which is aggressive with respect to taxation may also be aggressive 
with respect to its dealings with shareholders. In terms of ex post rationalisation 
on the negative shareholders’ tax planning valuation, Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) 
explain that the relationship shows the market’s confirmation of suspicions of 
poor  corporate  governance  that  were  previously  not  impounded  in  the 
shareholders’ valuation. 
 
This  study,  therefore,  firstly  attempts  to  investigate  the  relationship  between 
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that  corporate  governance  could  influence  shareholders’  perception  on  tax 
planning, this study further investigates whether corporate governance moderates 
the above mentioned relationship. As there are arguments on companies’ ability 
to pursue effective tax planning based on earning persistency, in which persistent 
profit making  companies  are  argued  as  having  more  incentives  to  conduct 
effective tax planning compared to their non persistent counterparts (Mills et al., 
1998), the relationships are investigated based on two categories of companies: 
firstly,  persistent profit  making  companies  and  secondly,  combined  persistent 
and  non persistent  profit making  companies.  To  investigate  the  nature  of  the 
relationships based on components of tax saving, this study tests the relationship 
between  firm  value  and  the  individual  components  of  tax  saving,  and 
subsequently  examines  whether  the  relationship  is  moderated  by  corporate 
governance. The summary of the findings will be discussed in turn. 
 
8.2 Summary of the Hypotheses, Findings and 
Discussions 
 
This section summarises the hypotheses that have been developed in Chapter 5 
and  the  findings  that  have  been  derived  from  the  methodology  described  in 
Chapter 6. In addition to answering the research questions addressed in Chapter 
1, this section discusses the findings that have been detailed in Chapter 7. 
 
8.2.1 Hypotheses 
 
The hypotheses in Chapter 5 are developed based on two parts: firstly, on the 
relationship  between  firm  value  and  tax  planning  and  secondly,  on  the 
moderating implication of corporate governance on the firm value tax planning 
relationship.  As  there  is  no  previous  U.K.  literature  on  the  directions  of  the 
relationships,  the  hypotheses  are  developed  without  any  predicted  direction. 
Although there is U.S. literature in the area of this study, the conflicting findings 
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Wilson,  2009)  make  any  new  findings  difficult  to  predict.  The  hypothesised 
variables in each hypothesis testing are shown in Table 8.1. 
 
Table 8.1 
Interested Variables in Hypotheses 
Objective  Hypo-
theses 
Tested 
Variable 
(Abbrevia-
tion) 
Expec-
ted Sign 
Results of 
Hypotheses 
Testing 
 
Results 
Table 
(Chapter 
7) 
To investigate 
the relationship 
between firm 
value and tax 
planning of 
persistent profit 
making 
companies 
 
H1a  Tax saving  
(TS) 
+/   Supported: 
Negative 
relationship 
between 
firm value 
and TS 
 
Column I 
Table 7.5 
 
To investigate 
the relationship 
between firm 
value and tax 
planning of 
non persistent 
profit making 
companies 
 
H1b  Interactive 
variable 
between non 
persistent 
profit making 
companies 
and tax 
saving 
(NPSTDUM
TS) 
 
+/   Supported: 
Negative 
relationship 
between 
firm value 
and 
NPSTDUM
TS 
 
Column II 
Table 7.5 
To investigate 
the relationship 
between firm 
value and 
permanent 
differences of 
persistent profit 
making 
companies 
 
H2a  Permanent 
differences 
(TPD) 
+/   Supported: 
Negative 
relationship 
between 
firm value 
and TPD 
 
Column 
III 
Table 7.5 
To investigate 
the relationship 
between firm 
value and 
temporary 
differences of 
persistent profit 
making 
H2b  Temporary 
differences 
(TTD) 
+/   Not 
Supported 
Column 
III 
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companies 
 
To investigate 
the relationship 
between firm 
value and NOLs 
of persistent 
profit making 
companies 
H2c  NOLs 
(TLOSS) 
+/   Not 
Supported 
Column 
III 
Table 7.5 
To investigate 
the relationship 
between firm 
value and 
foreign tax rates 
differentials of 
persistent profit 
making 
companies 
 
H2d  Foreign tax 
rates 
differentials 
(TFTR) 
+/   Not 
Supported 
Column 
III 
Table 7.5 
To investigate 
the difference of 
detected 
relationship 
between firm 
value and  each 
of the 
components of 
tax saving of 
persistent profit 
making 
companies  
 
H2e  Chi squared 
test on the 
coefficient 
estimates of 
permanent 
differences, 
temporary 
differences, 
NOLs and 
foreign tax 
rates 
differentials 
(Chi squared) 
 
≠0  Not 
Supported: 
The chi 
squared is 
not 
significant 
 
Table 7.6 
To investigate 
the relationship 
between firm 
value and 
permanent 
differences of 
non persistent 
profit making 
companies 
H2f  Interactive 
variable 
between non 
persistent 
profit making 
companies 
and 
permanent 
differences 
(NPSTDUM
_TPD) 
 
+/   Cannot be 
tested due to 
insufficient 
variation of 
observations 
  
To investigate 
the relationship 
between firm 
value and 
temporary 
H2g  Interactive 
variable 
between non 
persistent 
profit making 
+/   Cannot be 
tested due to 
insufficient 
variation of 
observations 
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differences of 
non persistent 
profit making 
companies 
companies 
and 
temporary 
differences 
(NPSTDUM
_TTD) 
 
To investigate 
the relationship 
between firm 
value and NOLs 
of non 
persistent profit 
making 
companies 
 
H2h  Interactive 
variable 
between non 
persistent 
profit making 
companies 
and NOLs 
(NPSTDUM
_TLOSS) 
 
 
 
+/   Cannot be 
tested due to 
insufficient 
variation of 
observations 
  
To investigate 
the relationship 
between firm 
value and 
foreign tax rates 
differentials of 
non persistent 
profit making 
companies 
 
H2i  Interactive 
variable 
between non 
persistent 
profit making 
companies 
and foreign 
tax rates 
differentials 
(NPSTDUM
_TFTR) 
 
+/   Cannot be 
tested due to 
insufficient 
variation of 
observations 
  
To investigate 
the difference of 
detected 
relationship 
between firm 
value and  each 
of the 
components of 
tax saving of 
non persistent 
profit making 
companies  
 
H2j  Chi squared 
test on the 
coefficient 
estimates of 
permanent 
differences, 
temporary 
differences, 
NOLs and 
foreign tax 
rates 
differentials 
(Chi squared)  
 
≠0  Cannot be 
tested due to 
insufficient 
variation of 
observations 
- 
To investigate 
the moderating 
effect of 
corporate 
governance on 
H3a  Tax saving 
(TS) 
+/   Not 
supported 
Column I 
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the relationship 
between firm 
value and tax 
planning of 
persistent profit 
making 
companies 
 
To investigate 
the moderating 
effect of 
corporate 
governance on 
the relationship 
between firm 
value and tax 
planning of 
non persistent 
profit making 
companies 
 
H3b  Interactive 
variable 
between non 
persistent 
profit making 
companies 
and tax 
saving 
(NPSTDUM
TS)  
+/   Not 
supported 
Column 
III 
Table 7.7 
To investigate 
the moderating 
effect of 
corporate 
governance on 
the relationship 
between firm 
value and 
permanent 
differences of 
persistent profit 
making 
companies 
 
H4a  Permanent 
differences 
(TPD) 
+/   Not 
supported 
Column I 
Table 7.8 
To investigate 
the moderating 
effect of 
corporate 
governance on 
the relationship 
between firm 
value and 
temporary 
differences of 
persistent profit 
making 
companies 
 
H4b  Temporary 
differences 
(TTD) 
+/   Not 
supported 
Column I 
Table 7.8 
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the moderating 
effect of 
corporate 
governance on 
the relationship 
between firm 
value and NOLs 
of persistent 
profit making 
companies 
 
(TLOSS)  supported  Table 7.8 
To investigate 
the moderating 
effect of 
corporate 
governance on 
the relationship 
between firm 
value and 
foreign tax rates 
differentials of 
persistent profit 
making 
companies 
 
H4d  Foreign tax 
rates 
differentials 
(TFTR) 
+/   Not 
supported 
Column I 
Table 7.8 
To investigate 
the moderating 
effect of 
corporate 
governance on 
the relationship 
between firm 
value and 
permanent 
differences of 
non persistent 
profit making 
companies 
 
H4e  Interactive 
variable 
between non 
persistent 
profit making 
companies 
and 
permanent 
differences 
(NPSTDUM
_TPD) 
+/   Cannot be 
tested due to 
insufficient 
variation of 
observations 
  
To investigate 
the moderating 
effect of 
corporate 
governance on 
the relationship 
between firm 
value and 
temporary 
differences of 
non persistent 
H4f  Interactive 
variable 
between non 
persistent 
profit making 
companies 
and 
temporary 
differences 
(NPSTDUM
_ 
+/   Cannot be 
tested due to 
insufficient 
variation of 
observations 
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Hypotheses related to components of tax saving of non persistent profit making 
companies,  however,  could  not  be  tested  due  to  lack  of  variations  in  the 
components of tax saving of non persistent profit making companies. Therefore, 
this study does not provide evidence for those particular hypotheses.  
 
The  sample  to  test  the  above mentioned  hypotheses  consists  of  non financial 
publicly traded LSE listed companies. The collected data cover the three year 
period from 2005 until 2007. In testing the relationship between firm value and 
tax  planning,  the  final  sample  of  persistent  profit making  and  combined 
persistent  and  non persistent  profit making  companies  is  444  and  472  firms 
years  respectively.  In  examining  the  relationship  between  firm  value  and 
components  of  tax  saving,  the  final  sample  of  persistent  profit making  and 
combined persistent and non persistent profit making companies is 405 and 455 
profit making 
companies 
 
TTD) 
To investigate 
the moderating 
effect of 
corporate 
governance on 
the relationship 
between firm 
value and NOLs 
of non 
persistent profit 
making 
companies 
 
H4g  Interactive 
variable 
between non 
persistent 
profit making 
companies 
and NOLs 
(NPSTDUM
_ 
TLOSS) 
+/   Cannot be 
tested due to 
insufficient 
variation of 
observations 
  
To investigate 
the moderating 
effect of 
corporate 
governance on 
the relationship 
between firm 
value and 
foreign tax rates 
differentials of 
non persistent 
profit making 
companies 
H4h  Interactive 
variable 
between non 
persistent 
profit making 
companies 
and foreign 
tax rates 
differentials 
(NPSTDUM
_ 
TFTR) 
+/   Cannot be 
tested due to 
insufficient 
variation of 
observations 
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firms years  respectively.  These  panel  datasets  are  as  after  the  exclusions  of 
outliers and influential observations. 
 
8.2.2 Summary of the Findings and Discussions 
 
The  descriptive  statistics  presented  in  Chapter  7  show  an  existence  of  tax 
planning  activities  across  companies  in  the  U.K.  On  average,  the  tax  saving 
within the persistent profit making companies is of 2.89 per cent of the PBT 
while  for  non persistent  profit making  companies,  the  average  negative  tax 
saving is 2.90 per cent. This also indicates general variations in the level of tax 
planning between both samples. In terms of components of tax saving, with scale 
effect  consideration,  the  highest  tax  saving  component  of  persistent  profit 
making companies (in terms of magnitude) is temporary differences, followed by 
(in order) unclassified items, NOLs, foreign tax rates differentials and permanent 
differences while for non persistent profit making companies, the rank from the 
highest to the lowest is as follows: temporary differences, permanent differences, 
NOLs  and  foreign  tax  rates  differentials.  There  is  “zero”  magnitude  of 
unclassified items of non persistent profit making companies during the sample 
period. 
 
The descriptive statistics also reveal companies’ corporate governance structure 
in  the  sense  of  board  size,  proportion  of  non executive  directors,  directors’ 
ownership,  institutional  ownership,  multi directorship  and  executive  directors’ 
compensation. The average number of directors who serve the board for both 
samples  (persistent  profit making  companies  and  non persistent  profit making 
companies)  is  eight  directors.  In  terms  of  board  composition,  the  average 
percentage  of  non executive  directors  to  total  directors  of  persistent  profit 
making companies and non persistent profit making companies is 57 per cent 
and  58  per  cent  respectively.  Directors  who  serve  more  than  one  board  or 
company are described as at 49 per cent for persistent profit making companies 
and 44 per cent for non persistent profit making companies.  The average equity 
ownerships  of  the  directors  of  both  samples  are  at  seven  per  cent  of  total 
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persistent samples is at 34 per cent and 39 per cent respectively. In terms of 
executive  directors’  salary  compensation,  the  companies  averagely  spent 
£987,577  and  £808,229  for  all  executive  directors  of  persistent  and  non 
persistent profit making companies respectively. 
 
8.2.2.1 Firm Value and Tax Planning  
 
Chapter 7 presents the multivariate results of the relationship between firm value 
and  tax  planning  based  on  persistent  profit making  companies,  combined 
persistent  and  non persistent  profit making  companies  and  components  of  tax 
saving of persistent profit making companies. In summary, the results exhibit 
that tax planning by persistent profit making companies is negatively valued by 
the shareholders. This result could be related to shareholders’ concern on moral 
hazard risk in tax planning or other tax planning related risks, for example, the 
risk related to inspection or investigation by the authority (Slemrod, 2005; Desai 
and Dharmapala, 2009; Chen et al., 2010). The risks of being challenged by the 
tax authority is highlighted in the case of Furniss v Dawson (Tiley, 2005) when  
the expected tax saving may be reduced by the authority’s actions in countering 
tax  planning  activities,  for  example  by  implementing  “arm’s  length  price”. 
Therefore,  it  can  be  concluded  that  the  results  support  the  hypothesis  that 
predicts  an  association  between  firm  value  and  the  extent  of  tax  planning 
activities. 
 
A similar relationship is also found between firm value and tax planning by non 
persistent  profit making  companies.  The  results  report  that  the  interactive 
variable that proxies the extent of tax planning activities of non persistent profit 
making  companies  is  negatively  related  with  firm  value.  This  suggests  that 
earning persistency provides indications to shareholders on the managers’ ability 
to  pursue  long run  tax  planning  (Dyreng  et  al.,  2008).  Therefore,  the  results 
support the hypothesis that predicts an association between firm value and the 
extent of tax planning activities of non persistent profit making companies. 
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In addition to the above results, the findings also present negative shareholders’ 
valuation on the permanent differences component of tax saving of persistent 
profit making companies. The results are derived from the multivariate analysis 
that tests the relationship between firm value and the components of tax saving. 
These  results  support  Frank  et  al.’s  (2009)  arguments  on  the  influence  of 
permanent  differences  on  shareholders’  valuation  but  in  a  negative  direction. 
Therefore, the above negative relationship between firm value and tax planning 
can be generally inferred as related to the permanent differences component of 
tax saving. The other components of tax saving, temporary differences, NOLs 
and foreign tax rates differentials, are found as not significantly related with firm 
value, suggesting that these components have a low impact on shareholders’ tax 
planning valuation. These results may be related to “inability” or “inefficiency” 
of  shareholders  in  recognising  the  temporary  tax  planning  components  of 
reported  earnings  (Shane  and  Stock,  2006).  Overall,  the  results  support  the 
hypothesis that predicts an association between firm value and the permanent 
differences component of tax planning activities. The results, however, fail to 
support the hypotheses that predict an association between firm value and the 
other three components of tax saving, which are temporary differences, NOLs 
and foreign tax rates differentials respectively.  
 
In assessing whether the nature of the above relationships, between firm value 
and each of the components of tax saving of persistent profit making companies, 
differs from one another, the chi squared test was conducted. The results indicate 
that  the  coefficient  estimate  of  the  permanent  differences  component  is 
significantly  different  compared  to  the  other  three  components,  temporary 
differences,  foreign  tax  rates  differentials  and  NOLs,  suggesting  that 
shareholders  value  the  permanent  differences  component  differently  from  the 
others due to differently perceived components’ benefits and risks. This may be 
due the perception that permanent differences, compared to other components, 
are related with managers’ aggressiveness in tax planning (Frank et al., 2009) 
and  this  consequently  indicates  a  high  risk  of  managerial  opportunism  in  tax 
planning. However, the differences between coefficient estimates of each of the 
other three components, temporary differences, foreign tax rates differentials and 
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a  significant  difference  on  shareholders’  valuation  between  permanent 
differences and the other three components, it can be concluded that the results 
do not support the hypothesis that predicts a different nature of the relationship 
between market value and each of the four components of tax saving, namely 
permanent  differences,  temporary  differences,  NOLs  and  foreign  tax  rates 
differentials. 
 
8.2.2.2 Firm Value, Tax Planning and Corporate Governance 
 
The multivariate results on the moderating influence of corporate governance on 
the relationship between firm value and tax planning are presented in Chapter 7. 
The  chapter  also  reports  the  results  of  the  additional  analyses  that  were 
conducted  to  assess  whether  the  above  detected  relationships  are  conditional 
upon the strength of companies’ corporate governance structures.   
 
The  results  show  that  corporate  governance  is  not  a  controlling  factor  in  the 
relationship between firm value and tax planning for both persistent and non 
persistent profit making companies. Specifically, with the inclusion of corporate 
governance  variables,  the  coefficient  estimates  of  tax  planning  of  both  for 
persistent  and  non persistent  profit making  companies  are  reported  as  higher 
than their initial estimates, i.e. without corporate governance variables. However, 
the coefficient estimates of the tax planning variable of both models, with and 
without corporate governance variables, for both persistent and non persistent 
profit making companies are insignificantly different from each other. Although 
the findings exhibit that, with corporate governance, shareholders value the tax 
planning  even  more  negatively,  the  insignificant  difference  between  both 
estimates  does  not  support  the  argument  on  the  importance  of  corporate 
governance practice to shareholders’ tax planning valuation, as highlighted by 
Henderson Global Investors (2005) and Desai and Dharmapala (2009). This may 
be due to shareholders’ perception that good corporate governance practice in the 
U.K. is generally in operation and therefore corporate governance practice is not 
a discriminating factor from the shareholders’ point of view (Bauer et al., 2004). 
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planning of both models, with and without corporate governance variables, are in 
line with Hanlon and Slemrod’s (2009) arguments on shareholders’ doubts about 
managers’ role in enhancing shareholders’ wealth, particularly in conducting tax 
planning activities. Therefore, it can be concluded that the results do not support 
the hypotheses in examining the moderating influence of corporate governance 
on the relationship between firm value and the extent of tax planning activities of 
persistent and non persistent profit making companies respectively. 
 
A  similar  implication  of  corporate  governance  on  shareholders’  tax  planning 
valuation  is  also  observed  in  the  relationship  between  firm  value  and  the 
components of tax saving. Although a significant negative relationship is found 
with respect to permanent differences, the estimates of the permanent differences 
variable of both models, with and without corporate governance variables, are 
insignificantly different between one another. Similar to the initial results of the 
relationship  between  firm  value  and  the  other  components  of  tax  saving,  the 
coefficient estimates of the components, temporary differences, foreign tax rates 
differentials  and  NOLs,  are  also  found  to  be  insignificant,  suggesting  that 
corporate governance does not affect the relationship between firm value and the 
three components. Overall, the results fail to support the hypothesis that predicts 
the moderating influence of corporate  governance on the  association between 
firm value and the permanent differences component of tax planning activities. 
The  results  were  also  found  not  to  support  the  hypotheses  in  predicting  the 
moderating influence of corporate governance on the association between firm 
value  and  the  other  three  components  of  tax  saving,  which  are  temporary 
differences, NOLs and foreign tax rates differentials respectively.  
 
In the subsequent analyses of the implications of corporate governance structure 
on  the  relationship  between  firm  value  and  tax  planning  of  persistent  profit 
making companies, the results from the estimation models with the inclusion of 
interactive variables between tax planning and corporate governance indicate an 
insignificant relationship between firm value and the interactive variables. This 
insignificant result does not support Desai and Dharmaphala’s (2009) argument 
on  the  stronger  effect  of  tax  planning  on  firm  value  when  the  corporate 
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However, when the same estimation is analysed using combined persistent and 
non persistent  profit making  companies,  the  results  reveal  significant 
relationships  between  firm  value  and  the  interactive  variables  between  tax 
planning  of  the  non persistent  profit making  companies  and  corporate 
governance.  The  results  suggest  that  the  moderating  influence  of  corporate 
governance  on  the  relationship  between  firm  value  and  tax  planning  of  non 
persistent profit making companies is conditional upon the strength of corporate 
governance  structure.  Based  on  this  result,  the  interactions  between  the 
proportions  of  non executive  directors  and  tax  planning  and  between  the 
institutional  investors  and  tax  planning  are  respectively  documented  as 
negatively  and  positively  related  with  shareholders’  valuation.  These  results 
support the arguments on political constraint of non executive directors (Agrawal 
and Knoeber, 1996) and effective monitoring of institutional investors (Desai and 
Dharmapala, 2009).    
 
In  examining  whether  the  corporate  governance  implication  in  shareholders’ 
valuation  on  components  of  tax  saving  is  conditional  upon  the  strength  of 
corporate  governance  structure,  significant  negative  relationships  are  found 
between firm value and three interaction variables: first, between institutional 
ownership and NOLs; second, between institutional ownership and foreign tax 
rates  differentials;  and  third,  between  institutional  ownership  and  unclassified 
items. These results imply the importance of institutional ownership structure in 
shareholders’  tax  planning  valuation,  specifically  from  the  aspect  of  NOLs, 
foreign tax rates differentials and unclassified items. 
 
The above implication  of corporate  governance is also tested by  splitting the 
sample around the median of corporate governance score. This analysis is tested 
on  both  persistent  and  combined  persistent  and  non persistent  profit making 
companies. The results show a higher negative tax planning coefficient estimate 
within the “low” corporate governance firms years of persistent profit making 
companies than the tax saving coefficient estimate within the other observations. 
However, there is no significant difference between the two estimates. In terms 
of non persistent profit making companies, the interactive variable is found to be 
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firms years.  However,  no  significant  relationship  is  found  in  the  interactive 
variable within the “high” governance firms years. These results suggest that tax 
planning by non persistent profit making companies is viewed as a set of value 
decreasing activities within the companies that have poor corporate governance 
practice. This interpretation is consistent with Desai and Dharmapala’s (2009) 
argument on the importance of corporate governance practice to shareholders in 
valuing  tax  planning  as  a  wealth  creation  activity  by  managers.  This  finding 
provides  an  explanation  for  the  initial  results  of  an  insignificant  moderating 
effect  of  corporate  governance  for  non persistent  profit making  companies. 
Analysing  the  moderating  influence  of  corporate  governance  in  such  a  way 
provides further evidence to the findings of the model that tests an implication of 
strong corporate governance structure on shareholders’ tax planning valuation 
where both corporate governance variables (proportion of non executive director 
and  institutional  ownership)  signify  conflicting  effects  on  shareholders’  tax 
planning  valuation,  i.e.  negative  coefficient  estimate  of  interaction  variable 
between tax saving of non persistent profit making companies and proportion of 
non executive director and positive coefficient estimate of interaction variable 
between tax saving of non persistent profit making companies and proportion of 
institutional ownership. Therefore, by splitting the sample around the median of 
the total corporate governance score, the results highlight the general implication 
of  corporate  governance  structure  in  which  it  indicates  that  the  negative 
shareholders’ tax planning valuation exists only within non persistent companies 
that exhibit poor corporate governance practice. 
 
In  summary,  this  study  finds  only  weak  evidence  of  a  moderating  effect  of 
corporate governance on shareholders’ tax planning valuation. Therefore, it can 
be  concluded  that  corporate  governance  practice  does  not  moderate  the 
relationship  between  firm  value  and  tax  planning.  In  general,  shareholders 
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8.3 Contributions 
 
This section discusses the methodological and theoretical contributions, and the 
practical and policy implications. In the context of this study, the methodological 
contributions  are  related  to  the  focus  of  the  sample,  measures  of  tax  saving 
components and the process to determine the measure of corporate governance. 
The theoretical contributions section focuses on the significance of this study in 
terms of the Scholes Wolfson framework, the agency theory and value relevance 
literature. The final sub section, practical and policy implications, concentrates 
on the contributions in the sense of corporate governance disclosure, tax planning 
activities  reporting,  and  shareholders’  concern  on  tax  planning  activities  to 
academic researchers, authorities and managers. 
 
8.3.1 Methodological Contributions 
 
This study contributes to the methodology firstly through its sample selection. 
The sample of this study comprises non financial publicly traded companies that 
are listed in the LSE. As there is a general dearth of previous studies examining 
the relationship between firm value and tax planning outside the U.S. setting, this 
study  contributes  to  the  literature  by  providing  empirical  evidence  on  the 
relationship in the U.K. environment. To the researcher’s knowledge, this is the 
first study that examines the relationship between firm value and tax planning in 
the U.K. setting. This contribution is significant for the body of knowledge as the 
tax related regulations and enforcements differ between the U.S. and the U.K.  
The  difference  includes  a  different  level  of  tax  authority  aggressiveness  in 
minimising  the  level  of  tax  avoidance  and  evasion  among  large  businesses 
(Hampton, 2005; Varney, 2006; Freedman, Loomer and Vella, 2007). Similarly, 
the variation in the regulations between both countries is also applicable in the 
sense of corporate governance regulation. In the U.S., corporate governance is 
regulated  by  the  Sarbanes Oxley  Act  2002,  in  which  corporate  governance 
misconduct is subject to fines and imprisonment penalties but, in contrast, the 
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“comply and explain” (Dowdney, 2005).  Therefore, by focusing on the U.K. 
sample, this study indirectly examines shareholders’ perception and awareness of 
the U.K. corporate governance regulations.  
 
Secondly,  this  study  contributes  to  the  methodology  by  way  of  tax  planning 
measures.  In  investigating  the  relationship  between  firm  value  and  the 
components of tax saving, this study, by reference to IAS 12 and previous related 
studies,  disaggregates  the  total  tax  saving  into  five  components:  permanent 
differences,  temporary  differences,  NOLs,  foreign  tax  rates  differentials  and 
unclassified items. This is explained in detail in Chapter 6. By classifying the tax 
reconciliation items into the components, this study provides a better picture of 
the  shareholders’  valuation  on  the  tax  planning  activities.  This  refined  tax 
planning measure allows the researcher to investigate whether shareholders have 
different  valuations  on  each  component  of  tax  saving.  Although  studies  on 
components  of  tax  saving  have  been  conducted  by  previous  researchers 
(Boatsman et al., 2002; Hanlon, 2005; Atwood and Reynolds, 2008; Bauman and 
Shaw, 2008), this study is different as it does not focus only on one selective 
component. This is clearly exhibited by Table 6.5 of Chapter 6. Therefore, by 
refining the tax saving measure, this study contributes to the methodology in the 
sense of filling the literature gap in investigating shareholders’ valuation on the 
components of tax saving comprehensively. 
 
In  addition  to  the  above,  this  study  also  methodologically  contributes  to  the 
knowledge through the process of corporate governance variables determination. 
In the context of this research, previous studies have selectively determined the 
corporate  governance  proxy,  for  example,  institutional  ownership  (Desai  and 
Dharmapala,  2009)  and  shareholders’  rights  based  on  mergers  and  takeover 
provisions (Hanlon and Slemrod, 2009; Wilson, 2009). This study, on the other 
hand, measures corporate governance variables through factor analysis, which 
leads to the derivation of general corporate governance measures. This in turn 
allows  the  conclusion  that  the  findings  are  the  consequence  of  companies’ 
general  corporate  governance  practice.  Moreover,  considering  corporate 
governance mechanisms may substitute each other (Ho and Shun Wong, 2001), 
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estimation results that have controlled for redundancy of the roles of corporate 
governance  mechanisms.  Therefore,  it  can  be  concluded  that  this  study 
contributes  to  the  tax  governance  literature  by  suggesting  data  reduction 
procedures  in  determining  general  corporate  governance  mechanisms  to 
represent companies’ corporate governance conduct. 
 
8.3.2 Theoretical Contributions 
 
The  Scholes Wolfson  framework  (Scholes  and  Wolfson,  1992)  and  agency 
theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) are the two main theories that underpin the 
hypotheses development. This study contributes to the theories by adding further 
understanding of the contribution or otherwise of corporate governance from the 
aspect of shareholders’ tax planning valuation in the U.K. environment. 
 
As  explained  in  Chapter  2,  the  Scholes Wolfson  tax  planning  framework 
suggests  three  important  principles  in  tax  planning  decisions:  consideration 
should be given to all contracting parties, all taxes, and all costs. These principles 
are important in achieving effective tax planning objective that is increase the 
after tax return. By applying the framework, this study contributes to the theory 
through  further  empirical  analysis  and  results  to  support  the  framework.  The 
results of this study show shareholders’ concern about the tax planning activities 
carried  out  by  the  managers.  This  adds  further  empirical  evidence  on  the 
importance  of  shareholders  as  one  of  the  contracting  parties  in  tax  planning, 
particularly in the U.K. The findings also indicate that shareholders in the U.K. 
are aware of the risks of tax planning activities, which in turn can increase the 
cost of tax planning by way of increasing agency related costs; as a consequence, 
this can reduce the expected benefits of the activities to the shareholders. The 
analysis is within the spirit of the Scholes Wolfson framework because the effect 
of taxation is considered with respect to the share price, i.e. the net effect on 
shareholders  after  all  taxes  and  costs.  Therefore  the  empirical  analysis  and 
findings derived therefrom add further empirical evidence and understanding to 
the theory. 
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This  study  contributes  to  the  understanding  of  agency  theory  by  providing 
empirical evidence on the owners managers conflict proposition in shareholders’ 
tax  planning  valuation,  particularly  in  the  U.K.  setting.  Although  there  are 
previous tax planning related studies that provide evidence on this conflict of 
interests hypothesis, the studies, however, focus only on the U.S. setting (Desai 
and  Dharmapala,  2009;  Hanlon  and  Slemrod,  2009;  Wilson,  2009).  As 
highlighted above (section 8.3.1), the U.K.’s taxation and corporate governance 
regulations are different compared to the U.S. regulations and this can contribute 
to differences in shareholders’ perception between countries. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that this study expands the understanding of corporate governance in 
tax planning valuation from the U.K. companies’ shareholders’ point of view.  
 
In addition to the above theories, this study also contributes to value relevance 
literature as it applies a valuation relevance approach in the analyses. It provides 
further empirical evidence on shareholders’ tax planning valuation, particularly 
in the U.K. This study finds that shareholders impound the extent of tax planning 
activities in determining the firm value. Similar evidence is also found between 
firm value and the permanent differences component of tax saving, suggesting 
that,  in  addition  to  the  aggregate  tax  saving  information,  shareholders  also 
consider the said component in their valuation.  
 
Based  on  the  above  discussions,  this  study  contributes  to  the  theories  by 
extending  the  general  knowledge  on  tax  planning,  corporate  governance  and 
value relevance. This study finds empirical evidence that supports not only the 
Scholes Wolfson framework and agency theory but also the valuation relevance 
literature.  
 
8.3.3 Practical and Policy Implications 
 
The  evidence  found  by  this  study  has  practical  and  policy  knowledge 
implications  for  at  least  three  parties:  academic  researchers,  authorities  and 
company managers. The said authorities include regulatory agencies related to 
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The  results  highlight  that  the  extent  of  tax  planning  activities  in  the  U.K.  is 
value relevant. These findings contradict the findings of a similar U.S. study by 
Desai  and  Dharmapala  (2009)  that  investigates  the  relationship  between  firm 
value and tax avoidance in which the tax avoidance variable is found not to be 
significantly  related  to  the  firm  value.  This  suggests  general  implications  of 
different tax and governance regulations on companies’ market value.  Therefore, 
tax  planning  researchers,  particularly  in  the  research  that  utilises  U.K.  data, 
should pay attention to the practical and policy differences in generalising the 
findings of literature based on other countries’ settings. 
 
In  addition  to  the  academics,  the  results  also  provide  practical  and  policy 
implications  for  the  authorities  from  the  aspects  of  both  enforcement  and 
regulation. In terms of taxation, the results indicate that there is a certain level of 
tax planning activity within the large companies in the U.K. If this is viewed as a 
factor that distorts the public good (Slemrod, 2004), the results suggest that the 
tax  authority  should  enforce  further  action  additional  to  the  existing  tax 
avoidance and evasion minimising strategies and schemes. The results also show 
that the activities are not viewed by shareholders as value creation activities. 
Considering  that  the  sample  period  is  related  to  the  tax risk  assessment 
enforcement, this may imply positive implications of the assessment from the 
shareholders’ point of view. In this context, shareholders may be less likely to 
support tax planning by managers as it may lead to a “high risk” classification by 
the  authority.  This  in  turn  may  influence  managers’  tax  planning related 
decisions  to  focus  on  “tax  assurance”  rather  than  “aggressive  tax  planning” 
(SustainAbility Ltd, 2006). This argument can be confirmed by replicating this 
study using a sample period prior to the enforcement of the assessment. 
 
From the corporate  governance  aspect, this study  contributes to practical and 
policy implications through the findings that indicate an insignificant effect of 
corporate governance on shareholders’ tax planning valuation. If this signifies 
that the current corporate governance practices or disclosures are not enough to 
provide governance information to shareholders in assessing managers’ moral 
hazard  in  tax  planning,  the  financial  reporting  authorities  should  require 
reporting rules and regulations that require managers to be more transparent, in Chapter 8 Summary, Contributions and Recommendations                              259 
 
 
terms of corporate governance conduct, to the shareholders. Conversely, if there 
is  already  sufficient  corporate  governance  disclosure  to  allow  shareholders  to 
assess  tax  planning  as  a  value decreasing  activity,  shareholders  may  need  to 
become more active in limiting managers’ moral hazard via tax planning. Similar 
to  disclosure  of  corporate  governance  practices,  as  the  results  indicate  that 
shareholders consider tax expense information in equity pricing, the authority 
should  also  pay  attention  to  whether  the  current  disclosure  requirements, 
particularly on tax expense, are  adequate in providing sufficient tax planning 
information to shareholders. 
 
In terms of company managers, the practical implications of this study are more 
concerned  with  the  transparency  of  tax  planning  information.  The  results  on 
negative perception of shareholders on tax planning activities may indicate an 
inadequate  supply  of  tax  planning  information  to  shareholders  in  valuing  tax 
planning as a value creation activity. If this information asymmetry issue has 
been considered by the managers in tax planning reporting, the managers should 
make tax planning related decisions with an awareness of the decrement effect 
on firm value.  
 
8.4 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Study 
 
This section discusses limitations of this study that constrain the generalisability 
of  the  results.  This  section  also  highlights  suggestions  for  future  study.  The 
limitations of this study are related to the methodology aspects comprising the 
sample framework and data collection. 
 
The sample framework of this study is limited to only non financial LSE public 
listed  companies.  As  a  consequence,  the  findings  of  this  study  may  be  not 
suitable  for  generalisation  to  the  other  types  of  companies.  In  terms  of  data 
collection, as the financial and corporate governance data were collected from 
secondary sources, a validity issue may arise. This is due to the weakness of the 
said  sources  in  accurately  presenting  the  data  from  the  original  sources 
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been verified through sample cross checks between the data from the secondary 
sources and the original sources, for example, annual report and LSE website. 
 
Despite  the  above  limitations,  the  findings  of  this  study  provide  some 
motivations  and  indications  for  future  studies.  As  highlighted  above  (section 
8.3.3), the contradictory findings between this study and similar U.S. studies may 
be  a  result  of  different  rules  and  regulations  between  countries,  particularly 
related  to  taxation  and  corporate  governance.  Therefore,  to  confirm  this 
argument, a future study that investigates and compares the shareholders’ tax 
planning  valuation  from  the  aspect  of  different  sets  of  rules  and  regulations 
should be conducted. 
 
In addition, as this study does not address an adequacy of disclosure issue from 
the shareholders’ perspective, future research should consider the sufficiency of 
current disclosure requirements in supplying important tax related information to 
shareholders, particularly for the decision making process.  This issue should be 
studied from both taxation and corporate governance aspects.  
 
As explained in Chapter 2, this study defines tax planning as consisting of both 
evasion  and  avoidance.  To  further  investigate  shareholders’  tax  planning 
valuation from the aspect of avoidance separately from evasion, or vice versa, 
future research should investigate this valuation with attention to the legal aspect 
definitions of avoidance and evasion. Consequently, future research should focus 
on  obtaining  more  sophisticated  proxies  of  unobservable  tax  avoidance  and 
evasion in order to evaluate their relative valuation implications. 
  
In addition, as this study does not test whether the findings are conditional upon 
tax  implication  of  peer  companies,  an  event  study  could  be  conducted  to 
determine  whether  any  “contagion”  effect,  i.e.  effect  of  other  companies  on 
another  company  within  similar  characteristics,  for  example  within  a  specific 
industrial  classification  (Gleason,  Jenkins  and  Johnson,  2008),  exists  in  the 
shareholders’ tax planning valuation. In line with literature that finds “contagion” 
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to exist in the case of shareholders’ responses to tax specific news, for example 
news about penalty on tax evasion that was imposed on peer companies.  
 
8.5 Conclusions 
 
This  study  contributes  to  the  existing  knowledge  by  providing  evidence  on 
shareholders’  tax  planning  valuation  in  the  U.K.  context.  It  also 
methodologically contributes to the current literature by refining the tax planning 
measure in terms of components of tax saving comprising permanent differences, 
temporary differences, NOLs and foreign tax rates differentials. In addition, this 
study  contributes  to  the  literature  by  applying  a  data  reduction  method  in 
determining corporate governance variables so as to ensure that the variables are 
more  representative  as  compared  to  the  selection  method  of  corporate 
governance  variables.  From  a  theoretical  aspect,  this  study  contributes  to  the 
existing theories by confirming that shareholders are  an affected party  of tax 
planning  activities  within  U.K. quoted  companies.  In  addition,  this  study 
provides evidence of an insignificant controlling effect of corporate governance 
on shareholders’ tax planning valuation. The findings also highlight the practical 
and policy implications in terms of disclosures of tax expense, effective tax rates 
reconciliation and corporate governance to academics, authorities and company 
managers. 
 
Limitations that have been discussed in this chapter consist of limitations in the 
sense of a sample framework that concentrates on large U.K. companies and the 
validity of the secondary data sources. A further limitation is the use of a proxy 
of tax saving. Based on these limitations and the findings that are derived from 
the analyses, several recommendations for future research have been made. The 
recommendations  comprise  comparison  between  countries,  adequacy  of 
disclosure issue, legal aspect of evasion and avoidance, and “contagion” effects 
on shareholders’ tax planning valuation. Therefore, with these recommendations, 
this study is expected to motivate future researchers to involve themselves with Chapter 8 Summary, Contributions and Recommendations                              262 
 
 
this  kind  of  research  especially  with  a  view  to  providing  more  evidence  on 
shareholders’ tax planning valuation. 
 
In summary, this study, which aims to investigate the relationship between firm 
value and tax planning while simultaneously considering corporate governance 
as  a  moderating  influence,  finds  that  shareholders  of  persistent  profit making 
companies  value  tax  planning  as  a  value deceasing  activity.  In  addition,  tax 
saving of non persistent profit making companies is also found to be related with 
firm value implying shareholders’ negative perception of the companies’ ability 
in pursuing long run tax planning. In terms of shareholders’ valuation on the 
components of tax saving, permanent differences are found to outweigh the other 
components of tax saving in shareholders’ tax planning valuation. In the case of 
the  corporate  governance  controlling  effect,  there  is  limited  evidence  that 
corporate  governance  factors  have  a  moderating  effect  on  the  firm  value tax 
planning relationship.   
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Appendix A: Summary of Estimation 
Models and Variables Measurements 
 
Estimation models: 
 
To examine the relationship between firm value and tax planning of persistent 
profit making companies: 
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To examine the relationship between firm value and components of tax saving of 
persistent profit making companies: 
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To  examine  the  relationship  between  firm  value  and  tax  planning  of  non 
persistent profit making companies: 
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To  examine  the  relationship  between  firm  value  and  the  components  of  tax 
saving of non persistent profit making companies: 
(15) 
(16) 
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To examine the moderating effect of corporate governance on the relationship 
between firm value and tax planning of persistent profit making companies: 
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To examine the moderating effect of corporate governance on the relationship 
between firm value and tax planning of non persistent profit making companies: 
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To  examine  whether  the  effect  of  corporate  governance  on  the  relationship 
between firm value and tax planning of persistent profit making companies is 
conditional upon the strength of companies’ corporate governance structure: 
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To  examine  whether  the  effect  of  corporate  governance  on  the  relationship 
between firm value and tax planning of non persistent profit making companies 
is conditional upon the strength of companies’ corporate governance structure: 
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To examine the moderating effect of corporate governance on the relationship 
between firm value and components of tax saving of persistent profit making 
companies: 
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To examine the moderating effect of corporate governance on the relationship 
between  firm  value  and  components  of  tax  saving  of  non persistent  profit 
making companies: 
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To  examine  whether  the  effect  of  corporate  governance  on  the  relationship 
between firm value and components of tax saving of persistent profit making 
companies is conditional upon the strength of companies’ corporate governance 
structure: 
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To  examine  whether  the  effect  of  corporate  governance  on  the  relationship 
between  firm  value  and  components  of  tax  saving  of  non persistent  profit 
making  companies  is  conditional  upon  the  strength  of  companies’  corporate 
governance structure: 
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Note: Figures in brackets reflect reference numbers of the estimation models in 
Chapter 6. 
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Table A.1 
Variables Descriptions and Measurements 
 
Variables  Description  Measurement 
MVEit+3months  Market value of 
equity 
Market value of equity 3 
months after the year 
end/BVEt 1 
BVEit              Book value of 
equity 
BVE/BVEt 1 
PBTit  Profit before tax  PBT/BVEt 1 
TSit    Tax saving  (STR ETR)*PBT/BVEt 1 
CCit    Capital contribution  Net proceeds from sales or 
issues of common and 
preferred shares/BVEt 1 
EMit    Earnings 
management 
Profit before tax – Cash flow 
from operating activities/BVEt 
1 
CAPINTit  Capital intensity  Gross machinery and 
equipment/Total assets 
LEVit    Leverage  Long term debt/Total assets 
DIVit    Dividend payout  (Dividends Per Share/Earnings 
Per Share)*100 
FSit    Foreign sales  Percentage of foreign sales 
over total net sales 
INDDUMit  Industry dummy  1 for each particular industry 
classification, 0 otherwise and 
an industry is eliminated for 
reference purpose. 
TLOSSit  Tax losses  NOLs  reconciling items/ 
BVEt 1  
TPDit    Permanent 
differences 
Permanent difference 
reconciling items/BVEt 1 
TTDit    Temporary 
differences 
Temporary difference 
reconciling items/BVEt 1 
TFTRit    Foreign tax rates 
differentials 
Foreign tax differential 
reconciling items/BVEt 1 
TUNCit  Unclassified items  Unclassified reconciling 
items/BVEt 1 
NPSTDUMTSit  Interaction variable 
between non 
persistent profit 
makers dummy and 
tax saving 
NPSTDUM * TS 
NPSTDUMit_TLOSSit  Interaction variable 
between non 
persistent profit 
makers dummy and 
tax losses 
NPSTDUM*TLOSS 
NPSTDUMit_TPDit  Interaction variable 
between non 
persistent profit 
makers dummy and 
permanent 
differences 
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NPSTDUMit_TTDit  Interaction variable 
between non 
persistent profit 
makers dummy and 
temporary 
differences 
NPSTDUM*TTD 
NPSTDUMit_TFTRit  Interaction variable 
between non 
persistent profit 
makers dummy and 
foreign tax rates 
differentials 
NPSTDUM*TFTR 
NPSTDUMit_TUNCit  Interaction variable 
between non 
persistent profit 
makers dummy and 
unclassified items 
NPSTDUM*TUNC 
NEDit    Non executive 
directors  
Percentage of non executive 
directors to total number of 
directors  
IOWNit  Institutional 
ownership 
Percentage of shares held by 
substantial institutional 
shareholders 
TSit_NEDit   Interaction variable 
between TS and 
NED 
TS * NED 
TSit_IOWNit            Interaction variable 
between TS and 
IOWN 
TS * IOWN 
NPSTDUMTSit_NEDit  Interaction variable 
between 
NPSTDUMTS and 
NED 
NPSTDUMTS*NED 
NPSTDUMTSit_IOWNit  Interaction variable 
between 
NPSTDUMTS and 
IOWN 
NPSTDUMTS*IOWN 
TLOSSit_NEDit   Interaction variable 
between tax losses 
component and 
non executive 
directors   
TLOSS*NED 
TLOSSit_IOWNit  Interaction variable 
between tax losses 
component and 
institutional 
ownership 
TLOSS*IOWN 
TPDit_NEDit   Interaction variable 
between permanent 
differences 
component and 
non executive 
directors  
TPD*NED 
TPDit_IOWNit  Interaction variable 
between permanent 
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differences 
component and 
institutional 
ownership 
TTDit_NEDit   Interaction variable 
between temporary 
differences 
component and 
non executive 
directors  
TTD*NED 
TTDit_IOWNit  Interaction variable 
between temporary 
differences 
component and 
institutional 
ownership 
TTD*IOWN 
TFTRit_NEDit   Interaction variable 
between foreign tax 
rates differentials 
component and 
non executive 
directors  
TFTR*NED 
TFTRit_IOWNit  Interaction variable 
between foreign tax 
rates differentials 
component and 
institutional 
ownership 
TFTR*IOWN 
TUNCit_NEDit   Interaction variable 
between 
unclassified 
reconciling items  
and non executive 
directors  
TUNC*NED 
TUNCit_IOWNit  Interaction variable 
between 
unclassified 
reconciling items  
and institutional 
ownership 
TUNC*IOWN 
NPSTDUMTLOSSit_NEDit  Interaction variable 
between tax losses 
of non persistent 
profit makers and 
NED  
NPSTDUM_TLOSS*NED 
NPSTDUMTLOSSit_IOWNit  Interaction variable 
between tax losses 
of non persistent 
profit makers and 
IOWN  
NPSTDUM_TLOSS*IOWN 
NPSTDUMTPDit_NEDit  Interaction variable 
between permanent 
differences of non 
persistent profit 
makers and NED  
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NPSTDUMTPDit_IOWNit  Interaction variable 
between permanent 
differences of non 
persistent profit 
makers and IOWN  
NPSTDUM_TPD*IOWN 
NPSTDUMTTDit_NEDit  Interaction variable 
between temporary 
differences of non 
persistent profit 
makers and NED  
NPSTDUM_TTD*NED 
NPSTDUMTTDit_IOWNit  Interaction variable 
between temporary 
differences of non 
persistent profit 
makers and IOWN  
NPSTDUM_TTD*IOWN 
NPSTDUMTFTRit_NEDit  Interaction variable 
between foreign tax 
rates differentials of 
non persistent profit 
makers and NED  
NPSTDUM_TFTR*NED 
NPSTDUMTFTRit_IOWNit  Interaction variable 
between foreign tax 
rates differentials of 
non persistent profit 
makers and IOWN 
NPSTDUM_TFTR*IOWN 
NPSTDUMTUNCit_NEDit  Interaction variable 
between 
unclassified items 
of  non persistent 
profit makers and 
NED  
NPSTDUM_TUNC*NED 
NPSTDUMTUNCit_IOWNit  Interaction variable 
between 
unclassified items 
of  non persistent 
profit makers and 
IOWN  
NPSTDUM_TUNC*IOWN 
it ε   Error term    
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Appendix B: Further Tests – Tabulated 
Results 
 
Table B.1 
Market Value Measurement Date: Firm Value and Tax Planning 
             (I)  (II)       (III) 
DV=MVEt+6months/ 
BVEt-1 
Persistent Profit-
Making 
Companies 
Persistent and 
Non-Persistent 
Profit-Making 
Companies 
Components of Tax 
Saving – Persistent 
Profit-Making 
Companies 
BVE  0.9283 
(3.58)*** 
0.8963 
(3.47)*** 
0.5118 
(1.42) 
PBT  10.1589 
(15.20)*** 
10.1375 
(15.76)*** 
9.8217 
(12.07)*** 
TS   7.8221 
( 2.46)** 
 7.4116 
( 2.37)** 
  
NPSTDUMTS      11.1232 
( 1.10) 
  
TLOSS         4.5501 
( 0.55) 
TPD         15.2373 
( 2.69)*** 
TTD        5.6672 
(1.08) 
TFTR        12.4696 
(1.30) 
TUNC         1.4348 
( 0.11) 
CC   0.2038 
( 0.37) 
 0.0955 
( 0.17) 
0.0786 
(0.12) 
EM   3.0968 
( 5.43)*** 
 3.1836 
( 5.76)*** 
 3.0668 
( 5.29)*** 
CAPINT   0.6385 
( 3.23)*** 
 0.6867 
( 3.16)*** 
 0.5881 
( 2.65)*** 
LEV   0.4880 
( 0.97) 
 0.0141 
( 0.03) 
 0.1454 
( 0.30) 
DIV   0.0029 
( 1.34) 
 0.0020 
( 0.96) 
0.0003 
(0.16) 
FS  0.0067 
(3.14)*** 
0.0057 
(2.66)*** 
0.0065 
(3.15)*** 
Cons   0.0713 
( 0.20) 
 0.2032 
( 0.53) 
0.1155 
(0.23) 
R squared   49.12%  47.22%  41.40% 
n  444  472  405 
Wald chi
2   440.60*** 
16
# 
1222.10*** 
18
# 
307.33*** 
20
# 
Breusch Pagan  88.67*** 
16
# 
88.37*** 
18
# 
103.26*** 
20
# 
Figures in parentheses represent cross section clustered Eicker Huber White adjusted t statistics. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 2.5% and 5% respectively.  
# indicates degree of freedom. Appendix B                                                                                                          272 
 
 
Table B.2 
Market Value Measurement Date: Firm Value, Tax Planning and Corporate Governance  
  (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV) 
DV=MVEt+6months/ 
BVEt-1 
Persistent 
Profit-Making 
Companies 
Persistent and 
Non-Persistent 
Profit-Making 
Companies 
Components of Tax 
Saving – Persistent 
Profit-Making 
Companies 
Components 
of Tax 
Saving – 
Persistent 
Profit-
Making 
Companies 
BVE  0.9566 
(3.65)*** 
0.9130 
(3.50)*** 
0.5353 
(1.45) 
0.5167 
(1.34) 
PBT  10.1558 
(14.93)*** 
10.1094 
(15.52)*** 
9.7701 
(11.85)*** 
9.7124 
(11.65)*** 
TS   8.2341 
( 2.56)** 
 7.5705 
( 2.41)** 
     
NED  0.0066 
(1.27) 
0.0018 
(0.35) 
0.0037 
(0.71) 
0.0028 
(0.52) 
IOWN   0.0047 
( 1.12) 
 0.0039 
( 0.94) 
 0.0044 
( 0.97) 
 0.0020 
( 0.48) 
NPSTDUMTS      11.8621 
( 1.13) 
     
TLOSS         5.3667 
( 0.66) 
41.6197 
(2.56)*** 
TPD         15.4198 
( 2.80)*** 
 6.9980 
( 0.53) 
TTD        5.7461 
(1.10) 
11.1559 
(0.43) 
TFTR        11.8938 
(1.26) 
33.4310 
(0.78) 
TUNC         3.1594 
( 0.26) 
 33.7841 
( 0.36) 
TLOSS_NED^           0.0347 
(0.07) 
TLOSS_IOWN            1.3957 
( 3.46)*** 
TPD_NED^            0.20373 
( 0.37) 
TPD_IOWN            0.3215 
( 0.91) 
TTD_NED           0.0414 
(0.10) 
TTD_IOWN            0.3969 
( 1.09) 
TFTR_NED           0.5819 
(0.86) 
TFTR_IOWN            1.5242 
( 2.72)*** 
TUNC_NED           1.1385 
(0.91) 
TUNC_IOWN            1.2606 
( 2.50)** 
CC   0.2730 
( 0.49) 
 0.1333 
( 0.24) 
0.0448 
(0.07) 
0.2398 
(0.35) 
EM   3.0904 
( 5.31)*** 
 3.1863 
( 5.66)*** 
 3.0981 
( 5.23)*** 
 3.0443 
( 5.34)*** Appendix B                                                                                                          273 
 
 
Figures in parentheses represent cross section clustered Eicker Huber White adjusted t statistics. 
 ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 2.5% and 5% respectively.  
# indicates degree of freedom. 
^ indicates centred variable. 
 
Table B.3 
Choice of Deflator: Firm Value and Tax Planning – Persistent Profit-Making Companies 
  (I)  (II)  (III) 
  Number of  
Shares 
(DV=MVEt+3months/ 
Number of shares) 
Opening Market  
Value 
(DV=MVEt+3months/ 
Opening market value) 
Sales 
(DV= 
MVEt+3months/ 
Sales) 
BVE  0.4395 
(2.00)** 
0.0473 
(0.64) 
0.7740 
(3.13)*** 
PBT  7.3650 
(8.40)*** 
4.3187 
(10.32)*** 
7.1451 
(6.81)*** 
TS  1.5773 
(0.40) 
 2.6808 
( 1.83)* 
 11.0318 
( 3.47)*** 
CC   0.7497 
( 1.94)* 
0.9562 
(3.55)*** 
1.2564 
(1.27) 
EM   1.5091 
( 2.54)** 
 1.4099 
( 4.26)*** 
 3.7930 
( 3.48)*** 
CAPINT   0.7497 
( 1.94)* 
 0.1902 
( 3.74)*** 
 0.4106 
( 3.85)*** 
LEV   0.1957 
( 0.18) 
 0.1740 
( 1.57) 
 0.1720 
( 0.46) 
DIV  0.0043 
(1.43) 
0.0001 
(0.14) 
0.0011 
(1.20) 
FS  0.0114 
(2.75)*** 
0.0009 
(2.14)** 
0.0030 
(2.22)** 
Cons   0.0836 
( 0.33) 
0.7534 
(11.09)*** 
0.3234 
(1.59) 
R squared   36.53%  31.55%  38.41% 
n  444  444  444 
Wald chi
2   1123.21*** 
16
# 
241.26*** 
16
# 
1750.48*** 
16
# 
Breusch Pagan  107.20*** 
16
# 
25.83* 
16
# 
80.86*** 
16
# 
Figures in parentheses represent cross section clustered Eicker Huber White adjusted t statistics. 
 ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 2.5% and 5% respectively.  
# indicates degree of freedom. 
CAPINT   0.6284 
( 3.23)*** 
 0.6679 
( 3.08)*** 
 0.5970 
( 2.71)*** 
 0.6217 
( 2.92)*** 
LEV   0.6491 
( 1.28) 
 0.0910 
( 0.19) 
 0.2546 
( 0.52) 
 0.1731 
( 0.35) 
DIV   0.0029 
( 1.35) 
 0.0021 
( 1.00) 
0.0004 
(0.17) 
0.0004 
(0.21) 
FS  0.0063 
(2.93)*** 
0.0056 
(2.59)*** 
0.0064 
(2.95)*** 
0.0056 
(2.90)*** 
Cons   0.2902 
( 0.63) 
 0.1733 
( 0.37) 
0.0536 
(0.10) 
0.0293 
(0.05) 
R squared   49.80%  47.77%  42.16%  44.49% 
n  444  472  405  405 
Wald chi
2  427.40*** 
18
# 
992.23*** 
20
# 
321.09*** 
22
# 
587.54 
32
# 
Breusch Pagan  89.23*** 
18
# 
89.53*** 
20
# 
103.91*** 
22
# 
110.81*** 
32
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Table B.4 
Choice of Deflator: Firm Value, Tax Planning and Corporate Governance – Persistent 
Profit-Making Companies 
  (I)  (II)  (III) 
  Number of  
Shares 
(DV=MVEt+3months/ 
Number of shares) 
Opening Market  
Value 
(DV=MVEt+3months/ 
Opening market value) 
Sales 
(DV= 
MVEt+3months/ 
Sales) 
BVE  0.4496 
(2.03)* 
0.0585 
(0.83) 
0.7941 
(3.20)*** 
PBT  7.2808 
(8.33)*** 
4.4152 
(10.32)*** 
7.0747 
(6.73)*** 
TS  1.6296 
(0.41) 
 2.8426 
( 1.91)* 
 11.0393 
( 3.52)*** 
NED  0.0214 
(2.06)* 
0.0016 
(1.35) 
0.0047 
(1.83)* 
IOWN   0.0106 
( 1.71)* 
0.0001 
(0.11) 
 0.0040 
( 1.97)* 
CC   0.4295 
( 0.83) 
0.9258 
(3.45)*** 
1.1952 
(1.26) 
EM   1.5040 
( 2.55)** 
 1.4044 
( 4.21)*** 
 3.8069 
( 3.46)*** 
CAPINT   0.7784 
( 2.03)** 
 0.1933 
( 3.91)*** 
 0.4100 
( 3.92)*** 
LEV   0.6549 
( 0.59) 
 0.1995 
( 1.75)* 
 0.2735 
( 0.73) 
DIV  0.0045 
(1.49) 
0.0001 
(0.21) 
0.0011 
(1.26) 
FS  0.0103 
(2.43)** 
0.0008 
(1.83)* 
0.0029 
(2.07)** 
Cons   0.8469 
( 1.31) 
0.6550 
(6.64)*** 
0.2056 
(0.78) 
R squared   38.19%  31.97%  40.04% 
n  444  444  444 
Wald chi
2  
 
1220.07*** 
18
# 
229.87*** 
18
# 
1737.70*** 
18
# 
Breusch Pagan  108.38*** 
18
# 
28.10* 
18
# 
82.21*** 
18
# 
Figures in parentheses represent cross section clustered Eicker Huber White adjusted t statistics. 
 ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 2.5% and 5% respectively.  
# indicates degree of freedom. 
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Table B.5 
Choice of Deflator: Firm Value and Tax Planning – Persistent and Non-Persistent Profit-
Making Companies 
  (I)  (II)  (III) 
  Number of  
Shares 
(DV=MVEt+3months/ 
Number of shares) 
Opening Market  
Value 
(DV=MVEt+3months/ 
Opening market value) 
Sales 
(DV= 
MVEt+3months/ 
Sales) 
BVE  0.3345 
(1.46) 
0.0577 
(0.98) 
0.0007 
(2.94)*** 
PBT  8.3494 
(7.73)*** 
4.4598 
(11.09)*** 
0.0079 
(7.71)*** 
TS   2.0478 
( 0.44) 
 3.0200 
( 1.97)** 
 0.0119 
( 3.65)*** 
NPSTDUMTS   28.4100 
( 3.14)*** 
 11.5456 
( 2.48)** 
 0.0020 
( 0.50) 
CC   0.2247 
( 0.34) 
0.9901 
(3.34)*** 
0.0013 
(1.37) 
EM   1.8169 
( 3.00)*** 
 1.3895 
( 6.25)*** 
 0.0042 
( 3.81)*** 
CAPINT   0.9035 
( 2.23)** 
 0.1635 
( 2.55)** 
 0.0004 
( 3.59)*** 
LEV  0.3623 
(0.32) 
 0.0465 
( 0.40) 
 0.0001 
( 0.23) 
DIV  0.0048 
(1.55) 
0.0003 
(0.41) 
0.0001 
(1.45) 
FS  0.0118 
(2.97)*** 
0.0008 
(1.78)* 
0.0001 
(2.03)** 
Cons   0.1975 
( 0.77) 
0.7284 
(10.38)*** 
0.0002 
(1.23) 
R squared   41.60%  33.01%  36.49% 
n  472  472  472 
Wald chi
2  
 
990.97*** 
18
# 
206.62*** 
18
# 
735.93*** 
18
# 
Breusch Pagan  134.73*** 
18
# 
24.49 
18
# 
73.38*** 
18
# 
Figures in parentheses of Column I and Column III represent cross section clustered Eicker 
Huber White  adjusted  t statistics.  Results  reported  in  Column  II  are  based  on  unadjusted  t 
statistics as the tests indicate no significant heteroscedasticity. 
 ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 2.5% and 5% respectively.  
# indicates degree of freedom. 
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Table B.6 
Choice of Deflator: Firm Value, Tax Planning and Corporate Governance – Persistent and 
Non-Persistent Profit-Making Companies 
  (I)  (II)  (III) 
  Number of  
Shares 
(DV=MVEt+3months/ 
Number of shares) 
Opening Market  
Value 
(DV=MVEt+3months/ 
Opening market value) 
Sales 
(DV= 
MVEt+3months/ 
Sales) 
BVE  0.3437 
(1.49) 
0.0656 
(1.09) 
0.7426 
(3.00)*** 
PBT  8.2634 
(7.65)*** 
4.5024 
(11.01)*** 
7.7983 
(7.56)*** 
TS   2.0239 
( 0.43) 
 3.0802 
( 1.98)** 
 11.8221 
( 3.68)*** 
NED  0.0165 
(1.68)* 
0.0004 
(0.31) 
0.0025 
(1.06) 
IOWN   0.0084 
( 1.41) 
 0.0002 
( 0.23) 
 0.0041 
( 2.08)** 
NPSTDUMTS   29.4820 
( 3.29)*** 
 11.6092 
( 2.45)** 
 3.0583 
( 0.74) 
CC   0.2614 
( 0.41) 
0.9718 
(3.26)*** 
1.2615 
(1.37) 
EM   1.7880 
( 2.95)*** 
 1.3838 
( 6.17)*** 
 4.2191 
( 3.79)*** 
CAPINT   0.8811 
( 2.17)** 
 0.1611 
( 2.47)** 
 0.3983 
( 3.54)*** 
LEV   0.0033 
( 0.00) 
 0.0527 
( 0.44) 
 0.1543 
( 0.45) 
DIV  0.0048 
(1.54) 
0.0003 
(0.42) 
0.0013 
(1.43) 
FS  0.0109 
(2.67)*** 
0.0008 
(1.70)* 
0.0026 
(1.97)** 
Cons   0.7310 
( 1.20) 
0.7090 
(7.00)*** 
0.2362 
(1.01) 
R squared   42.80%  33.56%  38.13% 
n  472  472  472 
Wald chi
2   1042.01*** 
20
# 
205.76*** 
20
# 
689.58*** 
20
# 
Breusch Pagan  137.08*** 
20
# 
27.60 
20
# 
74.13*** 
20
# 
Figures in parentheses of Column I and Column III represent cross section clustered Eicker 
Huber White  adjusted  t statistics.  Results  reported  in  Column  II  are  based  on  unadjusted  t 
statistics as the tests indicate no significant heteroscedasticity. 
 ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 2.5% and 5% respectively.  
# indicates degree of freedom. 
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Table B.7 
Choice of Deflator: Firm Value and Components of Tax Saving – Persistent Profit-Making 
Companies 
  (I)  (II)  (III) 
  Number of  
Shares 
(DV=MVEt+3months/ 
Number of shares) 
Opening Market  
Value 
(DV=MVEt+3months/ 
Opening market value) 
Sales 
(DV= 
MVEt+3months/ 
Sales) 
BVE  0.3504 
(1.53) 
0.0451 
(0.56) 
1.1818 
(3.80)*** 
PBT  7.8118 
(10.81)*** 
4.3535 
(9.33)*** 
6.4680 
(7.57)*** 
TLOSS  7.2658 
(1.00) 
 2.7016 
( 0.66) 
6.7986 
(1.43) 
TPD   4.0571 
( 0.85) 
1.0593 
(0.26) 
 1.6227 
( 0.28) 
TTD  6.5065 
(1.17) 
 2.2052 
( 0.70) 
11.0158 
(2.10)** 
TFTR  23.5546 
(2.24)** 
7.3833 
(1.15) 
 25.5034 
( 1.47) 
TUNC   4.1739 
( 0.32) 
 3.0296 
( 0.59) 
 5.0557 
( 0.56) 
CC   0.5322 
( 0.81) 
1.0719 
(3.62)*** 
 0.0689 
( 0.10) 
EM   1.4939 
( 2.29)** 
 1.3973 
( 3.91)*** 
 1.4991 
( 2.73)*** 
CAPINT   0.8828 
( 1.91)* 
 0.1778 
( 3.28)*** 
 0.1563 
( 1.73)* 
LEV  0.2121 
(0.16) 
 0.0733 
( 0.61) 
 0.0447 
( 0.15) 
DIV  0.0063 
(2.08)** 
0.0005 
(0.74) 
0.0015 
(1.72)* 
FS  0.0116 
(2.84)*** 
0.0011 
(2.37)** 
0.0026 
(1.96)** 
Cons   0.1897 
( 0.72) 
0.7247 
(9.53)*** 
0.0479 
(0.27) 
R squared   39.70%  35.09%  40.25% 
n  405  405  405 
Wald chi
2   2537.68*** 
20
# 
234.23*** 
20
# 
1602.25*** 
20
# 
Breusch Pagan  103.84*** 
20
# 
30.18* 
20
# 
168.92*** 
20
# 
Figures in parentheses represent cross section clustered Eicker Huber White adjusted t statistics. 
 ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 2.5% and 5% respectively.  
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Table B.8 
Choice of Deflator: Firm Value, Components of Tax Saving and Corporate Governance - 
Persistent Profit-Making Companies 
  (I)  (II)  (III) 
  Number of  
Shares 
(DV=MVEt+3months/ 
Number of shares) 
Opening Market  
Value 
(DV=MVEt+3months/ 
Opening market value) 
Sales 
(DV= 
MVEt+3months/ 
Sales) 
BVE  0.3619 
(1.56) 
0.0449 
(0.57) 
1.2264 
(3.96)*** 
PBT  7.7006 
(10.62)*** 
4.3722 
(9.18)*** 
6.3696 
(7.63)*** 
NED  0.0234 
(2.21)** 
 0.0001 
( 0.06) 
0.0054 
(2.05)** 
IOWN   0.0130 
( 1.94)* 
0.0005 
(0.53) 
 0.0059 
( 2.87)*** 
TLOSS  7.3263 
(1.01) 
 2.6076 
( 0.63) 
6.7838 
(1.37) 
TPD   4.2825 
( 0.90) 
1.1068 
(0.27) 
 1.4448 
( 0.25) 
TTD  6.8358 
(1.19) 
 2.1531 
( 0.68) 
11.9691 
(2.27)** 
TFTR  23.0864 
(2.20)** 
7.4117 
(1.14) 
 24.1738 
( 1.45) 
TUNC   4.8541 
( 0.39) 
 2.5071 
( 0.48) 
 7.4529 
( 0.83) 
CC   5.5659 
( 0.89) 
1.0699 
(3.56)*** 
 0.1248 
( 0.20) 
EM   1.4734 
( 2.27)** 
 1.3827 
( 3.88)*** 
 1.5597 
( 2.91)*** 
CAPINT   0.9400 
( 2.08)** 
 0.1762 
( 3.26)*** 
 0.1705 
( 1.89)* 
LEV   0.3126 
( 0.23) 
 0.0672 
( 0.54) 
 0.1929 
( 0.69) 
DIV  0.0064 
(2.15)** 
0.0005 
(0.77) 
0.0015 
(1.81)* 
FS  0.0101 
(2.42)** 
0.0011 
(2.25)** 
0.0024 
(1.85)* 
Cons   0.9284 
( 1.45) 
0.7106 
(6.70)*** 
 0.0435 
( 0.19) 
R squared   41.47%  34.65%  43.80% 
n  405  405  405 
Wald chi
2  2132.80*** 
22
# 
238.89*** 
22
# 
1454.12*** 
22
# 
Breusch Pagan  106.91*** 
22
# 
31.35* 
22
# 
169.58*** 
22
# 
Figures in parentheses represent cross section clustered Eicker Huber White adjusted t statistics. 
 ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 2.5% and 5% respectively.  
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Table B.9 
Choice of Deflator: Firm Value, Components of Tax Saving and Corporate Governance 
with Interaction Variables - Persistent Profit-Making Companies 
  (I)  (II)  (III) 
  Number of  
Shares 
(DV=MVEt+3months/ 
Number of shares) 
Opening Market  
Value 
(DV=MVEt+3months/ 
Opening market value) 
Sales 
(DV= 
MVEt+3months/ 
Sales) 
BVE  0.4077 
(1.84)* 
0.0545 
(0.87) 
1.2465 
(4.24)*** 
PBT  7.5592 
(11.24)*** 
4.3937 
(9.99)*** 
6.1252 
(7.78)*** 
NED  0.2236 
(2.13)** 
 0.0002 
( 0.13) 
0.0052 
(2.01)** 
IOWN   0.0065 
( 0.92) 
0.0010 
(0.94) 
 0.0059 
( 2.90)*** 
TLOSS  42.1614 
(2.32)** 
20.6707 
(2.17)** 
11.8920 
(1.15) 
TPD  2.1040 
(0.14) 
 9.5247 
( 1.16) 
2.8847 
(0.28) 
TTD  16.8757 
(1.69)* 
 3.2542 
( 0.21) 
33.4630 
(1.40) 
TFTR   45.2904 
( 0.81) 
 1.5081 
( 0.05) 
 24.2210 
( 0.35) 
TUNC  25.8895 
(0.90) 
11.7359 
(0.81) 
9.1036 
(0.62) 
TLOSS_NED   0.4264^ 
( 0.37) 
0.0346^ 
(0.08) 
 1.0824^ 
( 1.69)* 
TLOSS_IOWN   1.3086 
( 2.23)** 
 0.6752 
( 2.54)** 
 0.2645 
( 0.83) 
TPD_NED   0.7909^ 
( 1.07) 
 0.1077^ 
( 0.33) 
 0.2787^ 
( 0.61) 
TPD_IOWN   0.1105 
( 0.24) 
0.2507 
(1.20) 
 0.1731 
( 0.62) 
TTD_NED  0.1926^ 
(0.31) 
0.4080 
(0.14) 
 0.4521 
( 1.15) 
TTD_IOWN   0.4421 
( 1.32) 
 0.0598 
( 0.30) 
0.0069 
(0.03) 
TFTR_NED  1.8687 
(1.79)* 
0.1239 
(0.28) 
1.2290 
(1.15) 
TFTR_IOWN   1.4307 
( 2.40)** 
0.0563 
(0.14) 
 2.1234 
( 3.60)*** 
TUNC_NED  0.3391 
(0.64) 
0.2229^ 
(0.33) 
 0.4176^ 
( 0.49) 
TUNC_IOWN   1.3993 
( 2.26)** 
 0.4472 
( 1.10) 
 0.4275 
( 1.06) 
CC   0.7258 
( 1.21) 
1.0646 
(3.55)*** 
0.3133 
(0.41) 
EM   1.4229 
( 2.27)** 
 1.3173 
( 5.52)*** 
 1.3772 
( 2.92)*** 
CAPINT   1.0613 
( 2.54)** 
 0.1780 
( 2.70)*** 
 0.1934 
( 2.04)** 
LEV   0.1078 
( 0.08) 
 0.0750 
( 0.61) 
 0.2797 
( 1.00) 
DIV  0.0058 
(1.91)* 
0.0007 
(0.95) 
0.0015 
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FS  0.0088 
(2.13)** 
0.0010 
(2.15)** 
0.0019 
(1.62) 
Cons   0.9682 
( 1.52) 
0.6875 
(6.63)*** 
0.0107 
(0.05) 
R squared   43.84%  36.52%  49.01% 
n  405  405  405 
Wald chi
2  3909.48*** 
32
# 
206.72*** 
32
# 
1856.37*** 
32
# 
Breusch Pagan  118.06*** 
32
# 
0.92 
32
# 
176.69*** 
32
# 
Figures in parentheses of Column I and Column III represent cross section clustered Eicker 
Huber White  adjusted  t statistics.  Results  reported  in  Column  II  are  based  on  unadjusted  t 
statistics as the tests indicate no significant heteroscedasticity. 
 ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 2.5% and 5% respectively.  
# indicates degree of freedom. 
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Table B.10 
Firm Fixed-Effect: Firm Value and Tax Planning 
             (I)  (II)       (III) 
DV=MVEt+3months/ 
BVEt-1 
Persistent 
Profit-Making 
Companies 
Persistent and 
Non-Persistent 
Profit-Making 
Companies 
Components of 
Tax Saving – 
Persistent Profit-
Making 
Companies 
BVE  1.2523 
(4.41)*** 
1.2362 
(4.55)*** 
0.9728 
(3.38)*** 
PBT  9.1020 
(7.04)*** 
9.0147 
(7.57)*** 
8.6500 
(6.86)*** 
TS   9.4580 
( 1.98)** 
 9.3716 
( 2.19)** 
  
NPSTDUMTS     19.7116 
(1.13) 
  
TLOSS         5.8114 
( 1.00) 
TPD         13.9747 
( 1.95)* 
TTD         1.1184 
( 0.19) 
TFTR         12.1764 
( 0.96) 
TUNC         10.8878 
( 1.22) 
CC  0.0766 
(0.14) 
0.1299 
(0.23) 
0.0634 
(0.12) 
EM   2.2270 
( 3.69)*** 
 2.2325 
( 3.87)*** 
 1.8782 
( 3.08)*** 
CAPINT  0.1559 
(0.20) 
0.2719 
(0.36) 
 0.0533 
( 0.09) 
LEV   0.8857 
( 0.96) 
 1.0203 
( 1.14) 
 1.0015 
( 1.22) 
DIV   0.0006 
(0.28) 
 0.0007 
( 0.37) 
0.0018 
(0.95) 
FS   0.0018 
( 0.43) 
 0.0031 
( 0.73) 
 0.0011 
( 0.27) 
Cons   0.1911 
( 0.43) 
 0.1201 
( 0.27) 
 0.0488 
( 0.10) 
R squared   63.91%  63.50%  58.78% 
n  444  472  405 
F statistic 
 
24.80*** 
9
# 
22.90*** 
10
# 
6.66*** 
13
# 
Breusch Pagan  64.98*** 
9
# 
68.39*** 
10
# 
58.08*** 
13
# 
Figures in parentheses represent cross section clustered Eicker Huber White adjusted t statistics. 
 ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 2.5% and 5% respectively.  
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Table B.11 
Firm Fixed-Effect: Firm Value, Tax Planning and Corporate Governance  
             (I)  (II)       (III)  (IV) 
DV=MVEt+3months/ 
BVEt-1 
Persistent 
Profit-
Making 
Companies 
Persistent 
and Non-
Persistent 
Profit-
Making 
Companies 
Components of 
Tax Saving – 
Persistent 
Profit-Making 
Companies 
Components 
of Tax Saving 
– Persistent 
Profit-
Making 
Companies 
BVE  1.3319 
(4.79)*** 
1.3070 
(4.92)*** 
0.9942 
(3.37)*** 
0.9966 
(3.03)*** 
PBT  8.8697 
(6.96)*** 
8.7895 
(7.50)*** 
8.6520 
(7.12)*** 
8.5747 
(6.97)*** 
TS   8.2344 
( 1.77)* 
 8.0922 
( 1.95)* 
     
NPSTDUMTS     3.4235 
(0.15) 
     
NED   0.0022 
( 0.23) 
 0.0056 
( 0.58) 
0.0290 
(0.29) 
0.0065 
(0.50) 
IOWN   0.0235 
( 3.73)*** 
 0.0238 
( 3.77)*** 
 0.0201 
( 3.36)*** 
 0.0272 
( 3.61)*** 
TLOSS         4.7147 
( 0.77) 
10.4564 
(0.86) 
TPD         13.9522 
( 2.09)** 
 14.9295 
( 0.98) 
TTD        2.2369 
(0.38) 
 3.2351 
( 0.11) 
TFTR         7.0877 
( 0.53) 
82.7032 
(0.91) 
TUNC         10.7543 
( 1.09) 
17.4809 
(0.28) 
TLOSS_NED^            0.4506 
( 0.80) 
TLOSS_IOWN            0.3657 
( 0.92) 
TPD_NED^            0.3775 
( 0.61) 
TPD_IOWN           0.0178 
(0.04) 
TTD_NED           0.0822 
(0.18) 
TTD_IOWN           0.0038 
(0.01) 
TFTR_NED            0.5746 
( 0.46) 
TFTR_IOWN            1.4814 
( 2.14)** 
TUNC_NED           0.1102 
(0.12) 
TUNC_IOWN            0.8540 
( 1.32) 
CC  0.0184 
(0.04) 
0.0906 
(0.18) 
0.0788 
(0.17) 
0.2000 
(0.39) 
EM   2.2854 
( 3.76)*** 
 2.3051 
( 3.99)*** 
 1.9882 
( 3.23)*** 
 1.9895 
( 3.12)*** 
CAPINT  0.1989 
(0.25) 
0.2830 
(0.36) 
 0.1110 
( 0.16) 
 0.3060 
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LEV   0.6849 
( 0.79) 
 0.9047 
( 1.07) 
 1.1095 
( 1.43) 
 1.2936 
( 1.76)* 
DIV  0.0001 
(0.00) 
 0.0002 
( 0.12) 
0.0023 
(1.24) 
0.0027 
(1.42) 
FS   0.0008 
( 0.19) 
 0.0020 
( 0.47) 
 0.0006 
( 0.14) 
 0.0003 
( 0.07) 
Cons  0.5832 
(0.86) 
0.8932 
(1.32) 
0.4026 
(0.60) 
0.2480 
(0.32) 
R squared   65.79%  65.45%  60.70%  62.15% 
n  444  472  405  405 
F statistic 
 
27.56*** 
11
# 
25.47*** 
12
# 
7.30*** 
15
# 
6.01*** 
25
# 
Breusch Pagan  65.14*** 
11
# 
70.10*** 
12
# 
58.77*** 
15
# 
73.19*** 
25
# 
Figures in parentheses represent cross section clustered Eicker Huber White adjusted t statistics. 
 ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 2.5% and 5% respectively.  
# indicates degree of freedom. 
^ indicates centred variable. 
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Table B.12 
Tobin’s Q and Tax Planning 
Figures in parentheses represent cross section clustered Eicker Huber White adjusted t statistics. 
 ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 2.5% and 5% respectively.  
# indicates degree of freedom. 
             (I)  (II)       (III) 
DV=Tobin’s Q  Persistent 
Profit-Making 
Companies 
Persistent and Non-
Persistent Profit-
Making Companies 
Components of Tax 
Saving – Persistent 
Profit-Making 
Companies 
PBT  8.3508 
(7.79)*** 
8.6052 
(8.97)*** 
8.3423 
(7.67)*** 
TS   5.0502 
( 2.22)** 
 5.8674 
( 2.56)*** 
  
NPSTDUMTS      8.1942 
( 1.04) 
  
TLOSS        4.0909 
(0.94) 
TPD         5.9914 
( 1.15) 
TTD        3.7909 
(0.91) 
TFTR        8.4308 
(0.85) 
TUNC        2.000 
(0.31) 
CC  0.1346 
(0.22) 
0.3562 
(0.57) 
0.3864 
(0.59) 
EM   1.825 
( 3.56)*** 
 1.9735 
( 3.86)*** 
 1.5826 
( 3.13)*** 
CAPINT   0.2315 
( 3.18)*** 
 0.2302 
( 2.85)*** 
 0.1845 
( 2.64)*** 
LEV   0.0928 
( 0.53) 
0.0212 
(0.12) 
0.1208 
(0.72) 
DIV  0.0005 
(0.68) 
0.0006 
(0.77) 
0.0014 
(1.88)* 
FS  0.0025 
(2.89)*** 
0.0022 
(2.54)** 
0.0023 
(2.81)*** 
Cons  1.0485 
(8.06)*** 
0.9607 
(7.19)*** 
0.9111 
(6.78)*** 
R squared   18.38%  18.44%  22.43% 
n  444  472  405 
Wald chi
2 
 
227.12*** 
15
# 
284.15*** 
17
# 
242.16*** 
19
# 
Breusch Pagan  93.31*** 
15
# 
105.04*** 
17
# 
77.73*** 
19
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Table B.13 
Tobin’s Q, Tax Planning and Corporate Governance  
             (I)  (II)       (III)  (IV) 
DV=Tobin’s Q  Persistent 
Profit-
Making 
Companies 
Persistent 
and Non-
Persistent 
Profit-
Making 
Companies 
Components 
of Tax Saving 
– Persistent 
Profit-
Making 
Companies 
Components 
of Tax Saving 
– Persistent 
Profit-
Making 
Companies 
PBT  8.3709 
(7.66)*** 
8.5916 
(8.81)*** 
8.3222 
(7.44)*** 
8.0717 
(6.97)*** 
TS   5.4257 
( 2.37)** 
 6.1391 
( 2.70)*** 
     
NPSTDUMTS      9.7617 
( 1.19) 
     
NED  0.0028 
(1.41) 
0.0015 
(0.73) 
0.0028 
(1.39) 
0.0028 
(1.22) 
IOWN   0.0028 
( 1.91)* 
 0.0033 
( 2.19)** 
 0.0030 
( 1.91)* 
 0.0022 
( 1.21) 
TLOSS        3.6169 
(0.86) 
16.2603 
(1.32) 
TPD         6.4144 
( 1.26) 
 12.2592 
( 0.44) 
TTD        4.2379 
(1.04) 
8.1372 
(0.71) 
TFTR        7.8003 
(0.79) 
19.8320 
(0.41) 
TUNC         0.9491 
( 0.15) 
15.9653 
(0.99) 
TLOSS_NED^            0.2549 
( 0.49) 
TLOSS_IOWN            0.3649 
( 0.95) 
TPD_NED            0.1292 
( 0.26) 
TPD_IOWN           0.3576 
(0.78) 
TTD_NED^           0.1449 
(0.33) 
TTD_IOWN            0.0977 
( 0.29) 
TFTR_NED           0.4238 
(0.57) 
TFTR_IOWN            1.0177 
( 1.76)* 
TUNC_NED^           0.0829 
(0.11) 
TUNC_IOWN            0.4986 
( 1.26) 
CC  0.1177 
(0.21) 
0.3533 
(0.63) 
0.3757 
(0.65) 
0.5223 
(0.93) 
EM   1.8154 
( 3.49)*** 
 1.9857 
( 3.84)*** 
 1.6004 
( 3.13)*** 
 1.5606 
( 2.98)*** 
CAPINT   0.2267 
( 3.07)*** 
 0.2179 
( 2.65)*** 
 0.1880 
( 2.71)*** 
 0.2032 
( 2.82)*** 
LEV   0.1589 
( 0.91) 
 0.0341 
( 0.19) 
0.0456 
(0.27) 
0.0366 
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DIV  0.0005 
(0.71) 
0.0005 
(0.72) 
0.0014 
(1.90)* 
0.0014 
(1.93)* 
FS  0.0024 
(2.71)*** 
0.0021 
(2.48)** 
0.0022 
(2.64)*** 
0.0017 
(2.19)** 
Cons  0.9947 
(5.45)*** 
1.000 
(2.76)*** 
0.8668 
(2.05)*** 
0.8808 
(4.89)*** 
R squared   20.68%  20.84%  24.52%  26.87% 
n  444  472  405  405 
Wald chi
2 
 
199.99*** 
17
# 
268.11*** 
19
# 
319.09*** 
21
# 
425.29*** 
31
# 
Breusch Pagan  94.47*** 
17
# 
105.32*** 
19
# 
79.54*** 
21
# 
95.35*** 
31
# 
Figures in parentheses represent cross section clustered Eicker Huber White adjusted t statistics. 
 ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 2.5% and 5% respectively.  
# indicates degree of freedom. 
^ indicates centred variable. 
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Table B.14 
Potential Effects of Tax Planning-Related Factors: Market Value of Equity and Tax 
Planning  
             (I)  (II)       (III) 
DV=MVEt+3months/ 
BVEt-1 
Persistent 
Profit-Making 
Companies 
Persistent and 
Non-Persistent 
Profit-Making 
Companies 
Components of Tax 
Saving – Persistent 
Profit-Making 
Companies 
BVE  1.0979 
(4.53)*** 
1.0257 
(4.40)*** 
0.6982 
(2.59)*** 
PBT  10.0736 
(16.84)*** 
10.1056 
(18.00)*** 
9.6650 
(14.34)*** 
TS   9.5025 
( 2.96)*** 
 9.0177 
( 2.94)*** 
  
NPSTDUMTS      13.2592 
( 1.68)* 
  
TLOSS         0.1621 
( 0.03) 
TPD         12.1023 
( 1.84)* 
TTD        7.5070 
(1.52) 
TFTR        3.4746 
(0.42) 
TUNC         2.8043 
( 0.25) 
CC  0.2145 
(0.45) 
0.4027 
(0.85) 
0.3906 
(0.83) 
EM   2.6499 
( 6.00)*** 
 2.7548 
( 6.57)*** 
 2.4189 
( 5.29)*** 
DIV   0.0006 
( 0.36) 
 0.0003 
( 0.18) 
0.0022 
(1.25) 
Cons  0.0679 
(0.19) 
 0.0586 
( 0.16) 
0.2039 
(0.52) 
R squared   63.64%  62.86%  57.65% 
n  444  472  405 
Wald chi
2 
 
491.81*** 
13
# 
547.47*** 
15
# 
310.14*** 
17
# 
Breusch Pagan  78.95*** 
13
# 
80.75** 
15
# 
76.09*** 
17
# 
Figures in parentheses represent cross section clustered Eicker Huber White adjusted t statistics. 
 ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 2.5% and 5% respectively.  
# indicates degree of freedom. 
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Table B.15 
Potential Effects of Tax Planning-Related Factors: Market Value of Equity, Tax Planning 
and Corporate Governance  
             (I)  (II)       (III)  (IV) 
DV=MVEt+3months/ 
BVEt-1 
Persistent 
Profit-
Making 
Companies 
Persistent and 
Non-
Persistent 
Profit-Making 
Companies 
Components 
of Tax 
Saving – 
Persistent 
Profit-
Making 
Companies 
Components 
of Tax 
Saving – 
Persistent 
Profit-
Making 
Companies 
BVE  1.1346 
(4.68)*** 
1.0564 
(4.50)*** 
0.7333 
(2.59)*** 
0.7143 
(2.48)*** 
PBT  10.0788 
(16.72)*** 
10.0674 
(17.76)*** 
9.6111 
(14.17)*** 
9.6301 
(14.40)*** 
TS   10.0404 
( 3.14)*** 
 9.3222 
( 3.07)*** 
     
NPSTDUMTS      14.7436 
( 1.75)* 
     
NED  0.0091 
(1.70)* 
0.0055 
(1.00) 
0.0095 
(1.88)* 
0.0094 
(1.88)* 
IOWN   0.0073 
( 1.86)* 
 0.0072 
( 1.88)* 
 0.0081 
( 2.02)** 
 0.0048 
( 1.23) 
TLOSS         1.3063 
( 0.22) 
28.6994 
(2.08)** 
TPD         12.4622 
( 1.97) 
 12.6910 
( 0.93) 
TTD        7.7668 
(1.62) 
24.5286 
(0.94) 
TFTR        2.5688 
(0.31) 
13.3405 
(0.30) 
TUNC         5.7410 
( 0.55) 
2.4211 
(0.04) 
TLOSS_NED^            0.1566 
( 0.36) 
TLOSS_IOWN            0.8954 
( 2.44)** 
TPD_NED^            0.3768 
( 0.72) 
TPD_IOWN            0.0218 
( 0.06) 
TTD_NED            0.0895 
( 0.22) 
TTD_IOWN            0.4122 
( 1.22) 
TFTR_NED           0.4591 
(0.67) 
TFTR_IOWN            1.0198 
( 1.97)** 
TUNC_NED           0.4285 
(0.49) 
TUNC_IOWN            1.0285 
( 2.20)** 
CC  0.1229 
(0.26) 
0.3334 
(0.71) 
0.3287 
(0.72) 
0.4911 
(1.01) 
EM   2.6239 
( 5.81)*** 
 2.7466 
( 6.41)*** 
 2.4338 
( 5.14)*** 
 2.3604 
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DIV   0.0007 
( 0.38) 
 0.0004 
( 0.23) 
0.0023 
(1.30) 
0.0021 
(1.19) 
Cons   0.2325 
( 0.50) 
 0.1278 
( 0.28) 
 0.0736 
( 0.16) 
 0.1852 
( 0.40) 
R squared   64.49%  63.79%  58.98%  59.71% 
n  444  472  405  405 
Wald chi
2 
 
496.10*** 
15
# 
547.90*** 
17
# 
329.80*** 
19
# 
443.50*** 
29
# 
Breusch Pagan  81.82*** 
15
# 
84.12*** 
17
# 
75.18*** 
19
# 
85.83*** 
29
# 
Figures in parentheses represent cross section clustered Eicker Huber White adjusted t statistics. 
 ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 2.5% and 5% respectively.  
# indicates degree of freedom. 
^ indicates centred variable. 
 
Table B.16 
Potential Effects of Tax Planning-Related Factors: Tobin’s Q and Tax Planning  
             (I)  (II)       (III) 
DV=Tobin’s Q  Persistent 
Profit-Making 
Companies 
Persistent and 
Non-Persistent 
Profit-Making 
Companies 
Components of Tax 
Saving – Persistent 
Profit-Making 
Companies 
PBT  8.4483 
(8.14)*** 
8.6364 
(9.41)*** 
8.2553 
(7.75)*** 
TS   5.2056 
( 2.32)** 
 5.9490 
( 2.63)*** 
  
NPSTDUMTS      6.3324 
( 0.87) 
  
TLOSS        4.5165 
(1.05) 
TPD         5.9151 
( 1.14) 
TTD        4.5251 
(1.10) 
TFTR        6.3175 
(0.59) 
TUNC        3.4216 
(0.48) 
CC  0.2542 
(0.43) 
0.4500 
(0.75) 
0.4187 
(0.67) 
EM   1.6318 
( 3.21)*** 
 1.8007 
( 3.56)*** 
 1.4258 
( 2.89)*** 
DIV  0.0003 
(0.43) 
0.0004 
(0.56) 
0.0013 
(1.74)* 
Cons  1.1481 
(9.40)*** 
1.0552 
(8.35)*** 
1.0241 
(7.84)*** 
R squared   18.74%  19.05%  23.04% 
n  444  472  405 
Wald chi
2 
 
180.96*** 
12
# 
216.90*** 
14
# 
268.59*** 
16
# 
Breusch Pagan  61364*** 
12
# 
106.39** 
14
# 
80.98*** 
16
# 
Figures in parentheses represent cross section clustered Eicker Huber White adjusted t statistics. 
 ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 2.5% and 5% respectively.  
# indicates degree of freedom. 
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Table B.17 
Potential Effects of Tax Planning-Related Factors: Tobin’s Q, Tax Planning and Corporate 
Governance  
             (I)  (II)       (III)  (IV) 
DV=Tobin’s Q  Persistent 
Profit-Making 
Companies 
Persistent and 
Non-Persistent 
Profit-Making 
Companies 
Components 
of Tax 
Saving – 
Persistent 
Profit-
Making 
Companies 
Components 
of Tax 
Saving – 
Persistent 
Profit-
Making 
Companies 
PBT  8.5127 
(8.03)*** 
8.6588 
(9.26)*** 
8.3064 
(7.63)*** 
8.0673 
(7.18)*** 
TS   5.7304 
( 2.55)** 
 6.3274 
( 2.83)*** 
     
NPSTDUMTS      7.8264 
( 1.03) 
     
NED  0.0034 
(1.63) 
0.0023 
(1.09) 
0.0038 
(1.86)* 
0.0035 
(1.59) 
IOWN   0.0028 
( 1.95)* 
 0.0033 
( 2.26)** 
 0.0030 
( 1.92)* 
 0.0022 
( 1.21) 
TLOSS        3.8658 
(0.93) 
16.2757 
(1.31) 
TPD         6.5768 
( 1.29) 
 11.8392 
( 0.41) 
TTD        4.8685 
(1.24) 
9.7404 
(0.85) 
TFTR        5.7604 
(0.54) 
21.7135 
(0.43) 
TUNC         0.1220 
( 0.02) 
17.1055 
(1.01) 
TLOSS_NED^            0.2600 
( 0.51) 
TLOSS_IOWN            0.3425 
( 0.90) 
TPD_NED            0.1389 
( 0.28) 
TPD_IOWN           0.3560 
(0.78) 
TTD_NED^           0.2511 
(0.58) 
TTD_IOWN            0.1146 
( 0.35) 
TFTR_NED           0.4389 
(0.56) 
TFTR_IOWN            1.1409 
( 1.88)* 
TUNC_NED^            0.0023 
( 0.00) 
TUNC_IOWN            0.5046 
( 1.25) 
CC  0.2306 
(0.44) 
0.4396 
(0.83) 
0.4099 
(0.75) 
0.5725 
(1.06) 
EM   1.6197 
( 3.11)*** 
 1.8176 
( 3.52)*** 
 1.4374 
( 2.84)*** 
 1.4103 
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DIV  0.0003 
(0.45) 
0.0004 
(0.51) 
0.0013 
(1.77)* 
0.0013 
(1.81)* 
Cons  1.0538 
(5.57)*** 
1.0488 
(5.89)*** 
0.9156 
(5.12)*** 
0.9177 
(5.00)*** 
R squared   20.95%  21.40%  25.01%  27.42% 
n  444  472  405  405 
Wald chi
2 
 
159.96*** 
14
# 
200.54*** 
16
# 
325.57*** 
18
# 
424.74*** 
28
# 
Breusch Pagan  98.71*** 
14
# 
107.86*** 
16
# 
83.09*** 
18
# 
97.02*** 
28
# 
Figures in parentheses represent cross section clustered Eicker Huber White adjusted t statistics. 
 ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 2.5% and 5% respectively.  
# indicates degree of freedom. 
^ indicates centred variable. 
 
 Table B.18   
Firm Value and Tax Planning of Persistent Profit-Making Companies: 2SLS 
 
Dependent Variable (DV) = MVEt+3months/BVEt-1  Persistent Profit-Making 
Companies 
BVE  0.5840 
(1.60) 
PBT  10.3617 
(17.87)*** 
TS   8.7792 
( 1.44) 
CC   0.3726 
( 0.53) 
EM   3.0447 
( 7.09)*** 
CAPINT   0.7373 
( 2.45)** 
LEV   0.2828 
( 0.51) 
DIV   0.0002 
( 0.07) 
FS  0.0054 
(2.56)** 
Cons  0.3040 
(0.60) 
R squared (centred)   72.86% 
R squared (un centred)  92.52% 
n  444 
F statistic 
 
46.56*** 
16
# 
***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 2.5% and 5% respectively. 
# indicates degree of freedom. 
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Table B.19 
Reclassification of Unclassified Items – Persistent Profit-Making Companies 
Figures in parentheses represent cross section clustered Eicker Huber White adjusted t statistics. 
 ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 2.5% and 5% respectively.  
# indicates degree of freedom. 
 
  (I)   (II)  (III)   (IV) 
DV=MVEt+3months/BVEt-1  TUNC as 
TPD 
TUNC as 
TTD  
TUNC as 
TPD  
TUNC as 
TTD  
BVE  0.6945 
(2.50)** 
0.6823 
(2.56)** 
0.7291 
(2.54)** 
0.7169 
(2.60)*** 
PBT  9.6029 
(14.42)*** 
9.6300 
(14.35)*** 
9.5257 
(14.13)*** 
9.5555 
(14.05)*** 
TLOSS   0.4901 
( 0.08) 
 2.1415 
( 0.36) 
 1.6637 
( 0.29) 
 3.5058 
( 0.61) 
TPD      12.6433 
( 1.90)* 
    13.0309 
( 2.03)** 
TPDUNC   10.2204 
( 1.76)* 
    11.0061 
( 1.97)** 
  
TTD  6.1396 
(1.17) 
   6.6674 
(1.31) 
  
TTDUNC     4.5407 
(1.04) 
   4.3322 
(1.01) 
TFTR  6.5811 
(0.79) 
6.1774 
(0.70) 
5.7470 
(0.71) 
5.4379 
(0.63) 
NED        0.0077 
(1.48) 
0.0068 
(1.32) 
IOWN         0.0086 
( 2.15)** 
 0.0076 
( 1.89)* 
CC  0.3650 
(0.74) 
0.3758 
(0.79) 
0.3170 
(0.67) 
0.3278 
(0.72) 
EM   2.5419 
( 5.56)*** 
 2.5558 
( 5.59)*** 
 2.5813 
( 5.46)*** 
 2.6001 
( 5.51)*** 
CAPINT   0.4690 
( 2.38)** 
 0.4521 
( 2.34)** 
 0.4828 
( 2.50)** 
 0.4678 
( 2.47)** 
LEV   0.0093 
( 0.02) 
 0.0765 
( 0.19) 
 0.2355 
( 0.57) 
 0.2752 
( 0.66) 
DIV  0.0024 
(1.37) 
0.0025 
(1.40) 
0.0026 
(1.46) 
0.0025 
(1.44) 
FS  0.0062 
(3.18)*** 
 2.5558 
( 5.59)*** 
0.0059 
(2.94)*** 
0.0060 
(3.04)*** 
Cons   0.0548 
( 0.14) 
 0.0451 
( 0.12) 
 0.1953 
( 0.43) 
 0.1691 
( 0.38) 
R squared   57.37%  57.22%  58.88%  58.53% 
n  405  405  405  405 
Wald chi
2 
 
347.17*** 
19
# 
347.27*** 
19
# 
360.99*** 
21
# 
355.97*** 
21
# 
Breusch Pagan  75.08*** 
19
# 
77.17*** 
19
# 
77.28*** 
21
# 
77.97*** 
21
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Table B.20 
Reclassification of Unclassified Items with Corporate Governance Interaction Variables – 
Persistent Profit-Making Companies 
  (I)   (II) 
DV=MVEt+3months/BVEt-1  TUNC as TPD   TUNC as TTD  
BVE  0.7103 
(2.29)** 
0.6901 
(2.36)** 
PBT  9.5263 
(13.93)*** 
9.5785 
(14.18)*** 
TLOSS  29.9363 
(2.28)** 
31.6662 
(2.66)*** 
TPD      10.1712 
( 0.74) 
TPDUNC   4.5914 
( 0.37) 
  
TTD  25.6560 
(0.98) 
  
TTDUNC     19.9973 
(2.43)** 
TFTR  11.2306 
(0.27) 
11.5518 
(0.29) 
TLOSS_NED   0.0886^ 
( 0.22) 
 0.2200^ 
( 0.56) 
TLOSS_IOWN   0.9504 
( 2.78)*** 
 1.0509 
( 3.34)*** 
TPD_NED      0.3959^ 
( 0.72) 
TPD_IOWN      0.1153 
( 0.29) 
TPDUNC_NED   0.1540^ 
( 0.37) 
  
TPDUNC_IOWN   0.2210 
( 0.69) 
  
TTD_NED   0.1506 
( 0.37) 
  
TTD_IOWN   0.3724 
( 1.13) 
  
TTDUNC_NED      0.1574^ 
( 0.49) 
TTDUNC_IOWN      0.5075 
( 2.15)** 
TFTR_NED  0.4169 
(0.63) 
0.4318 
(0.65) 
TFTR_IOWN   0.8201 
( 1.72)* 
 0.8561 
( 1.77)* 
NED  0.0075 
(1.46) 
0.0062 
(1.04) 
IOWN   0.0074 
( 1.91)* 
 0.0051 
( 1.30) 
CC  0.4356 
(0.89) 
0.4855 
(1.40) 
EM   2.5477 
( 5.27)*** 
 2.5295 
( 5.17)*** 
CAPINT   0.4987 
( 2.56)** 
 0.4905 
( 2.54)** 
LEV   0.2114 
( 0.49) 
 0.2372 
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Figures in parentheses represent cross section clustered Eicker Huber White adjusted t statistics. 
 ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 2.5% and 5% respectively.  
# indicates degree of freedom. 
^ indicates centred variable. 
 
 
Table B.21 
Annual Regressions: Firm Value and Tax Planning – Persistent Profit- Making Companies 
      (I)     (II)  (III) 
DV=MVEt+3months/BVEt-1  2005  2006  2007 
BVE  1.0983 
(4.93)*** 
1.6337 
(3.89)*** 
 0.9939 
( 2.10)** 
PBT  10.9880 
(15.76)*** 
10.6205 
(15.25)*** 
9.7832 
(10.10)*** 
TS   9.1206 
( 1.94)* 
 8.7871 
( 2.03)** 
1.4302 
(0.35) 
CC  0.3557 
(0.62) 
 1.7190 
( 2.04)** 
2.0719 
(3.74)*** 
EM   2.5500 
( 3.68)*** 
 2.8017 
( 4.97)*** 
 3.1506 
( 4.75)*** 
CAPINT   0.3361 
( 1.24) 
 0.6415 
( 2.35)** 
 0.9161 
( 2.76)*** 
LEV  0.0286 
(0.05) 
 0.1975 
( 0.31) 
 0.7309 
( 1.06) 
DIV   0.0020 
( 0.63) 
 0.0013 
( 0.35) 
0.0034 
(0.77) 
FS  0.0093 
(3.36)*** 
0.0071 
(2.86)*** 
0.0024 
(1.02) 
Cons   0.1448 
( 0.37) 
 0.6152 
( 1.21) 
1.6665 
(3.22)*** 
R squared   83.88%  82.75%  70.47% 
n  148  148  148 
F statistic  125.81*** 
16
# 
34.48*** 
16
# 
27.30*** 
16
# 
Figures in parentheses represent cross section clustered Eicker Huber White adjusted t statistics. 
 ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 2.5% and 5% respectively.  
# indicates degree of freedom. 
 
DIV  0.0023 
(1.31) 
0.0023 
(1.40) 
FS  0.0055 
(2.78)*** 
0.0054 
(2.84)*** 
Cons   0.2197 
( 0.48) 
 0.1987 
( 0.40) 
R squared   59.27%  59.21% 
n  405  405 
Wald chi
2 
 
440.02*** 
29
# 
472.24*** 
29
# 
Breusch Pagan  87.51*** 
29
# 
94.11*** 
29
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Table B.22 
Annual Regressions: Firm Value, Tax Planning and Corporate Governance – Persistent 
Profit-Making Companies 
  (I)                    (II)  (III) 
DV=MVEt+3months/BVEt-1  2005  2006  2007 
BVE  1.1081 
(4.70)*** 
1.6532 
(3.84)*** 
 0.9579 
( 1.96)* 
PBT  11.0321 
(15.63)*** 
10.7328 
(15.80)*** 
9.7254 
(9.90)*** 
TS   9.1429 
( 1.85)* 
 9.3589 
( 2.19)** 
1.1381 
(0.27) 
NED  0.0063 
(0.80) 
0.0102 
(1.45) 
0.0072 
(0.98) 
IOWN  0.0023 
(0.44) 
 0.0056 
( 1.01) 
0.0011 
(0.16) 
CC  0.3520 
(0.58) 
 1.6043 
( 1.96)* 
1.9752 
(3.26)*** 
EM   2.5702 
( 3.76)*** 
 2.6947 
( 4.84)*** 
 3.0847 
( 4.24)*** 
CAPINT   0.3467 
( 1.31) 
 0.5933 
( 2.27)** 
 0.9523 
( 2.87)*** 
LEV   0.0615 
( 0.10) 
 0.4833 
( 0.78) 
 0.8706 
( 1.26) 
DIV   0.0016 
( 0.49) 
 0.0021 
( 0.56) 
0.0035 
(0.82) 
FS  0.0083 
(2.74)*** 
0.0067 
(2.63)*** 
0.0020 
(0.81) 
Cons   0.5327 
( 0.90) 
 1.0086 
( 1.59) 
1.2065 
(1.94)* 
R squared   84.02%  83.10%  70.70% 
n  148  148  148 
F statistic  103.42*** 
18
# 
36.25*** 
18
# 
25.93*** 
18
# 
Figures in parentheses represent cross section clustered Eicker Huber White adjusted t statistics. 
 ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 2.5% and 5% respectively.  
# indicates degree of freedom. 
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Table B.23 
Annual Regressions: Firm Value and Tax Planning – Persistent and Non-Persistent Profit- 
Making Companies 
          (I)                    (II)  (III) 
DV=MVEt+3months/BVEt-1  2005  2006  2007 
BVE  1.0238 
(4.62)*** 
1.4728 
(3.09)*** 
 0.9540 
( 1.95)* 
PBT  10.6980 
(13.84)*** 
10.7652 
(16.90)*** 
9.8823 
(10.55)*** 
TS   7.5579 
( 1.50) 
 7.7699 
( 1.93)* 
0.7465 
(0.19) 
NPSTDUMTS   16.0897 
( 1.80)* 
 39.3077 
( 2.46)** 
  
CC  0.6509 
(1.15) 
 0.8146 
( 1.12) 
2.1178 
(3.57)*** 
EM   2.6470 
( 3.84)*** 
 3.2055 
( 5.75)*** 
 3.4511 
( 5.28)*** 
CAPINT   0.3645 
( 1.27) 
 0.6676 
( 2.55)** 
 1.0437 
( 3.06)*** 
LEV  0.2860 
(0.47) 
0.1975 
(0.33) 
 0.3436 
( 0.51) 
DIV   0.0022 
( 0.71) 
0.0002 
(0.06) 
0.0038 
(0.86) 
FS  0.0067 
(2.42)** 
0.0068 
(2.81)*** 
0.0020 
(0.81) 
Cons   0.1232 
( 0.30) 
 0.6196 
( 1.05) 
1.3698 
(2.46)** 
R squared   82.04%  83.08%  71.25% 
n  163  157  152 
F statistic  68.41*** 
18
# 
44.40*** 
17
# 
27.48*** 
16
# 
Figures in parentheses represent cross section clustered Eicker Huber White adjusted t statistics.  
 ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 2.5% and 5% respectively.  
# indicates degree of freedom. 
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Table B.24 
Annual Regressions: Firm Value, Tax Planning and Corporate Governance – Persistent 
and Non-Persistent Profit-Making Companies 
          (I)                    (II)  (III) 
DV=MVEt+3months/BVEt-1  2005  2006  2007 
BVE  1.0268 
(4.39)*** 
1.4672 
(3.02)*** 
 0.9545 
( 1.90)* 
PBT  10.7224 
(13.85)*** 
10.8044 
(17.37)*** 
9.8587 
(10.39)*** 
TS   7.4779 
( 1.42) 
 7.9760 
( 1.96)* 
0.8241 
(0.20) 
NED  0.0037 
(0.45) 
0.0026 
(0.34) 
0.0040 
(0.56) 
IOWN  0.0026 
(0.51) 
 0.0041 
( 0.73) 
0.0022 
(0.36) 
NPSTDUMTS   14.6289 
( 1.54) 
 40.0394 
( 2.24)** 
  
CC  0.6663 
(1.09) 
 0.7240 
( 1.00) 
2.0907 
(3.31)*** 
EM   2.6561 
( 3.89)*** 
 3.1968 
( 5.64)*** 
 3.3668 
( 4.68)*** 
CAPINT   0.3689 
( 1.30) 
 0.6361 
( 2.54)** 
 1.0550 
( 3.11)*** 
LEV  0.2492 
(0.42) 
0.0660 
(0.11) 
 0.4280 
( 0.63) 
DIV   0.0018 
( 0.59) 
 0.0002 
( 0.06) 
0.0040 
(0.92) 
FS  0.0060 
(1.98)** 
0.0068 
(2.73)*** 
0.0017 
(0.67) 
Cons   0.3715 
( 0.61) 
 0.6226 
( 0.82) 
1.0582 
(1.63) 
R squared   82.12%  83.17%  71.36% 
n  163  157  152 
F statistic  61.41*** 
20
# 
42.29*** 
19
# 
26.17*** 
18
# 
Figures in parentheses represent cross section clustered Eicker Huber White adjusted t statistics.  
 ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 2.5% and 5% respectively.  
# indicates degree of freedom. 
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Table B.25 
Annual Regressions: Firm Value and Components of Tax Saving – Persistent Profit-
Making Companies 
                    (I)                     (II)  (III) 
DV=MVEt+3months/BVEt-1  2005  2006  2007 
BVE  0.6995 
(2.04)*** 
1.0305 
(2.60)*** 
 1.6880 
( 2.65)*** 
PBT  9.7108 
(11.03)*** 
10.8634 
(19.61)*** 
10.2907 
(12.79)*** 
TLOSS  13.4291 
(1.37) 
0.1072 
(0.01) 
27.3225 
(1.22) 
TPD   15.9155 
( 1.97)* 
 20.5526 
( 2.78)*** 
29.4864 
(2.69)*** 
TTD  11.1602 
(1.68)* 
12.8281 
(1.70)* 
25.0081 
(2.61)*** 
TFTR  22.7113 
(1.89)* 
9.8445 
(1.20) 
46.4135 
(3.40)*** 
TUNC   20.2492 
( 1.43) 
31.1064 
(2.38)** 
 3.3048 
( 0.29) 
CC  1.1701 
(2.31)** 
 0.7898 
( 1.44) 
2.7937 
(3.61)*** 
EM   1.8286 
( 2.54)** 
 2.6290 
( 4.66)*** 
 3.0259 
( 4.73)*** 
CAPINT   0.1234 
( 0.39) 
 0.5705 
( 2.26)** 
 0.8814 
( 2.63)*** 
LEV  0.3662 
(0.63) 
 0.0262 
( 0.05) 
 0.6703 
( 1.00) 
DIV  0.0028 
(0.87) 
0.0002 
(0.06) 
0.0053 
(1.13) 
FS  0.0098 
(3.62)*** 
0.0065 
(2.88)*** 
0.0014 
(0.57) 
Cons  0.1292 
(0.30) 
 0.2706 
( 0.56) 
1.7647 
(2.40)** 
R squared   74.47%  87.88%  75.36% 
n  135  135  135 
F statistic  16.63*** 
20
# 
41.33*** 
20
# 
17.44*** 
20
# 
Figures in parentheses represent cross section clustered Eicker Huber White adjusted t statistics. 
 ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 2.5% and 5% respectively.  
# indicates degree of freedom. 
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Table B.26 
Annual Regressions: Firm Value, Components of Tax Saving and Corporate Governance – 
Persistent Profit-Making Companies 
                  (I)                (II)  (III) 
DV=MVEt+3months/BVEt-1  2005  2006  2007 
BVE  0.7706 
(2.14)** 
1.0115 
(2.44)** 
 1.6818 
( 2.54)** 
PBT  9.7034 
(10.78)*** 
10.9025 
(18.90)*** 
10.2776 
(11.94)*** 
NED  0.0068 
(0.86) 
0.0036 
(0.50) 
0.0013 
(0.21) 
IOWN   0.0010 
( 0.21) 
0.0011 
(0.18) 
0.0008 
(0.12) 
TLOSS  12.7527 
(1.21) 
0.9603 
(0.12) 
27.8859 
(1.22) 
TPD   17.0481 
( 1.99)** 
 20.6681 
( 2.80)*** 
29.5961 
(2.65)*** 
TTD  11.0665 
(1.61) 
13.0295 
(1.67)* 
25.1923 
(2.65)*** 
TFTR  22.8321 
(1.87)* 
10.3766 
(1.17) 
46.3689 
(3.30)*** 
TUNC   19.7354 
( 1.44) 
30.9350 
(2.09)** 
 2.7656 
( 0.24) 
CC  1.1038 
(2.07)** 
 0.7952 
( 1.45) 
2.7714 
(3.40)*** 
EM   1.9015 
( 2.70)*** 
 2.5832 
( 4.34)*** 
 2.9827 
( 4.22)*** 
CAPINT   0.1216 
( 0.40) 
 0.5704 
( 2.26)** 
 0.8820 
( 2.64)*** 
LEV  0.2815 
(0.47) 
 0.0828 
( 0.51) 
 0.6950 
( 1.04) 
DIV  0.0030 
(0.91) 
0.0001 
(0.05) 
0.0054 
(1.14) 
FS  0.0088 
(2.81)*** 
0.0062 
(2.63)*** 
0.0013 
(0.52) 
Cons   0.2474 
( 0.39) 
 0.4583 
( 0.76) 
1.6530 
(2.02)** 
R squared   74.69%  87.93%  75.38% 
n  135  135  135 
F statistic  15.03*** 
22
# 
37.09*** 
22
# 
15.58*** 
22
# 
Figures in parentheses represent cross section clustered Eicker Huber White adjusted t statistics. 
 ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 2.5% and 5% respectively.  
# indicates degree of freedom. 
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Table B.27 
Annual Regressions: Firm Value, Components of Tax Saving and Corporate Governance 
with Interaction Variables – Persistent Profit-Making Companies 
                  (I)                (II)  (III) 
DV=MVEt+3months/BVEt-1  2005  2006  2007 
BVE  0.9931 
(2.81)*** 
1.1223 
(3.07)*** 
 1.2384 
( 1.94)* 
PBT  9.2793 
(10.41)*** 
11.3381 
(20.96)*** 
10.0258 
(10.63)*** 
NED  0.0086 
(1.22) 
 0.0014 
( 0.18) 
 0.0050 
( 0.45) 
IOWN  0.0009 
(0.18) 
0.0102 
(1.46) 
0.0125 
(1.59) 
TLOSS  43.4085 
(1.98)* 
41.5914 
(2.66)*** 
73.5482 
(2.82)*** 
TPD  8.0038 
(0.51) 
 31.5985 
( 2.04)** 
 12.2378 
( 0.24) 
TTD  44.7185 
(1.25) 
92.2947 
(1.92)* 
112.4462 
(1.93)* 
TFTR  48.3433 
(1.08) 
 42.2585 
( 0.87) 
 18.6723 
( 0.23) 
TUNC  31.9274 
(0.34) 
94.5330 
(1.50) 
 23.8075 
( 0.32) 
TLOSS_NED^  0.7263 
(0.83) 
 0.6956 
( 0.78) 
 1.0204 
( 0.33) 
TLOSS_IOWN   0.9251 
( 1.35) 
 1.6092 
( 3.04)*** 
 1.7376 
( 2.48)** 
TPD_NED^   0.0372 
( 0.04) 
0.2987 
(0.30) 
0.0903 
(0.06) 
TPD_IOWN   0.5728 
( 1.38) 
0.2304 
(0.52) 
1.0569 
(0.80) 
TTD_NED   0.0987 
( 0.17) 
 0.0913 
( 0.11) 
 0.5568 
( 0.70) 
TTD_IOWN  0.8793 
( 1.76)* 
 2.1357 
( 2.92)*** 
 1.5884 
( 1.87)* 
TFTR_NED  0.6185 
(0.77) 
0.8017 
(0.98) 
0.9854 
(0.94) 
TFTR_IOWN   1.8817 
( 2.70)*** 
0.1243 
(0.25) 
 0.1292 
( 0.14) 
TUNC_NED  0.9802 
(0.74) 
 1.0532 
( 1.17) 
0.6250 
(0.58) 
TUNC_IOWN   3.1424 
( 3.55)*** 
0.1249 
(0.13) 
 0.2040 
( 0.14) 
CC  1.2317 
(2.19)** 
 1.2726 
( 2.43)** 
2.3933 
(3.07)*** 
EM   1.5656 
( 2.09)** 
 2.1676 
( 3.79)*** 
 2.8094 
( 3.58)*** 
CAPINT   0.1864 
( 0.61) 
 0.4327 
( 1.56) 
 0.6799 
( 1.74)* 
LEV  0.2503 
(0.42) 
 0.1091 
( 0.19) 
 0.5900 
( 0.80) 
DIV  0.0031 
(0.95) 
0.0003 
(0.09) 
0.0027 
(0.49) 
FS  0.0062 
(2.15)** 
0.0048 
(2.11)** 
0.0030 
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Cons   0.4782 
( 0.84) 
 0.6182 
( 0.97) 
0.9100 
(0.90) 
R squared   78.57%  89.70%  78.19% 
n  135  135  135 
F statistic  11.69*** 
32
# 
22.76*** 
32
# 
11.43*** 
32
# 
Figures in parentheses represent cross section clustered Eicker Huber White adjusted t statistics. 
 ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 2.5% and 5% respectively.  
# indicates degree of freedom. 
^ indicates centred variable. 
 Appendix B                                                                                                          302 
 
 
Table B.28 
Year Dummies: Firm Value and Tax Planning 
             (I)  (II)       (III) 
DV=MVEt+3months/BVEt-1  Persistent Profit-
Making 
Companies 
Persistent and 
Non-Persistent 
Profit-Making 
Companies 
Components of Tax 
Saving – Persistent 
Profit-Making 
Companies 
BVE  1.1449 
(5.04)*** 
1.0890 
(4.92)*** 
0.7681 
(2.87)*** 
PBT  9.9825 
(17.29)*** 
9.9726 
(18.15)*** 
9.5940 
(15.05)*** 
TS   8.5650 
( 2.80)*** 
 7.9537 
( 2.71)*** 
  
NPSTDUMTS      15.5259 
( 1.78)* 
  
TLOSS        0.0793 
(0.01) 
TPD         11.4174 
( 1.82)* 
TTD        6.9996 
(1.44) 
TFTR        9.7455 
(1.17) 
TUNC         4.8217 
( 0.43) 
CC  0.1460 
(0.33) 
0.3313 
(0.75) 
0.4290 
(0.94) 
EM   2.7343 
( 6.64)*** 
 2.8161 
( 7.06)*** 
 2.4814 
( 5.67)*** 
CAPINT   0.5591 
( 3.03)*** 
 0.5875 
( 3.18)*** 
 0.4950 
( 2.48)** 
LEV   0.1146 
( 0.26) 
0.1771 
(0.44) 
0.1368 
(0.33) 
DIV  0.0002 
(0.10) 
0.0007 
(0.38) 
0.0029 
(1.67)* 
FS  0.0060 
(2.88)*** 
0.0047 
(2.33)** 
0.0061 
(3.05)*** 
Year dummy1  0.3754 
(3.38)*** 
0.3832 
(3.51)*** 
0.3206 
(3.17)*** 
Year dummy2  0.5777 
(5.63)*** 
0.5976 
(5.95)*** 
0.5469 
(5.62)*** 
Cons   0.5549 
( 1.49) 
 0.6580 
( 1.66)* 
 0.4404 
( 1.07) 
R squared   67.52%  67.04%  62.69% 
n  444  472  405 
Wald chi
2 
 
672.47*** 
18
# 
799.04*** 
20
# 
461.55*** 
22
# 
Breusch Pagan  77.89*** 
18
# 
78.78*** 
20
# 
75.12*** 
22
# 
Figures in parentheses represent cross section clustered Eicker Huber White adjusted t statistics. 
 ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 2.5% and 5% respectively.  
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Table B.29 
Year Dummies: Firm Value, Tax Planning and Corporate Governance  
 
    (I)  (II)       (III)  (IV) 
DV=MVEt+3months/ 
BVEt-1 
Persistent 
Profit-
Making 
Companies 
Persistent 
and Non-
Persistent 
Profit-
Making 
Companies 
Components of 
Tax Saving – 
Persistent 
Profit-Making 
Companies 
Components of 
Tax Saving – 
Persistent 
Profit-Making 
Companies 
BVE  1.1658 
(5.12)*** 
1.1046 
(4.95)*** 
0.7843 
(2.83)*** 
0.7743 
(2.71)*** 
PBT  9.9821 
(17.15)*** 
9.9459 
(17.98)*** 
9.5334 
(14.77)*** 
9.5760 
(14.94)*** 
TS   8.9484 
( 2.89)*** 
 8.1781 
( 2.77)*** 
     
NPSTDUMTS      16.1760 
( 1.80)* 
     
NED  0.0078 
(1.56) 
0.0039 
(0.75) 
0.0072 
(1.44) 
0.0079 
(1.57) 
IOWN   0.0045 
( 1.14) 
 0.0045 
( 1.17) 
 0.0057 
( 1.47) 
 0.0015 
( 0.37) 
TLOSS         0.7457 
( 0.13) 
21.8714 
(1.49) 
TPD         11.7011 
( 1.92)* 
 12.8454 
( 0.95) 
TTD        7.2161 
(1.50) 
28.9501 
(1.21) 
TFTR        8.8090 
(1.07) 
5.7104 
(0.14) 
TUNC         6.7105 
( 0.63) 
27.0367 
(0.47) 
TLOSS_NED^            0.1100 
( 0.26) 
TLOSS_IOWN            0.6909 
( 1.78)* 
TPD_NED^            0.4023 
( 0.80) 
TPD_IOWN           0.0295 
(0.08) 
TTD_NED            0.1409 
( 0.37) 
TTD_IOWN            0.4311 
( 1.30) 
TFTR_NED           0.5147 
(0.81) 
TFTR_IOWN            0.7276 
( 1.54) 
TUNC_NED           0.1162 
(0.15) 
TUNC_IOWN            1.1960 
( 3.08)*** 
CC  0.0915 
(0.21) 
0.2979 
(0.67) 
0.3913 
(0.87) 
0.5152 
(1.08) 
EM   2.7260 
( 6.52)*** 
 2.8161 
( 6.96)*** 
 2.5088 
( 5.52)*** 
 2.3980 
( 5.10)*** Appendix B                                                                                                          304 
 
 
Figures in parentheses represent cross section clustered Eicker Huber White adjusted t statistics. 
 ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 2.5% and 5% respectively.  
# indicates degree of freedom. 
^ indicates centred variable. 
  
 
CAPINT   0.5560 
( 3.17)*** 
 0.5674 
( 3.17)*** 
 0.5095 
( 2.62)*** 
 0.5484 
( 2.81)*** 
LEV   0.2832 
( 0.64) 
0.0652 
(0.16) 
 0.0465 
( 0.11) 
 0.0034 
( 0.01) 
DIV  0.0002 
(0.12) 
0.0006 
(0.34) 
0.0030 
(1.74)* 
0.0029 
(1.72)* 
FS  0.0056 
(2.69)*** 
0.0046 
(2.25)** 
0.0057 
(2.81)*** 
0.0053 
(2.75)*** 
Year dummy1  0.3539 
(3.08)*** 
0.3596 
(3.22)*** 
0.2937 
(2.94)*** 
0.3388 
(3.27)*** 
Year dummy2  0.5615 
(5.38)*** 
0.5824 
(5.73)*** 
0.5269 
(5.43)*** 
0.5232 
(5.14)*** 
Cons   0.8246 
( 1.80)* 
 0.6983 
( 1.47) 
 0.6104 
( 1.31) 
 0.7900 
( 1.66)* 
R squared   67.91%  67.47%  63.43%  63.99% 
n  444  472  405  405 
Wald chi
2 
 
674.08*** 
20
# 
808.44*** 
22
# 
466.48*** 
24
# 
604.46*** 
34
# 
Breusch Pagan  79.56*** 
20
# 
81.49*** 
22
# 
76.35*** 
24
# 
88.70*** 
34
#  
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